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  1. What makes any agent a moral agent? Reflections on machine consciousness and moral agency.Joel Parthemore & Blay Whitby - 2013 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 5 (2):105-129.
    In this paper, we take moral agency to be that context in which a particular agent can, appropriately, be held responsible for her actions and their consequences. In order to understand moral agency, we will discuss what it would take for an artifact to be a moral agent. For reasons that will become clear over the course of the paper, we take the artifactual question to be a useful way into discussion but ultimately misleading. We set out a number of (...)
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    Moral Agency, Moral Responsibility, and Artifacts: What Existing Artifacts Fail to Achieve , and Why They, Nevertheless, Can Make Moral Claims upon Us.Joel Parthemore & Blay Whitby - 2014 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 6 (2):141-161.
    This paper follows directly from an earlier paper where we discussed the requirements for an artifact to be a moral agent and concluded that the artifactual question is ultimately a red herring. As...
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  3.  41
    Moral Agency, Moral Responsibility, and Artifacts: What Existing Artifacts Fail to Achieve (and Why), and Why They, Nevertheless, Can (and Do!) Make Moral Claims upon Us.Joel Parthemore & Blay Whitby - 2014 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 6 (2):141-161.
    International Journal of Machine Consciousness, Volume 06, Issue 02, Page 141-161, December 2014. This paper follows directly from an earlier paper where we discussed the requirements for an artifact to be a moral agent and concluded that the artifactual question is ultimately a red herring. As before, we take moral agency to be that condition in which an agent can appropriately be held responsible for her actions and their consequences. We set a number of stringent conditions on moral agency. A (...)
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    Representations reclaimed: Accounting for the co-emergence of concepts and experience.Joel Parthemore & Anthony F. Morse - 2010 - Pragmatics and Cognition 18 (2):273-312.
    Understanding the relationship between concepts and experience seems necessary to specifying the content of experience, yet current theories of concepts do not seem up to the job. With Peter Gärdenfors's conceptual spaces theory as a foundation and with enactivist philosophy as inspiration, we present a proposed extension to conceptual spaces theory and use it to outline a model of the emergence of concepts and experience. We conclude that neither is ultimately primary but each gives rise to the other: i.e., that (...)
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  5. Specification of the Unified Conceptual Space, for Purposes of Empirical Investigation.Joel Parthemore - 2015 - In Peter Gärdenfors & Frank Zenker (eds.), Applications of Conceptual Spaces : the Case for Geometric Knowledge Representation. Cham: Springer Verlag.
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  6.  18
    Conceptualization for intended action: A dynamic model.Mauri Kaipainen, Antti Hautamäki & Joel Parthemore - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology:1-36.
    Concepts are the building blocks of higher-order cognition and consciousness. Building on Conceptual Spaces Theory (CST) and proceeding from the assumption that concepts are inherently dynamic, this paper provides historical context to and significantly elaborates the previously offered Iterative Subdivision Model (ISDM) with the goal of pushing it toward empirical testability. The paper describes how agents in continuous interaction with their environment adopt an intentional orientation, estimate the utility of the concept(s) applicable to action in the current context, engage in (...)
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  7. Proceedings of the AAAI Fall Symposium on "Consciousness and Artificial Intelligence: Theoretical foundations and current approaches".Ron Chrisley & Joel Parthemore (eds.) - 2007 - AAAI.
     
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  8.  49
    Robotic Specification of the Non-Conceptual Content of Visual Experience.Ron Chrisley & Joel Parthemore - 2007 - In Ron Chrisley & Joel Parthemore (eds.), Proceedings of the AAAI Fall Symposium on "Consciousness and Artificial Intelligence: Theoretical foundations and current approaches". AAAI.
    Standard, linguistic means of specifying the content of mental states do so by expressing the content in question. Such means fail when it comes to capturing non-conceptual aspects of visual experience, since no linguistic expression can adequately express such content. One alternative is to use depictions: images that either evoke (reproduce in the recipient) or refer to the content of the experience. Practical considerations concerning the generation and integration of such depictions argue in favour of a synthetic approach: the generation (...)
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  9.  10
    Artefactual ethics as opportunity for rethinking “natural” ethics.Joel Parthemore & Blay Whitby - unknown
    This paper serves as introduction to a significantly longer paper in progress. It argues that, within the ethics community, the wider philosophical establishment and society in general, people have been far too lax about what to accept as morally “right” behaviour – far too quick to let themselves and, all too often, each other off the hook. By drawing comparisons to artefactual behaviour and the objections people raise to calling that behaviour the morally acceptable behaviour of authentic moral agents, this (...)
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  10. Of boundaries and metaphysical starting points: Why the extended mind cannot be so lightly dismissed.Joel Parthemore - 2011 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 31 (2).
     
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