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  1.  86
    What Makes Any Agent a Moral Agent? Reflections on Machine Consciousness and Moral Agency.Joel Parthemore & Blay Whitby - 2013 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 5 (2):105-129.
    In this paper, we take moral agency to be that context in which a particular agent can, appropriately, be held responsible for her actions and their consequences. In order to understand moral agency, we will discuss what it would take for an artifact to be a moral agent. For reasons that will become clear over the course of the paper, we take the artifactual question to be a useful way into discussion but ultimately misleading. We set out a number of (...)
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  2.  51
    Moral Agency, Moral Responsibility, and Artifacts: What Existing Artifacts Fail to Achieve , and Why They, Nevertheless, Can Make Moral Claims Upon Us.Joel Parthemore & Blay Whitby - 2014 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 6 (2):141-161.
    This paper follows directly from an earlier paper where we discussed the requirements for an artifact to be a moral agent and concluded that the artifactual question is ultimately a red herring. As...
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  3.  12
    Conceptual Change and Development on Multiple Time Scales: From Incremental Evolution to Origins.Joel Parthemore - 2014 - Sign Systems Studies 42 (2/3):193-218.
    In the context of the relationship between signs and concepts, this paper tackles some of the ongoing controversies over conceptual development and change – including the claim by some that concepts are not open to revision at all – taking the position that concepts pull apart from language and that concepts can be discussed on at least four levels: that of individual agent, community, society, and language. More controversially, it claims that concepts are not just inherently open to revision but (...)
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  4. Of Boundaries and Metaphysical Starting Points: Why the Extended Mind Cannot Be so Lightly Dismissed.Joel Parthemore - 2011 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 31 (2).
     
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  5.  39
    Robotic Specification of the Non-Conceptual Content of Visual Experience.Ron Chrisley & Joel Parthemore - 2007 - In Proceedings of the AAAI Fall Symposium on "Consciousness and Artificial Intelligence: Theoretical foundations and current approaches". AAAI.
    Standard, linguistic means of specifying the content of mental states do so by expressing the content in question. Such means fail when it comes to capturing non-conceptual aspects of visual experience, since no linguistic expression can adequately express such content. One alternative is to use depictions: images that either evoke (reproduce in the recipient) or refer to the content of the experience. Practical considerations concerning the generation and integration of such depictions argue in favour of a synthetic approach: the generation (...)
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  6. Specification of the Unified Conceptual Space, for Purposes of Empirical Investigation.Joel Parthemore - 2015 - In Peter Gärdenfors & Frank Zenker (eds.), Applications of Conceptual Spaces. Springer Verlag.
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