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Profile: Joëlle Proust (Institut Jean Nicod)
  1.  49
    The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness.Joëlle Proust - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
    Does metacognition--the capacity to self-evaluate one's cognitive performance--derive from a mindreading capacity, or does it rely on informational processes? Joëlle Proust draws on psychology and neuroscience to defend the second claim. She argues that metacognition need not involve metarepresentations, and is essentially related to mental agency.
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  2. Looking for the Agent: An Investigation Into Consciousness of Action and Self-Consciousness in Schizophrenic Patients.E. Daprati, N. Franck, N. Georgieff, Joëlle Proust, Elisabeth Pacherie, J. Dalery & Marc Jeannerod - 1997 - Cognition 65 (1):71-86.
    The abilities to attribute an action to its proper agent and to understand its meaning when it is produced by someone else are basic aspects of human social communication. Several psychiatric syndromes, such as schizophrenia, seem to lead to a dysfunction of the awareness of one’s own action as well as of recognition of actions performed by other. Such syndromes offer a framework for studying the determinants of agency, the ability to correctly attribute actions to their veridical source. Thirty normal (...)
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  3. Metacognition and Metarepresentation: Is a Self-Directed Theory of Mind a Precondition for Metacognition? [REVIEW]Joëlle Proust - 2007 - Synthese 159 (2):271 - 295.
    Metacognition is often defined as thinking about thinking. It is exemplified in all the activities through which one tries to predict and evaluate one’s own mental dispositions, states and properties for their cognitive adequacy. This article discusses the view that metacognition has metarepresentational structure. Properties such as causal contiguity, epistemic transparency and procedural reflexivity are present in metacognition but missing in metarepresentation, while open-ended recursivity and inferential promiscuity only occur in metarepresentation. It is concluded that, although metarepresentations can redescribe metacognitive (...)
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  4.  21
    The Foundations of Metacognition.Michael Beran, Johannes Brandl, Josef Perner & Joëlle Proust (eds.) - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    Bringing together researchers from across the cognitive sciences, the book is valuable for philosophers of mind, developmental and comparative psychologists, and neuroscientists.
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  5. Metacognition.Joëlle Proust - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (11):989-998.
  6. Epistemic Agency and Metacognition: An Externalist View.Joëlle Proust - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):241-268.
    Controlling one's mental agency encompasses two forms of metacognitive operations, self-probing and post-evaluating. Metacognition so defined might seem to fuel an internalist view of epistemic norms, where rational feelings are available to instruct a thinker of what she can do, and allow her to be responsible for her mental agency. Such a view, however, ignores the dynamics of the mind–world interactions that calibrate the epistemic sentiments as reliable indicators of epistemic norms. A 'brain in the lab' thought experiment suggests that (...)
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  7.  54
    Simulation and Knowledge of Action.Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.) - 2002 - John Benjamins.
    CHAPTER Simulation theory and mental concepts Alvin I. Goldman Rutgers University. Folk psychology and the TT-ST debate The study of folk psychology, ...
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  8.  22
    Cognitive Theories of Mental Illness.Brendan A. Maher, A. W. Young, Philip Gerrans, John Campbell, Kai Vogeley, Valerie Gray Hardcastle, Owen Flanagan, Robert L. Woolfolk, Barry Smith & Joëlle Proust - 1999 - The Monist 82 (4).
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  9.  20
    Rationality and Metacognition in Non-Human Animals.Joëlle Proust - 2006 - In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press. pp. 247--274.
    The project of understanding rationality in non-human animals faces a number of conceptual and methodological difficulties. The present chapter defends the view that it is counterproductive to rely on the human folk psychological idiom in animal cognition studies. Instead, it approaches the subject on the basis of dynamic- evolutionary considerations. Concepts from control theory can be used to frame the problem in the most general terms. The specific selective pressures exerted on agents endowed with information-processing capacities are analysed. It is (...)
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  10.  45
    Perceiving Intentions.Joelle Proust - 2003 - In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Clarendon Press.
    This paper defends the view that knowledge about one's own intentions can be gained in part through perception, although not through introspection. The various kinds of misperception of one's intentions are discussed. The latter distinction is applied to the analysis of schizophrenic patients' delusion of control.
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  11.  13
    Is Hypnotic Responding the Strategic Relinquishment of Metacognition?Zoltán Dienes, Michael Beran, Johannes L. Brandl, Josef Perner & Joelle Proust - 2012 - In Michael Beran, Johannes Brandl, Josef Perner & Joëlle Proust (eds.), The Foundations of Metacognition. Oxford University Press.
  12.  10
    Questions of Form: Logic and Analytic Proposition From Kant to Carnap.Joelle Proust - 1989 - Univ of Minnesota Press.
    Hence, this book's provocative claim: today's so-called logical empiricism owes much more to Kant's notion of science than to Hume's.
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  13.  99
    Exploring the Informational Sources of Metaperception: The Case of Change Blindness Blindness.Anna Loussouarn, Damien Gabriel & Joëlle Proust - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1489-1501.
    Perceivers generally show a poor ability to detect changes, a condition referred to as “Change Blindness” . They are, in addition, “blind to their own blindness”. A common explanation of this “Change Blindness Blindness” is that it derives from an inadequate, “photographical” folk-theory about perception. This explanation, however, does not account for intra-individual variations of CBB across trials. Our study aims to explore an alternative theory, according to which participants base their self-evaluations on two activity-dependent cues, namely search time and (...)
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  14. A Plea for Mental Acts.Joëlle Proust - 2001 - Synthese 129 (1):105-128.
    A prominent but poorly understood domain of human agency is mental action, i.e., thecapacity for reaching specific desirable mental statesthrough an appropriate monitoring of one's own mentalprocesses. The present paper aims to define mentalacts, and to defend their explanatory role againsttwo objections. One is Gilbert Ryle's contention thatpostulating mental acts leads to an infinite regress.The other is a different although related difficulty,here called the access puzzle: How can the mindalready know how to act in order to reach somepredefined result? A (...)
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  15. Is There a Sense of Agency for Thought?Joelle Proust - 2009 - In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press.
  16. Mental Acts as Natural Kinds.Joëlle Proust - 2013 - In Till Vierkant, Julian Kieverstein & Andy Clark (eds.), Decomposing the Will. Oxford University Press. pp. 262-282.
    This chapter examines whether, and in what sense, one can speak of agentive mental events. An adequate characterization of mental acts should respond to three main worries. First, mental acts cannot have pre-specified goal contents. For example, one cannot prespecify the content of a judgment or of a deliberation. Second, mental acts seem to depend crucially on receptive attitudes. Third, it does not seem that intentions play any role in mental actions. Given these three constraints, mental and bodily actions appear (...)
     
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  17. Awareness of Agency: Three Levels of Analysis.Joelle Proust - 2000 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 307--24.
    This paper discusses the content of agency awareness. It contrast three elements in content: what the goal is, how it is to be reached, and who is having the goal/performing the action ? Marc Jeannerod's claim that goal representations are self-other neutral is discussed. If goal representations are essentially sharable, then we do not understand other people by projecting a piece of internal knowledge on to them, as often assumed. The problem which our brain has to solve is the converse (...)
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  18.  48
    Thinking of Oneself as the Same.Joelle Proust - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):495-509.
    What is a person, and how can a person come to know that she is a person identical to herself over time ? The article defends the view that the sense of being oneself in this sense consists in the ability to consciously affect oneself : in the memory of having affected oneself, joint to the consciousness of being able to affect oneself again. In other words, being a self requires a capacity for metacognition (control and monitoring of one's own (...)
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  19.  20
    Epistemic Action, Extended Knowledge, and Metacognition.Joëlle Proust - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):364-392.
    How should one attribute epistemic credit to an agent, and hence, knowledge, when cognitive processes include an extensive use of human or mechanical enhancers, informational tools, and devices which allow one to complement or modify one's own cognitive system? The concept of integration of a cognitive system has been used to address this question. For true belief to be creditable to a person's ability, it is claimed, the relevant informational processes must be or become part of the cognitive character of (...)
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  20.  11
    The Representational Basis of Brute Metacognition: A Proposal.Joëlle Proust - 2009 - In Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge University Press. pp. 165--183.
  21.  15
    Précis of The Philosophy of Metacognition.Joëlle Proust - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):703-709.
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  22.  31
    Time and Action: Impulsivity, Habit, Strategy.Joëlle Proust - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):717-743.
    Granting that various mental events might form the antecedents of an action, what is the mental event that is the proximate cause of action? The present article reconsiders the methodology for addressing this question: Intention and its varieties cannot be properly analyzed if one ignores the evolutionary constraints that have shaped action itself, such as the trade-off between efficient timing and resources available, for a given stake. On the present proposal, three types of action, impulsive, routine and strategic, are designed (...)
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  23.  67
    Overlooking Metacognitive Experience.Joëlle Proust - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):158-159.
    Peter Carruthers correctly claims that metacognition in humans may involve self-directed interpretations (i.e., may use the conceptual interpretative resources of mindreading). He fails to show, however, that metacognition cannot rely exclusively on subjective experience. Focusing on self-directed mindreading can only bypass evolutionary considerations and obscure important functional differences.
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  24.  41
    The Norms of Acceptance.Joëlle Proust - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):316-333.
    An area in the theory of action that has received little attention is how mental agency and world-directed agency interact. The purpose of the present contribution is to clarify the rational conditions of such interaction, through an analysis of the central case of acceptance. There are several problems with the literature about acceptance. First, it remains unclear how a context of acceptance is to be construed. Second, the possibility of conjoining, in acceptance, an epistemic component, which is essentially mind-to-world, and (...)
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  25.  20
    On the Nature, Evolution, Development, and Epistemology of Metacognition: Introductory Thoughts.Michael J. Beran, Johannes L. Brandl, Josef Perner & Joélle Proust - 2012 - In Michael Beran, Johannes Brandl, Josef Perner & Joëlle Proust (eds.), The Foundations of Metacognition. Oxford University Press.
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  26.  73
    Does Metacognition Necessarily Involve Metarepresentation?Joëlle Proust - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):352-352.
    Against the view that metacognition is a capacity that parallels theory of mind, it is argued that metacognition need involve neither metarepresentation nor semantic forms of reflexivity, but only process-reflexivity, through which a task-specific system monitors its own internal feedback by using quantitative cues. Metacognitive activities, however, may be redescribed in metarepresentational, mentalistic terms in species endowed with a theory of mind.
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  27. Questions de Forme Logique Et Proposition Analytique de Kant À Carnap.Joëlle Proust - 1986 - Fayard.
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  28. Mind, Space and Objectivity in Non-Human Animals.Joëlle Proust - 1999 - Erkenntnis 51 (1):545-562.
    This article is a summary of two chapters of a book published in French in 1997, entitled Comment L'esprit vient aux Bêtes, Paris, Gallimard. The core idea is that the crucial distinction between internal and external states, often used uncritically by theorists of intentionality, needs to be made on a non-circular basis. The proposal is that objectivity - the capacity to reidentify individuals as the same across places and times depends on the capacity to extract spatial crossmodal invariants, which in (...)
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  29.  36
    Les conditions de la connaissance de soi.Joëlle Proust - 2000 - Philosophiques 27 (1):161-186.
    La connaissance de soi suppose que l'on puisse former des pensées vraies de la forme 'je Y que P', où 'Y' fait référence à une attitude propositionnelle, 'P' à son contenu, et 'je' au penseur de cette pensée. La question qui se pose est de savoir, ce qui, dans le contenu mental occurrent [P], justifie l'auto-attribution de cette pensée. Ce problème dit de la transition soulève trois difficultés ; celle de la préservation du contenu intentionnel entre la pensée de premier (...)
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  30.  31
    Indexes for Action.Joëlle Proust - 1999 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 1999 (3):321-345.
    This articles examines three ways in which the connection between semantic and pragmatic representations of a single action can be tightened up in order to remedy the puzzle of deviant causation. A first move consists in making the feedback process, i.e. the dynamics of the relationship between both representational components, a central element in the definition of an action. A second step brings in the action-effect principle, emphasizing the teleological relation of each pragmatic representation type with its external effects. A (...)
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  31.  29
    Bolzano's Analytic Revisited.Joëlle Proust - 1981 - The Monist 64 (2):214-230.
  32.  40
    Criticial Review Of: When Self-Consciousness Breaks, by G. Lynn Stephens & G. Graham.Joëlle Proust - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):543-550.
    The book under review offers two important contributions. One is a valuable discussion of the various ways of addressing the paradoxical experience of externality. The other is an emphasis on a distinction between the experience of subjectivity and the experience of agency. This review tries to show that this distinction is indeed a crucial feature in any solution to the question of externality, but that it is associated with a view of thinking as acting that is questionable.
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  33.  26
    Précis de La Nature de la Volonté et Disputatio.Joëlle Proust - 2008 - Philosophiques:0-00.
    Cet article résume l'ouvrage paru en 2005 et répond aux objections de Stéphane Chauvier, Daniel Laurier et Pierre Livet dans le cadre d'une disputatio organisée par la revue Philosophiques.
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  34.  37
    Formal Logic as Transcendental in Wittgenstein and Carnap.Joelle Proust & Jill Vance Buroker - 1987 - Noûs 21 (4):501-520.
  35.  31
    Metacognition and Mindreading: One or Two Functions?Joëlle Proust - 2012 - In Michael Beran, Johannes Brandl, Josef Perner & Joëlle Proust (eds.), The foundations of metacognition. Oxford University Press. pp. 234.
    Given disagreements about the architecture of the mind, the nature of self-knowledge, and its epistemology, the question of how to understand the function and scope of metacognition – the control of one's cognition - is still a matter of hot debate. A dominant view, the self-ascriptive view (or one-function view), has been that metacognition necessarily requires representing one's own mental states as mental states, and, therefore, necessarily involves an ability to read one's own mind. The self-evaluative view (or two-function view), (...)
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  36.  8
    How Voluntary Are Minimal Actions?Joëlle Proust - unknown
    This book chapter aims at exploring how intentional a piece of behavior should be to count as an action, and how a minimal view on action, not requiring a richly intentional causation, may still qualify such a behavior as voluntary.
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  37.  29
    Conversational Metacognition.Joëlle Proust - 2008 - In Ipke Wachsmuth, Manuela Lenzen & Günther Knoblich (eds.), Embodied Communication in Humans and Machines. Oxford University Press. pp. 329.
    This chapter aims to relate two fields of research that have been rarely – if ever – associated, namely embodied communication and metacognition. Exploring this relationship offers a new perspective for understanding the relationship between self-knowledge and mindreading. "Embodied communication" refers to the process of conveying information to one or several interlocutors through speech and associated bodily gestures, or through gestures only. It is prima facie plausible that embodied communication crucially involves metacognitive interventions. Let the term ‘conversational metacognition’ refer to (...)
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  38.  5
    The Evolution of Primate Communication and Metacommunication.Joëlle Proust - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (2):177-203.
    Against the prior view that primate communication is based only on signal decoding, comparative evidence suggests that primates are able, no less than humans, to intentionally perform or understand impulsive or habitual communicational actions with a structured evaluative nonconceptual content. These signals convey an affordance-sensing that immediately motivates conspecifics to act. Although humans have access to a strategic form of propositional communication adapted to teaching and persuasion, they share with nonhuman primates the capacity to communicate in impulsive or habitual ways. (...)
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  39. On Indicative Conditionals and Rationality in the Wason Task.Joelle Proust - 2009 - Psyche 15 (1).
    In his interesting paper, Duca argues that even though people don't apply a logical rule of inference – contraposition- when they try to solve the Wason task, they may be using another kind of formal strategy in terms of probabilistic relations between the antecedent and the consequent. It is suggested that there are two ways of intepreting this task – one logical and apriori, the other hypothetical and data driven. Taking a probabilistic interpretation of the conditional rule for subjects' card (...)
     
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  40. Pour réitérer les différences, réponse à Derrida.John R. Searle & Joëlle Proust - 1993 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 183 (2):482-482.
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  41.  4
    Agency in Schizophrenia From a Control Theory Viewpoint.Joëlle Proust - unknown
    Experience of agency in patients with schizophrenia involves an interesting dissociation; these patients demonstrate that one can have a thought or perform an action consciously without being conscious of thinking or acting as the motivated agent, author of that thought or of that action. This chapter examines several interesting accounts of this dissociation, and aims at showing how they can be generalized to thought insertion phenomena. It is argued that control theory allows such a generalization; three different comparators need to (...)
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  42.  34
    Why Evolution Has to Matter to Cognitive Psychology and to Philosophy of Mind.Joëlle Proust - 2006 - Biological Theory 1 (4):346-348.
    Growing suspicions were raised however that an exclusively language-oriented view of the mind, focussing on the characterization of anhistorical, static mental states through their propositional contents, was hardly compatible with what is currently known of brain architecture and did not fare well when confronted with results from many behavioral studies of mental functions. My aim in what follows is to show that these forms of dissatisfaction stem from the fact that brain evolution and development were either entirely ignored, or insufficiently (...)
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  43.  15
    Epistemic Normativity From the Reasoner's Viewpoint.Joëlle Proust - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):265-265.
    Elqayam & Evans (E&E) are focused on the normative judgments used by theorists to characterize subjects' performances (e.g. in terms of logic or probability theory). They ignore the fact, however, that subjects themselves have an independent ability to evaluate their own reasoning performance, and that this ability plays a major role in controlling their first-order reasoning tasks.
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  44.  36
    Can 'Radical' Simulation Theories Explain Psychological Concept Acquisition?Joëlle Proust - 2002 - In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.
    This paper examines the response offered by Robert Gordon to the question how an interpreter can reach the correct content of others'psychological states. It exposes the main problems raised by Gordon's proposal, and provides a tentative solution that emphasizes the structuring role of counterfactual reasoning in embedding simulations and deriving facts that are holding across them.
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  45.  22
    Can Nonhuman Primates Read Minds?Joëlle Proust - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 27 (1):203-232.
    Granted that a given species is able to entertain beliefs and desires, i.e. to have (epistemic and motivational) internal states with semantically evaluable contents, one can raise the question of whether the species under investigation is, in addition, able to represent properties and events that are not only perceptual or physical, but mental, and use the latter to guide their actions, not only as reliable cues for achieving some output, but as mental cues (that is: whether it can 'read minds'). (...)
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  46.  2
    Source Unreliability Decreases but Does Not Cancel the Impact of Social Information on Metacognitive Evaluations.Amélie Jacquot, Terry Eskenazi, Edith Sales-Wuillemin, Benoît Montalan, Joëlle Proust, Julie Grèzes & Laurence Conty - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  47.  3
    Why Evolution has to Matter to Cognitive Psychology and to Philosophy of Mind.Joëlle Proust - unknown
    Growing suspicions were raised however that an exclusively language-oriented view of the mind, focussing on the characterization of anhistorical, static mental states through their propositional contents, was hardly compatible with what is currently known of brain architecture and did not fare well when confronted with results from many behavioral studies of mental functions. My aim in what follows is to show that these forms of dissatisfaction stem from the fact that brain evolution and development were either entirely ignored, or insufficiently (...)
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  48.  9
    Replies to Langland‐Hassan, Nagel, and Smith.Joëlle Proust - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):736-755.
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  49.  6
    Free Will : A Neurophilosophical Viewpoint.Joëlle Proust - 2012 - Archives de Philosophie du Droit 55:79-95.
    Le déterminisme implique que le libre arbitre n’existe pas, que nous ne pouvons pas faire autrement ; réciproquement, avoir la possibilité de faire autrement implique que le déterminisme ne s’applique pas à l’instant, s’il existe, où on l’exerce. Cependant, la question de la responsabilité rend difficile d’accepter que les agents ne puissent pas faire autrement et motive fortement à rendre compatibles déterminisme et libre arbitre ou à soutenir, dans une veine « incompatibiliste », que le cerveau humain n’est pas soumis (...)
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  50.  24
    A Critical Review of G. Lynn Stephens & G. Graham's When Self-Consciousness Breaks. [REVIEW]Joëlle Proust - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):543 – 550.
    This book deals with the experience of externality, i.e. an experience, common in schizophrenia, present both in verbal hallucination and in thought insertion. The view defended is that thought insertion is a case of failed agency, experienced by the agent at the personal level as an intelligible thought with which she cannot identify. Such a case in which sense of agency and sense of subjectivity come apart reveals the existence of two dimensions in self-consciousness. Several difficulties of the solution offered (...)
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