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  1.  9
    The Sequential Dominance Argument for the Independence Axiom of Expected Utility Theory.Johan E. Gustafsson - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Independence is the condition that, if X is preferred to Y, then a lottery between X and Z is preferred to a lottery between Y and Z given the same probability of Z. Is it rationally required that one’s preferences conform to Independence? The main objection to this requirement is that it would rule out the alleged rationality of Allais and Ellsberg Preferences. In this paper, I put forward a sequential dominance argument with fairly weak assumptions for a variant of (...)
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  2.  69
    A Paradox for the Intrinsic Value of Freedom of Choice.Johan E. Gustafsson - forthcoming - Noûs.
    A standard liberal claim is that freedom of choice is not only instrumentally valuable but also intrinsically valuable, that is, valuable for its own sake. I argue that each one of five conditions is plausible if freedom of choice is intrinsically valuable. Yet there exists a counter-example to the conjunction of these conditions. Hence freedom of choice is not intrinsically valuable.
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  3.  49
    A Patch to the Possibility Part of Gödel’s Ontological Proof.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):229-240.
    Kurt Gödel’s version of the Ontological Proof derives rather than assumes the crucial Possibility Claim: the claim that it is possible that something God-like exists. Gödel’s derivation starts off with a proof of the Possible Instantiation of the Positive: the principle that, if a property is positive, it is possible that there exists something that has that property. I argue that Gödel’s proof of this principle relies on some implausible axiological assumptions but it can be patched so that it only (...)
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  4.  38
    Dennett and Taylor’s Alleged Refutation of the Consequence Argument.Johan E. Gustafsson - forthcoming - Analysis:anz048.
    Daniel C. Dennett and Christopher Taylor claim that the Consequence Argument relies on an inference rule that is invalid given a fairly plausible account of having the power to cause something. I show that Dennett and Taylor’s refutation does not work against a better, more standard version of the Consequence Argument.
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  5.  93
    Non-Branching Personal Persistence.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2307-2329.
    Given reductionism about people, personal persistence must fundamentally consist in some kind of impersonal continuity relation. Typically, these continuity relations can hold from one to many. And, if they can, the analysis of personal persistence must include a non-branching clause to avoid non-transitive identities or multiple occupancy. It is far from obvious, however, what form this clause should take. This paper argues that previous accounts are inadequate and develops a new proposal.
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  6.  57
    Bentham’s Binary Form of Maximizing Utilitarianism.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (1):87-109.
    Jeremy Bentham is often interpreted as defending a satisficing, rather than maximizing, version of utilitarianism, where an act is right as long as it produces more pleasure than pain. This lack of maximization is surprising given Bentham’s maximizing slogan ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’. Against the satisficing interpretation, I argue that Bentham consistently defends a maximizing version of utilitarianism, where an act’s consequences are compared to those of not performing the act. I show that following this version of (...)
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