We study arithmetic and hyperarithmetic degrees of categoricity. We extend a result of E. Fokina, I. Kalimullin, and R. Miller to show that for every computable ordinal $\alpha$, $\mathbf{0}^{}$ is the degree of categoricity of some computable structure $\mathcal{A}$. We show additionally that for $\alpha$ a computable successor ordinal, every degree $2$-c.e. in and above $\mathbf{0}^{}$ is a degree of categoricity. We further prove that every degree of categoricity is hyperarithmetic and show that the index set of structures with degrees (...) of categoricity is $\Pi_{1}^{1}$-complete. (shrink)
We give several characterizations of Schnorr trivial sets, including a new lowness notion for Schnorr triviality based on truth-table reducibility. These characterizations allow us to see not only that some natural classes of sets, including maximal sets, are composed entirely of Schnorr trivials, but also that the Schnorr trivial sets form an ideal in the truth-table degrees but not the weak truth-table degrees. This answers a question of Downey, Griffiths and LaForte.
We show that van Lambalgen's Theorem fails with respect to recursive randomness and Schnorr randomness for some real in every high degree and provide a full characterization of the Turing degrees for which van Lambalgen's Theorem can fail with respect to Kurtz randomness. However, we also show that there is a recursively random real that is not Martin-Löf random for which van Lambalgen's Theorem holds with respect to recursive randomness.
We study the connection between Schnorr triviality and genericity. We show that while no 2-generic is Turing equivalent to a Schnorr trivial and no 1-generic is tt-equivalent to a Schnorr trivial, there is a 1-generic that is Turing equivalent to a Schnorr trivial. However, every such 1-generic must be high. As a corollary, we prove that not all K-trivials are Schnorr trivial. We also use these techniques to extend a previous result and show that the bases of cones of Schnorr (...) trivial Turing degrees are precisely those whose jumps are at least 0". (shrink)
A real is Martin-Löf (Schnorr) random if it does not belong to any effectively presented null ${\Sigma^0_1}$ (recursive) class of reals. Although these randomness notions are very closely related, the set of Turing degrees containing reals that are K-trivial has very different properties from the set of Turing degrees that are Schnorr trivial. Nies proved in (Adv Math 197(1):274–305, 2005) that all K-trivial reals are low. In this paper, we prove that if ${{\bf h'} \geq_T {\bf 0''}}$ , then h (...) contains a Schnorr trivial real. Since this concept appears to separate computational complexity from computational strength, it suggests that Schnorr trivial reals should be considered in a structure other than the Turing degrees. (shrink)
We investigate the relationship between lowness for Schnorr randomness and Schnorr triviality. We show that a real is low for Schnorr randomness if and only if it is Schnorr trivial and hyperimmune free.
The weakly random reals contain not only the Schnorr random reals as a subclass but also the weakly 1-generic reals and therefore the n -generic reals for every n . While the class of Schnorr random reals does not overlap with any of these classes of generic reals, their degrees may. In this paper, we describe the extent to which this is possible for the Turing, weak truth-table, and truth-table degrees and then extend our analysis to the Schnorr random and (...) hyperimmune reals. (shrink)
Abstract Internet communication technology has been said to affect our sense of self by altering the way we construct “personal identity,” understood as identificatory valuative narratives about the self; in addition, some authors have warned that internet communication creates special conditions for moral agency that might gradually change our moral intuitions. Both of these effects are attributed to the fact that internet communication is “disembodied.” Our aim in this paper is to establish a link between this complex of claims and (...) past and ongoing research in phenomenology, empirical psychology and cognitive science, in order to formulate an empirical hypothesis that can assist development and evaluation of recent technology for embodied telecommunication. We first suggest that for the purposes of interdisciplinary exchange, personal identity is formally best represented by a selection function that (for temporal intervals of variable length) “bundles” capacity ascriptions into identificatory narratives. Based on this model, we discuss which cultural changes engendered by the internet affect the construction of personal identity in ways that diminish our ethical sensitivies. In a second step, working from phenomenological claims by Martin Buber, we argue that disembodied communication severs two modes of cognitive function, preconceptual and conceptual, which tie together moral motivation, self-experience, and identity construction. We translate Buber’s claims into the theoretical idiom of the “theory of cognitive orientation,” a psychological theory of motivation that links up with recent research in embodied cognition. In a third step, we investigate whether the embodiment of the internet with communication robots (e.g., telenoids) holds out the prospect of reverting this structural change at least partially. We conclude by formulating an empirical hypothesis (for researchers in cognitive science) that has direct import, we submit, on the question whether embodied telecommunication promises a new form of ethically sensitive self-constituting encounter. Content Type Journal Article Category Special Issue Pages 1-23 DOI 10.1007/s13347-012-0064-9 Authors Johanna Seibt, Department for Philosophy and the History of Ideas, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark Marco Nørskov, Department for Philosophy and the History of Ideas, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark Journal Philosophy & Technology Online ISSN 2210-5441 Print ISSN 2210-5433. (shrink)
Spivak translates Derrida’s “il n’y a pas de hors-texte” as “there is nothing outside the text.” By considering how the aphorism works within his study of Rousseau on sexual and textual supplements, and by reviewing related expressions in French, a mistranslation is revealed. This is not a simple error, however. The distortion is generated by Derrida’s own broader context. We must not only distinguish signification from reference but also place the aphorism within Derrida’s allusion, in the first part of Of (...) Grammatology, to an all-embracing arche-writing. The paper ends in thus opening out the discussion of a textual “inside” or “outside.”. (shrink)
Sudoku puzzles, which are popular worldwide, require individuals to infer the missing digits in a 9 9 array according to the general rule that every digit from 1 to 9 must occur once in each row, in each column, and in each of the 3-by-3 boxes in the array. We present a theory of how individuals solve these puzzles. It postulates that they rely solely on pure deductions, and that they spontaneously acquire various deductive tactics, which differ in their difficulty (...) depending on their “relational complexity”, i.e., the number of constraints on which they depend. A major strategic shift is necessary to acquire tactics for more difficult puzzles: solvers have to keep track of possible digits in a cell. We report three experiments corroborating this theory. We also discuss their implications for theories of reasoning that downplay the role of deduction in everyday reasoning. (shrink)
In an excerpt preserved by John Stobaeus in the chapter of the Anthologion entitled Peri tôn eph’hêmin, Porphyry addresses the issue of the origin of evil within the context of a broader investigation of individual autonomy : is it enough to envisage man as a subject with the freedom to act in order to make him responsible for evil and thus to free God of any responsibility with regard to the ills besetting individuals? An answer to this question is provided (...) on the basis of a comparative reading of the Myth of Er and of Homer. The conclusion reached is that evil is not intrinsic to human nature, but rather concerns certain forms of existence which individuals opt for when they disregard the divine and forego rationality. Consequently, God is not responsible for evil.The exegetical and argumentative strategy adopted by Porphyry in order to support this answer suggests that his stance is a polemical one, targeting Stoics in particular. Against Chrysippus’ reading of the same verses from Homer, which leads to a deterministic perspective, or at any rate one likely to prove inconsistent, Porphyry offers an interpretation of Homer as a coherent thinker and a forerunner of Plato : Homer is seen to have proposed a kind of dichotomy between the self-determination and the necessity that characterise the life of the soul, and as having assigned individuals the faculty of choosing between virtue and vice, thus making them ultimately responsible with regard to evil. (shrink)
Should we in the moral community accept the modern business corporation as one of us? French answers 'yes'. In this book, French investigates the metaphysical foundations of the application of our established moral principles to corporations as moral persons.
« Sous les masques, il n’y a pas de visages, l’homme historique n’a jamais été homme, et pourtant nul homme n’est seul » : notre article s’interroge sur le sens et les enjeux éthiques de cette affirmation merleau-pontyenne énoncée dans la préface de Signes. Partant du caractère énigmatique et très inquiétant de cette thèse et constatant sa résonance avec l’affirmations deleuzienne, dans Différence et répétition, « Les masques ne recouvrent rien, sauf d’autres masques », nous avons voulu explorer la possibilité (...) de prendre pleinement au sérieux la formule merleau-pontyenne et de lui donner l’envergure d’une théorie des simulacres rendue éthiquement féconde. Le contexte, un dialogue avec Sartre et Nizan entre désenchantement, découragement et nouvelles perspectives éthiques et politiques, nous projette d’emblée dans un pensée de l’adversité et des apories indissociables de la rencontre d’autrui. Il permet également d’entrer avec Merleau-Ponty dans la quête d’une théorie éthique et politique de la communauté non exclusive de l’altérité radicale. A partir d’une analyse de la notion de masques et de ses occurrences dans les travaux de Merleau-Ponty, nous montrons que toute image est essentiellement un masque ontologiquement premier, c’est-à-dire qui ne copie ni ne recouvre une réalité plus authentique. La formulation de Signes qui nous intéresse fait d’emblée apparaître la dimension éthiquement dramatique de cette ontologie. Ce qui est en cause est une hyper-crise, une pensée de l’abîme et des ruptures de sens. Comment agir quand tout être est évasif et autre que soi? Nous aimerions montrer que surgit, dans l’oeuvre merleau-pontyenne, une tension entre une première solution pratique centrée sur la foi et une seconde voie « centrée », si l’on peut dire, sur la temporalité tourbillonnaire de l’institution. Ces deux issues pratiques, qui ne sont pas si nettement circonscrites explicitement par Merleau-Ponty, mais se déploient plutôt de texte en texte sous des formes parfois entremêlées, parfois incompatibles, doivent être, selon nous, soigneusement distinguées. La première, la solution de la foi, fait trop peu de cas du caractère trompeur de l’Urdoxa et des dangers d’une action qui ne s’inquiète pas de la mystification et des biais sur lesquels, peut-être, elle repose. La seconde, la voie de l’institution ne prétend plus surmonter le vertige, mais parvient à en faire un atout. Les masques, compris comme essentiellement instituants – en même temps qu’ils éclairent sur le sens de la notion merleau-pontyenne d’institution – peuvent retrouver un rôle éthique : passer de masque en masque sans jamais trouver de visage, autrement dit répondre à côté, c’est répondre tout de même et cela peut même être la meilleure réponse et compréhension possibles puisque les masques euxmêmes, comme institutions, sont des « visées à côté » qui réclament indéfiniment de nouvelles reprises et ont le pouvoir de relier entre elles, dans une structure de dialogue sans fin, des réinstitutions pourtant minées par une opacité à soi et aux autres. Les simulacres peuvent ainsi devenir en tant que tels notre plus grande chance : véhicules d’altérité radicale et de communication pourtant ininterrompue. Cette théorie élaborée à partir des thèses et analyses merleau-pontyennes fait place aux expériences commotionnantes, mais a, en même temps et sans contradiction, le mérite d’insister davantage, sans attendrissement, sur l’heureuse nature de l’être au lieu de déboucher sur la misosophie que développera Deleuze.“Under the masks, there are no faces: historical man has never been man, and yet, no man is alone.” This article questions the meaning and the ethical stakes of this Merleau-Pontian affirmation articulated in the preface of Signs. Beginning with the enigmatic and very worrisome character of this thesis, and while noticing its resonance with Deleuzian affirmations in Difference and Repetition—“masks recover nothing apart from other masks”—we wanted to explore the possibility of taking seriously the Merleau-Pontian formula and to give it meaning as a theory of ethically productive simulacra. The context, a dialogue between Sartre and Nizan regarding disenchantment, despondency and new ethical as well as political perspectives, immediately projects us toward the thought of adversity and the inseparable aporias in the encounter with the Other. Equally, it permits us to enter with Merleau-Ponty into a search for a political and ethical theory of the community that is not exclusive to radical alterity. Starting from an analysis of the concept of masks and its occurrences in the works of Merleau-Ponty, we show that all image is essentially first an ontological mask; that is to say, one that does not copy nor recovers a more authentic reality. The formulation in Signs which interests us immediately reveals the dramatic ethical dimension of this ontology. That which is a cause is a hyper-crisis, a thought of the damage and the rupture of meaning. How does one act when all being is evasive and other than oneself? We would like to show that what surfaces in Merleau-Ponty’s work is a tension between a primary practical solution centered on faith and a second path “centered,” if we can say this, on the turbulent temporality of the institution. These two practical issues, which are not so explicitly circumscribed by Merleau-Ponty, but which rather reveal themselves from text to text in somewhat intermingled and sometimes incompatible forms must be carefully distinguished. The first, the solution of faith, makes too little of the falsifying character of the Urdoxa and the dangers of an action that is not concerned with the mystification and biases on which, perhaps, it rests. The second, the path of the institution, does not attempt to surmount the vertigo, but nevertheless manages to hold the advantage. The masks, understood essentially as “instituted,” which at the same time clarify the meaning of the Merleau-Pontian notion of the institution, are able to rediscover an ethical role: passing from mask to mask without ever uncovering a face or, stated otherwise, responding side by side, is nevertheless a response. Moreover, this might provide an even better response and possible understanding since the masks themselves, as institutions, are proximate viewfinders which indefinitely reclaim new recoveries and which have the ability to link up with each other in a never-ending structure of dialogue regarding “reinstitutions” despite being undermined by the opacity of self and other. The simulacra can also become as they are in themselves a greatest chance: vehicles of radical alterity and communication, but uninterrupted. This theory, elaborated from the theses and analyses of Merleau-Ponty, gives way to experiences of shock, but, at the same time and without contradiction, to the right to insist further, without tenderness, on the happy nature of being instead of opening itself up to the misosophie that Deleuze will develop.“Dietro le maschere non ci sono volti, l’uomo storico non è mai stato uomo, e tuttavia nessun uomo è solo”: il nostro articolo si interroga sul senso e sulla posta in gioco etica di questa affermazione merleau-pontyana che troviamo nella Prefazione a Segni. Partendo dal tratto enigmatico e inquietante di questa tesi, e dalla constatazione della sua risonanza con l’affermazione deleuziana secondo cui “le maschere non ricoprono nulla, se non altre maschere”, abbiamo voluto esplorare la possibilità di prendere sul serio la formula merleau-pontyana ricavandone una teoria dei simulacri eticamente feconda. Il contesto, quello di un dialogo con Sartre e Nizan intorno ai temi del disincanto e delle nuove prospettive etiche e politiche, ci proietta direttamente nello spazio di un pensiero dell’avversità e delle aporie indissociabili dall’incontro con l’altro, e consente parimenti di farci strada con Merleau-Ponty in direzione di un’etica e di una politica della comunità non esclusiva della dimensione dell’alterità radicale. A partire da un’analisi della nozione di maschera e delle sue occorrenze nei testi merleau-pontyani mostriamo che ogni immagine è una maschera ontologicamente prima, che non copia e non ricopre affatto una realtà più autentica. La formulazione richiamata da Segni introduce immediatamente alla dimensione eticamente drammatica di tale ontologia. La sua posta in gioco è quella di un ipercriticismo, di un pensiero dell’abisso e dell’interruzione del senso. Come agire quando ogni essere è evasivo ed è altro rispetto a se stesso? Vorremmo mostrare che a quest’altezza si fa strada nell’opera merleau-pontyana una tensione tra una prima soluzione pratica, affidata alla dimensione della fede, e una seconda via d’uscita “incentrata”, se così si può dire, sulla temporalità spiraliforme dell’istituzione. Questi due esiti pratici, che in Merleau-Ponty non risultano nettamente ed esplicitamente circoscritti, ma si dispiegano di testo in testo dando luogo a sovrapposizioni e al limite a contraddizioni, vanno invece, a nostro avviso, accuratamente distinte. La prima, la soluzione della fede, fa troppo poco spazio al carattere ingannevole dell’Urdoxa e ai pericoli di un’azione che non si preoccupa di farsi carico delle mistificazioni e delle deformazioni su cui essa forse si fonda. La seconda, la soluzione dell’istituzione, non pretende più di oltrepassare la vertigine ma arriva a farne una risorsa. Le maschere, intese come essenzialmente istitutive, facendo luce sulla nozione merleau-pontyana di istituzione vengono a giocare un ruolo etico: passare di maschera in maschera senza mai trovare volti, in altri termini rispondere “a lato”, significa rispondere comunque e forse rispondere nel modo migliore, secondo la migliore comprensione possibile. Poiché le maschere stesse in quanto istituzioni sono delle “visées à côté” che chiamano indefinitiamente a nuove riprese e hanno il potere di legare tra loro in un dialogo senza fine una serie di re-istituzioni inevitabilmente opache a sé e agli altri. I simulacri possono così diventare, proprio in quanto simulacri, la nostra più grande chance: veicoli di alterità radicale e di comunicazione ininterrotta. Questa teoria, elaborata a partire dalle tesi e dalle analisi merleau-pontyane, consente di fare spazio a esperienze di grande momento emotivo, e allo stesso tempo, senza contraddizione, di insistere senza sentimentalismi sulla felice natura dell’essere, evitando infine la “misosophia” a cui approda Deleuze. (shrink)
« En vertu de quoi la catégorie de l’Utopique possède donc à côté de son sens habituel et justement dépréciatif, cet autre sens qui, loin d’être nécessairement abstrait et détourné du monde, est au contraire centralement préoccupé du monde : celui du dépassement de la marche naturelle des événements »« Il n’y a guère, même parmi les économistes bourgeois, un savant..
La formule de Ga 3,28 « ...Il y a ni esclave ni libre, il n’y a pas l’homme et la femme... » est souvent citée pour justifier une vision égalitaire de la communauté chrétienne, notamment par des théologien(ne)s féministes. La majorité des exégètes limite pourtant l’effet de ces paroles de Paul au domaine spirituel ou eschatologique ; s’agirait-il, au fond, d’une simple utopie ? Pour tenter de répondre à cette interrogation, Ga 3,28 est resitué dans le contexte de l’épître, puis (...) dans celui d’une éventuelle formule de foi pré-paulinienne. Les résultats sont ensuite comparés au texte de Mc 10,6-8 qui comporte lui aussi l’expression « l’homme et la femme », dans le contexte du divorce. L’ensemble de ce dossier permettra d’esquisser quelques modestes repères pour une interprétation de Ga 3,28, qui ne se cantonne pas uniquement au constat de l’utopie. (shrink)
En la sección titulada Irreversibilidad y el Poder de Perdonar en La Condición Humana, Arendt afirma que “el descubridor del papel del perdón en la esfera de los asuntos humanos fue Jesús de Nazaret”. En lo que sigue, quisiéramos aproximarnos al uso antiguo del verbo griego sungignôskô que a nuestro entender cumple el mismo papel que Arendt advierte en esta supuesta novedad cristiana —la “mutua exoneración de lo que se ha hecho”—, no sólo para entender en qué consistiría el descubrimiento (...) que Arendt atribuye a Jesús, sino porque creemos que la idea de que los griegos desconocían la facultad de perdonar es, si no falsa, al menos imprecisa. In the section titled Irreversibility and the Power to Forgive in the Human Condition, Arendt claims that “the discoverer of the role of forgiveness in the sphere of human affairs was Jesus of Nazareth”. In what follows, we would like to approach the ancient use of the Greek verb sungignôskô which, in our opinion, fulfills the same role that Arendt finds in this alleged Christian novelty —the “mutual exoneration of what has been done”— not only to understand what would the actual discovery Arendt attributes to Jesus imply, but because we believe claiming the Greeks were unaware of the faculty of forgiveness is, if not false, at least inaccurate. (shrink)
The medical ethics of a physician’s relationship with a prisoner who is participating in a collective hunger strike has become a major public, professional, and governmental concern in The Republic of Turkey. This article examines the Turkish experience and debate about physician ethics during prison hunger strikes. It is hoped that this analysis will be of use to those formulating policy in similar situations.
Si on cherche une définition minimale de la phénoménologie, on trouvera l'idée de philosophie descriptive. En ce sens, on peut imputer quelque chose de phénoménologique á de nombreuses philosophies contemporaines, audelà des limites de la phénoménologie au sens étroit et historique du terme. Néanmoins, il faut alors prendre en compte la question de savoir ce qui est à décrire. La réponse phénoménologique est: ce qui est vu. Qu'est-ce qui est donc vu ? Cette question est inséparable de celle de la (...) grammaire du voir. L'auteur soutient que c'est ce qui doit être retenu de la critique wittgensteinienne de la phénoménologie. Mais, si ce qui doit être dit est le vu en tant qu'il est dit, il n'en reste pas moins qu'il doit être dit en tant que vu. Que faire de cette dimension qui est celle de l'« être-vu » ? En ce point, la phénoménologie est inévitable, non plus comme discipline, mais au moins comme problème. If one requires a minimal definition for phenomenology, one may settle for the idea of a descriptive philosophy. In that sense, something phenomenological can be ascribed to many contemporary species of philosophiy, beyond the limits of « phenomenology » taken in a narrow, historical sense. However, the question arises : what is to be described? Phenomenology's answer is: what is seen. What, then, is seen ? This question is inseparable from the question of the grammar of seeing, as the author holds to be drawn from the wittgensteinian criticism of phenomenology. But if what is to be said is what is seen, as said, yet it remains that it is to be said as seen. What can be done with this « being-seen-ness » ? Here, phenomenology is unavoidable, not as a discipline anymore, but at least as a problem. (shrink)
En su encierro durante la II Guerra Mundial, Althusser, según declaró, solamente tuvo al alcance un libro: los Pensées de Pascal, un clásico que, tras la reflexión religiosa, también planteó problemas epistemológicos, históricos y sociológicos de tal manera que en él se pueden encontrar rasgos “profundamente materialistas”. [1] La influencia de Pascal es expresa, cuando Althusser recoge la parábola de la conversión religiosa para explicar (insuficientemente) el fenómeno de la interpelación ideológica. Pero los textos de Pascal contienen intuiciones que sobrepasan (...) los límites de la teoría althusseriana y que se pueden rastrear a la luz de la teoría psicoanalítica de la ideología tal como ésta es elaborada por los autores de la escuela eslovena. [1] L. Althusser: Filosofía y marxismo. Entrevista por Fernanda Navarro , Madrid, Siglo XXI, 1988, pp. 46-47. (shrink)
The Court of Appeals of New York held, in Council of the City of New York u. Giuliani, slip op. 02634, 1999 WL 179257, that New York City may not privatize a public city hospital without state statutory authorization. The court found invalid a sublease of a municipal hospital operated by a public benefit corporation to a private, for-profit entity. The court reasoned that the controlling statute prescribed the operation of a municipal hospital as a government function that must be (...) fulfilled by the public benefit corporation as long as it exists, and nothing short of legislative action could put an end to the corporation's existence.In 1969, the New York State legislature enacted the Health and Hospitals Corporation Act, establishing the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation as an attempt to improve the New York City public health system. Thirty years later, on a renewed perception that the public health system was once again lacking, the city administration approved a sublease of Coney Island Hospital from HHC to PHS New York, Inc., a private, for-profit entity. (shrink)
Here presented are three singular, philosophical perspectives on the Delhi student protests which took place in 2019 and 2020, before the coronavirus pandemic. The writers hail from India, England...
L'État actionnaire de la télévision publique est soucieux du rendement social de son investissement. Les programmes des chaînes publiques doivent être globalement vus par le plus grand nombre. Mais en même temps, chaque entité du service public doit respecter un cahier des charges et ne peut être une simple addition de «pièges à audience». Au programmateur de gérer ces paradoxes en forgeant une grille qui s'appuie sur ces contraintes et affirme la relation particulière de chaque chaîne avec le public. L'audience (...) est la récompense d'une programmation généreuse, qui prend des risques et produit du sens. La grille de France 3 s'est construite autour des concepts de proximité et de curiosité; France 2 doit être une grande chaîne de divertissement, d'information et de création; France 5 est une chaîne pédagogique qui tente d'apporter à certains publics qui en ont besoin , des clés pour mieux comprendre la réalité de tous les jours.As the main shareholder in public television, the State is of course concerned by the level of social profit in return for its investment. Overall, public channels' programme schedules should be seen by the largest audience possible. But at the same time, each public channel has to respect certain obligations and cannot be a simple accumulation of "audience traps". It is the programmer’s responsibility to manage these paradoxes when constructing a schedule which should be based on these very constraints while affirming each channel's particular relationship with its audience. High audience ratings are the reward for generous scheduling in which risks are taken and a certain meaning is produced. France 3's programming was built around the concepts of proximity and curiosity; France 2 is intended to be a major entertainment, information and creation channel; France 5 is an educational channel aiming to bring keys to better understand everyday reality to certain audiences who need it, particularly young people. (shrink)
It is time for the noon conference. Your job is to impart a career-changing experience in ethics to a group of students and interns gathered from four different schools with varying curriculums in ethics. They have just finished 1½ h of didactic sessions and lunch. One third of them were on call last night. Your first job is to keep them awake. The authors argue that this “tragic case” approach to ethics education is of limited value because it limits understanding (...) of moral problems to dilemmas; negates the moral agency of the student; encourages solutions that are merely intellectual; and suggests that ethical encounters are a matter for experts. The authors propose an alternative that focuses on three issues: the provider-patient relationship, the relationships between providers in the everyday world of health work and, the social position of healthcare providers in society. In this approach, teachers are not experts but more like guides on a journey who help students to learn that much of ethical practice comprises living through difficult situations of caring for vulnerable others and who help students to navigate some of these difficulties. (shrink)
