We begin by considering two common ways of conceiving critical metaphysics. According to the first (and polemical) conception, critical metaphysics analyzes nothing more than the form of thought and thereby misses the proper point of metaphysics, namely to investigate the form of reality. According to the second (and affirmative) conception, critical metaphysics starts from the supposed insight that the form of reality cannot be other than the form of thought and is thus not required to analyze anything but that form. (...) We argue that the first conception is too weak while the second is too strong. Then we sketch an alternative conception of critical metaphysics, a conception we find expressed both in Kant’s B-Deduction and in the way Barry Stroud has recently investigated the possibility of metaphysics. According to such a conception, a properly critical metaphysics needs to proceed in two steps: first, it needs to analyze the most general and necessary form of any thought that is about an objective reality at all; second, it needs to investigate how that form of thought relates to the reality it purports to represent. But unlike Kant, Stroud remains sceptical regarding the possibility of a satisfying transition from thought to reality in metaphysics. We argue that this dissatisfaction can be traced back to a notion of objectivity and reality in terms of complete mind-independence. Then we sketch an alternative notion of objectivity and reality in terms of distinctness from subjects and acts of thinking, and argue that it is that notion that allows Kant, with his Transcendental Idealism, to make the transition required for any satisfying metaphysics, namely that from the form of thought to reality. (shrink)

Die Auseinandersetzung mit teleologischen Vorstellungen ist in Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft an die Diskussion des Begriffs der Zweckmäßigkeit geknüpft. Einerseits wird dort eine subjektiv zweckmäßige Spezifikation der Natur einem transzendentalen Prinzip der Urteilskraft zu Grunde gelegt. Diese Möglichkeit wird durch die Darstellbarkeit dieses Begriffes eröffnet, den die Kritik der ästhetischen Urteilskraft thematisiert: Der Begriff einer subjektiven Zweckmäßigkeit wird durch das Wirken der Einbildungskraft in der Synthesis derjenigen Naturprodukte dargestellt, die wir als schön beurteilen.

Spinoza′s theory of ideas is one of the most important and at the same time most controversial aspects of his Ethics. In this paper a new interpretation of this theory is suggested that allows for a conception of this theory as providing valuable steps towards a naturalized theory of intentionality. To begin with, the principled distinction between the finite and the infinite intellect is established by a distinction between two kinds of representational relation. Since both of these relations can in (...) turn be reduced to a relation of indication there is no evidence for an alleged ambiguity with respect to the concept of an idea in Spinoza′s theory. While the distinction between different relations of representation has important epistemological consequences, the reducibility of those relations to an underlying relation of indication opens the way for a possible naturalization of the intentionality of the mental. (shrink)

The notion of idea is a key concept in early modern philosophy. From Descartes seminal works at the beginning of the 17th century to the work of Thomas Reid in the closing years of the 18th century, discussion in theoretical philosophy is dominated by the debate about the core concept of idea. This two-volume textbook introduces eleven key authors from this period. The first volume presents the central texts in modern translation, often new translations based on the source texts. The (...) second volume contains commentaries on each text with a systematic introduction, a line-by-line commentary and a contextualisation of the contents. Thus this textbook provides students of philosophy with a comprehensive overview of the modern discussion of the concept of idea. ". (shrink)

The discussion of the hermetical §§ 76/77 of Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment is the centerpiece of Eckart Förster’s groundbreaking Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie. The decisive methodological tool employed by Kant in those sections is the use of limiting concepts such as intellectual intuition and intuitive intellect. Förster’s discussion of the use of limiting concepts in those paragraphs is outlined and ultimately – despite some criticism in exegetical detail – assessed as the right way to reconstruct the (...) intricate argument of those important sections. (shrink)

Obwohl jüngere Interpretationen Descartes meist vor dem Vorwurf eines doxastischen Voluntarismus in Schutz nehmen, gibt es im Kontext der cartesischen Urteilstheorie erhebliche Schwierigkeiten mit seinem Begriff der Willensfreiheit. Vor allem zwei Aspekte von Descartes’ Theorie lassen sich auf den ersten Blick nur schwer miteinander vereinbaren: die unbegrenzte Freiheit des Willens auf der einen und die unweigerliche Zustimmung des Willens zu klaren und deutlichen Ideen auf der anderen Seite.Ich schlage zunächst vor, zur Lösung dieser Schwierigkeiten zwei verschiedene Begriffe der Willensfreiheit bei (...) Descartes zu unterscheiden, von denen jeder seinen spezifischen Anwendungsbereich hat: Freiheit als Wahlfreiheit und Freiheit als Spontaneität. In einem zweiten Schritt argumentiere ich, dass sich unter Voraussetzung von Descartes’ Urteilstheorie seine These der unbegrenzten Freiheit des Willens für beide Begriffe von Willensfreiheit verteidigen lässt, ohne dass Descartes deshalb zum doxastischen Voluntaristen würde. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Internationales Jahrbuch für philosophische Anthropologie Jahrgang: 5 Heft: 1 Seiten: 159-178.