We develop a criterion for telling when integrating two pieces of information, e.g. two pictures or statements requires an understanding of perspective. Problems that require such an understanding are perspective problems. With this criterion we can show that understanding false beliefs vis-à-vis reality pose a perspective problem, so does understanding spatial descriptions given from different viewing points (a classical example of what is commonly seen as a problem of perspective) and individuating objects with different sortals (naming objects). We use the (...) result that understanding false belief as well as alternative naming of objects are both perspective problems to explain the otherwise inexplicable developmental finding that children master these two tasks at about the same time, around the age of 4 years. (shrink)

WHAT IS PRESENT TO THE MIND? Donald DAVIDSON The University of California at Berkeley There is a sense in which anything we think about is, ...

In this paper we address the question how children come to understand normativity through simple forms of social interaction. A recent line of research suggests that even very young children can understand social norms quite independently of any moral context. We focus on a methodological procedure developed by Rakoczy et al., Developmental Psychology, 44, 875–881, that measures children’s protest behaviour when a pre-established constitutive rule has been violated. Children seem to protest when they realize that rule violations are not allowed (...) or should not have happened. We point out that there is more than one possible explanation for children’s reactions in these studies. They could be due to disobeying an authority, an inability to follow a rule, or the violation of an empirical expectation due to the mismatch between statement and action. We thus question whether it would still count as an indicator for normative understanding if children responded to aspects of the game other than the violation of a constitutive rule and conclude that the protesting behavior, when taken in isolation, does not suffice as evidence for normative understanding. (shrink)

Critically reflecting some theses of Fodor & LePore's Holism, it is argued that semantic holism in spite of all their criticism is not defeated. As a consequence of the rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction, a first result is that they do not take Traditional Holism, as it originates from Frege and Wittgenstein, serious at all. Whereas a Weak Anatomism, inspired with views of Traditional Holism, might be an interesting alternative to atomism and holism even for Quine and Neo-Fregeans like Dummett. (...) Concerning the Principle of Compositionality an ambiguity between recurrence and functional compositionality is localized that relativizes their critique on Davidson. And finally versions of content- and belief-holism in combination with adequate charity-principles are discussed as a basis for squaring Intentional Realism with Brentano's Thesis. (shrink)

IntroductionE.J. LOWE: Event Causation and Agent CausationRalf STOECKER: Agents in ActionGeert KEIL: How Do We Ever Get Up? On the Proximate Causation of Actions and EventsMaria ALVAREZ: Letting Happen, Omissions, and CausationFrederick STOUTLAND: Responsive Action and the Belief-Desire ModelMarco IORIO: How Are Agents Related to Their Actions? The Existentialist ResponseJens KULENKAMPFF: What Oedipus Did When He Married Jocasta or What Ancient Tragedy Tells Us About Agents, Their Actions, and the WorldRüdiger BITTNER: Agents as RulersMonika BETZLER: How Can an Agent Rationally (...) Guide His Actions?Martina HERRMANN: Competence, Options, and RelationsWeitere Abhandlungen/Further ArticlesEduardo FERMANDOIS: Kommunikation ohne Sprache? Zu Davidsons später SprachphilosophieGuido IMAGUIRE: Die Form der Externalität in Russells An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry und die Ursprünge seiner RelationstheorieBuch-Symposium/Book-SymposiumJohn BICKLE: Precis of Psychoneural Reduction: The New WaveAnsgar BECKERMANN: Physicalism and New Wave ReductionismJ. Christopher MALONEY: Reservations about New Wave ReductionAchim STEPHAN: How to Lose the Mind-Body ProblemJohn BICKLE: New Wave Metascience. Replies to Beckermann, Maloney, and StephanBuchnotizen/Critical NotesEingesandte Bücher/Books Received. (shrink)

Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of ContentsThemenschwerpunkt/Special Topic: Bolzano & KantGastherausgeber/Guest Editor: Sandra LapointeSandra Lapointe: IntroductionSandra Lapointe: Is Logic Formal? Bolzano, Kant and the Kantian LogiciansNicholas F. Stang: A Kantian Reply to Bolzano’s Critique of Kant’s Analytic-Synthetic DistinctionClinton Tolley: Bolzano and Kant on the Place of Subjectivity in a WissenschaftslehreTimothy Rosenkoetter: Kant and Bolzano on the Singularity of IntuitionsWaldemar Rohloff: From Ordinary Language to Definition in Kant and BolzanoWeitere Artikel/Further ArticlesChristian Damböck: Wilhelm Diltheys empirische Philosophie und der rezente Methodenstreit in der analytischen PhilosophieBernd Prien: (...) Socially Constituted Actions and ObjectsDaniel Enrique Kalpokas: Two Dogmas of CoherentismJon Cogburn & Jeff W. Roland: Strong, therefore Sensitive. Misgivings about DeRose’s ContextualismAndre Abath: Brewer’s Switching ArgumentEssay-Wettbewerb/Essay CompetitionAmadeus Magrabi: The Value of Feelings for Decision-MakingStefan Reining: Do Pain-Accompanying Emotions Mislead Us?—Considerations in the Light of Reactive Dissociation PhenomenaPeter Königs: Patriotism. A Case Study in the Philosophy of EmotionsBesprechungsaufsatz/Review EssayChristopher Gauker: What Do Your Senses Say? On Burge’s Theory of PerceptionDiskussion/DiscussionGeorg Brun: Adequate Formalization and De Morgan’s ArgumentBuchnotizen/Critical Notes. (shrink)

Kutschera's criticism of an objectivist theory of mind is shown to rest on a premise which an objectivist need not accept, namely, that there is a deep metaphysical distinction between the physical and the psychological domain. This premise can be rejected on naturalistic grounds. Referring to the work of Rosenthal, Dennett and Davidson, it is argued that less metaphysically loaded explanations can be given of what is subjective about the mind.

Grazer Philosophische Studien is a peer reviewed journal that publishes articles on philosophical problems in every area, especially articles related to the analytic tradition.

Critically reflecting some theses of Fodor & LePore's Holism, it is argued that semantic holism in spite of all their criticism is not defeated. As a consequence of the rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction, a first result is that they do not take Traditional Holism, as it originates from Frege and Wittgenstein, serious at all. Whereas a Weak Anatomism, inspired with views of Traditional Holism, might be an interesting alternative to atomism and holism even for Quine and Neo-Fregeans like Dummett. (...) Concerning the Principle of Compositionality an ambiguity between recurrence and functional compositionality is localized that relativizes their critique on Davidson. And finally versions of content- and belief-holism in combination with adequate charity-principles are discussed as a basis for squaring Intentional Realism with Brentano's Thesis. (shrink)

Kazimierz Twardowski is most commonly known as the teacher of great philosophers and the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School. As a philosopher however, he is primarily remembered for his famous comparison of the contents and objects of various kinds of representations, a comparison that remains enshrined in European thought.In fact, he attained important results in many other branches of philosophy as well. For instance, in ontology, he laid the foundations for the modern theory of formal structure of objects, and he (...) introduced the theoretically fruitful pair of terms, action-product. In epistemology, he developed a profound analysis of the notion and criteria of truth; and he provided a forceful account of the errors underlying relativist theories of truth. In methodology, he drew an explicit distinction between the processes of discovering, systematising, and grounding in science, and he offered accurate descriptions of the nature of psychology and other humanities. In logic, he offered decisive arguments on behalf of the idiogenetic conception of judgement, and he improved the traditional typology of adjectives.These achievements are of significance that is not only historical. Kazimierz Twardowski's work, formulated in plain, precise language, are instructive and inspiring for contemporary students of philosophy. (shrink)

Ever since the publication of 'Truth' in 1959 Sir Michael Dummett has been acknowledged as one of the most profoundly creative and influential of contemporary philosophers. His contributions to the philosophy of thought and language, logic, the philosophy of mathematics, and metaphysics have set the terms of some of most fruitful discussions in philosophy. His work on Frege stands unparalleled, both as landmark in the history of philosophy and as a deep reflection on the defining commitments of the analytic school.This (...) volume of specially composed essays on Dummett's philosophy presents a new perspective on his achievements, and provides a focus for further research fully informed by the Dummett's most recent publications. Collectively the essays in philosophy of mathematics provide the most sustained discussion to date of the role of Dummett's diagnosis of the root of the logico-mathematical paradoxes in his case for an intuitionist revision of classical mathematics. The themes of other essays include a fundamental challenge to Dummett's Fregean understanding of predication, and a criticism of his case for logical revision outside of mathematics. (shrink)

We develop a new theory of the cognitive changes around 4 years of age by trying to explain why understanding of false belief and of alternative naming emerge at this age. We make use of the notion of discourse referents as it is used in File Change Semantics, one of the early forms of the more widely known Discourse Representation Theory. The assumed cognitive change exists in how children can link DRs in their mind to external referents. The younger children (...) check whether the conditions for a DR match the conditions of an external entity. The older children, in addition, have an explicit understanding of reference in virtue of making explicit identity assertions. This involves the metarepresentational ability of representing that different DRs represent the same external referent, which — we argue — is required for alternative naming and for the false belief task. (shrink)

Theories of mind draw on processes that represent mental states and their computational connections; simulation, in addition, draws on processes that replicate (Heal 1986 ) a sequence of mental states. Moreover, mental simulation can be triggered by input from imagination instead of real perceptions. To avoid confusion between mental states concerning reality and those created in simulation, imagined contents must be quarantined. Goldman bypasses this problem by giving pretend states a special role to play in simulation (Goldman 2006 ). We (...) argue that this path leads to the resurgence of the threat of collapse (Davies 1994 ), diluting the principled distinction between simulation and theory use. Exploration of a related method of real-mental states operating in a pretend mode leads to a factually untenable model. Our main goal here is to raise this problem as a challenge for Goldman’s reconfigured simulation theory. Only at the end we will briefly sketch a possible alternative way of quarantine that preserves the replicative element of simulation and avoids collapse. Figure 1 provides a guide to our argument. (shrink)