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Johannes Roessler
University of Warwick
  1.  97
    From Infants' to Children's Appreciation of Belief.Josef Perner & Johannes Roessler - 2012 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16 (10):519-525.
  2. Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology.Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.) - 2005 - Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Sometime around their first birthday most infants begin to engage in relatively sustained bouts of attending together with their caretakers to objects in their environment. By the age of 18 months, on most accounts, they are engaging in full-blown episodes of joint attention. As developmental psychologists (usually) use the term, for such joint attention to be in play, it is not sufficient that the infant and the adult are in fact attending to the same object, nor that the one’s attention (...)
  3. The Silence of Self-Knowledge.Johannes Roessler - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):1-17.
    Gareth Evans famously affirmed an explanatory connection between answering the question whether p and knowing whether one believes that p. This is commonly interpreted in terms of the idea that judging that p constitutes an adequate basis for the belief that one believes that p. This paper formulates and defends an alternative, more modest interpretation, which develops from the suggestion that one can know that one believes that p in judging that p.
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  4.  62
    Reason Explanation and the Second-Person Perspective.Johannes Roessler - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):346-357.
    Reason explanation and the second-person perspective. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/13869795.2014.946954.
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  5. Perceptual Experience and Perceptual Knowledge.Johannes Roessler - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):1013-1041.
    Commonsense epistemology regards perceptual experience as a distinctive source of knowledge of the world around us, unavailable in ‘blindsight’. This is often interpreted in terms of the idea that perceptual experience, through its representational content, provides us with justifying reasons for beliefs about the world around us. I argue that this analysis distorts the explanatory link between perceptual experience and knowledge, as we ordinarily conceive it. I propose an alternative analysis, on which representational content plays no explanatory role: we make (...)
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  6. Agency and Self Awareness.Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.) - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    In recent years there has been much psychological and neurological work purporting to show that consciousness and self-awareness play no role in causing actions, and indeed to demonstrate that free will is an illusion. The essays in this volume subject the assumptions that motivate such claims to sustained interdisciplinary scrutiny. The book will be compulsory reading for psychologists and philosophers working on action explanation, and for anyone interested in the relation between the brain sciences and consciousness.
  7.  77
    Thinking, Inner Speech, and Self-Awareness.Johannes Roessler - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):541-557.
    This paper has two themes. One is the question of how to understand the relation between inner speech and knowledge of one’s own thoughts. My aim here is to probe and challenge the popular neo-Rylean suggestion that we know our own thoughts by ‘overhearing our own silent monologues’, and to sketch an alternative suggestion, inspired by Ryle’s lesser-known discussion of thinking as a ‘serial operation’. The second theme is the question whether, as Ryle apparently thought, we need two different accounts (...)
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  8. Perceptual Attention and the Space of Reasons.Johannes Roessler - 2011 - In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 274.
  9.  70
    Agency and Self-Awareness: Mechanisms and Epistemology.Naomi M. Eilan & Johannes Roessler - 2003 - In Johannes Roessler (ed.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  10. Understanding Delusions of Alien Control.Johannes Roessler - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):177-187.
    According to Jaspers, claims to the effect that one's thoughts, impulses, or actions are controlled by others belong to those schizophrenic symptoms that are not susceptible to any psychological explanation. In opposition to Jaspers, it has recently been suggested that such claims can be made intelligible by distinguishing two ingredients in our common sense notion of ownership of a thought: It is one thing for a thought to occur in my stream of consciousness; it is another for it to be (...)
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  11.  57
    Thought Insertion, Self-Awareness, and Rationality.Johannes Roessler - 2013 - In K. W. M. Fulford (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter argues that recent attempts to make sense of the delusion of thought insertion in terms of a distinction between two notions of thought ownership have been unsuccessful. It also proposes an alternative account, in which the delusion is to be interpreted in the light of its prehistory.
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  12.  45
    III—The Epistemic Role of Intentions.Johannes Roessler - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (1pt1):41-56.
    According to David Velleman, it is part of the ‘commonsense psychology’ of intentional agency that an agent can know what she will do without relying on evidence, in virtue of intending to do it. My question is how this claim is to be interpreted and defended. I argue that the answer turns on the commonsense conception of calculative practical reasoning, and the link between such reasoning and warranted claims to knowledge. I also consider the implications of this argument for Velleman's (...)
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  13.  28
    The Practical Other : Teleology and its Development.Josef Perner, Beate Priewasser & Johannes Roessler - 2018 - Interdisciplinary Science Reviews 43 (2).
    We argue for teleology as a description of the way in which we ordinarily understand others’ intentional actions. Teleology starts from the close resemblance between the reasoning involved in understanding others’ actions and one’s own practical reasoning involved in deciding what to do. We carve out teleology’s distinctive features more sharply by comparing it to its three main competitors: theory theory, simulation theory, and rationality theory. The plausibility of teleology as our way of understanding others is underlined by developmental data (...)
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  14. Joint Attention and the Problem of Other Minds.Johannes Roessler - 2005 - In Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    The question of what it means to be aware of others as subjects of mental states is often construed as the question of how we are epistemically justified in attributing mental states to others. The dominant answer to this latter question is that we are so justified in virtue of grasping the role of mental states in explaining observed behaviour. This chapter challenges this picture and formulates an alternative by reflecting on the interpretation of early joint attention interactions. It argues (...)
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  15.  9
    Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology.Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):528-530.
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  16. Intentional Action and Self-Awareness.Johannes Roessler - 2003 - In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Clarendon Press.
  17.  75
    Teleology and Causal Understanding in Children's Theory of Mind.Josef Perner & Johannes Roessler - unknown
    The causal theory of action is widely recognized in the literature of the philosophy of action as the "standard story" of human action and agency--the nearest approximation in the field to a theoretical orthodoxy. This volume brings together leading figures working in action theory today to discuss issues relating to the CTA and its applications, which range from experimental philosophy to moral psychology. Some of the contributors defend the theory while others criticize it; some draw from historical sources while others (...)
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  18.  30
    Self-Knowledge and Communication.Johannes Roessler - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):153-168.
    First-person present-tense self-ascriptions of belief are often used to tell others what one believes. But they are also naturally taken to express the belief they ostensibly report. I argue that this second aspect of self-ascriptions of belief holds the key to making the speaker's knowledge of her belief, and so the authority of her act of telling, intelligible. For a basic way to know one's beliefs is to be aware of what one is doing in expressing them. This account suggests (...)
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  19. Perception, Causation, and Objectivity.Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.) - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    Perceptual experience, that paradigm of subjectivity, constitutes our most immediate and fundamental access to the objective world. At least, this would seem to be so if commonsense realism is correct — if perceptual experience is (in general) an immediate awareness of mind-independent objects, and a source of direct knowledge of what such objects are like. Commonsense realism raises many questions. First, can we be more precise about its commitments? Does it entail any particular conception of the nature of perceptual experience (...)
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  20. Introduction.Johannes Roessler - 2011 - In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
     
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  21.  92
    Perception, Introspection and Attention.Johannes Roessler - 1999 - European Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):47-64.
  22.  34
    Pro-Social Cognition: Helping, Practical Reasons, and ‘Theory of Mind’.Johannes Roessler & Josef Perner - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):755-767.
    There is converging evidence that over the course of the second year children become good at various fairly sophisticated forms of pro-social activities, such as helping, informing and comforting. Not only are toddlers able to do these things, they appear to do them routinely and almost reliably. A striking feature of these interventions, emphasized in the recent literature, is that they show precocious abilities in two different domains: they reflect complex ‘ theory of mind’ abilities as well as ‘altruistic motivation’. (...)
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  23.  38
    Causation in Commonsense Realism.Johannes Roessler - 2011 - In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
    Leading philosophers & psychologists offer an assessment of the commonsense view that perceptual experience is an immediate awareness of mind-independent objects. They examine the nature of perception, its role in the acquisition of knowledge, the role of causation in perception, & how perceptual understanding develops in humans.
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  24.  5
    Perception, Introspection and Attention.Johannes Roessler - 1999 - European Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):47-64.
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  25.  13
    Perceptual Causality, Counterfactuals, and Special Causal Concepts.Johannes Roessler - unknown
    How are causal judgements such as 'The ice on the road caused the traffic accident' connected with counterfactual judgements such as 'If there had not been any ice on the road, the traffic accident would not have happened'? This volume throws new light on this question by uniting, for the first time, psychological and philosophical approaches to causation and counterfactuals. Traditionally, philosophers have primarily been interested in connections between causal and counterfactual claims on the level of meaning or truth-conditions. More (...)
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  26.  89
    Consciousness and the World.Johannes Roessler - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (1):163-173.
  27.  85
    Attention and the Self: An Appreciation of C.O. Evans' The Subject of Consciousness.Johannes Roessler - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (5):76-81.
    _The Sub ject of Con scious ness_ is a rich, strik ingly orig i nal and ambi tious work. It makes an impor tant and timely con tri bu tion to cur rent debates on a num ber of issues which over the last few years have been tak ing cen tre stage in the phi los o phy of mind: for exam ple, self-consciousness, selec tive atten tion and the nature of bodily aware ness. What makes this achieve ment (...)
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  28.  38
    Agents' Knowledge.Johannes Roessler - 2010 - In A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  29.  31
    Action, Emotion, and the Development of Self-Awareness.Johannes Roessler - 2002 - European Review of Philosophy 5:33-52.
  30.  37
    Critical Notice of Lucy O'Brien, Self-Knowing Agents.Johannes Roessler - 2009 - Philosophical Books 50 (4):227-234.
  31.  18
    Counterfactuals, and Special Causal Concepts.Johannes Roessler - 2011 - In Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Sarah R. Beck (eds.), Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation. Oxford University Press. pp. 75.
  32.  18
    Review of The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays, by Shoemaker, S. [REVIEW]Johannes Roessler - unknown
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  33. Introduction.Naomi Eilan & Johannes Roessler - 2003 - In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Clarendon Press.
     
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  34. 1 Strawson's Rationale for the Causal Theory of Perception.Johannes Roessler - 2011 - In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press. pp. 103.