32 found
Order:
Disambiguations
John A. Barker [34]John Anthony Barker [1]
  1. Towards closure on closure.Fred Adams, John A. Barker & Julia Figurelli - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):179-196.
    Tracking theories of knowledge are widely known to have the consequence that knowledge is not closed. Recent arguments by Vogel and Hawthorne claim both that there are no legitimate examples of knowledge without closure and that the costs of theories that deny closure are too great. This paper considers the tracking theories of Dretske and Nozick and the arguments by Vogel and Hawthorne. We reject the arguments of Vogel and Hawthorne and evaluate the costs of closure denial for tracking theories (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  2.  78
    The Fallacy of Begging the Question.John A. Barker - 1976 - Dialogue 15 (2):241-255.
    Begging the question — roughly, positing in the premises what is to be proved in the conclusion — is a perplexing fallacy.1 Are not question-begging arguments valid? Yes, we may find ourselves saying, but they are fallacious despite their validity, owing to their inability to establish the truth of a conclusion which is not already known. But are not question-begging arguments sometimes effective in bringing an audience to an awareness of the truth of the conclusion? How can a dialectical maneuver (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  3. Knowledge as Fact-Tracking True Belief.Fred Adams, John A. Barker & Murray Clarke - 2017 - Manuscrito 40 (4):1-30.
    ABSTRACT Drawing inspiration from Fred Dretske, L. S. Carrier, John A. Barker, and Robert Nozick, we develop a tracking analysis of knowing according to which a true belief constitutes knowledge if and only if it is based on reasons that are sensitive to the fact that makes it true, that is, reasons that wouldn’t obtain if the belief weren’t true. We show that our sensitivity analysis handles numerous Gettier-type cases and lottery problems, blocks pathways leading to skepticism, and validates the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  4. Autism and the "theory of mind" debate.Robert M. Gordon & John A. Barker - 1994 - In George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press.
  5. Epistemic Closure and Skepticism.John A. Barker & Fred Adams - 2010 - Logos and Episteme 1 (2):221-246.
    Closure is the epistemological thesis that if S knows that P and knows that P implies Q, then if S infers that Q, S knows that Q. Fred Dretske acknowledges that closure is plausible but contends that it should be rejected because it conflicts with the plausible thesis: Conclusive reasons (CR): S knows that P only if S believes P on the basis of conclusive reasons, i.e., reasons S wouldn‘t have if it weren‘t the case that P. Dretske develops an (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  6. Beat the (Backward) Clock.Fred Adams, John A. Barker & Murray Clarke - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (3):353-361.
    In a recent very interesting and important challenge to tracking theories of knowledge, Williams & Sinhababu claim to have devised a counter-example to tracking theories of knowledge of a sort that escapes the defense of those theories by Adams & Clarke. In this paper we will explain why this is not true. Tracking theories are not undermined by the example of the backward clock, as interesting as the case is.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  7. What You Don't Know Won't Hurt You?John A. Barker - 1976 - American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (4):303 - 308.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  8.  99
    Conclusive reasons, knowledge, and action.John A. Barker & Fred Adams - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):35-52.
    The article presents information on the capabilities of Dretske-style analysis of knowing (DAK) and of several competing analyses with respect to accounting for the apparent facts. It informs that the DAK can ground plausible verdicts about knowledge and ignorance in cases involving lotteries. It further informs that the knowledge-efficacy donor imply the implausible thesis.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  9.  52
    Brand and Swain on causation.John A. Barker - 1974 - Synthese 26 (3-4):396 - 400.
  10.  84
    Relevance logic, classical logic, and disjunctive syllogism.John A. Barker - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (6):361 - 376.
  11.  33
    The Nature of Question-Begging Arguments.John A. Barker - 1978 - Dialogue 17 (3):490-498.
  12.  90
    Paradox without knowledge.John A. Barker - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):261 - 270.
  13. Methods Matter: Beating the Backward Clock.Murray Clarke, Fred Adams & John A. Barker - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):99-112.
    In “Beat the (Backward) Clock,” we argued that John Williams and Neil Sinhababu’s Backward Clock Case fails to be a counterexample to Robert Nozick’s or Fred Dretske’s Theories of Knowledge. Williams’ reply to our paper, “There’s Nothing to Beat a Backward Clock: A Rejoinder to Adams, Barker and Clarke,” is a further attempt to defend their counterexample against a range of objections. In this paper, we argue that, despite the number and length of footnotes, Williams is still wrong.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. (1 other version)Computer modeling and the fate of folk psychology.John A. Barker - 2002 - Metaphilosophy 33 (1-2):30-48.
    Although Paul Churchland and Jerry Fodor both subscribe to the so-called theory-theory– the theory that folk psychology (FP) is an empirical theory of behavior – they disagree strongly about FP’s fate. Churchland contends that FP is a fundamentally flawed view analogous to folk biology, and he argues that recent advances in computational neuroscience and connectionist AI point toward development of a scientifically respectable replacement theory that will give rise to a new common-sense psychology. Fodor, however, wagers that FP will be (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15.  57
    Hypotheticals: Conditionals and theticals.John A. Barker - 1973 - Philosophical Quarterly 23 (93):335-345.
  16. Presupposition and entailment.John A. Barker - 1976 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 17 (2):272-278.
  17. 'If' and 'Even If'.John A. Barker - 1980 - Analysis 40 (2):93 - 98.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18.  9
    A formal analysis of conditionals.John A. Barker - 1969 - [Carbondale,:
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19.  75
    A Note on Knowledge and Belief.John A. Barker - 1975 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):143 - 144.
  20.  27
    Abstract of Comments: Pollock on Epistemology and Probability.John A. Barker - 1983 - Noûs 17 (1):68 - 69.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Audi on Epistemic Disavowals.John A. Barker - 1976 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 57 (4):376.
  22.  44
    A paradox of knowing whether.John A. Barker - 1975 - Mind 84 (334):281-283.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23.  30
    Audi's Theory of Practical Reasoning.John A. Barker - 1991 - Behavior and Philosophy 19 (2):49 - 58.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24.  53
    Aristotle vs. Diodorus.John A. Barker & Thomas D. Paxson Jr - 1985 - Philosophy Research Archives 11:41-76.
    We develop a modified system of standard logic, Augmented Standard Logic (ASL), and we employ ASL in an effort to show that, contrary to prevailing opinion, both Aristotle and Diodorus presented impressive arguments, having valid structures and highly plausible premisses, in their famous fatalism debate. We argue that ASL, which contains standard logic and a full system of modal and temporal logic emanating from a modicum of primitives, should not only enable one to appreciate the sophisticated philosophizing which characterized this (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25.  16
    Cause and Condition.John A. Barker - 1975 - Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philosophy 5:503-506.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26.  45
    'If', '⊃', and the principle of exportation.John A. Barker - 1974 - Philosophical Studies 26 (2):127 - 133.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27.  34
    Knowledge and causation.John A. Barker - 1972 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):313-324.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28.  91
    Knowledge, Ignorance and Presupposition.John A. Barker - 1974 - Analysis 35 (2):33 - 45.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  29.  80
    Pragmatics and Definite Descriptions.John A. Barker - 1972 - Tulane Studies in Philosophy 21:63-84.
  30. Relevance Logic and Inferential Knowledge.John A. Barker - 1989 - In J. Norman & R. Sylvan (eds.), Directions in Relevant Logic. Dordrecht and Boston: Springer. pp. 317-326.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31.  35
    Socratic ignorance vindicated.John A. Barker - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 28 (1):71 - 75.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32.  43
    Scriven on The Logic of Cause.John A. Barker - 1975 - Theory and Decision 6 (1):43-55.
    In a recent article entitled, ‘The Logic of Cause’ Scriven has presented a series of formidable arguments against the possibility of explicating the concept of cause in terms of the concepts of sufficient condition and necessary condition. Some of his main arguments center on the difficulties of capturing the asymmetry of cause and effect and of handling a certain kind of over-determination he calls linked overdetermination. Scriven's contention that there is no way to capture the asymmetry of cause and effect (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation