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John Bickle
Mississippi State University
  1.  36
    Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave.John W. Bickle - 2008 - Bradford.
    One of the central problems in the philosophy of psychology is an updated version of the old mind-body problem: how levels of theories in the behavioral and brain sciences relate to one another. Many contemporary philosophers of mind believe that cognitive-psychological theories are not reducible to neurological theories. However, this antireductionism has not spawned a revival of dualism. Instead, most nonreductive physicalists prefer the idea of a one-way dependence of the mental on the physical.In Psychoneural Reduction, John Bickle presents a (...)
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  2. Philosophy and Neuroscience a Ruthlessly Reductive Account.John Bickle - 2003
     
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  3. Reducing Mind to Molecular Pathways: Explicating the Reductionism Implicit in Current Cellular and Molecular Neuroscience. [REVIEW]John Bickle - 2006 - Synthese 151 (3):411-434.
    As opposed to the dismissive attitude toward reductionism that is popular in current philosophy of mind, a “ruthless reductionism” is alive and thriving in “molecular and cellular cognition”—a field of research within cellular and molecular neuroscience, the current mainstream of the discipline. Basic experimental practices and emerging results from this field imply that two common assertions by philosophers and cognitive scientists are false: (1) that we do not know much about how the brain works, and (2) that lower-level neuroscience cannot (...)
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  4.  52
    What's Old Is New Again: Kemeny-Oppenheim Reduction at Work in Current Molecular Neuroscience.Kari Theurer & John Bickle - 2013 - Philosophia Scientiae 17 (2):89-113.
    We introduce a new model of reduction inspired by Kemeny and Oppenheim’s model [Kemeny & Oppenheim 1956] and argue that this model is operative in a “ruthlessly reductive” part of current neuroscience. Kemeny and Oppenheim’s model was quickly rejected in mid-20th-century philosophy of science and replaced by models developed by Ernest Nagel and Kenneth Schaffner [Nagel 1961], [Schaffner 1967]. We think that Kemeny and Oppenheim’s model was correctly rejected, given what a “theory of reduction” was supposed to account for at (...)
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  5.  85
    Multiple Realizability.John Bickle - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  6.  72
    Has the Last Decade of Challenges to the Multiple Realization Argument Provided Aid and Comfort to Psychoneural Reductionists?John Bickle - 2010 - Synthese 177 (2):247 - 260.
    The previous decade has seen renewed critical interest in the multiple realization argument. These criticisms constitute a "second wave" of challenges to this central argument in late-20th century philosophy of mind. Unlike the first wave, which challenged the premise that multiple realization is inconsistent with reduction or type identity, this second wave challenges the truth of the multiple realization premise itself. Since psychoneural reductionism was prominent among the explicit targets of the multiple realization argument, one might think that this second (...)
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  7.  49
    Marr and Reductionism.John Bickle - 2015 - Topics in Cognitive Science 7 (2):299-311.
    David Marr's three-level method for completely understanding a cognitive system and the importance he attaches to the computational level are so familiar as to scarcely need repeating. Fewer seem to recognize that Marr defends his famous method by criticizing the “reductionistic approach.” This sets up a more interesting relationship between Marr and reductionism than is usually acknowledged. I argue that Marr was correct in his criticism of the reductionists of his time—they were only describing, not explaining. But a careful metascientific (...)
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  8. Science of Research and the Search for the Molecular Mechanisms of Cognitive Functions.A. J. Silva & John Bickle - 2009 - In John Bickle (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.
  9.  3
    What’s Old Is New Again: Kemeny-Oppenheim Reduction at Work in Current Molecular Neuroscience.Kari Theurer & John Bickle - 2013 - Philosophia Scientae 17:89-113.
  10. Real Reduction in Real Neuroscience : Metascience, Not Philosophy of Science (and Certainly Not Metaphysics!).John Bickle - 2008 - In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press.
  11. The Philosophy of Neuroscience.John Bickle, Pete Mandik & Anthony Landreth - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Over the past three decades, philosophy of science has grown increasingly “local.” Concerns have switched from general features of scientific practice to concepts, issues, and puzzles specific to particular disciplines. Philosophy of neuroscience is a natural result. This emerging area was also spurred by remarkable recent growth in the neurosciences. Cognitive and computational neuroscience continues to encroach upon issues traditionally addressed within the humanities, including the nature of consciousness, action, knowledge, and normativity. Empirical discoveries about brain structure and function suggest (...)
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  12.  3
    Connection Experiments in Neurobiology.John Bickle & Aaron Kostko - forthcoming - Synthese:1-25.
    Accounts of causal explanation are standard in philosophy of science. Less common are accounts of experimentation to investigate causal relations: detailed discussions of the specific kinds of experiments scientists design and run. Silva, Landreth, and Bickle’s account of “connection experiments” derives directly from landmark experiments in “molecular and cellular cognition.” We start with its key components, and then using a detailed case study from recent social neuroscience we emphasize and extend three features of SLB’s account: a division of distinct types (...)
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  13. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience.John Bickle (ed.) - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience is a state-of-the-art collection of interdisciplinary research spanning philosophy (of science, mind, and ...
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  14.  70
    New Wave Psychophysical Reductionism and the Methodological Caveats.John Bickle - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):57-78.
  15.  56
    Concepts Structured Through Reduction: A Structuralist Resource Illuminates the Consolidation – Long-Term Potentiation (Ltp) Link.John Bickle - 2002 - Synthese 130 (1):123 - 133.
    The structuralist program has developed a useful metascientific resource: ontological reductive links (ORLs) between the constituents of the potential models of reduced and reducing theories. This resource was developed initially to overcome an objection to structuralist ``global'' accounts of the intertheoretic reduction relation. But it also illuminates the way that concepts at a higher level of scientific investigation (e.g., cognitive psychology) become ``structured through reduction'' to lower-level investigations (e.g., cellular/molecular neuroscience). After (briefly) explaining this structuralist background, I demonstrate how this (...)
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  16. Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Semantic View of Theories.John Bickle - 1993 - Erkenntnis 39 (3):359-382.
    Recently some philosophers have urged that connectionist artificial intelligence is (potentially) eliminative for the propositional attitudes of folk psychology. At the same time, however, these philosophers have also insisted that since philosophy of science has failed to provide criteria distinguishing ontologically retentive from eliminative theory changes, the resulting eliminativism is not principled. Application of some resources developed within the semantic view of scientific theories, particularly recent formal work on the theory reduction relation, reveals these philosophers to be wrong in this (...)
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  17.  79
    Mental Anomaly and the New Mind-Brain Reductionism.John Bickle - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (2):217-30.
    Davidson's principle of the anomalousness of the mental was instrumental in discrediting once-popular versions of mind-brain reductionism. In this essay I argue that a novel account of intertheoretic reduction, which does not require the sort of cross-theoretic bridge laws that Davidson's principle rules out, allows a version of mind-brain reductionism which is immune from Davidson's challenge. In the final section, I address a second worry about reductionism, also based on Davidson's principle, that survives this response. I argue that new reductionists (...)
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  18.  37
    Neuroeconomics, Neurophysiology and the Common Currency Hypothesis.Anthony Landreth & John Bickle - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):419-429.
    We briefly describe ways in which neuroeconomics has made contributions to its contributing disciplines, especially neuroscience, and a specific way in which it could make future contributions to both. The contributions of a scientific research programme can be categorized in terms of (1) description and classification of phenomena, (2) the discovery of causal relationships among those phenomena, and (3) the development of tools to facilitate (1) and (2). We consider ways in which neuroeconomics has advanced neuroscience and economics along each (...)
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  19.  46
    Psychoneural Reductionism: The New Wave.John Bickle - 1997 - MIT Press.
  20.  38
    Psychoneural Reduction of the Genuinely Cognitive: Some Accomplished Facts.John Bickle - 1995 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):265-85.
    The need for representations and computations over their contents in psychological explanations is often cited as both the mark of the genuinely cognitive and a source of skepticism about the reducibility of cognitive theories to neuroscience. A generic version of this anti-reductionist argument is rejected in this paper as unsound, since (i) current thinking about associative learning emphasizes the need for cognitivist resources in theories adequate to explain even the simplest form of this phenomena (Pavlovian conditioning), and yet (ii) the (...)
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  21.  55
    Replies.John Bickle - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):285-296.
    I reply to challenges raised by contributors to this book symposium. Key challenges include (but are not limited to): distancing my new account of reductionism-in-practice from my previous “new wave” account; clarifying my claimed “heuristic” status for higher-level investigations (including cognitive-neuroscientific ones); defending the “reorientation of philosophical desires” I claim to be required by my project; and addressing consideration about normativity.
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  22.  74
    Revisionary Physicalism.John Bickle - 1992 - Biology and Philosophy 7 (4):411-30.
    The focus of much recent debate between realists and eliminativists about the propositional attitudes obscures the fact that a spectrum of positions lies between these celebrated extremes. Appealing to an influential theoretical development in cognitive neurobiology, I argue that there is reason to expect such an “intermediate” outcome. The ontology that emerges is a revisionary physicalism. The argument draws lessons about revisionistic reductions from an important historical example, the reduction of equilibrium thermodynamics to statistical mechanics, and applies them to the (...)
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  23. Understanding Neural Complexity: A Role for Reduction. [REVIEW]John Bickle - 2001 - Minds and Machines 11 (4):467-481.
    Psychoneural reduction is under attack again, only this time from a former ally: cognitive neuroscience. It has become popular to think of the brain as a complex system whose theoretically important properties emerge from dynamic, non-linear interactions between its component parts. ``Emergence'' is supposed to replace reduction: the latter is thought to be incapable of explaining the brain qua complex system. Rather than engage this issue at the level of theories of reduction versus theories of emergence, I here emphasize a (...)
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  24.  30
    Multiple Realizability and Psychophysical Reduction.John Bickle - 1992 - Behavior and Philosophy 20 (1):47-58.
    The argument from multiple realizability is that, because quite diverse physical systems are capable of giving rise to identical psychological phenomena, mental states cannot be reduced to physical states. This influential argument depends upon a theory of reduction that has been defunct in the philosophy of science for at least fifteen years. Better theories are now available.
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  25.  66
    A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism.John Bickle - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):262–264.
  26. Empirical Evidence for a Narrative Concept of Self.John Bickle - 2003 - In Gary D. Fireman, T. E. McVay & Owen J. Flanagan (eds.), Narrative and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
  27. Concepts of Intertheoretic Reduction in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind.John Bickle - manuscript
  28. Precis of Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account[REVIEW]John Bickle - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):231-238.
    This book precis describes the motives behind my recent attempt to bring to bear “ruthlessly reductive” results from cellular and molecular neuroscience onto issues in the philosophy of mind. Since readers of this journal will probably be most interested in results addressing features of conscious experience, I highlight these most prominently. My main challenge is that philosophers (even scientifically-inspired ones) are missing the nature and scope of reductionism in contemporary neuroscience by focusing exclusively on higher-level cognitive neuroscience, and ignoring the (...)
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  29.  53
    Molecular Neuroscience to My Rescue (Again): Reply to Looren de Jong and Schouten.John Bickle - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):487-494.
    In their review essay (published in this issue), Looren de Jong and Schouten take my 2003 book to task for (among other things) neglecting to keep up with the latest developments in my favorite scientific case study (memory consolidation). They claim that these developments have been guided by psychological theorizing and have replaced neurobiology's traditional 'static' view of consolidation with a 'dynamic' alternative. This shows that my 'essential but entirely heuristic' treatment of higher-level cognitive theorizing is a mistaken view of (...)
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  30.  3
    Sounding the Call for External Validity in Decision Neuroscience.Andrew Bollhagen & John Bickle - 2017 - Science & Education 26 (3-4):429-433.
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  31. Phenomenology and Cortical Microstimulation.John Bickle - 2005 - In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 140.
  32.  66
    Introduction.John Bickle - 1992 - Topoi 11 (1):1-4.
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  33. The Effect of Motivation on the Stream of Consciousness: Generalizing From a Neurocomputational Model of Cingulo-Frontal Circuits Controlling Saccadic Eye Movements.Marica Bernstein, Samantha Stiehl & John Bickle - 2000 - In Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (eds.), The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organization. John Benjamins. pp. 133-160.
  34.  33
    Editor's Note.John Bickle - 2000 - Brain and Mind 1 (1):305-.
  35.  62
    Editor's Introduction.John Bickle - 2006 - Synthese 153 (3):1-6.
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  36.  51
    From Sensory Neuroscience to Neurophilosophy: Reflections on Llinas and Churchland's Mind-Brain Continuum.John Bickle - 1997 - Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):523-530.
    Philosophers and psychologists seeking an accessible introduction to current neuroscience will find much value in this volume. Befitting the neuroscientific focus on sensory processes, many essays address explicitly the binding problem. Theoretical and experimental work pertaining to the “temporal synchronicity” solution is prominent. But there are also some surprising implications for current philosophical concerns, such as the intemalism/extemalism debate about representational content, epistemological realism, a “bottom-up” approach to naturalizing intentionality, Humean concerns about the self, and implications from phantom-limb phenomena. Higher-level (...)
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  37.  24
    A Brief History of Neuroscience's Actual Influences on Mind-Brain Reductionism.John Bickle - 2012 - In Hill Christopher & Gozzano Simone (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press. pp. 88.
  38.  42
    Editor's Introduction.John Bickle - 2004 - Synthese 141 (2):1-6.
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  39.  29
    Connectionism, Reduction, and Multiple Realizability.John Bickle - 1995 - Behavior and Philosophy 23 (2):29-39.
    I sketch a theory of cognitive representation from recent "connectionist" cognitive science. I then argue that (i) this theory is reducible to neuroscientific theories, yet (ii) its kinds are multiply realized at a neurobiological level. This argument demonstrates that multiple realizability alone is no barrier to the reducibility of psychological theories. I conclude that the multiple realizability argument, the most influential argument against psychophysical reductionism, should be abandoned.
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  40. Philosophy Neuralized: A Critical Notice of PM Churchland's Neurocomputational Perspective.John Bickle - 1993 - Behavior and Philosophy 20:75-88.
  41.  32
    Book Symposium on John Horgan's the Undiscovered Mind: How the Human Brain Denies Replication, Medication and Explanation. [REVIEW]John Bickle - 2001 - Brain and Mind 2 (2):213-213.
  42.  28
    Editor's Note: State of the Science Article. [REVIEW]John Bickle - 2002 - Brain and Mind 3 (3):381-381.
  43.  6
    Editor's Introduction.John Bickle - 2004 - Synthese 141 (2):153-154.
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  44.  6
    Editor’s Introduction.John Bickle - 2006 - Synthese 153 (3):341-342.
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  45.  13
    Editors' Introduction.John Bickle, Gillian Einstein & Valerie Hardcastle - 2000 - Brain and Mind 1 (1):1-6.
  46.  2
    Editor's Note.John Bickle - 2003 - Brain and Mind 4 (3):305-305.
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  47.  2
    Review: Philosophy Neuralized. [REVIEW]John Bickle - 1993 - Behavior and Philosophy 20:75 - 88.
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  48. Alkire, MT, 370.Laurent Auclair, Jodie A. Baird, Kati Balog, Iris R. Bell, Marcia Bernstein, John Bickle, Steven Ravett Brown, Peter Cariani, Wallace Chafe & Ziya V. Dikman - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9:639.
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  49. Limbic Connectivities with Parietofrontal Circuits Controlling Saccadic Eye Movements: A Neurobiological Model for the Role of Affect in the Stream of Consciousness.Marica Bernstein, Sara Stiehl & John Bickle - 2000 - In Ralph D. Ellis (ed.), The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organization. John Benjamins.
  50. A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism. [REVIEW]John Bickle - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):262-264.
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