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John Bolender [19]John Herbert Bolender [1]
  1. An argument for idealism.John Bolender - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (4):37-61.
    According to Russell, the intrinsic nature of the physical is the same as or deeply analogous to phenomenal qualities, those properties known through acquaintance in one's subjective experience. I defend his position and argue that it implies a kind of idealism, specifically the view that any intrinsic physical property instance can only exist as an object of acquaintance. This follows because a necessary feature of physicality is spatial location, and hence the intrinsic nature of the physical must share with phenomenal (...)
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  2.  87
    Prehistoric cognition by description: A Russellian approach to the upper paleolithic.John Bolender - 2007 - Biology and Philosophy 22 (3):383-399.
    A cultural change occurred roughly 40,000 years ago. For the first time, there was evidence of belief in unseen agents and an afterlife. Before this time, humans did not show widespread evidence of being able to think about objects, persons, and other agents that they had not been in close contact with. I argue that one can explain this transition by appealing to a population increase resulting in greater exoteric (inter-group) communication. The increase in exoteric communication triggered the actualization of (...)
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  3.  61
    A two-tiered cognitive architecture for moral reasoning.John Bolender - 2001 - Biology and Philosophy 16 (3):339-356.
    The view that moral cognition is subserved by a two-tieredarchitecture is defended: Moral reasoning is the result both ofspecialized, informationally encapsulated modules which automaticallyand effortlessly generate intuitions; and of general-purpose,cognitively penetrable mechanisms which enable moral judgment in thelight of the agent's general fund of knowledge. This view is contrastedwith rival architectures of social/moral cognition, such as Cosmidesand Tooby's view that the mind is wholly modular, and it is argued thata two-tiered architecture is more plausible.
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  4.  18
    The Self-Organizing Social Mind.John Bolender & Alan Page Fiske - 2010 - Bradford.
    A proposal that the basic mental models used to structure social interaction result from self-organization in brain activity.
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  5. Nomic universals and particular causal relations: Which are basic and which are derived?John Bolender - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (4):405-410.
    Armstrong holds that a law of nature is a certain sort of structural universal which, in turn, fixes causal relations between particular states of affairs. His claim that these nomic structural universals explain causal relations commits him to saying that such universals are irreducible, not supervenient upon the particular causal relations they fix. However, Armstrong also wants to avoid Plato’s view that a universal can exist without being instantiated, a view which he regards as incompatible with naturalism. This construal of (...)
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  6. The genealogy of the moral modules.John Bolender - 2003 - Minds and Machines 13 (2):233-255.
    This paper defends a cognitive theory of those emotional reactions which motivate and constrain moral judgment. On this theory, moral emotions result from mental faculties specialized for automatically producing feelings of approval or disapproval in response to mental representations of various social situations and actions. These faculties are modules in Fodor's sense, since they are informationally encapsulated, specialized, and contain innate information about social situations. The paper also tries to shed light on which moral modules there are, which of these (...)
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  7.  17
    A forma lógica da linguagem religiosa e ética.John Bolender - 2018 - Trans/Form/Ação 41 (4):155-176.
    Resumo: Ludwig Wittgenstein tentou desenvolver, desde 1929, uma abordagem à filosofia da lógica em termos de escalas de medição. Embora mostrasse grande sensibilidade a diversos tipos de escalas, Wittgenstein não estava bem posicionado para fazer seu projeto render frutos, porque a teoria das medidas não começou a fazer avanços significativos antes do final da década de 1940, e continuou desfrutando de um progresso relevante, até os anos 80. Não obstante, nas suas obras e palestras dos anos 30, Wittgenstein fez diversas (...)
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  8.  23
    A farewell to isms.John Bolender - 2003 - In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action. Imprint Academic. pp. 109.
  9.  18
    Color incompatibility in Wittgenstein and its relationship with Arithmetic.John Bolender - 2020 - Revista Filosófica de Coimbra 29 (58):405-430.
    After Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein realized that elementary propositions may logically conflict with each other, due to the fact that the most elementary measurements may contradict each other. This led to the view that logic consists of various calculi. A calculus consists of measurement scales, each scale being a rule for the application of numbers. These scales determine logical relationships between elementary propositions by reason of arithmetical relations. Attempts to reject Wittgenstein's change in viewpoint, which ignore the relevance of measurement and (...)
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  10.  24
    Cognição por meio de descriç'o e a evolução de linguagem.John Bolender - 2015 - Dissertatio 42:231-260.
    É surpreendente que o ser humano possa formar representações mentais de objetos e propriedades que os seus órgãos dos sentidos não foram projetados pela seleção natural para registrar. Isto não é apenas referência deslocada, uma capacidade partilhada com algumas outras espécies. Afinal, referência deslocada pode ser referência para observáveis. Defendo a plausibilidade de desenvolver um programa de pesquisa para explorar como essa capacidade se refere o conhecimento por descrição em um sentido mais ou menos russelliano. Como tal, é um desdobramento (...)
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  11.  3
    Digital Social Mind.John Bolender - 2011 - Imprint Academic.
    This book argues that relational cognition, a form of social cognition, exhibits digital infinity as does language. Copies of elementary models are combined and recursively nested to form a potentially infinite number of complex models. Just as one posits proof-theoretic grammars in order to account for the digital infinity of language, one also should posit proof-theoretic grammars to account for the digital infinity of relational cognition. Objections to a proof-theoretic approach, often equally applicable both to language and to relational cognition, (...)
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  12. Factual phenomenalism: A supervenience theory.John Bolender - 1998 - Sorites 9 (9):16-31.
    Broadly speaking, phenomenalism is the position that physical facts depend upon sensory facts. Many have thought it to imply that physical statements are translatable into sensory statements. Not surprisingly, the impossibility of such translations led many to abandon phenomenalism in favor of materialism. But this was rash, for if phenomenalism is reformulated as the claim that physical facts supervene upon sensory facts, then translatability is no longer required. Given materialism's failure to account for subjective experience, there has been a revival (...)
     
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  13. Is multiple realizability compatible with antireductionism?John Bolender - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):129-42.
    Jaegwon Kim attempts to pose a dilemma for anyone who would deny mind/body reductionism, namely that one must either advocate the wholesale reduction of psychology to physical science or the sundering of psychology into distinct fields each one of which is reducible to physical science. Supposedly, the denial of mind/body reduction is not an option. My aim is to show that this is not a genuine dilemma, and that antireductionism is an option, if one recognizes that natural-kind individuation is not (...)
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  14. O limite epistêmico humano.John Bolender (ed.) - 2021 - Editora Fênix.
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  15. On Terrorism.John Bolender - unknown
    At the moment, this compiled interview finds a home at Jump Arts Journal, but it will be an ongoing matter at the for-fee section of Zmag.org. Many would-be champions of Chomsky find themselves of similar political outlook, but find the professor a wee on the didactic side, as well as a media machine unto himself. I am one of these, but don’t find this to be a necessarily bad thing, believe the discussion worthy and significant, and, asJAJ deals will all (...)
     
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  16. (1 other version)Real algorithms: A defense of cognitivism.John Bolender - 1998 - Philosophical Inquiry 20 (3-4):41-58.
    John Searle dismisses the attempt to understand thought as a form of computation, on the grounds that it is not scientific. Science is concerned with intrinsic properties, i.e. those features which are not observer relative, e.g. science is concerned with mass but not with beauty. Computation, according to Searle, presupposes the property of following an algorithm, but algorithmicity is normative, by reason of appealing to function, and hence not intrinsic. I argue that Searle's critique presupposes the folk notion of function, (...)
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  17.  68
    Two accounts of moral diversity: The cognitive science of pluralism and absolutism.John Bolender - 2004 - [Journal (on-Line/Unpaginated)] 3.
    Advances in cognitive science are relevant to the debate between moral pluralism and absolutism. Parametric structure, which plausibly underlies syntax, gives some idea of how pluralism might be true. The cognitive mechanisms underlying mathematical intelligence give some idea of how far absolutism is right. Advances in cognitive science should help us better understand the extent to which we are divided and how far we are potentially harmonious in our values.
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  18.  35
    Três tipos de forma lógica.John Bolender - 2017 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 62 (3):481-507.
    Em linguística gerativa, distinguem-se várias propriedades formais dos sistemas representacionais: a infinidade discreta, a finitude discreta e a infinidade do contínuo. Não é frequente filósofos aplicarem essas distinções ao estudo da forma lógica. O fato de essas distinções serem raramente aplicadas resultou em os filósofos pressuporem, geralmente sem discutir, que todas as formas lógicas apresentam una infinidade discreta, como o faz a linguagem natural. Este artigo defende a existência de outros tipos de forma lógica, além daquela que apresenta infinidade discreta. (...)
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