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  1. Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    John Campbell investigates how consciousness of the world explains our ability to think about the world; how our ability to think about objects we can see depends on our capacity for conscious visual attention to those things. He illuminates classical problems about thought, reference, and experience by looking at the underlying psychological mechanisms on which conscious attention depends.
  2. Past, Space, and Self.John Campbell - 1994 - MIT Press.
    In this book John Campbell shows that the general structural features of human thought can be seen as having their source in the distinctive ways in which we...
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  3. Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):490-494.
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  4. Berkeley's Puzzle: What Does Experience Teach Us?John Campbell & Quassim Cassam (eds.) - 2014 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
    Sensory experience seems to be the basis of our knowledge of mind-independent things. The puzzle is to understand how that can be: how does our sensory experience enable us to conceive of them as mind-independent? This book is a debate between two rival approaches to understanding the relationship between concepts and sensory experience.
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  5. Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):191-194.
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  6. A simple view of colour.John Campbell - 1993 - In John J. Haldane & C. Wright (eds.), Reality: Representation and Projection. Oxford University Press. pp. 257-268.
    Physics tells us what is objectively there. It has no place for the colours of things. So colours are not objectively there. Hence, if there is such a thing at all, colour is mind-dependent. This argument forms the background to disputes over whether common sense makes a mistake about colours. It is assumed that..
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  7. Schizophrenia, the space of reasons, and thinking as a motor process.John Campbell - 1999 - The Monist 82 (4):609-625.
    Ordinarily, if you say something like “I see a comet,” you might make a mistake about whether it is a comet that you see, but you could not be right about whether it is a comet but wrong about who is seeing it. There cannot be an “error of identification” in this case. In making a judgement like, “I see a comet,” there are not two steps, finding out who is seeing the thing and finding out what it is that (...)
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  8. a variational approach to niche construction.Axel Constant, Maxwell Ramstead, Samuel Veissière, John Campbell & Karl Friston - 2018 - Journals of the Royal Society Interface 15:1-14.
    In evolutionary biology, niche construction is sometimes described as a genuine evolutionary process whereby organisms, through their activities and regulatory mechanisms, modify their environment such as to steer their own evolutionary trajectory, and that of other species. There is ongoing debate, however, on the extent to which niche construction ought to be considered a bona fide evolutionary force, on a par with natural selection. Recent formulations of the variational free-energy principle as applied to the life sciences describe the properties of (...)
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  9. Consciousness and Reference.John Campbell - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
  10. Rationality, meaning, and the analysis of delusion.John Campbell - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):89-100.
  11. Is sense transparent?John Campbell - 1988 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88:273-292.
  12. The Ownership of Thoughts.John Campbell - 2002 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):35-39.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.1 (2002) 35-39 [Access article in PDF] The Ownership of Thoughts John Campbell Keywords: schizophrenia, thought insertion, immunity to error through misidentification. SYDNEY SHOEMAKER FORMULATED a basic point about first-person, present-tense ascriptions of psychological states when he declared that they are, in general, immune to error through misidentification (Shoemaker 1984). Assuming Shoemaker's point to be correct, the puzzle it raises is this: how are we (...)
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  13.  33
    Precis of Past, Space and SelfPast, Space and Shelf.John Campbell - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):633.
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  14. Berkeley's puzzle.John Campbell - 2002 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. New York: Oxford University Press.
    But say you,surely there is nothing easier than to imagine trees,for instance,in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no dif?culty in it:but what is all this,I beseech you,more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of anyone that may perceive them? But do you not yourself perceive or think of (...)
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  15. Sense, Reference and Selective Attention.John Campbell & Michael Martin - 1997 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (71):55-98.
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1997), 55-74, with a reply by Michael Martin.
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  16. Control variables and mental causation.John Campbell - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1pt1):15-30.
    I introduce the notion of a ‘control variable’ which gives us a way of seeing how mental causation could be an unproblematic case of causation in general, rather than being some sui generis form of causation. Psychological variables may be the control variables for a system for which there are no physical control variables, even in a deterministic physical world. That explains how there can be psychological causation without physical causation, even in a deterministic physical world.
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  17. An interventionist approach to causation in psychology.John Campbell - 2006 - In Alison Gopnik & Larry J. Schulz (eds.), Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy and Computation. Oxford University Press. pp. 58--66.
  18. Demonstrative Reference, the Relational View of Experience, and the Proximality Principle.John Campbell - 2010 - In Robin Jeshion (ed.), New Essays on Singular Thought. Oxford University Press.
     
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  19. Immunity to error through misidentification and the meaning of a referring term.John Campbell - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2):89-104.
  20. L. A. Paul's Transformative Experience.John Campbell - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):787-793.
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  21. Joint attention and common knowledge.John Campbell - 2005 - In Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 287--297.
    This chapter makes the case for a relational version of an experientialist view of joint attention. On an experientialist view of joint attention, shifting from solitary attention to joint attention involves a shift in the nature of your perceptual experience of the object attended to. A relational analysis of such a view explains the latter shift in terms of the idea that, in joint attention, it is a constituent of your experience that the other person is, with you, jointly attending (...)
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  22. The Role of Sensory Experience in Propositional Knowledge.John Campbell - 2014 - In Berkeley’s Puzzle: What Does Experience Teach Us? Oxford University Press. pp. 76–99.
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  23. The role of sensory experience in propositional knowledge.John Campbell - 2014 - In John Campbell & Quassim Cassam (eds.), Berkeley's Puzzle: What Does Experience Teach Us? Oxford University Press.
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  24. Institutional analysis and the role of ideas in political economy.John L. Campbell - 1998 - Theory and Society 27 (3):377-409.
  25. Causation in psychiatry.John Campbell - 2008 - In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology. Johns Hopkins University Press. pp. 196–216.
  26. The structure of time in autobiographical memory.John Campbell - 1997 - European Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):105-17.
    Much of ordinary memory is autobiographical; memory of what one saw and did, where and when. It may derive from your own past experiences, or from what other people told you about your past life. It may be phenomenologically rich, redolent of that autumn afternoon so long ago, or a few austere reports of what happened. But all autobiographical memory is first-person memory, stateable using ‘I’. It is a memory you would express by saying, ‘I remember I . . .’.
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  27.  22
    The Structure of Time in Autobiographical Memory.John Campbell - 2002 - European Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):105-118.
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  28. Visual Attention and the Epistemic Role of Consciousness.John Campbell - 2011 - In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 323.
  29.  22
    Sense, Reference and Selective Attention.John Campbell & Michael Martin - 1997 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71:55-98.
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  30. Transparency vs. revelation in color perception.John Campbell - 2005 - Philosophical Topics 33 (1):105-115.
    What knowledge of the colors does perception of the colors provide? My first aim in this essay is to characterize the way in which color experience seems to provide knowledge of colors. This in turn tells us something about what it takes for there to be colors. Color experience provides knowledge of the aspect of the world that is being acted on when we, or some external force, act on the color of an object and thus make a difference to (...)
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  31.  29
    Functional Role and Truth Conditions.Ned Block & John Campbell - 1988 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88 (1):273-292.
    Ned Block, John Campbell; Functional Role and Truth Conditions, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 88, Issue 1, 1 June 1988, Pages 273–292, https:/.
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  32. The role of physical objects in spatial thinking.John Campbell - 1993 - In Naomi M. Eilan, R. McCarthy & M. W. Brewer (eds.), Problems in the Philosophy and Psychology of Spatial Representation. Blackwell.
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  33.  98
    Malfunction and Mental Illness.Brendan A. Maher, A. W. Young, Philip Gerrans, John Campbell, Kai Vogeley, Valerie Gray Hardcastle, Owen Flanagan, Robert L. Woolfolk, Barry Smith & Joëlle Proust - 1999 - The Monist 82 (4):658-670.
    For years a debate has raged within the various literatures of philosophy, psychiatry, and psychology over whether, and to what degree, the concepts that characterize psychopathology are social constructions that reflect cultural values. While the majority position among philosophers has been normativist, i.e., that the conception of a mental disorder is value-laden, a vocal and cogent minority have argued that psychopathology results from malfunctions that can be described by terminology that is objective and scientific. Scientists and clinicians have tended to (...)
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  34.  39
    What does rationality have to do with psychological causation? Propositional attitudes as mechanisms and as control variables.John Campbell - 2009 - In Matthew Broome & Lisa Bortolotti (eds.), Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 137--149.
  35. Knowledge and understanding.John Campbell - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (126):17-34.
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  36. The simple view of colour.John Campbell - 1997 - In Alex Byrne & David Hilbert (eds.), Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color. MIT Press. pp. 177-90.
    Physics tells us what is objectively there. It has no place for the colours of things. So colours are not objectively there. Hence, if there is such a thing at all, colour is mind-dependent. This argument forms the background to disputes over whether common sense makes a mistake about colours. It is assumed that..
     
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  37.  12
    Meaning, Quantification, Necessity. Themes in Philosophical Logic.John Campbell - 1983 - Philosophical Quarterly 33 (130):107-108.
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  38. Reference as attention.John Campbell - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):265-76.
  39. An Object-Dependent Perspective on Joint Attention.John Campbell - forthcoming - In Axel Seemann (ed.), Joint Attention: New Developments in Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience. The MIT Press.
  40.  15
    Transparency versus Revelation in Color Perception.John Campbell - 2005 - Philosophical Topics 33 (1):105-115.
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  41. Tyler Burge: Origins of objectivity.John Campbell - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (5):269-285.
  42. Interventionism, control variables and causation in the qualitative world.John Campbell - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):426-445.
  43. The role of physical objects in spatial thinking.John Campbell - 1999 - In Naomi Eilan, Rosaleen McCarthy & Bill Brewer (eds.), Spatial representation: problems in philosophy and psychology. Clarendon Press.
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  44.  73
    Causation in Psychology.John Campbell - 2020 - Harvard University Press.
    "A blab droid is a robot with a body shaped like a pizza box, a pair of treads, and a smiley face. Guided by an onboard video camera, it roams hotel lobbies and conference centers, asking questions in the voice of a seven-year-old. "Can you help me?" "What is the worst thing you've ever done?" "Who in the world do you love most?" People pour their hearts out in response. This droid prompts the question of what we can hope from (...)
  45. Can philosophical accounts of altruism accommodate experimental data on helping behaviour?John Campbell - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (1):26 – 45.
    Philosophers often discuss altruism, how it is to be understood, explained, justified, evaluated, etc. Few refer to any experimental data on helping behaviour. I will argue that some of these data seem at least initially to present a challenge to various philosophical accounts of altruism. Put very broadly, when one looks at various philosophical accounts of altruism in light of various data on helping behaviour, one might wonder whether many philosophical accounts fall prey to the 'fundamental attribution error', overestimating people's (...)
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    I_– _John Campbell.John Campbell - 1997 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):55-74.
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  47. Molyneux's question.John Campbell - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:301-318.
    in Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception (Philosophical Issues vol. 7) (Atascadero: Ridgeview 1996), 301-318, with replies by Brian Loar and Kirk Ludwig.
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  48.  44
    I–John Campbell.John Campbell - 1997 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):55-74.
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  49.  93
    Memory demonstratives.John Campbell - 2001 - In Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormack (eds.), Time and memory: issues in philosophy and psychology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 177--194.
  50.  22
    Death and Well-Being.John Bigelow, John Campbell & Robert Pargetter - 1990 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2):119-40.
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