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John H. Campbell
University of California, Los Angeles
  1. Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):490-494.
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  2. Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):191-194.
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  3.  53
    Berkeley's Puzzle: What Does Experience Teach Us?John Campbell & Quassim Cassam - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Sensory experience seems to be the basis of our knowledge of mind-independent things. The puzzle is to understand how that can be: how does our sensory experience enable us to conceive of them as mind-independent? This book is a debate between two rival approaches to understanding the relationship between concepts and sensory experience.
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  4. A Simple View of Colour.John Campbell - 1993 - In John J. Haldane & C. Wright (eds.), Reality: Representation and Projection. Oxford University Press. pp. 257-268.
    Physics tells us what is objectively there. It has no place for the colours of things. So colours are not objectively there. Hence, if there is such a thing at all, colour is mind-dependent. This argument forms the background to disputes over whether common sense makes a mistake about colours. It is assumed that..
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  5. Schizophrenia, the Space of Reasons, and Thinking as a Motor Process.John Campbell - 1999 - The Monist 82 (4):609-625.
    Ordinarily, if you say something like “I see a comet,” you might make a mistake about whether it is a comet that you see, but you could not be right about whether it is a comet but wrong about who is seeing it. There cannot be an “error of identification” in this case. In making a judgement like, “I see a comet,” there are not two steps, finding out who is seeing the thing and finding out what it is that (...)
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  6. A Variational Approach to Niche Construction.Axel Constant, Maxwell Ramstead, Samuel Veissière, John Campbell & Karl Friston - 2018 - Journals of the Royal Society Interface 15:1-14.
    In evolutionary biology, niche construction is sometimes described as a genuine evolutionary process whereby organisms, through their activities and regulatory mechanisms, modify their environment such as to steer their own evolutionary trajectory, and that of other species. There is ongoing debate, however, on the extent to which niche construction ought to be considered a bona fide evolutionary force, on a par with natural selection. Recent formulations of the variational free-energy principle as applied to the life sciences describe the properties of (...)
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  7. Consciousness and Reference.John Campbell - 2011 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
  8. The Ownership of Thoughts.John Campbell - 2002 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):35-39.
  9. Berkeley's Puzzle.John Campbell - 2002 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. MIT Press.
    But say you,surely there is nothing easier than to imagine trees,for instance,in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no dif?culty in it:but what is all this,I beseech you,more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of anyone that may perceive them? But do you not yourself perceive or think of (...)
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  10. Control Variables and Mental Causation.John Campbell - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1pt1):15-30.
    I introduce the notion of a ‘control variable’ which gives us a way of seeing how mental causation could be an unproblematic case of causation in general, rather than being some sui generis form of causation. Psychological variables may be the control variables for a system for which there are no physical control variables, even in a deterministic physical world. That explains how there can be psychological causation without physical causation, even in a deterministic physical world.
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  11. Is Sense Transparent?John Campbell - 1987 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88:273-292.
  12.  96
    L. A. Paul's Transformative Experience.John Campbell - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):787-793.
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    Schizophrenia, the Space of Reasons, and Thinking as a Motor Process.John Campbell - 1999 - The Monist 82 (4):609-625.
    Ordinarily, if you say something like “I see a comet,” you might make a mistake about whether it is a comet that you see, but you could not be right about whether it is a comet but wrong about who is seeing it. There cannot be an “error of identification” in this case. In making a judgement like, “I see a comet,” there are not two steps, finding out who is seeing the thing and finding out what it is that (...)
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  14. An Interventionist Approach to Causation in Psychology.John Campbell - 2006 - In Alison Gopnik & Larry J. Schulz (eds.), Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy and Computation. Oxford University Press. pp. 58--66.
  15. Institutional Analysis and the Role of Ideas in Political Economy.John L. Campbell - 1998 - Theory and Society 27 (3):377-409.
  16. Tyler Burge: Origins of Objectivity.John Campbell - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (5):269-285.
  17. Transparency Vs. Revelation in Color Perception.John Campbell - 2005 - Philosophical Topics 33 (1):105-115.
    What knowledge of the colors does perception of the colors provide? My first aim in this essay is to characterize the way in which color experience seems to provide knowledge of colors. This in turn tells us something about what it takes for there to be colors. Color experience provides knowledge of the aspect of the world that is being acted on when we, or some external force, act on the color of an object and thus make a difference to (...)
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  18. Sensorimotor Knowledge and Naïve Realism. [REVIEW]John Campbell - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):666 - 673.
  19. Sense, Reference and Selective Attention.John Campbell - 1997 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (71):55-98.
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1997), 55-74, with a reply by Michael Martin.
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  20. Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and the Meaning of a Referring Term.John Campbell - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2):89-104.
  21. What Does Rationality Have to Do with Psychological Causation? Propositional Attitudes as Mechanisms and as Control Variables.John Campbell - 2009 - In Matthew Broome Lisa Bortolotti (ed.), Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 137--149.
     
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  22.  59
    Cognitive Theories of Mental Illness.Brendan A. Maher, A. W. Young, Philip Gerrans, John Campbell, Kai Vogeley, Valerie Gray Hardcastle, Owen Flanagan, Robert L. Woolfolk, Barry Smith & Joëlle Proust - 1999 - The Monist 82 (4):658-670.
    For years a debate has raged within the various literatures of philosophy, psychiatry, and psychology over whether, and to what degree, the concepts that characterize psychopathology are social constructions that reflect cultural values. While the majority position among philosophers has been normativist, i.e., that the conception of a mental disorder is value-laden, a vocal and cogent minority have argued that psychopathology results from malfunctions that can be described by terminology that is objective and scientific. Scientists and clinicians have tended to (...)
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  23. Demonstrative Reference, the Relational View of Experience, and the Proximality Principle.John Campbell - 2010 - In Robin Jeshion (ed.), New Essays on Singular Thought. Oxford University Press.
     
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  24. Joint Attention and Common Knowledge.John Campbell - 2005 - In Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 287--297.
    This chapter makes the case for a relational version of an experientialist view of joint attention. On an experientialist view of joint attention, shifting from solitary attention to joint attention involves a shift in the nature of your perceptual experience of the object attended to. A relational analysis of such a view explains the latter shift in terms of the idea that, in joint attention, it is a constituent of your experience that the other person is, with you, jointly attending (...)
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  25. Causation in Psychiatry.John Campbell - 2008 - In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology. Johns Hopkins University Press.
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    Visual Attention and the Epistemic Role of Consciousness.John Campbell - 2011 - In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 323.
  27. Reference as Attention.John Campbell - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):265-76.
  28. Manipulating Colour: Pounding an Almond.John Campbell - 2006 - In T. S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 31--48.
    It seems a compelling idea that experience of colour plays some role in our having concepts of the various colours, but in trying to explain the role experience plays the first thing we have to describe is what sort of colour experience matters here. I will argue that the kind of experience that matters is conscious attention to the colours of objects as an aspect of them on which direct intervention is selectively possible. As I will explain this idea, it (...)
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  29. The Role of Physical Objects in Spatial Thinking.John Campbell - 1993 - In Naomi M. Eilan, R. McCarthy & M. W. Brewer (eds.), Problems in the Philosophy and Psychology of Spatial Representation. Blackwell.
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  30. What's the Role of Spatial Awareness in Visual Perception of Objects?John Campbell - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (5):548–562.
    I set out two theses. The first is Lynn Robertson’s: (a) spatial awareness is a cause of object perception. A natural counterpoint is: (b) spatial awareness is a cause of your ability to make accurate verbal reports about a perceived object. Zenon Pylyshyn has criticized both. I argue that nonetheless, the burden of the evidence supports both (a) and (b). Finally, I argue conscious visual perception of an object has a different causal role to both: (i) non-conscious perception of the (...)
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  31. Death and Well-Being.John Bigelow, John Campbell & Robert Pargetter - 1990 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2):119-40.
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    Precis of Past, Space and SelfPast, Space and Shelf.John Campbell - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):633.
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  33. Does Visual Reference Depend on Sortal Classification? Reply to Clark.John Campbell - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (2):221-237.
  34. Relational Vs Kantian Responses to Berkeley's Puzzle.John Campbell - 2011 - In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
     
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  35. Cogito Ergo Sum: Christopher Peacocke and John Campbell: II—Lichtenberg and the Cogito.John Campbell - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (3pt3):361-378.
    Our use of ‘I’, or something like it, is implicated in our self-regarding emotions, in the concern to survive, and so seems basic to ordinary human life. But why does that pattern of use require a referring term? Don't Lichtenberg's formulations show how we could have our ordinary pattern of use here without the first person? I argue that what explains our compulsion to regard the first person as a referring term is our ordinary causal thinking, which requires us to (...)
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  36. Information-Processing, Phenomenal Consciousness and Molyneux's Question.John Campbell - 2005 - In José Luis Bermúdez (ed.), Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Ordinary common sense suggests that we have just one set of shape concepts that we apply indifferently on the bases of sight and touch. Yet we understand the shape concepts, we know what shape properties are, only because we have experience of shapes. And phenomenal experience of shape in vision and phenomenal experience of shape in touch seem to be quite different. So how can the shape concepts we grasp and use on the basis of vision be the same as (...)
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  37. The Simple View of Colour.John Campbell - 1997 - In Alex Byrne & David Hilbert (eds.), Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color. MIT Press. pp. 177-90.
    Physics tells us what is objectively there. It has no place for the colours of things. So colours are not objectively there. Hence, if there is such a thing at all, colour is mind-dependent. This argument forms the background to disputes over whether common sense makes a mistake about colours. It is assumed that..
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  38.  78
    Can Philosophical Accounts of Altruism Accommodate Experimental Data on Helping Behaviour?John Campbell - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (1):26 – 45.
    Philosophers often discuss altruism, how it is to be understood, explained, justified, evaluated, etc. Few refer to any experimental data on helping behaviour. I will argue that some of these data seem at least initially to present a challenge to various philosophical accounts of altruism. Put very broadly, when one looks at various philosophical accounts of altruism in light of various data on helping behaviour, one might wonder whether many philosophical accounts fall prey to the 'fundamental attribution error', overestimating people's (...)
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    Sense, Reference and Selective Attention.John Campbell & Michael Martin - 1997 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71:55-98.
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  40.  35
    Sortals and the Binding Problem.John Campbell - 2006 - In Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality. Oxford University Press. pp. 203--18.
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  41.  75
    A Straightforward Solution to Berkeley's Puzzle.John Campbell - 2012 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 18 (1):31-49.
  42.  11
    Sense, Reference and Selective Attention.John Campbell & Michael Martin - 1997 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 71:55-98.
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  43.  10
    The Structure of Time in Autobiographical Memory.John Campbell - 1997 - European Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):105-118.
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  44. Molyneux's Question.John Campbell - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:301-318.
    in Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception (Philosophical Issues vol. 7) (Atascadero: Ridgeview 1996), 301-318, with replies by Brian Loar and Kirk Ludwig.
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    Sense, Reference and Selective Attention: John Campbell.John Campbell - 1997 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (1):55-74.
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  46.  21
    I–John Campbell.John Campbell - 1997 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):55-74.
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  47. Susanna Siegel’s the Contents of Visual Experience.John Campbell - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):819-826.
  48.  95
    Interventionism, Control Variables and Causation in the Qualitative World.John Campbell - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):426-445.
  49.  53
    Memory Demonstratives.John Campbell - 2001 - In Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormark (eds.), Time and Memory. Oxford University Press. pp. 177--194.
  50. Comment: Psychological Causation Without Physical Causation.John Campbell - 2008 - In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology. Johns Hopkins University Press. pp. 184--195.
     
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