IN 1903, commenting on an article he had written more than thirty years before, Charles Peirce said that he had changed his mind on many issues at least a half-dozen times but had "never been able to think differently on that question of nominalism and realism" (1.20). For anyone acquainted with Peirce's writings, this remark alone could justify a study of "that question.".

Scotus argues that the will of a rational agent has two basic inclinations: for benefit and for justice. Having examined in other articles why he picks these two, I ask here how the combination produces a unified thing. At one point, Scotus proposes an analogy for the two inclinations with the relations of genus and differentia which produce a unified definition. In arguing that the analogy does not succeed, I hope to have given a clearer understanding of the theory of (...) dual affections. (shrink)