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  1. Things That Make Things Reasonable.John Gibbons - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):335-361.
    One fairly common view about practical reason has it that whether you have a reason to act is not determined by what you know, or believe, or are justified in believing. Your reasons are determined by the facts. Perhaps there are two kinds of reasons, and however it goes with motivating reasons, normative reasons are determined by the facts, not your take on the facts. One fairly common version of this view has it that what's reasonable for you to do (...)
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  2.  58
    The Norm of Belief.John Gibbons - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
    John Gibbons presents an original account of epistemic normativity. Belief seems to come with a built-in set of standards or norms. One task is to say where these standards come from. But the more basic task is to say what those standards are. In some sense, beliefs are supposed to be true. Perhaps they’re supposed to constitute knowledge. And in some sense, they really ought to be reasonable. Which, if any of these is the fundamental norm of belief? The book (...)
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  3.  93
    Access Externalism.John Gibbons - 2006 - Mind 115 (457):19-39.
    This paper argues for externalism about justification on the basis of thought experiments. I present cases in which two individuals are intrinsically and introspectively indistinguishable and in which intuitively, one is justified in believing that p while the other is not. I also examine an argument for internalism based on the ideas that we have privileged access to whether or not our own beliefs are justified and that only internalism is compatible with this privilege. I isolate what I take to (...)
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  4. Mental Causation Without Downward Causation.John Gibbons - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (1):79-103.
    The problem of downward causation is that an intuitive response to an intuitive picture leads to counterintuitive results. Suppose a mental event, m1, causes another mental event, m2. Unless the mental and the physical are completely independent, there will be a physical event in your brain or your body or the physical world as a whole that underlies this event. The mental event occurs at least partly in virtue of the physical event’s occurring. And the same goes for m2 [2] (...)
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  5. Knowledge in Action.John Gibbons - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):579-600.
    This paper argues that the role of knowledge in the explanation and production of intentional action is as indispensable as the roles of belief and desire. If we are interested in explaining intentional actions rather than intentions or attempts, we need to make reference to more than the agent’s beliefs and desires. It is easy to see how the truth of your beliefs, or perhaps, facts about a setting will be involved in the explanation of an action. If you believe (...)
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  6.  97
    Externalism and Knowledge of Content.John Gibbons - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (3):287.
    If the contents of our thoughts are partly determined by facts outside our heads, can we still know those contents directly, without investigating our environment? What if we were surreptitiously switched to Twin-Earth? Would we know the contents of our thoughts under these unusual circumstances? By looking carefully at what determines the content of a second-order thought, a candidate for self-knowledge, the paper argues that we can know the contents of our thoughts directly, even after being switched. Learning about the (...)
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  7. Reason in Action.John Gibbons - 2009 - In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press. pp. 72.
    There is a problem with a very common theory of the nature of action. The problem stems from the fact that causation by practical reasons may be a necessary condition for being an intentional action, but it can’t be a sufficient condition. After all, desires and intentions are caused by practical reasons that rationalize them, but they’re clearly not actions. Even if all actions are events or changes and desires and intentions aren’t, the acquistion of a desire or an intention (...)
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  8.  11
    Identity Without Supervenience.John Gibbons - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 70.
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  9. Seeing What You're Doing.John Gibbons - 2010 - In T. Szabo Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    We have some kind of privileged access to our own intentional actions. At least typically, if we're doing it on purpose, we know what we're doing. This privilege consists in the fact that the facts in virtue of which you're intentionally acting are not independent of the facts in virtue of which you're in a position to know what you're doing. An explanation of this privilege is an explanation of the relevant sort of nonindependence. In this paper, I try to (...)
     
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  10. You Gotta Do What You Gotta Do.John Gibbons - 2009 - Noûs 43 (1):157-177.
    One question about the role of the mental in the determination of practical reason concerns the pro-attitudes: can any set of beliefs, without the help of a desire, rationalize or make reasonable a desire, intention, attempt, or intentional action? After criticizing Michael Smith’s argument for a negative answer to this question, I present two arguments in favor of a positive answer. Another question about the role of the mental in the determination of practical reason concerns belief: what gives you a (...)
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  11. Qualia: They're Not What They Seem.John Gibbons - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (3):397-428.
    Whether or not qualia are ways things seem, the view that qualia have the properties typically attributed to them is unjustified. Ways things seem do not have many of the properties commonly attributed to them. For example, inverted ways things seem are impossible. If ways things seem do not have the features commonly attributed to them, and qualia do have those same features, this looks like good reason to distinguish the two. But if your reasons for believing that qualia have (...)
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  12.  18
    Introspecting Knowledge.John Gibbons - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    If we use “introspection” just as a label for that essentially first-person way we have of knowing about our own mental states, then it’s pretty obvious that if there is such a thing as introspection, we know on that basis what we believe, and want, and intend, at least in many ordinary cases. I assume there is such a thing as introspection. So I think the hard question is how it works. But can you know that you know on the (...)
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  13.  69
    Externalism and Knowledge of the Attitudes.John Gibbons - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):13-28.
    Knowledge of your own propositional attitudes requires at least two things. You need to know the content of the relevant mental state, and you need to know what attitude you take towards that content. If it is possible to mistake a wish for a belief, this is a mistake about the attitude, not the content. One need not believe that we are generally infallible about our mental states to hold that, typically, when I sincerely say..
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  14.  72
    Identity Without Supervenience.John Gibbons - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 70 (1):59-79.
  15. Language and the Law.John Gibbons (ed.) - 1994 - Longman.
  16. Levels.John Gibbons - unknown
    Natural realism is the view that there is a real, metaphysical distinction between those properties, perhaps like being a quark, that are natural kinds and those, perhaps like being either red or round that are not. This is a fairly respectable doctrine, though by no means universally accepted. Perhaps slightly less well entrenched is the idea that there is a relation of causal relevance that sometimes holds between a property of a cause and a property of an effect. If causation (...)
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  17.  1
    Some Sicknesses and Thelr Saints.John Gibbons - 1929 - New Blackfriars 10 (115):1392-1395.
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  18.  1
    The Pope's Foreign Mercenaries.John Gibbons - 1929 - New Blackfriars 10 (110):1068-1075.
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  19. Book Review. [REVIEW]John Gibbons - 1983 - Theory, Culture and Society 1 (3):175-177.
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  20. Celestial Science, Total Creation.John Presley[from old catalog] Gibbons - 1959 - New York: Pageant Press.
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  21. Educating the Prince: Essays in Honor of Harvey Mansfield.John Gibbons, Nathan Tarcov, Ralph Hancock, Jerry Weinberger, Paul A. Cantor, Mark Blitz, James W. Muller, Kenneth Weinstein, Clifford Orwin, Arthur Melzer, Susan Meld Shell, Peter Minowitz, James Stoner, Jeremy Rabkin, David F. Epstein, Charles R. Kesler, Glen E. Thurow, R. Shep Melnick, Jessica Korn & Robert P. Kraynak - 2000 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    For forty years, Harvey Mansfield has been worth reading. Whether plumbing the depths of MachiavelliOs Discourses or explaining what was at stake in Bill ClintonOs impeachment, MansfieldOs work in political philosophy and political science has set the standard. In Educating the Prince, twenty-one of his students, themselves distinguished scholars, try to live up to that standard. Their essays offer penetrating analyses of Machiavellianism, liberalism, and America., all of them informed by MansfieldOs own work. The volume also includes a bibliography of (...)
     
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  22. Language and Disadvantage Before the Law.John Gibbons - 1994 - In Language and the Law. Longman.
  23. Language Constructing Law.John Gibbons - 1994 - In Language and the Law. Longman. pp. 3--10.