A passage on the origin of property in Grotius, De iure praedae , pp. 226-230 [Note 1] seems to contain echoes of the controversy between pope John XXII and William of Ockham on Franciscan poverty. Grotius's note (b) on p. 227 refers to the decretals..

Philosophical Commentary on the Words of the Gospel 'Compel Them to Come In', written by the Protestant philosopher Pierre Bayle in 1686-88, was a classic statement of the case for toleration at a time of extreme persecution. This collection of Kilcullen's writings on Bayle's work examines a wide range of 17th-century religious and philosophical issues, including Bayle's arguments, Arnauld's attack on Jesuit moral theories similar to Bayle's, the uses and limitations of "reciprocity" arguments, the "ethics of belief," and questions of (...) moral responsibility and free will. (shrink)

A line of thought suggested by certain passages in Mill's writings runs as follows. [Note 1] Virtue should be regarded as an end in itself outranking even happiness, because virtue so regarded guarantees certain modes of feeling and conduct, and the benefits resulting from this guarantee make up for what is lost in the odd cases in which virtue and happiness conflict. Notice that benefits result from the guarantee, not only from the conduct guaranteed. In this paper I will explore (...) this theory in comparison with certain other versions of utilitarianism. I will illustrate my argument by reference to Mill, who, I believe, held substantially this theory; but exegesis is not my present purpose. (shrink)

This is a critical study of the arguments of Pierre Bayle’s Commentaire philosophique by which he tries to show that someone whose conscience is in error has a moral right (of a limited kind) to do what it commands, and that the act may be morally good; and that others, such as the government, may nevertheless have the right, and a duty, to prevent the act by force.

The long war between Israel and the Palestinians is not the root cause of all conflicts between Islam and the West, but it exacerbates every such conflict. From Northern Europe through North Africa, the Middle East, Pakistan, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, and down to Australia, there are violent opponents of “the West” motivated, in part, by indignation at the..

First, something about the word. 'Bureau' (French, borrowed into German) is a desk, or by extension an office (as in 'I will be at the office tomorrow'; 'I work at the Bureau of Statistics'). 'Bureaucracy' is rule conducted from a desk or office, i.e. by the preparation and dispatch of written documents - or, these days, their electronic equivalent. In the office are kept records of communications sent and received, the files or archives, consulted in preparing new ones. This kind (...) of rule is of course not found in the ancient classifications of kinds of government: monarchy, aristocracy, democracy - and bureaucracy? In fact it does not belong in such a classification. It is a servant of government, a means by which a monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, or other form of government, rules. Those who invented the word wanted to suggest that the servant was trying to become the master. Weber is of course aware of this tendency; in fact he attacked the pretensions of the Prussian bureaucracy to be an objective and neutral servant of society, above politics, and emphasized that every bureaucracy has interests of its own, and connections with other social strata (especially among the upper classes); see Beetham, chapter 3. But formally and in theory the bureaucracy is merely a means, and this is largely true also in practice: someone must provide policy direction and back the bureaucrat up (if necessary) with force. 'At the top of a bureaucratic organization, there is necessarily an element which is at least not purely bureaucratic', SEO, p. 335, to give policy direction. (shrink)

A review of The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Thought, vol. 2.

This is a critical study of the arguments of Pierre Bayle’s Commentaire philosophique by which he tries to show that someone whose conscience is in error has a moral right (of a limited kind) to do what it commands, and that the act may be morally good; and that others, such as the government, may nevertheless have the right, and a duty, to prevent the act by force.

Like the American system ours is federal: i.e., there are two levels of government, neither of which can change the powers of the other or make laws within certain fields assigned to the other. The British system is 'unitary': the British parliament can make laws on any matter, local government has whatever powers the national government delegates to it. Like the British, ours is a system of responsible government . The Government (the Prime Minister and cabinet) is 'responsible' to parliament. (...) This means that at any time, simply by vote of no confidence, carried on whatever grounds, the parliament can remove the Government from office or force it to call an election. In the American system the head of the executive Government, the President, cannot be removed by the Congress (except by impeachment, which requires a kind of trial). As in the British system, a general election can be called at any time (by the Governor General, on the advice of the Prime Minister). There is a maximum term by which an election must be called, but an election can be held short of term. This makes the parliament responsible to the electorate -- for example, if Government policy that has general community support is blocked by the opposition or minor parties, the Government can appeal to the electorate. In the American system the terms of office of the House of Representatives, Senate, and President are all 'fixed', so that an early election cannot be held. If a President dies or resigns, the Vice President serves out the remaining part of his term. There are no circumstances in which the American President can dissolve Congress and call an early election. The U.S. constitution has separation of powers , i.e., the members of the Executive (in our terms, the Government) do not have seats in Congress or participate in its sessions, and they are not removable by Congress and cannot dissolve Congress. The Judiciary is also separate from both Executive and Congress (though judges are appointed by the Senate on the nomination of the President, and can in exceptional cases be removed).. (shrink)

A society is capitalist if most production is carried on by employees working with means of production (equipment and materials) belonging to their employer, producing commodities which belong to the employer. (Employees: those whose services are treated as commodities. 'Labour is a commodity like any other', 'an article of trade' - Edmund Burke, Thoughts on Scarcity , 1795.).

The Australian political system is in some ways democratic, and in some ways not. The relationship between Prime Minister, Parliament and electorate seems to me the most democratic part of the system. The undemocratic features include bicameralism, federalism, monarchy, and some others. In calling certain features undemocratic I don't necessarily mean they're bad. For the views of 19th century liberals on whether democracy is a good thing, and if so subject to what limitations (if any), and several similar questions, see (...) Liberal Democracy . My own view is that democracy (in the sense of deciding by majority vote) is not an absolute or basic political value. There is no guarantee that democratic decision making will produce justice for racial, linguistic, religious and other minorities, or that it will produce just and wise decisions about relations with other nations (e.g. on war, trading policies), or about environmental questions and other matters affecting the interests of future generations . Democracy needs to be tempered by culture or by institutions, e.g. by a liberal legal tradition, by education, by a Bill of Rights (perhaps), by special representation ("over"-representation by democratic standards) of minorities, etc. These things are connected with the "liberal" tradition, rather than with democracy. There is no reason why individuals or minorities should not press for such balances to democracy, undeterred by any opposition from the majority -- there is no political obligation " to conform to majority views. Having got that off my chest, I will look at Australia's political institutions from a democratic point of view: How democratic are they? (shrink)

Weber's most famous book is The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904-5). It is generally taken as a counter to the Marxist thesis of the primacy of base over superstructure: Weber is supposed to have argued in this book that capitalism in fact developed historically as a result of a..

Much has been written about Locke 's Second Treatise,[Note 1] but still, I believe, the book's main line of argument has been left unclear. Some concepts need more prominence---the duty to preserve mankind, the right of war, and private judgment; others need less---consent, majority rule, and property. Locke 's aim was not to show that political obligation rests upon consent: that is assumed without argument.[Note 2] What he set out to prove is that there are certain limits to political obligation (...) which not even consent could set aside.[Note 3]. (shrink)

John Rawls, professor of philosophy at Harvard, published a paper in the Philosophical Review for 1958 called 'Justice as Fairness', followed up by various other papers, and in 1971 a large book A Theory of Justice . Rawls disagrees with the Utilitarians over their way of spelling out the idea of the happiness of mankind generally. They say: Consider whether the act, rule or institution to be evaluated is best for the happiness of mankind generally. The difficulty is that often (...) it will be both to the advantage of some people and to the disadvantage of others. The effect on the happiness of mankind generally has to be assessed by somehow balancing off the bad effects on some people against the good effects on others. There is no way of avoiding this. Some of the practical questions we have to decide do involve choice between possible courses of action all of which have good effects on some people and bad effects on others. (shrink)

Open the Readings on p.217 and look through the table of contents. Part I is an appreciation and critique of Marx. Schumpeter argues that Marx's argument to show that Capitalism will eventually destroy itself is unsound. Nevertheless, Schumpeter himself thinks that Capitalism contains the seeds of its one destruction. Hence Part II: Can Capitalism Survive? The answer he gives is No. But at first, Chapters 5-8, he explains the strengths and virtues of Capitalism. Then he explains why it will eventually (...) be transformed into socialism. Notice Chapter XIII, which is the first of the extracts we will read. (shrink)

('Freedom' and 'liberty' mean the same.) In 20th century political philosophy some have favoured a 'negative' concept of liberty (freedom from constraint) and criticised 'positive' notions of liberty ('freedom to') as incipiently authoritarian. According to Rawls every liberty is both negative and positive. That there is a certain liberty means that a certain person (or persons, or all persons) is (are) not under certain constraints, so that they can do a certain sort of thing (see p.

In the last lecture I talked first about the difference principle, and then about the original position and the intuitions that seem to have guided Rawls in constructing it. At the end I was saying that his intuitions about religion and morality are those of the small-l liberal, who wants a 'fair go' for diverse and conflicting philosophies of life. This leads to my next topic (still under the general heading of the Original Position), -.

I suggest that each political party could (if it chose) nominate two (or more) candidates to the same seat, and that the ballot papers should be printed in batches rotating the order among candidates of the same party. Suppose two parties nominate one candidate each and another party nominates two.

The point of the suggestions made below is not to design a perfectly representative voting system there is no such thing, given the multiplicity of functions elections perform — but to encourage a deeper public discussion of the issues facing Australia, and at the same time reduce the bitterness of partisan and factional conflict.

William of Ockham was a medieval English philosopher and theologian. In 1328 Ockham turned away from 'pure' philosophy and theology to polemic. From that year until the end of his life he worked to overthrow what he saw as the tyranny of Pope John XXII and of his successors Popes Benedict XII and Clement VI. This campaign led him into questions of ecclesiology and political philosophy. The Dialogus purports to be a transcript made by a mature student of lengthy discussions (...) between himself and a university master about the various opinions of the learned on the matters disputed between John XXII and the dissident Franciscans. (shrink)

This is the first critical edition of the most important political text by William of Ockham, a significant and influential fourteenth century British philosopher.

The eagerly-awaited second volume of The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts will allow scholars and students access for the first time in English to major texts in ethics and political thought from one of the most fruitful periods of speculation and analysis in the history of western thought. Beginning with Albert the Great, who introduced the Latin west to the challenging moral philosophy and natural science of Aristotle, and concluding with the first substantial presentation in English of the revolutionary (...) ideas on property and political power of John Wyclif, the seventeen texts in this anthology offer late medieval treatments of fundamental issues in human conduct that are both conceptually subtle and of direct practical import. Special features of this volume include copious editorial introductions, an analytical index, and suggestions for further reading. This is an important resource for scholars and students of medieval philosophy, history, political science, theology and literature. (shrink)

(Abstract: To say that there is a moral right to act in a certain way is to say that there is a presumption that such acts are morally right, which implies that others should not blame, punish or deliberately obstruct. A community’s recognition of such rights is a way of reducing conflict among its members. Natural or human rights are rights that ought to be recognised in every community. Statements of natural rights are not analytic; they may be self evident, (...) at least in the sense that everyone can easily see the usefulness of recognising such rights. The concept of a right has not changed since the middle ages and neither have the kinds of justifications given for recognising rights. Medieval moralists clearly recognised the human freedom presupposed by all ethical and legal systems and valued the liberty that consists in not being excessively constrained by legally and socially enforced duties. In modern times more recognition has been given to the rights of conscience, and this has led to some attempt to formulate duties we have toward conscientious agents whose actions we cannot accept as morally permissible.). (shrink)

From the 12 th century onwards, medieval canon lawyers and, from the early 14 th century, theologians and philosophers began to use ius to mean a right, and developed a theory of natural rights, the predecessor of modern theories of human rights. The main applications of this theory were in respect of property and government.

See collation, showing variants found in the early printed edition and some manuscripts. The corrected text following omits rejected variants and implements those that have been accepted.

Saint Francis 's desire to follow the life of Jesus made him go to great lengths to dissociate himself from power, property and legal rights of any kind. The witness to Christian humility that his small group gave was so attractive to his contemporaries that soon his fellowship became a large organisation entrusted by the Church with a preaching mission throughout Europe and beyond. By 1300 there were Franciscans in Beijing.

Every intellectual discipline constructs and reconstructs its own history, as writings not previously regarded as important get into reading lists and others fall out. Until recently students of political theory were urged to read Plato and Aristotle, and then Hobbes and Locke, but nothing, or very little, between the Greeks and the early moderns. Those who have ventured into this gap have found that, at least from the thirteenth century, there was a good deal of political theory, with clear links (...) with the theories of the seventeenth century. The seventeenth-century writers are better understood if we are also familiar with the work of their predecessors, who are in any case as much worth reading as they are. An interesting task for historians of political theory, and for political theorists, is to integrate the study of medieval thought into the discipline. (shrink)

In Democracy in Australia I argued that the Australian system is a mixture of features, some democratic and some oligarchical. In this lecture I want to outline the thinking behind this mixture. It is not an inconsistency or an accident, as if the drafters of our constitution meant to make a democracy but did not quite succeed. Rather, the Australian constitution is an intelligent and successful solution to certain problems which worried educated people in the 19th century but are now (...) largely forgotten. Perhaps their problems have turned out to be unreal; or perhaps the problems are forgotten because their solution was so successful. The drafters of the Australian Constitution set out to balance Democracy and certain other values, in a tradition of the mixed or balanced constitution coming down from Aristotle. (shrink)

In the POL167 course materials there is an essay 'Free enterprise and its critics' , which I suggest you read. It is not about Adam Smith particularly, but about the theory which he proposed and others developed.

The case for toleration as Bayle presents it seems closely tied to the proposition that if we do what we sincerely think right then we do a morally good act, even if that act is actually wrong. The prominence of this proposition in his book would have made it seem unpersuasive to some of the people most important to convince, namely those who followed "the principles of St Augustine". Arnauld, for example, rejects the Jesuits' thesis that an act cannot be (...) morally bad unless we do it in the belief that it is wrong, for reasons that imply rejection of Bayle's thesis that an act must be morally good if we do it in the belief that it is right. In fact, neither proposition is needed as a premiss in Bayle's main argument for toleration, but the difference over this matter is a suitable starting-point for reflection on some of the features of Bayle's moral theory. (shrink)

I Virtue 1. Moral Virtue 2. Continence, Endurance, and Virtue 3. Desert 4. The Intellectual Virtues II The Good Life 5. The Good for Man 6. Happiness 7. Production and Action 8. Action and Contemplation 9. Teleology III Friendship 10. What friendship is 11. Kinds of friendship 12. The friend as another self 13. The need for friends IV Political science V Some reflections..

We all follow the news and we all think about the Israel/Palestine conflict, I believe, but it is not much discussed in this country. Our politicians leave it to the Americans. General Petraeus, in a statement to the US Senate Armed Services Committee, last year, listed this issue as one of the “major drivers of instability, inter-state tensions, and conflict” in the Middle East. “The conflict foments anti- American sentiment,” he said, “due to a perception of U.S. favoritism for Israel”. (...) Because Australia closely follows the US in foreign affairs, our relations with the Muslim world are affected also. There are many Muslims living in Australia. The country with the largest Muslim population in the world is our neighbour, Indonesia. (shrink)

The book begins with a critique of Marx. The subtitle of part 1 is 'The Marxian Doctrine'. The most interesting parts of it are chapter 2, 'Marx the Sociologist', and chapter 3 'Marx the Economist'. Schumpeter's criticisms are well-informed and sympathetic. His sociological views are like Weber's, and he is aware of the kinship between those views and the more sophisticated versions of Marxism, such as is found in the letters Engels wrote in the 1890s. 'Nevertheless, the question arises whether (...) the economic interpretation of history is more than a convenient approximation which must be expected to work less satisfactorily in some cases than it does in others.... Social structures, types and attitudes are coins that do not readily melt. Once they are formed they persist, possibly for centuries, and since different structures and types display different degrees of this ability to survive, we almost always find that actual group and national behaviour more or less departs from what we should expect it to be if we tried to infer it from the dominant forms of the productive process... Such facts Marx did not overlook but he hardly realized all their implications.... [Feudalism] influenced conditions of production, wants and technology included But its simplest explanation is to be found in the function of military leadership previously filled by the families and individuals who (retaining that function however) became feudal landlords after the definitive conquest of the new territory. This does not fit the Marxian schema at all well and could easily be so construed as to point in a different direction. Facts of this nature can no doubt also be brought into the fold by means of auxiliary hypotheses but the necessity of inserting such hypotheses is usually the beginning of the end of a theory. Many other difficulties that arise in the course of attempts at historical interpretation by means of the Marxian schema could be met by admitting some measure of interaction between the sphere of production and other spheres of social life.. (shrink)

This is cassette 12, concerned with more connexions between late medieval and early modern thought. The first writer we will look at is George Berkeley, who criticised Locke's theory of abstract ideas and put forward his own theory of universality.

The best way of becoming acquainted with William of Ockham and his Dialogue would be to read A.S. McGrade's "Introduction", "Principal Dates in Ockham's Life", and "Suggestions for Further Reading" in..

(Abstract: The right of “national self-determination” sometimes claimed for ethnic/religious/linguistic groups is not to be confused with the right to rebel against tyranny or with a right to secede, and it is limited by respect for the territorial integrity of functioning states. In some cases self-determination may take the form of some sort of autonomy within a mixed state. Ockham’s use of the canon..

In medieval texts the term ius naturale can mean either natural law or natural right; for the latter sense see the article Natural Rights ”. Ius naturale in the former sense, and also lex naturalis, mean the universal and immutable law to which the laws of human legislators, the customs of particular communities and the actions of individuals ought to conform. It is equivalent to morality thought of as a system of law. It is called “natural” either (a) because it (...) is taught by natural instinct, i.e. some capacity innate in human beings, or (b) because it is accessible to “natural reason”, i.e. to personal reflection independent of any special revelation from God (such as the Christian faith claims to be) and independent of the moral authority of other human beings; or for both reasons. (shrink)

Adam Smith was born in Kirkcaldy, Scotland, in 1723 (Source on Smith's life: E G West, Adam Smith ). He entered Glasgow University in 1737, aged 14. This university still followed some practices of the medieval universities, for example in admitting students at age 14. Its professors still took fees directly from students: that had been the original practice in medieval universities, but in more famous universities rich people had endowed colleges within the university, which paid lecturers' salaries. The Glasgow (...) timetable was still medieval. The main lecture took place at 7.30 am in the cold and dark, at 11 the students were quizzed on the mornings lecture, at 12 there was a lecture on an optional topic. This was the typical student's day in the thirteenth century. But the curriculum was modern: besides philosophy (the main medieval subject) students took Greek and Mathematics. The philosophy was modern. At Glasgow Adam Smith studied under Francis Hutcheson (see extracts from his works in Raphael British Moralists vol.1, p.261ff.)). Hutcheson taught in English (not Latin) and was a vivid lecturer. Moral philosophy, or ethics, was a flourishing subject at the time. The main division was between two schools of 'intuitionists' (as they would now be called). To remind you: Ethics is concerned with what is good and bad, better and worse, in human conduct - in the ends we seek, in the actions in which we seek our ends. Intuitionism is the doctrine that in the last analysis we simply 'see' that some way of acting is good or right, or the opposite: that basic ethical assessments cannot be justified by argument, and do not need to be. 'See' of course is a metaphor. Many 18C moral philosophers held that it is reason that 'sees' what is good and right. Hutcheson said that it is a moral sense: not reason, and not the bodily senses of vision, hearing etc., but something more like a bodily sense than like reason. On Hutcheson's analysis, ethical judgement is a specific kind of emotional reaction to a contemplated act.. (shrink)

Utilitarianism is the doctrine that actions, institutions, etc. are to be evaluated (as right, wrong, good, evil, etc.) by considering their likely contribution to the happiness of the human race; in this calculation the happiness of any one person is to count for no more or less than the happiness of any other.

Marx was an exponent of the 'Labour theory' of value, held also by Adam Smith, Ricardo, James Mill, John Stuart Mill and some early 19th century political economists. This is the theory that human labour is the sole source of value (of exchange value), and that the value of a commodity is the quantity of socially necessary labour embodied in it. When we exchange commodities they exchange in the ratio of the quantities of labour required to produce them and bring (...) them into the market. (shrink)

My talk tonight comes under the heading of history of theology. It may take you away somewhat from the study of early Christianity, but perhaps it can come under the head of the history of the history of early Christianity—my topic is a dispute involving Marsilius and Ockham over Peter ’s role in the early Church and the use Ockham made of early Christian documents, or what he thought were such.

The first article is from 1958, "Justice as Fairness", Readings, p.241. It is divided into eight sections numbered with Roman numerals. I have underlined some phrases and written in some headings. Read Section I. The first two paragraphs give the reader some preliminary idea of what he will do in the rest of the article, the 3rd and 4th fend off possible misunderstandings. Read now section II. Some comments. First, in these two principles there are in fact four points: (1) (...) that there should be as much freedom as possible; (2) that people should be equally free; (3) that inequalities should be to everyone's advantage, and (4) that the better positions must be open to all (compare "equality of opportunity"). It is as if he supposes that freedom is a good thing and inequality a bad thing. (shrink)

What is Mill's principle of liberty? The question may seem superfluous, since he gave his own apparently careful formulation (223/34-224/10).[Note 1] However he gave several formulations in different terms, and his principle has been interpreted in a number of ways.[Note 2] The Acts meant to be subject to social control have been said variously to be other-regarding acts, acts which harm others, or affect them, or affect their interests, or violate duties owed to them, or violate their rights. These formulae (...) are not equivalent. An act may harm others (indirectly), yet not be other-regarding; an other-regarding act may harm others without any violation of duty; an act may violate a duty to others without violating anyone's right. But it seems to me clear enough, if all Mill's statements are taken together, that the correct formulation is this: punishment is justified only for violations of secondary rules prescribing duties to others. Duty and Liberty divide the whole field of human conduct, without overlap; and there are no duties besides duties to others. (shrink)

Wealth of Nations was published in 1776. Among the people who took up its ideas were Jeremy Bentham (b. 1748). Bentham and James Mill were friendly also with David Ricardo and Thomas Malthus. Ricardo's Principles of Political Economy & Taxation (1817) was written at James Mill's suggestion; 'it is almost certain that he would not have finished it without Mill's continuous encouragement' (R.M. Hartwell, 'Introduction' to Ricardo's Principles (Penguin), p.13). James Mill published his own Elements of Political Economy in 1821. (...) James Mill's son was John Stuart Mill (b. 1806). The younger Mill began to make an impact as a writer of newspaper articles in the 1820s. His Logic was published in 1843, Principles of Political Economy in 1848. He died in 1873, almost a century after the publication of the Wealth of Nations. (shrink)

In 20th Century America, and in countries of similar political culture, it seemed a permanently established principle that there should be a "wall of separation" between Church and State. But the separation has again become contentious. It is rejected by Muslims and in the US it is under attack from "evangelical" Christians (see Theocracy watch " website). It seems useful to look again at the doctrine of "separation of Church and State", to see what various things the phrase might mean, (...) and what reasons there might be, for and against, regarding at least some of the possible formulations of the doctrine. (shrink)

book 2, distinction 3, extracts from which are in Hyman and Walsh. The first question is, in effect, whether any theory of individuation is needed. Aren't real things individual "from themselves", just by being real? The Latin says: ex se , sive ex natura sua , "from (or out of) itself, or from its nature". Elsewhere he uses as equivalent per se and de se . Se means itself, ex means from or out of, per means through, de means of (...) or by or from. So the question is whether an individual thing gets it singularity or individuality from itself, not from anything else. (shrink)

Remember that for Ockham there is nothing in the universe that is in any way universal except a concept or word: there are no real natures shared by many things. However, things do resemble one another, some things more closely than others. So the various degrees of resemblance give a foundation in reality for our conceptual structures, such as Porphyry's tree. Now resemblance (or similitude or likeness) is a relation. If such relations are realities, then we can say that there (...) are realities out there that correspond to our conceptual structures. But it won't surprise you to hear that Ockham denies that relations are realities out there in the world: or more exactly, he denies that relations are out there as realities additional to the things that are related. He wants to say that if Socrates is white and Plato is white then they are similar in respect of their whiteness, but their similarity is not something additional to Socrates and Plato and Socrates' whiteness and Plato's whiteness. Nothing is out there except absolute things. (shrink)

Descartes (1596-1650) is generally regarded as the first of the modern philosophers. Indeed, until about 50 years ago most philosophers would have said that Descartes was the first significant philosopher since Aristotle. Descartes himself does not draw attention to his sources--not to conceal them (that would have been pointless, because to his contemporaries the continuities of his thought with the books they had all been brought up on would have been obvious), but so as to avoid getting embroiled in learned (...) disputes about who had said what and what they had meant. Descartes wanted his readers to look at his arguments and judge them by using their own intelligence. He calls on his readers to empty their minds of prejudices, i.e. previous judgments, and take a fresh look. His writings had such an impact that philosophy after Descartes generally took his arguments and positions as a starting point or as a point of reference, and earlier writers were no longer read. (There was a social reason for this also: philosophical books were, after Descartes set the example, generally addressed in French or some other vernacular language to lay readers outside the universities, and most readers could not easily read the Latin authors Descartes had himself read when he was a student of the Jesuits.) So it came to be thought that Descartes had had no significant predecessors--that all of his ideas were original. Descartes was indeed an original thinker, but he used a good deal of medieval material. In this lecture I want to go through Descartes' chief work in philosophy, The Meditations , outlining the argument and drawing attention to the medieval material. (shrink)