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John Lemos [46]John Paul Lemos [1]
  1.  42
    Kane's Libertarian Theory and Luck: A Reply to Griffith.John Lemos - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (2):357-367.
    In a recent article, Meghan Griffith (American Philosophical Quarterly 47:43–56, 2010) argues that agent-causal libertarian theories are immune to the problem of luck but that event-causal theories succumb to this problem. In making her case against the event-causal theories, she focuses on Robert Kane’s event-causal theory. I provide a brief account of the central elements of Kane’s theory and I explain Griffith’s critique of it. I argue that Griffith’s criticisms fail. In doing so, I note some important respects in which (...)
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  2.  5
    Hard-Heartedness and Libertarianism Again.John Lemos - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42:319-323.
    In a recent article, I defended libertarian views of free will against Richard Double’s argument that such views are hard-hearted. In supporting my main argument against Double, I invoked what I call “the Puppetmaster” argument. Double has recently countered that this argument fails. In this essay, I provide a response to this negative assessment of the Puppetmaster argument.
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  3.  4
    Hard-Heartedness and Libertarianism.John Lemos - 2013 - Philo 16 (2):180-195.
    Richard Double argues that libertarians believe we should hold people morally responsible for their actions and we must possess libertarian free will to be morally responsible for our actions; most libertarians believe there is scant epistemic justification for the belief that any of us possess LFW; and morally conscientious persons hold people responsible for their actions only if they have epistemic justification for their guilt. Thus, he concludes most libertarians are not being morally conscientious when they hold people responsible for (...)
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  4.  5
    Moral Concerns About Responsibility Denial and the Quarantine of Violent Criminals.John Lemos - 2016 - Law and Philosophy 35 (5):461-483.
    Some contemporary philosophers maintain we lack the kind of free will that makes us morally responsible for our actions. Some of these philosophers, such as Derk Pereboom, Gregg Caruso, and Bruce Waller, also argue that such a view supports the case for significant reform of the penal system. Pereboom and Caruso explicitly endorse a quarantine model for dealing with dangerous criminals, arguing that while not responsible for their crimes such criminals should be detained in non-harsh conditions and offered the opportunity (...)
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  5.  13
    A Libertarian Response to Dennett and Harris on Free Will.John Lemos - 2017 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 8 (3):231-246.
    : This article critically examines central arguments made in Sam Harris’ Free Will as well as key aspects of Daniel Dennett’s compatibilist conception of free will. I argue that while Dennett makes thoughtful replies to Harris’ critique of compatibilism, his compatibilism continues to be plagued by critical points raised by Bruce Waller. Additionally, I argue that Harris’ rejection of the libertarian view of free will is ill-informed and I explain the basics of Robert Kane’s libertarian view, arguing that it can (...)
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  6.  22
    Self-Forming Acts and the Grounds of Responsibility.John Lemos - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (1):135-146.
    Robert Kane has for many years claimed that in our underivatively free actions, what he calls “self-forming acts”, we actually try to do both of the two acts we are contemplating doing and then we ultimately end up doing only one of them. This idea of dual willings/efforts was put forward in an attempt to solve luck problems, but Randolph Clarke and Alfred Mele argue that for this to work agents must, then, freely engage in the dual efforts leading up (...)
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  7.  53
    Wanting, Willing, Trying and Kane's Theory of Free Will.John Lemos - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (1):31-48.
    Robert Kane's event-causal libertarian theory of free will has been subjected to a variety of criticisms. In response to the luck objection, he has provided an ambiguous answer which results in additional criticisms that are avoidable. I explain Kane's theory, the luck objection and Kane's reply to the problem of luck. I note that in some places he suggests that the dual wantings of agents engaged in self-forming actions (SFAs) provides the key to answering the luck objection, whereas in other (...)
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  8. Psychological Hedonism, Evolutionary Biology, and the Experience Machine.John Lemos - 2004 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (4):506-526.
    In the second half of their recent, critically acclaimed book Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior , Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson discuss psychological hedonism. This is the view that avoiding our own pain and increasing our own pleasure are the only ultimate motives people have. They argue that none of the traditional philosophical arguments against this view are good, and they go on to present theirownevolutionary biological argument against it. Interestingly, the first half of their (...)
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  9.  31
    In Defense of Organizational Evolution: A Reply to Reydon and Scholz.John Lemos - 2009 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (3):463-474.
    Organizational ecology applies Darwinian principles of natural selection to understand the evolution of new forms of organizations over time. The idea here is that there are different forms of human organizations, such as different business organizations, religious organizations, political organizations, etc. The growth of new forms of organizations within each of these fields is to be understood in terms of a struggle for existence among organizations with different traits. In a recent article, Reydon and Scholz (2009) argue that this Darwinian (...)
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  10. Sober and Wilson and Nozick and the Experience Machine.John Lemos - 2002 - Philosophia 29 (1-4):401-409.
    Years ago Robert Nozick provided the experience machine argument, which states that since many people would forgo a life of artificially stimulated tremendous pleasure provided by an "experience machine," it must be that sometimes people are motivated by things other than the pursuit of their own pleasure. This is to say that he rejected psychological hedonism. In a recent book Elliot Sober and David Wilson defend the view that Nozick's argument does not provide adequate refutation of psychological hedonism. This article (...)
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  11.  62
    Morality, Self-Interest, and Two Kinds of Prudential Practical Rationality.John Lemos - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (1):85-93.
    : In this article it is assumed that human goodness is to be judged with respect to how well one does at practical reasoning. It is acknowledged that there is a difference between moral practical reasoning and prudential practical reasoning and what these would recommend sometimes conflict. A distinction is then made between absolute PPR and relative PPR and it is argued that doing well at absolute PPR is always consistent with MPR. It is also argued that since it is (...)
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  12.  81
    The Problems with Emotivism.John Lemos - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Research 25:285-309.
    This article provides a defense of a variety of MacIntyrean arguments against emotivism. In After Virtue MacIntyre explains that emotivism might be understood either as a theory about the meaning or about the function of moral language. He also argues that emotivism is false either way. I argue that MacIntyre is right about this by explaining and then answering the recent defenses of emotivism that have appeared in the literature. I conclude by reminding the reader that according to MacIntyre his (...)
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  13.  89
    Theism, Evolutionary Epistemology, and Two Theories of Truth.Lemos John - 2002 - Zygon 37 (4):789-801.
  14.  98
    Foot and Aristotle on Virtues and Flourishing.John Lemos - 2007 - Philosophia 35 (1):43-62.
    This article compares the views of Foot and Aristotle on virtues and flourishing. It is argued that the view put forward in Philippa Foot’s recent book, Natural Goodness, suffers from a certain sort of vagueness and it is open to other criticisms which the Aristotelian view can avoid. Foot’s views have been subjected to criticism in the recent literature by David Copp and David Sobel. These criticisms are given consideration in the article and it is argued that the more traditional (...)
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  15.  42
    Flanagan and Cartesian Free Will: A Defense of Agent Causation.John Lemos - 2006 - Disputatio 2 (21):1 - 22.
  16.  17
    Rachels on Darwinism and Theism.John Lemos - 2003 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 77 (3):399-415.
    In his book, Created From Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism (1990), James Rachels argues that the Darwinian theory of evolution by natural selection undermines the view that human beings are made in the image of God. By this he means that Darwinism makes things such that there is no longer any good reason to think that human beings are made in the image of God. Some other widely read and respected authors seem to share this view of the implications (...)
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  17.  24
    A Defense of Darwinian Accounts of Morality.John Lemos - 2001 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 31 (3):361-385.
    This article is a defense of Michael Ruse's sociobiological account of the origins and nature of morality. In the piece, the author provides a summary explanation of Ruse's views and arguments. Then he goes on to explain and critically discuss a variety of objections that have been made against sociobiological accounts of morality. He argues that the criticisms that have been made often work against less sophisticated sociobiological theories but that Ruse's theory is immune to the criticisms. The author responds (...)
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  18.  14
    God’s Existence and the Kantian Formula of Humanity.John Lemos - 2017 - Sophia 56 (2):265-278.
    Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative can be expressed as the formula of humanity. This states that rational beings ought always to treat humanity, whether in our own persons or in others, as ends in themselves and never as mere means. In this essay, I argue that if God exists, then the Kantian formula of humanity is false. The basic idea behind my argument is that if God exists, then he has knowingly created a world with all kinds of naturally occurring threats, (...)
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  19.  22
    Critical Notice Flanagan and Cartesian Free Will: A Defense of Agent Causation.John Lemos - 2006 - Disputatio 2 (21).
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  20.  34
    Can Ethics Provide Answers? And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy.John Lemos - 1999 - Teaching Philosophy 22 (1):91-95.
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  21.  8
    The Problems with Emotivism: Reflections on Some MacIntyrean Arguments.John Lemos - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Research 25:285-309.
    This article provides a defense of a variety of MacIntyrean arguments against emotivism. In After Virtue MacIntyre explains that emotivism might be understood either as a theory about the meaning or about the function of moral language. He also argues that emotivism is false either way. I argue that MacIntyre is right about this by explaining and then answering the recent defenses of emotivism that have appeared in the literature. I conclude by reminding the reader that according to MacIntyre his (...)
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  22.  38
    Bridging the Is/Ought Gap with Evolutionary Biology: Is This a Bridge Too Far?John Lemos - 1999 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):559-577.
  23.  49
    Darwinian Natural Right and the Naturalistic Fallacy.John Lemos - 2000 - Biology and Philosophy 15 (1):119-132.
  24.  16
    Ruling Passions.John Lemos - 2000 - Teaching Philosophy 23 (3):286-290.
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  25.  35
    Kanian Freedom and the Problem of Luck.John Lemos - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):515-532.
    This article provides a brief explanation of Robert Kane’s indeterministic, event-causal libertarian theory of freedom and responsibility. It is noted that a number of authors have criticized libertarian theories,such as Kane’s, by presenting the problem of luck. After noting how Kane has tried to answer this problem in his recent writings, the author goes on to explain Ishtiyaque Haji’s recent version of the luckargument. The author considers three possible Kanian replies to Haji’s luck argument and argues that the third reply (...)
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  26.  32
    Evolution and Free Will: A Defense of Darwinian Non-Naturalism.John Lemos - 2002 - Metaphilosophy 33 (4):468-482.
    In his recent book The Natural Selection of Autonomy, Bruce Waller defends a view that he calls “natural autonomy.” This view holds that human beings possess a kind of autonomy that we share with nonhuman animals, a capacity to explore alternative courses of action, but an autonomy that cannot support moral responsibility. He also argues that this natural autonomy can provide support for the ethical principle of noninterference. I argue that to support the ethical principle of noninterference Waller needs either (...)
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  27.  36
    An Agnostic Defence of Obligatory Prayer.John Lemos - 1998 - Sophia 37 (2):70-87.
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  28.  22
    Virtue, Happiness, and Intelligibility.John Lemos - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Research 22:307-320.
    In such works as A Short History of Ethics, Against the Self-lmages of the Age, and After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre has argued that the intelligibility of the moral life hinges upon viewing the moral life as essential to the happy life, or eudaimonia. In my article I examine the reasons he gives for saying this, arguing that this thesis is not sufficiently defended by MacIntyre. I also draw connections between this thesis about the intelligibility of the moral life and other (...)
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  29.  20
    Morality Without Foundations.John Lemos - 2001 - Teaching Philosophy 24 (3):295-298.
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  30.  18
    The Unity of the Virtues and Its Recent Defenses.John Lemos - 1994 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):85-106.
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  31.  13
    American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 842.John Lemos, Thomas J. McPartland, John C. Médaille, Robert J. Spitzer, Runar M. Thorsteinsson, John R. Welch & Notre Dame - 2010 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4).
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  32.  17
    Happiness Is Overrated.John Lemos - 2004 - Review of Metaphysics 58 (2):423-425.
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  33.  13
    Bridging the Is/Ought Gap with Evolutionary Biology.John Lemos - 1998 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):559-577.
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  34.  10
    Moral Crutches and Nazi Theists.John Lemos - 1997 - Southwest Philosophy Review 13 (1):147-154.
  35.  18
    The Unity of the Virtues and Its Defenses.John Lemos - 1994 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):85-106.
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  36.  6
    Libertarianism and Free Determined Decisions.John Lemos - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):675-688.
    Free determined decisions are free decisions that are causally determined by the character of the agent. Robert Kane is a libertarian about free will who believes some of our free decisions are determined in this way. According to Kane, for a determined decision to be free it must proceed from the agent's character and the agent must have shaped that character through previous undetermined free decisions. In recent writings, Mark Balaguer has argued that human beings may well possess libertarian freedom, (...)
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  37.  10
    A Defense of Naturalistic Naturalized Epistemology (Una defensa de la epistemología naturalizada naturalista).John Lemos - 2003 - Critica 35 (105):49 - 63.
    Naturalistic naturalized epistemology combines ontological naturalism with naturalized epistemology. Ontological naturalism is the view that nothing exists other than spatio-temporal beings embedded within a space-time framework. Naturalized epistemology is a view about the nature of knowledge characterized by its commitment to externalism and the idea that knowledge consists in beliefs reliably generated by cognitive mechanisms operating in a suitable environment. Alvin Plantinga has provided a much discussed evolutionary biological argument against naturalistic naturalized epistemology. In this article I defend naturalistic naturalized (...)
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  38.  2
    Kanian Freedom and the Problem of Luck.John Lemos - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):515-532.
    This article provides a brief explanation of Robert Kane’s indeterministic, event-causal libertarian theory of freedom and responsibility. It is noted that a number of authors have criticized libertarian theories,such as Kane’s, by presenting the problem of luck. After noting how Kane has tried to answer this problem in his recent writings, the author goes on to explain Ishtiyaque Haji’s recent version of the luckargument. The author considers three possible Kanian replies to Haji’s luck argument and argues that the third reply (...)
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  39.  1
    Evolution and Free Will: A Defense of Darwinian Non–Naturalism.John Lemos - 2002 - Metaphilosophy 33 (4):468-482.
    In his recent book The Natural Selection of Autonomy, Bruce Waller defends a view that he calls “natural autonomy.” This view holds that human beings possess a kind of autonomy that we share with nonhuman animals, a capacity to explore alternative courses of action, but an autonomy that cannot support moral responsibility. He also argues that this natural autonomy can provide support for the ethical principle of noninterference. I argue that to support the ethical principle of noninterference Waller needs either (...)
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  40.  1
    Moral Crutches and Nazi Theists: A Defense of and Reservations About Undertaking Theism.John Lemos - 1997 - Southwest Philosophy Review 13 (1):147-154.
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  41.  1
    Virtue, Happiness, and Intelligibility.John Lemos - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Research 22:307-320.
    In such works as A Short History of Ethics, Against the Self-lmages of the Age, and After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre has argued that the intelligibility of the moral life hinges upon viewing the moral life as essential to the happy life, or eudaimonia. In my article I examine the reasons he gives for saying this, arguing that this thesis is not sufficiently defended by MacIntyre. I also draw connections between this thesis about the intelligibility of the moral life and other (...)
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  42. A Defense of Naturalistic Naturalized Epistemology.John Lemos - 2003 - Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 35 (105):49-63.
    Naturalistic naturalized epistemology combines ontological naturalism with naturalized epistemology. Ontological naturalism is the view that nothing exists other than spatio-temporal beings embedded within a space-time framework. Naturalized epistemology is a view about the nature of knowledge characterized by its commitment to externalism and the idea that knowledge consists in beliefs reliably generated by cognitive mechanisms operating in a suitable environment. Alvin Plantinga has provided a much discussed evolutionary biological argument against naturalistic naturalized epistemology. In this article I defend naturalistic naturalized (...)
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  43. Commonsense Darwinism: Evolution, Morality, and the Human Condition.John Lemos - 2008 - Open Court.
    Introduction -- Defending a socio-biological account of morality -- Non-objectivist evolutionary ethics -- Recent objectivist approaches to evolutionary ethics -- Sketch of an Aristotelian evolutionary ethics -- Evolutionary biology and the moral status of animals -- Faith, reason, and evolutionary epistemology -- Psychological egoism and evolutionary biology -- Evolution and free will : darwinian non-naturalism defended -- Recent developments in philosophy of evolution.
     
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  44. Freedom, Responsibility, and Determinism: A Philosophical Dialogue.John Lemos - 2013 - Hackett Publishing Company.
    John Lemos' _Freedom, Responsibility, and Determinism_ offers an up-to-date introduction to free will debates in an engaging, dialogic format that recommends it for use by beginning students in philosophy as well as by undergraduates in intermediate courses in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and action theory.
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  45. Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism. [REVIEW]John Lemos - 2001 - Teaching Philosophy 24 (3):295-298.
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  46. Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning. [REVIEW]John Lemos - 2000 - Teaching Philosophy 23 (3):286-290.
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