29 found
Order:
Disambiguations
John R. Lucas [15]John Lucas [11]John Randolph Lucas [2]John A. Lucas [1]
  1. Minds, Machines and Gödel.John R. Lucas - 1961 - Philosophy 36 (137):112-127.
    Gödei's Theorem seems to me to prove that Mechanism is false, that is, that minds cannot be explained as machines. So also has it seemed to many other people: almost every mathematical logician I have put the matter to has confessed to similar thoughts, but has felt reluctant to commit himself definitely until he could see the whole argument set out, with all objections fully stated and properly met. This I attempt to do.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   156 citations  
  2. The Future: An Essay on God, Temporality, and Truth.John R. Lucas - 1989 - Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  3. Mechanism: A Rejoinder.John R. Lucas - 1970 - Philosophy 45 (April):149-51.
    PROFESSOR LEWIS 1 and Professor Coder 2 criticize my use of Gödel's theorem to refute Mechanism. 3 Their criticisms are valuable. In order to meet them I need to show more clearly both what the tactic of my argument is at one crucial point and the general aim of the whole manoeuvre.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  4. Satan Stultified: A Rejoinder to Paul Benacerraf.John R. Lucas - 1968 - The Monist 52 (1):145-58.
    The argument is a dialectical one. It is not a direct proof that the mind is something more than a machine, but a schema of disproof for any particular version of mechanism that may be put forward. If the mechanist maintains any specific thesis, I show that [146] a contradiction ensues. But only if. It depends on the mechanist making the first move and putting forward his claim for inspection. I do not think Benacerraf has quite taken the point. He (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  5. The Gödelian Argument: Turn Over the Page.John R. Lucas - 2003 - Etica E Politica 5 (1):1.
    In this paper Lucas suggests that many of his critics have not read carefully neither his exposition nor Penrose’s one, so they seek to refute arguments they never proposed. Therefore he offers a brief history of the Gödelian argument put forward by Gödel, Penrose and Lucas itself: Gödel argued indeed that either mathematics is incompletable – that is axioms can never be comprised in a finite rule and so human mind surpasses the power of any finite machine – or there (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  6. Mind, Machines and Godel: A Retrospect.John R. Lucas - 1996 - In Peter Millican & A. Clark (eds.), Machines and Thought. Oxford University Press. pp. 103.
  7.  22
    Metamathematics and the Philosophy of Mind: A Rejoinder.John R. Lucas - 1971 - Philosophy of Science 38 (2):310-13.
  8.  74
    Truth and Provability.John Lucas & Michael Redhead - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2):331-2.
    The views of Redhead ([2004]) are defended against the argument by Panu Raatikainen ([2005]). The importance of informal rigour is canvassed, and the argument for the a priori nature of induction is explained. The significance of Gödel's theorem is again rehearsed.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  9. The Freedom of the Will.John R. Lucas - 1970 - Oxford University Press.
    It might be the case that absence of constraint is the relevant sense of ' freedom' when we are discussing the freedom of the will, but it needs arguing for. ...
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10. [Book Review] Ethical Economics. [REVIEW]M. R. Griffiths & John Randolph Lucas - 1999 - Ethics 109 (2):442-444.
  11. A Century of Time.John R. Lucas - 1999 - In Jeremy Butterfield (ed.), The Arguments of Time. Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press. pp. 1--20.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  12. A Simple Exposition Of Gödel's Theorem.John Lucas - 2003 - Etica E Politica 5 (1):1.
    Lucas introduces this paper by an account of how he began to be interested to questions about Materialism and Mechanism. Then he suggests a simple version of the Incompleteness theorem of Gödel, showing how this theorem proposes a version of the Epimenides’ paradox able to avoid the circularity of this paradox by means of the possibility to express meta-mathematics in terms of arithmetical propositions and by substituting questions concerning truth by questions concerning provability.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. A View of One's Own (Conscious Machines).John R. Lucas - 1994 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, Series A 349:147-52.
    Two questions are distinguished: how to program a machine so that it behaves in a manner that would lead us to ascribe consciousness to it; and what is involved in saying that something is conscious. The distinction can be seen in cases where anaesthetics have failed to work on patients temporarily paralysed.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14.  5
    Book-Reviews.John Lucas - 1990 - Mind 99 (394):315-316.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Book Review. [REVIEW]John Lucas - 2002 - Philosophia Christi 4 (2):527-530.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Conceptual Roots of Mathematics.John Randolph Lucas - 1999 - Routledge.
    _The Conceptual Roots of Mathematics_ is a comprehensive study of the foundation of mathematics. J.R. Lucas, one of the most distinguished Oxford scholars, covers a vast amount of ground in the philosophy of mathematics, showing us that it is actually at the heart of the study of epistemology and metaphysics.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Can the Theory of Games Save Mill's Utilitarianism?John R. Lucas - unknown
    John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism engages our interest and sympathy because it is flawed. It reflects the crisis in Mill’s life, when he lost his faith. He had been brought up by his father in the straitest tenets of utilitarianism, but had had nervous breakdown in early adult life from emotional ill-nourishment. Utilitarianism might work as a guide for the well-governing of India by James Mill and his colleagues, but gave little sustenance to the aspiring spirit of the Romantic Movement. It (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Future of the Olympic Games.John A. Lucas - 1992 - Human Kinetics.
  19.  3
    God, Time and Eternity.John Lucas - 2002 - Philosophia Christi 4 (2):527-531.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Human and Machine Logic: A Rejoinder.John R. Lucas - 1968 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (2):155-6.
    We can imagine a human operator playing a game of one-upmanship against a programmed computer. If the program is Fn, the human operator can print the theorem Gn, which the programmed computer, or, if you prefer, the program, would never print, if it is consistent. This is true for each whole number n, but the victory is a hollow one since a second computer, loaded with program C, could put the human operator out of a job.... It is useless for (...)
    Direct download (15 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Human and Machine Logic: A Rejoinder.John Lucas - 2003 - Etica E Politica 5 (1):1.
    These two articles are very interesting examples of how Lucas’ argument is not a direct proof but a dialectical argument depending from Mechanists’ first move. Good, starting from the Mentalists’ point of view, underlines that it is useless to argue that any program can be improved because the process for improving it can be programmed; he argues against Mentalism by denying that there are particular mental powers, because otherwise they could be described and so a computer could be programmed to (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22.  42
    Lucas Against Mechanism II: A Rejoinder.John R. Lucas - 1984 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (June):189-91.
    David Lewis criticizes an argument I put forward against mechansim on the grounds that I fail to distinguish between OL, Lucas's ordinary potential arithmetic output, and OML, Lucas's arithmetical output when accused of being some particular machine M; and correspondingly, between OM the ordinary potential arithmetic output of the machine M, and ONM, the arithmetic output of the machine M when accused of being a particular machine N. For any given machine, M, N, O, P, Q, R,... etc., I can (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Lucas Against Mechanism: A Rejoinder.John Lucas - 2003 - Etica E Politica 5 (1):1.
    Coder’s argument is very similar to Lewis’ one: he maintains that some human beings are not able to follow Gödel’s theorem, so Lucas’ argument cannot show that their minds are not machines. The answer of Lucas is that one proposed against Lewis’ criticism, that is that Mechanism makes a universal claim and so a single counter-example – a single mind producing a singe truth not recognizable by any machine – is a disproof for it.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24.  7
    Richard Walsh.John Lucas - 1985 - Hegel Bulletin 6 (2):4-7.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Smart, J. C. C., "Our Place in the Universe". [REVIEW]John Lucas - 1990 - Mind 99:315.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Satan Stultified: A Rejoinder to Paul Benacerraf.John Lucas - 2003 - Etica E Politica 5 (1):1.
    Benacerraf criticizes Lucas’ argument against Mechanism because, in his opinion, it depends too much on how the system we are talking about is presented and because the argument put in form of challenge reduces itself to a contest of wits between Lucas and the mechanists. In Benacerraf opinion, Lucas should clarify the sense of utilised notions and the argument would have to be reconstructed as formally as possible, in order to determine the involved philosophical premises. Moreover Benacerraf maintains that, instead (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27.  35
    This Godel is Killing Me: A Rejoinder.John R. Lucas - 1976 - Philosophia 6 (1):145-8.
  28.  16
    This Gödel is Killing Me: A Rejoinder.John Lucas - 2003 - Etica E Politica 5 (1):1.
    Hutton asserts that Lucas’ use of Gödel’s theorem against Mechanism is incorrect because of the impossibility to assume human minds’ consistency: he tries to show that there is a non-zero probability of a mind’s embracing mutually inconsistent propositions; moreover Hutton maintains that the request of human minds’ consistency is a request of infallibility. Lucas replies that the mistake of Hutton’s argument consists in his assigning probabilities to a mind’s accepting any proposition without considering what that mind has done hitherto, while (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Umysły, maszyny i Gödel (przełożył Michał Zawidzki).John R. Lucas - 2009 - Hybris. Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny 8.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark