Abstract Some recent theorists have relegated the emotions to a rather negligible role in moral education. This article is designed to show why the emotions should have a more central place and what this role should be. The characteristics and functions of the emotions are briefly outlined. Those emotions involved in moral judgement and action are of two types: constitutive and regulative. In terms of the former, three ways are presented which show how a person has grasped a moral concept. (...) Whereas constitutive emotions not only regulate but may help rectify wrong action, regulative emotions are less reliable because they can prevent as well as promote moral action. Fear and guilt are used as paradigms to explain how emotions are learned. Three character traits are chosen ?? conscientiousness, compassion, and benevolence ?? and the associated emotions and supporting principles are shown. Outlined is a three?tier development based on these traits along with suitable curriculum content. (shrink)
Abstract Gosling generally accepts my treatment of regulative emotions and directs his critique to my claims about constitutive emotions, which play a more vital role in moral conduct. Although Gosling has demonstrated some ambiguities in my original article, I attempt to show why his charge that my argument cannot be sustained is based on a mistaken line of reasoning and inapposite illustrations.