A substantial environmental ethic appears in the official teachings of the Catholic Church. The central driving force of this environmental ethic views human life and human dignity as the most sacred foundation, a tenet that appears in all of the Church’s ethical and social teachings. A Catholic environmental ethic can be situated among contemporary environmental ethics, specifically by examining Catholic environmental ethics along the axes of anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism by looking at Catholic social teaching, especially as it has been described (...) by Popes John Paul II and Benedict XVI. In their publications and speeches going back to 1987, they paid much attention to raising environmental awareness, and made continuous efforts to illustrate how an environmental ethic naturally fits within the Church’s ethical teachings. John Paul II illuminated the intimate connection between Catholic social teaching and environmental ethics, and Benedict XVI wove these themes together even more tightly. (shrink)

Error theorists argue that there is a fundamental mistake, an error of some kind, at the heart of commonsense morality. They have drawn on evolutionary theory to support some of their claims. This article looks at four different models of evolution and assesses what implications can be drawn from them concerning commonsense morality and the claims of the error theorists Mackie, Ruse and Joyce. The author first spells out the main points of error theory, then discusses how recent proponents of (...) error theory have attempted to join error theory about ethics with an evolutionary perspective. Finally, to assess their claims, the author examines what the models of evolution put forward by Darwin, Dawkins, Gould and Haught imply about error theory in ethics. (shrink)

The biocentric outlook on nature affirms our fellowship with other living creatures and portrays human beings as members of the Earth’s community who have equal moral standing with other living members of the community. A comparison of Paul Taylor’s biocentric theory of environmental ethics and the life and writings of St. Francis of Assisi reveals that Francis maintained a biocentric environmental ethic. This individualistc environmental ethic is grounded in biology and is unaffected by the paradigm shift in ecology in which (...) nature is regarded as in flux rather than tending toward equilibrium. A holistic environmental ethic that accords moral standing to holistic entities (species, ecosytems, biotic communities) is more vulnerable to these changes in ecology than an environmental ethic that accords moral standing to individuals. Another strength of biocentrism is its potential to provide a unified front across religious and scientific lines. (shrink)

This article situates Darwin’s views on evolution and ethics into contemporary normative categories of moral theory by looking at Darwin’s treatment of ethics in The Descent of Man and discussing how Darwin’s approach to evolution and ethics fits with several representative normative ethical theories (virtue ethics, natural law ethics, social contract ethics, utilitarian ethics, deontological ethics, and care ethics). A close study of Darwin’s treatment of ethics that situates it among the ethical concepts and principles of the above normative theories (...) is interesting, and helpful and necessary as today we seek to understand ethics against the backdrop of an evolutionary perspective on human beings. Ethics and human nature are distinct, yet theories of ethics always come with an attendant view of human nature. The moral philosophers Aristotle, Aquinas, Hobbes, Kant, and Mill—who provide important forerunners of normative theories on offer today—view human beings differently: their ethical theories have distinctive contours because of the particular aspects of human beings they regard as most significant. The same is true of Darwin; yet Darwin’s evolutionary view of human beings, though admittedly quite unique among traditional moral theorists, does not lead him to an unfamiliar and eccentric view about the nature and content of ethics. (shrink)

The biocentric outlook on nature affirms our fellowship with other living creatures and portrays human beings as members of the Earth’s community who have equal moral standing with other living members of the community. A comparison of Paul Taylor’s biocentric theory of environmental ethics and the life and writings of St. Francis of Assisi reveals that Francis maintained a biocentric environmental ethic. This individualistc environmental ethic is grounded in biology and is unaffected by the paradigm shift in ecology in which (...) nature is regarded as in flux rather than tending toward equilibrium. A holistic environmental ethic that accords moral standing to holistic entities is more vulnerable to these changes in ecology than an environmental ethic that accords moral standing to individuals. Another strength of biocentrism is its potential to provide a unified front across religious and scientific lines. (shrink)

In his critique of a common argument in favor of vegetarianism, Holmes Rolston III does not sufficiently address the nutritional factor. The nutritional factor is the important fact that the eating of animals is not nutritionally required to sustain human life. Also, although Rolston’s criterion for distinguishing when to model human conduct on animal conduct is defensible, he applies it inconsistently. One reason for this inconsistency is that Rolston misplaces the line he attempts to draw between culture and nature. Although (...) he himself makes a distinction between culture and nature Rolston fails to recognize that the nutritional “need” to eat meat is a cultural creation, not a natural event. For these reasons, Rolston’s defense of eating animals as a purported way of respected ecology is severely impaired. (shrink)

The arguments levelled by J L Mackie against objective values and moral realism still have sway over many philosophers. In this paper I carefully analyze these arguments. My analysis covers the following areas: 1) his notion of objective value, 2) his metaethical methodology, 3) his attempt at outlining a normative ethics in light of his metaethical skepticism, and 4) his understanding of the concept "institution". I conclude that a version of moral realism can be maintained in the face of Mackie's (...) arguments. I offer a moral realist rejoinder to each of the four above areas and the rebuttals culminate into a thesis I call contextual moral realism. (shrink)

In his critique of a common argument in favor of vegetarianism, Holmes Rolston III does not sufficiently address the nutritional factor. The nutritional factor is the important fact that the eating of animals is not nutritionally required to sustain human life. Also, although Rolston’s criterion for distinguishing when to model human conduct on animal conduct is defensible, he applies it inconsistently. One reason for this inconsistency is that Rolston misplaces the line he attempts to draw between culture and nature. Although (...) he himself makes a distinction between culture and nature Rolston fails to recognize that the nutritional “need” to eat meat is a cultural creation, not a natural event. For these reasons, Rolston’s defense of eating animals as a purported way of respected ecology is severely impaired. (shrink)

Franciscan biocentrism is the view that Francis of Assisi is a biocentrist who holds that all living things have intrinsic value. Recently, biocentric theorists Sterba and Taylor have modified biocentrism to accommodate holistic entities. I consider thinkers from the broader Franciscan intellectual tradition (Bonaventure and Scotus) to see whether Franciscan biocentrism can be similarly modified. I discuss notions from these medieval philosophers such as the Cosmic Christ and the concept of haecceitas. I also explore whether Franciscan biocentrism can provide a (...) satisfactory response to the problem of evil, since Franciscan biocentrism faces an issue that secular biocentrism does not: making sense of extinction. (shrink)

Gifford Pinchot (1865-1946) was a noted forestry expert, a conservationist, and governor of Pennsylvania. Rachel Carson (1907-1964), celebrated for her groundbreaking books that raised awareness of the negative human impact on the natural environment, was born, raised, and educated in Pennsylvania. Although these Pennsylvanians are both environmentalists, they approached the natural environment very differently and embody two main positions in contemporary environmental ethics. After situating their environmental legacies among contemporary environmental ethics, this paper then discusses implications of the irreconcilability of (...) their positions on environmental progress; the concept of environmental legacy; and the importance of reflecting on the lives of environmentalists like Pinchot and Carson. (shrink)

In recent metaethics there has been a great deal of discussion regarding moral realism. Moral realism in the tradition of ethical naturalism has been revitalized in the form of a synthetic ethical naturalism. This brand of moral realism has interesting theoretical implications for individualistic and holistic models of environmental ethics. In this paper I argue that most theorists of environmental ethics presuppose an irrealist metaethic out of fear of violating Hume's law and Moore's naturalistic fallacy (e.g., Callicott, Taylor, Elliot, and (...) Sterba, while Rolston is a notable exception). But if we take moral realism (in the form of synthetic ethical naturalism) seriously, then environmental ethics has more options than the conventional metaethical maxims of Hume's law and Moore's naturalistic fallacy would allow. Accordingly, I lay out various prospects for a realist environmental metaethic. Environ-moral realism is an attempt to ground nonanthropocentrism in a realist metaethic. (shrink)

Michael Ruse has argued that evolutionary ethics discredits the objectivity and foundations of ethics. Ruse must employ dubitable assumptions, however, to reach his conclusion. We can trace these assumptions to G. E. Moore. Also, part of Ruse’s case against the foundations of ethics can support the objectivity and foundations of ethics. Cooperative activity geared toward human flourishing helps point the way to a naturalistic moral realism and not exclusively to ethical skepticism as Ruse supposes.

John Haught offers a “critical intelligence” argument against naturalism. In this article, I outline Haught’s version of theistic evolution. Then I discuss the case he makes against naturalism with his critical intelligence argument. He uses two versions of the argument to make his case: a trustworthiness of critical intelligence argument and an ineffectiveness of naturalistic theories of the mind argument. I evaluate both versions of his critical intelligence argument against naturalism and find that they contain false premises. They thus come (...) up short in making a strong case against naturalism. (shrink)

In recent metaethics there has been a great deal of discussion regarding moral realism. Moral realism in the tradition of ethical naturalism has been revitalized in the form of a synthetic ethical naturalism. This brand of moral realism has interesting theoretical implications for individualistic and holistic models of environmental ethics. In this paper I argue that most theorists of environmental ethics presuppose an irrealist metaethic out of fear of violating Hume's law and Moore's naturalistic fallacy. But if we take moral (...) realism seriously, then environmental ethics has more options than the conventional metaethical maxims of Hume's law and Moore's naturalistic fallacy would allow. Accordingly, I lay out various prospects for a realist environmental metaethic. Environ-moral realism is an attempt to ground nonanthropocentrism in a realist metaethic. (shrink)

This book outlines the rich array of work being done with evolution and ethics by biologists, zoologists, paleontologists, philosophers, theologians, psychologists, and political scientists. John Mizzoni argues that we can understand ethical elements more deeply through an evolutionary perspective and ten theories of ethics.

Relative ethics or universal ethics? -- Virtue ethics -- Natural law ethics -- Social contract ethics -- Utilitarian ethics -- Deontological ethics -- Care ethics -- Using the tools of ethics.

_Ethics: The Basics_ provides beginning students with a solid grounding in basic ethical principles, theories and traditions, as well as a set of conceptual tools necessary to think about ethics and make ethical decisions. Introduces ethical concepts, theories, and traditions in an unusually reader-friendly manner Considers western and non-western ethical viewpoints and religious interpretations of ethical concepts Includes end of chapter summaries, case studies, review questions, diagrams and an appendix containing definitions of all the ethical concepts, principles, theories, and traditions (...) introduced in the book. (shrink)

_Ethics: The Basics_ provides beginning students with a solid grounding in basic ethical principles, theories and traditions, as well as a set of conceptual tools necessary to think about ethics and make ethical decisions. Introduces ethical concepts, theories, and traditions in an unusually reader-friendly manner Considers western and non-western ethical viewpoints and religious interpretations of ethical concepts Includes end of chapter summaries, case studies, review questions, diagrams and an appendix containing definitions of all the ethical concepts, principles, theories, and traditions (...) introduced in the book. (shrink)