Results for 'John N. Bassili'

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  1.  11
    Are implicit and explicit tests differentially sensitive to item-specific versus relational information.Colin M. MacLeod & John N. Bassili - 1989 - In S. Lewandowsky, J. M. Dunn & K. Kirsner (eds.), Implicit Memory: Theoretical Issues. Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 159--172.
  2.  6
    Algebra and logic: papers from the 1974 summer research institute of the Australian Mathematical Society, Monash University, Australia.John N. Crossley (ed.) - 1975 - New York: Springer Verlag.
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  3.  9
    Prologue to education: an enquiry into ends and means.John N. Wales - 1979 - Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
    Whatever the world thinks, he who hath not much meditated upon God, the human mind, and the summum bonum, may possibly make a thriving earthworm, ...
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  4. Moore's paradoxes, Evans's principle and self-knowledge.John N. Williams - 2004 - Analysis 64 (4):348-353.
    I supply an argument for Evans's principle that whatever justifies me in believing that p also justifies me in believing that I believe that p. I show how this principle helps explain how I come to know my own beliefs in a way that normally makes me the best authority on them. Then I show how the principle helps to solve Moore's paradoxes.
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  5. Moore’s Paradox in Speech: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):10-23.
    It is raining but you don’t believe that it is raining. Imagine accepting this claim. Then you are committed to saying ‘It is raining but I don’t believe that it is raining’. This would be an ‘absurd’ thing to claim or assert, yet what you say might be true. It might be raining, while at the same time, you are completely ignorant of the state of the weather. But how can it be absurd of you to assert something about yourself (...)
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  6. Moore’s Paradox and the Priority of Belief Thesis.John N. Williams - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1117-1138.
    Moore’s paradox is the fact that assertions or beliefs such asBangkok is the capital of Thailand but I do not believe that Bangkok is the capital of Thailand or Bangkok is the capital of Thailand but I believe that Bangkok is not the capital of Thailand are ‘absurd’ yet possibly true. The current orthodoxy is that an explanation of the absurdity should first start with belief, on the assumption that once the absurdity in belief has been explained then this will (...)
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  7. Moore’s Paradox, Truth and Accuracy: A Reply to Lawlor and Perry.John N. Williams & Mitchell S. Green - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (3):243-255.
    G. E. Moore famously observed that to assert ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I do not believe that I did’ would be ‘absurd’. Moore calls it a ‘paradox’ that this absurdity persists despite the fact that what I say about myself might be true. Krista Lawlor and John Perry have proposed an explanation of the absurdity that confines itself to semantic notions while eschewing pragmatic ones. We argue that this explanation faces four objections. We give a (...)
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  8. Moore's Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):24-37.
    It is raining but you don’t believe that it is raining. Imagine silently accepting this claim. Then you believe both that it is raining and that you don’t believe that it is raining. This would be an ‘absurd’ thing to believe,yet what you believe might be true. Itmight be raining, while at the same time, you are completely ignorant of the state of the weather. But how can it be absurd of you to believe something about yourself that might be (...)
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  9.  66
    Proclus and the neoplatonic syllogistic.John N. Martin - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (3):187-240.
    An investigation of Proclus' logic of the syllogistic and of negations in the Elements of Theology, On the Parmenides, and Platonic Theology. It is shown that Proclus employs interpretations over a linear semantic structure with operators for scalar negations (hypemegationlalpha-intensivum and privative negation). A natural deduction system for scalar negations and the classical syllogistic (as reconstructed by Corcoran and Smiley) is shown to be sound and complete for the non-Boolean linear structures. It is explained how Proclus' syllogistic presupposes converting the (...)
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  10. Propositional knowledge and know-how.John N. Williams - 2008 - Synthese 165 (1):107-125.
    This paper is roughly in two parts. The first deals with whether know-how is constituted by propositional knowledge, as discussed primarily by Gilbert Ryle (1949) The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001). Knowing how. Journal of Philosophy, 98, pp. 411–444 as well as Stephen Hetherington (2006). How to know that knowledge-that is knowledge-how. In S. Hetherington (Ed.) Epistemology futures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The conclusion of this first part is that know-how sometimes does and sometimes (...)
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  11.  9
    The Cartesian Semantics of the Port Royal Logic.John N. Martin - 2019 - New York: Routledge.
    This book sets out for the first time in English and in the terms of modern logic the semantics of the Port Royal Logic of Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, perhaps the most influential logic book in the 17th and 18th centuries. Its goal is to explain how the Logic reworks the foundation of pre-Cartesian logic so as to make it compatible with Descartes' metaphysics. The Logic's authors forged a new theory of reference based on the medieval notion of objective (...)
  12. Themes in Neoplatonic and Aristotelian Logic.John N. Martin - 2005 - Ars Disputandi 5.
     
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  13. The Backward Clock, Truth-Tracking, and Safety.John N. Williams & Neil Sinhababu - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (1):46-55.
    We present Backward Clock, an original counterexample to Robert Nozick’s truth-tracking analysis of propositional knowledge, which works differently from other putative counterexamples and avoids objections to which they are vulnerable. We then argue that four ways of analysing knowledge in terms of safety, including Duncan Pritchard’s, cannot withstand Backward Clock either.
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  14. Moorean Absurdity and the Intentional 'Structure' of Assertion.John N. Williams - 1994 - Analysis 54 (3):160 - 166.
  15.  61
    Moore's Paradox - One or Two?John N. Williams - 1979 - Analysis 39 (3):141-142.
    Discussions of what is sometimes called 'Moore's paradox' are often vitiated by a failure to notice that there are two paradoxes; not merely one in two sets of linguistic clothing. The two paradoxes are absurd, but in different ways, and accordingly require different explanations.
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  16. Moore’s paradox in belief and desire.John N. Williams - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (1):1-23.
    Is there a Moore ’s paradox in desire? I give a normative explanation of the epistemic irrationality, and hence absurdity, of Moorean belief that builds on Green and Williams’ normative account of absurdity. This explains why Moorean beliefs are normally irrational and thus absurd, while some Moorean beliefs are absurd without being irrational. Then I defend constructing a Moorean desire as the syntactic counterpart of a Moorean belief and distinguish it from a ‘Frankfurt’ conjunction of desires. Next I discuss putative (...)
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  17.  15
    Semiotic Animal: A Postmodern Definition of Human Being Transcending Patriarchy and Feminism.John N. Deely - 2010 - St. Augustine's Press.
  18.  10
    Augustine and Poinsot: The Protosemiotic Development.John N. Deely - 2009 - University of Scranton Press.
    While Saint Augustine has been a household name for centuries, the same cannot be said of long-overlooked philosopher John Poinsot. But in _Augustine and Poinsot_, John Deely contends that the history of semiotics cannot be conceived of without Poinsot’s landmark contribution. According to Deely, even though Augustine was the first to describe _what_ the sign does, Poinsot was the first to show _how_ the sign mediates between nature and culture. This revolutionary volume demonstrates how Poinsot’s account of semiotics (...)
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  19. Wittgensteinian accounts of Moorean absurdity.John N. Williams - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 92 (3):283-306.
    (A) I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did (1942, p. 543) or (B) I believe that he has gone out. But he has not (1944, p. 204) would be “absurd” (1942, p. 543; 1944, p. 204). Wittgenstein’s letters to Moore show that he was intensely interested in this discovery of a class of possibly true yet absurd assertions. Wittgenstein thought that the absurdity is important because it is “something similar to a contradiction, thought (...)
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  20.  64
    Inconsistency and contradiction.John N. Williams - 1981 - Mind 90 (360):600-602.
    Inconsistency and contradiction are important concepts. Unfortunately, they are easily confused. A proposition or belief which is inconsistent is one which is self- contradictory and vice-versa. Moreover two propositions or beliefs which are contradictories are inconsistent with each other. Nonetheless it is a mistake to suppose that inconsistency is the same as contradiction.
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  21.  95
    Moorean absurdities and the nature of assertion.John N. Williams - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1):135 – 149.
    I argue that Moore's propositions, for example, 'I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don't believe that I did' cannot be rationally believed. Their assertors either cannot be rationally believed or cannot be believed to be rational. This analysis is extended to Moorean propositions such as God knows that I am an atheist and I believe that this proposition is false. I then defend the following definition of assertion: anyone asserts that p iff that person expresses a belief (...)
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  22.  42
    Themes in Neoplatonic and Aristotelian logic: order, negation, and abstraction.John N. Martin - 2004 - Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
    This book shows otherwise. John Martin rehabilitates Neoplatonism, founded by Plotinus and brought into Christianity by St. Augustine.
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  23.  17
    All Brutes are Subhuman: Aristotle and Ockham on Private Negation.John N. Martin - 2003 - Synthese 134 (3):429-461.
    The mediaeval logic of Aristotelian privation, represented by Ockham's expositionof All A is non-P as All S is of a type T that is naturally P and no S is P, iscritically evaluated as an account of privative negation. It is argued that there aretwo senses of privative negation: (1) an intensifier (as in subhuman), the dualof Neoplatonic hypernegation (superhuman), which is studied in linguistics asan operator on scalar adjectives, and (2) a (often lexicalized) Boolean complementrelative to the extension of (...)
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  24.  11
    Elements of formal semantics: an introduction to logic for students of language.John N. Martin - 1987 - Orlando: Academic Press.
  25. Justifying circumstances and Moore-paradoxical beliefs: A response to Brueckner.John N. Williams - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):490-496.
    In 2004, I explained the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical belief via the syllogism (Williams 2004): (1) All circumstances that justify me in believing that p are circumstances that tend to make me believe that p. (2) All circumstances that tend to make me believe that p are circumstances that justify me in believing that I believe that p. (3) All circumstances that justify me in believing that p are circumstances that justify me in believing that I believe that p. I then (...)
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  26. In defence of an argument for Evans's principle: A rejoinder to Vahid.John N. Williams - 2006 - Analysis 66 (2):167–170.
    In (2004) I gave an argument for Evans’s principle -/- Whatever justifies me in believing that p also justifies me in believing that I believe that p -/- Hamid Vahid (2005) raises two objections against this argument. I show that the first is harmless and that the second is a non sequitur.
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  27.  34
    The Philosophical Origins of Mitchell's Chemiosmotic Concepts: The Personal Factor in Scientific Theory Formulation.John N. Prebble - 2001 - Journal of the History of Biology 34 (3):433 - 460.
    Mitchell's formulation of the chemiosmotic theory of oxidative phosphorylation in 1961 lacked any experimental support for its three central postulates. The path by which Mitchell reached this theory is explored. A major factor was the role of Mitchell's philosophical system conceived in his student days at Cambridge. This system appears to have become a tacit influence on his work in the sense that Polanyi understood all knowledge to be generated by an interaction between tacit and explicit knowing. Early in his (...)
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  28.  36
    In defence of an argument for Evans's principle: a rejoinder to Vahid.John N. Williams - 2006 - Analysis 66 (2):167-170.
  29. Wittgenstein, Moorean Absurdity and its Disappearance from Speech.John N. Williams - 2006 - Synthese 149 (1):225-254.
    G. E. Moore famously observed that to say, “ I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did” would be “absurd”. Why should it be absurd of me to say something about myself that might be true of me? Moore suggested an answer to this, but as I will show, one that fails. Wittgenstein was greatly impressed by Moore’s discovery of a class of absurd but possibly true assertions because he saw that it illuminates “the (...)
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  30. Moore-paradoxical Assertion, Fully Conscious Belief and the Transparency of Belief.John N. Williams - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (1):9-12.
    I offer a novel account of the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical assertion in terms of an interlocutor’s fully conscious beliefs. This account starts with an original argument for the principle that fully conscious belief collects over conjunction. The argument is premised on the synchronic unity of consciousness and the transparency of belief.
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  31.  17
    Problems in the Philosophy of Mathematics.John N. Crossley - 1968 - Philosophical Quarterly 18 (72):275-275.
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  32.  31
    General thinking skills: Are there such things?John N. Andrews - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 24 (1):71–81.
    John N Andrews; General Thinking Skills: are there such things?, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 24, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 71–79, https://doi.o.
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  33.  17
    Moore’s Paradoxes and Iterated Belief.John N. Williams - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32:145-168.
    I give an account of the absurdity of Moorean beliefs of the omissive form(om) p and I don’t believe that p,and the commissive form(com) p and I believe that not-p,from which I extract a definition of Moorean absurdity. I then argue for an account of the absurdity of Moorean assertion. After neutralizing two objections to my whole account, I show that Roy Sorensen’s own account of the absurdity of his ‘iterated cases’(om1) p and I don’t believe that I believe that (...)
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  34.  58
    The Surprise Exam Paradox.John N. Williams - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32:67-94.
    One tradition of solving the surprise exam paradox, started by Robert Binkley and continued by Doris Olin, Roy Sorensen and Jelle Gerbrandy, construes surpriseepistemically and relies upon the oddity of propositions akin to G. E. Moore’s paradoxical ‘p and I don’t believe that p.’ Here I argue for an analysis that evolves from Olin’s. My analysis is different from hers or indeed any of those in the tradition because it explicitly recognizes that there are two distinct reductios at work in (...)
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  35.  18
    The Human Use of Signs: Or Elements of Anthroposemiosis.John N. Deely - 1993 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    'An impressive synthesis of semiotics and anthropology which puts human experience in a new light. Deely gives us the foundation for a new paradigm for anthropology.' -Nathan Houser, Peirce Edition Project.
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  36.  5
    Wittgenstein: A Critique.John N. Findlay - 1984 - Boston: Routledge.
    First published in 2005. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
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  37. The preface paradox dissolved.John N. Williams - 1987 - Theoria 53 (2-3):121-140.
    The preface paradox strikes us as puzzling because we feel that if a person holds a set of inconsistent beliefs, i.e. beliefs such that at least one of them must be correct, then he should give at least one of them up. Equally, if a person's belief is rational, then he has a right to hold it. Yet the preface example is prima facie a case in which a person holds an inconsistent set of beliefs each of which is rational, (...)
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  38.  55
    The Concept of the Irreplaceable.John N. Martin - 1979 - Environmental Ethics 1 (1):31-48.
    An analysis is proposed for the common argument that something should be preserved because it is irreplaceable. The argument is shown to depend on modal elements in irreplaceable, existence assumptions of preserve, and the logic of obligation. In terms of this theory it is argued that utilitarianism can account for most, but not all instances of persuasive appeals to irreplaceability. Beingessentially backwards looking, utilitarianism cannot in principle justify preservation of objects irreplaceable because of their history or genesis.
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  39. Moore-paradoxical belief, conscious belief and the epistemic Ramsey test.John N. Williams - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):231-246.
    Chalmers and Hájek argue that on an epistemic reading of Ramsey’s test for the rational acceptability of conditionals, it is faulty. They claim that applying the test to each of a certain pair of conditionals requires one to think that one is omniscient or infallible, unless one forms irrational Moore-paradoxical beliefs. I show that this claim is false. The epistemic Ramsey test is indeed faulty. Applying it requires that one think of anyone as all-believing and if one is rational, to (...)
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  40.  73
    Existential Import in Cartesian Semantics.John N. Martin - 2011 - History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (3):211-239.
    The paper explores the existential import of universal affirmative in Descartes, Arnauld and Malebranche. Descartes holds, inconsistently, that eternal truths are true even if the subject term is empty but that a proposition with a false idea as subject is false. Malebranche extends Descartes? truth-conditions for eternal truths, which lack existential import, to all knowledge, allowing only for non-propositional knowledge of contingent existence. Malebranche's rather implausible Neoplatonic semantics is detailed as consisting of three key semantic relations: illumination by which God's (...)
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  41. The completeness of the pragmatic solution to Moore’s paradox in belief: a reply to Chan.John N. Williams - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2457-2476.
    Moore’s paradox in belief is the fact that beliefs of the form ‘ p and I do not believe that p ’ are ‘absurd’ yet possibly true. Writers on the paradox have nearly all taken the absurdity to be a form of irrationality. These include those who give what Timothy Chan calls the ‘pragmatic solution’ to the paradox. This solution turns on the fact that having the Moorean belief falsifies its content. Chan, who also takes the absurdity to be a (...)
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  42. Moore’s Paradoxes and Iterated Belief.John N. Williams - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32:145-168.
    I give an account of the absurdity of Moorean beliefs of the omissive form(om) p and I don’t believe that p,and the commissive form(com) p and I believe that not-p,from which I extract a definition of Moorean absurdity. I then argue for an account of the absurdity of Moorean assertion. After neutralizing two objections to my whole account, I show that Roy Sorensen’s own account of the absurdity of his ‘iterated cases’(om1) p and I don’t believe that I believe that (...)
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  43.  13
    The Surprise Exam Paradox.John N. Williams - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32:67-94.
    One tradition of solving the surprise exam paradox, started by Robert Binkley and continued by Doris Olin, Roy Sorensen and Jelle Gerbrandy, construes surpriseepistemically and relies upon the oddity of propositions akin to G. E. Moore’s paradoxical ‘p and I don’t believe that p.’ Here I argue for an analysis that evolves from Olin’s. My analysis is different from hers or indeed any of those in the tradition because it explicitly recognizes that there are two distinct reductios at work in (...)
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  44.  22
    David-Hillel Ruben’s 'Traditions and True Successors': A Critical Reply.John N. Williams - 2013 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (7):40-45.
  45. Believing the Self-Contradictory.John N. Williams - 1982 - American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (3):279 - 285.
    Clearly, if a man holds a self-contradictory belief, then his belief cannot be rational, for there can be no set of evidence sufficient to justify it. This is most apparent when the self contradictory belief is a belief in a conjunction, , rather than when it is a non-conjunctive self-contradictory belief, e.g. a belief that red is not a color.
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  46.  86
    Justified Belief And The Infinite Regress Argument.John N. Williams - 1981 - American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (1):85-88.
    The background to this paper is the question of how rational belief is possible in the light of the commonly presented infinite regress in reasons. The paper investigates the neglected question of whether this regress is vicious. I argue that given the genuine requirements of rational belief, The regress would require the rational believer to hold an infinity of beliefs, Which is impossible. The regress would not entail the rational believer holding an infinitely complex belief, Which, Admittedly, Would be logically (...)
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  47.  4
    Norms and the Law.John N. Drobak (ed.) - 2006 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book contains perspectives of world-renowned scholars from the fields of law, economics, and political science about the relationship between law and norms. The authors take different approaches by using a wide variety of perspectives from law, legal history, neoclassical economics, new institutional economics, game theory, political science, cognitive science, and philosophy. The essays examine the relationship between norms and the law in four different contexts. Part One consists of essays that use the perspectives of cognitive science and behavioral economics (...)
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  48. William 0. Hendricks.John N. Duvall - 1992 - Semiotica 89:129.
     
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  49.  75
    On the contestability of social and political concepts.John N. Cray - 1977 - Political Theory 5 (3):331-348.
  50.  82
    Learning without awareness.John N. Williams - 2005 - Studies in Second Language Acquisition. Special Issue 27 (2):269-304.
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