76 found
Order:
  1.  60
    Hume's Missing Shade of Blue Re-Viewed.John O. Nelson - 1989 - Hume Studies 15 (2):353-363.
  2.  54
    The Burial and Resurrection of Hume's Essay "Of Miracles".John O. Nelson - 1986 - Hume Studies 12 (1):57-76.
    I TRY TO EXPLAIN WHY THE "ESSAY OF MIRACLES" DID NOT APPEAR IN THE "TREATISE" BUT DID IN THE "ENQUIRY". I ARGUE THAT THE ESSAY WAS ORIGINALLY DIRECTED AGAINST REVEALED KNOWLEDGE; SO DIRECTED, IT FITTED INTO THE TIGHTLY ORGANIZED PROGRAM OF THE "TREATISE", BUT HAD TO BE SUPPRESSED FOR PRUDENTIAL REASONS. RECONSTRUCTED AS AN ESSAY DIRECTED MERELY AGAINST NON-SCRIPTURAL MIRACLES ITS APPEARANCE IN THE "ENQUIRY" PRESENTED NO PHILOSOPHICAL OR PRUDENTIAL DIFFICULTIES.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  69
    Are Inductive Generalizations Quantifiable?John O. Nelson - 1962 - Analysis 22 (3):59 - 65.
  4. Hume's 'New Scene of Thought' and the Several Faces of David Hume in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.Jeff Broome & John O. Nelson - 2009 - Upa.
    This book is a defense of Hume's philosophical principles in the Treatise of Human Nature. Nelson shows that Hume's new philosophy was a uniquely original and profound masterpiece in philosophical literature, worthy of serious study and acceptance. It is argued that Dialoguesis a reflective philosophical autobiography of Hume himself.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5.  69
    I Know That Here Is a Hand.John O. Nelson - 1964 - Analysis 24 (6):185 - 190.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  25
    Is the Pears-McGuinness Translation of The.John O. Nelson - 1999 - Philosophical Investigations 22 (2):165-175.
  7.  37
    Against Human Rights: John O. Nelson.John O. Nelson - 1990 - Philosophy 65 (253):341-348.
    Let me first explain what I am not attacking in this paper. I am not attacking, for instance, the right of free speech or any of the other specific rights listed in the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights or the United Nations' Charter. I am, rather, attacking any specific right's being called a ‘human right’. I mean to show that any such designation is not only fraudulent but, in case anyone might want to say that there can be noble lies, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8.  64
    Some Experiential Incoherencies of Riemannian Space.John O. Nelson - 1975 - Philosophia Mathematica (1):66-75.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9.  14
    The Role of Part XII in Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.John O. Nelson - 1988 - Hume Studies 14 (2):347-371.
  10.  34
    Was Aristotle a Functionalist?John O. Nelson - 1990 - Review of Metaphysics 43 (4):791 - 802.
    WHEN, CONTROVERSIALLY, IT IS MAINTAINED that Aristotle was a functionalist, what is meant by "functionalist" cannot have the sense of "teleological functionalist," for in that sense there can be no doubt that Aristotle was a functionalist. The sense of "functionalism" that is patently being exploited is that which appears in contemporary philosophies of mind with affinities to logical behaviorism but also with some important divergencies and which Paul Churchland describes as the view that "psychological states are functional states in the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  11.  15
    In Defence of Descartes: Squaring a Reputed Circle.John O. Nelson - 1964 - Dialogue 3 (3):262-272.
  12.  54
    Tastes.John O. Nelson - 1966 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (4):537-545.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13.  29
    Are There Inalienable Rights?: John O. Nelson.John O. Nelson - 1989 - Philosophy 64 (250):519-524.
    In the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights a quite large number of things are said to be ‘human rights’ and though in that Declaration the term ‘inalienable’ is not used to describe the rights in question it has been so used by commentators—at least with respect to some of the rights enumerated. I shall forgo asking the prior question as to whether any such thing as a human right exists and ask simply whether any such thing as an (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14.  55
    In Defense of the Traditional Interpretation of the Square.John O. Nelson - 1954 - Philosophical Review 63 (3):401-413.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  15.  13
    The Authorship of the Abstract Revisited.John O. Nelson - 1991 - Hume Studies 17 (1):83-86.
  16.  39
    Are There Inalienable Rights?John O. Nelson - 1989 - Philosophy 64 (250):519 - 524.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  17.  32
    Stroud's Dream Argument Critique: John O. Nelson.John O. Nelson - 1993 - Philosophy 68 (266):473-482.
    In his recent work, The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism , Barry Stroud proposes to carry out an in-depth critique of the attempt by philosophers to invalidate all knowledge of an external world on the basis of Descartes' dream argument. His more particular aims in this endeavour are to uncover significant features of any such scepticism and to disclose in the process fundamental aspects of ‘human knowledge’ itself. Thus, among other features of knowledge that his study discloses, he thinks, is, echoing (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18.  19
    Brute Animals and Legal Rights: John O. Nelson.John O. Nelson - 1987 - Philosophy 62 (240):171-177.
    Various proponents of animal rights—for example, H. J. McCloskey— maintain that while brute animals cannot have; moral rights they can have legal rights. Indeed, McCloskey himself goes so far as to maintain that even inanimate objects are able to have legal rights. 1 And why should not inanimate objects be able to? After f all, for there to be a legal right is anything more required than that whatever agency is empowered to issue legal rights simply legislate or proclaim that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  19.  7
    I know that here is a band.John O. Nelson - 1964 - Analysis 24 (6):185.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20.  11
    Remembering: A Philosophical Problem.John O. Nelson - 1963 - Philosophical Review 72 (1):127.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  21.  20
    Philosophers‘ Nonsense.John O. Nelson - 1972 - Metaphilosophy 3 (3):238–243.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  22.  18
    Can One Tell That He is Awake by Pinching Himself?John O. Nelson - 1966 - Philosophical Studies 17 (6):81 - 84.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  23.  9
    Propositional Knowledge and Belief: Entailment or Mutual Exclusion?John O. Nelson - 1982 - Philosophical Investigations 5 (2):135-141.
  24.  25
    Does Physics Lead to Berkeley?: John O. Nelson.John O. Nelson - 1982 - Philosophy 57 (219):91-103.
    Russell said that physics drove him to a position not unlike that of Berkeley —by which he meant subjectivism or solipsism. ‘As regards metaphysics’, he tells us in his Autobiography , ‘when, under the influence of Moore, I first threw off the belief in German idealism, I experienced the delight of believing that the sensible world is real. Bit by bit, chiefly under the influence of physics, this delight has faded, and I have been driven to a position not unlike (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25.  21
    Against Human Rights.John O. Nelson - 1990 - Philosophy 65 (253):341 - 348.
  26.  24
    Induction: A Non-Sceptical Humean Solution: John O. Nelson.John O. Nelson - 1992 - Philosophy 67 (261):307-327.
    Pre-analytically at least some of our inductions seem to be possessed of rational justification. This comment would apply, for instance, to my present induction, ‘If that climber high on the Flatirons falls he will be killed,’ not to mention such more momentous inductions as, ‘If a full-scale nuclear war breaks out there will be greater destruction than in World War II.’ Notoriously, however, a few Humean reflections seem to strip even the most plausible of our inductions of all possible rational (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27.  41
    An Examination of D M Armstrong's Theory of Perception.John O. Nelson - 1964 - American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (2):154-160.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28.  23
    That a Worker's Labour Cannot Be a Commodity: John O. Nelson.John O. Nelson - 1995 - Philosophy 70 (272):157-165.
    There are, no doubt, a variety of reasons, good and bad, why anyone might want to treat a worker's labour, and most people, consciously or unconsciously do, as a commodity.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29.  3
    Conceptual Thinking.John O. Nelson & Stephan Korner - 1957 - Philosophical Review 66 (3):402.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  30.  10
    Types and Ontology.Fred Sommers, John O. Nelson & Ronald Bon de Sousa - 1967 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 32 (3):406-408.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  31.  5
    Wittgenstein: Language and World. [REVIEW]John O. Nelson - 1984 - Review of Metaphysics 38 (2):380-382.
    In his preface to Wittgenstein: Language and World, Canfield briefly explains the plan of the work. Feeling that "Wittgenstein's later work remains, after decades of study, in significant part poorly grasped or misinterpreted," and that "to make Wittgenstein's thought available, what is needed are in-depth examinations of his major concepts," he proposes to undertake a part of that task by examining in detail the "two connected ideas, that of a 'criterion', or standard by which one judges truth, and that of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32.  24
    Modal Logic and the Ontological Proof for God's Existence.John O. Nelson - 1963 - Review of Metaphysics 17 (2):235 - 242.
    Now it cannot be denied, I think, that this argument has the appearance of being sound, that is, both true in its premises and valid in its conclusion. But one surely ought to harbor suspicions concerning an argument which establishes the most momentous of all conclusions upon nothing more than a few propositions. In this paper I shall attempt to show that these suspicions are well-founded by pointing out that the above "proof" derives whatever force it has from an equivocation.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  33.  21
    Mr. Hochberg on Moore.John O. Nelson - 1962 - Review of Metaphysics 16 (1):119-132.
  34.  16
    On Sommers' Reinstatement of Russell's Ontological Program.John O. Nelson - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (4):517-521.
  35.  38
    Stroud's Dream Argument Critique.John O. Nelson - 1993 - Philosophy 68 (266):473 - 482.
  36.  34
    Zeno's Paradoxes on Motion.John O. Nelson - 1963 - Review of Metaphysics 16 (3):486 - 490.
    The author argues that, Although zeno's paradoxes on motion cannot be resolved in their own terms, They are nonetheless illegitimate. Examining the paradox of achilles and the tortoise, He finds that the mechanism of zeno's argument consists in an equivocal concept of motion characterized at once by a constant rate and by proportionate segments of movement. He then contends it is illegitimate to treat the concept of motion and its subconcepts like the postulates of a deductive system. However, That the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37.  12
    Brute Animals and Legal Rights.John O. Nelson - 1987 - Philosophy 62 (240):171 - 177.
  38.  13
    Pragmatism According to Rorty: A Disaster Area.John O. Nelson - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:349-366.
    The limited objectives of this paper are to show that A), what seem to be merely superficial incoherencies in Rorty’s preferred pragmatism [according to which, “the only constraints on inquiry are conversational ones”] really are not but B), along with every assertion of Rorty’s defining his system and its consequences, belie an intrinsic incoherency resulting from that system’s intended conflation of “correspondence truth” and “pragmatic truth.” Then C), I shall argue that should we ask of a philosophy that denies to (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39.  36
    In Defence of a Radical Millianism.John O. Nelson - 1996 - Philosophy 71 (278):521 - 530.
    In order to by-pass immaterial historical bickering I shall stipulatively mean by ‘Radical Millianism’ just this much more than what Katz in his recent article in The Philosophical Review , ‘Names without Bearers’ , means by the unqualified term, ‘Millianism’; namely, whereas Katz means by ‘Millianism’ that theory of proper names which holds that proper names ‘have no linguistic meaning,’.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40.  23
    A Berkeleian Reading of Hume’s Treatise, Book I.John O. Nelson - 1987 - Philosophy Research Archives 13:245-269.
    In this essay I try, first, to show that Lockean passages in Book I can be given a Berkeleian interpretation. I take two passages that have, in particular, been cited as allowing only a Lockean interpretation and show how they can be more coherently construed as Berkeleian in their intended meaning. In the process of this demonstration I show that only a Berkeleian interpretation is tenable for Book I. Second, I defend the Berkeleian interpretation against several charges; for instance, a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41.  21
    An Inconsistency in “Dreaming”.John O. Nelson - 1964 - Philosophical Studies 15 (3):33 - 35.
  42.  37
    The Confirmation of Hypotheses.John O. Nelson - 1958 - Philosophical Review 67 (1):95-100.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43.  20
    The Conclusion of Book One, Part Four, of Hume's Treatise.John O. Nelson - 1964 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 24 (4):512-521.
  44.  20
    Has the Authorship of an Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature Really Been Decided?John O. Nelson - 1976 - Philosophical Quarterly 26 (102):82-91.
  45.  19
    Wittgenstein.John O. Nelson - 1984 - Review of Metaphysics 38 (2):380-382.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46.  33
    Is Object-Seeing Really Propositional Seeing?John O. Nelson - 1985 - Philosophical Topics 13 (2):231-238.
  47.  16
    Pragmatism According to Rorty.John O. Nelson - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:349-366.
    The limited objectives of this paper are to show that A), what seem to be merely superficial incoherencies in Rorty’s preferred pragmatism [according to which, “the only constraints on inquiry are conversational ones”] really are not but B), along with every assertion of Rorty’s defining his system and its consequences, belie an intrinsic incoherency resulting from that system’s intended conflation of “correspondence truth” and “pragmatic truth.” Then C), I shall argue that should we ask of a philosophy that denies to (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48.  15
    A Groat's Worth More on Moore's Assertion.John O. Nelson - 1965 - Analysis 26 (1):32 -.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49.  15
    A Question of Entailment.John O. Nelson - 1964 - Review of Metaphysics 18 (2):364 - 377.
    A r anderson and n d belnap, Jr., Maintained in their 1962 article, "the pure calculus of entailment," that necessary propositions can be entailed only by necessary propositions, And not by contingent ones. Against this r w ashby offered an apparently conclusive counterexample in "entailment and modality" (1963). In support of anderson and belnap, The author of the present paper develops a definition of entailment and argues that contingent propositions never entail necessary ones. However, Psychological factors may intervene in our (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50.  23
    Discussion.John O. Nelson - 1965 - Theoria 31 (1):61-63.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 76