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John O. Nelson [76]John Oliver Nelson [1]
  1.  61
    Hume's Missing Shade of Blue Re-Viewed.John O. Nelson - 1989 - Hume Studies 15 (2):353-363.
  2.  18
    In Defence of Descartes: Squaring a Reputed Circle.John O. Nelson - 1964 - Dialogue 3 (3):262-272.
  3.  55
    In Defense of the Traditional Interpretation of the Square.John O. Nelson - 1954 - Philosophical Review 63 (3):401-413.
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  4.  15
    The Role of Part XII in Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.John O. Nelson - 1988 - Hume Studies 14 (2):347-371.
  5.  37
    Was Aristotle a Functionalist?John O. Nelson - 1990 - Review of Metaphysics 43 (4):791 - 802.
    WHEN, CONTROVERSIALLY, IT IS MAINTAINED that Aristotle was a functionalist, what is meant by "functionalist" cannot have the sense of "teleological functionalist," for in that sense there can be no doubt that Aristotle was a functionalist. The sense of "functionalism" that is patently being exploited is that which appears in contemporary philosophies of mind with affinities to logical behaviorism but also with some important divergencies and which Paul Churchland describes as the view that "psychological states are functional states in the (...)
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  6.  3
    Conceptual Thinking.John O. Nelson & Stephan Korner - 1957 - Philosophical Review 66 (3):402.
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  7.  23
    Can One Tell That He is Awake by Pinching Himself?John O. Nelson - 1966 - Philosophical Studies 17 (6):81 - 84.
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  8.  11
    Remembering: A Philosophical Problem.John O. Nelson - 1963 - Philosophical Review 72 (1):127.
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  9.  22
    Philosophers‘ Nonsense.John O. Nelson - 1972 - Metaphilosophy 3 (3):238–243.
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  10.  13
    The Authorship of the Abstract Revisited.John O. Nelson - 1991 - Hume Studies 17 (1):83-86.
  11.  9
    Propositional Knowledge and Belief: Entailment or Mutual Exclusion?John O. Nelson - 1982 - Philosophical Investigations 5 (2):135-141.
  12.  69
    Are Inductive Generalizations Quantifiable?John O. Nelson - 1962 - Analysis 22 (3):59 - 65.
  13.  31
    Is the Pears-McGuinness Translation of The.John O. Nelson - 1999 - Philosophical Investigations 22 (2):165-175.
  14.  39
    Against Human Rights: John O. Nelson.John O. Nelson - 1990 - Philosophy 65 (253):341-348.
    Let me first explain what I am not attacking in this paper. I am not attacking, for instance, the right of free speech or any of the other specific rights listed in the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights or the United Nations' Charter. I am, rather, attacking any specific right's being called a ‘human right’. I mean to show that any such designation is not only fraudulent but, in case anyone might want to say that there can be noble lies, (...)
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  15.  30
    Are There Inalienable Rights?: John O. Nelson.John O. Nelson - 1989 - Philosophy 64 (250):519-524.
    In the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights a quite large number of things are said to be ‘human rights’ and though in that Declaration the term ‘inalienable’ is not used to describe the rights in question it has been so used by commentators—at least with respect to some of the rights enumerated. I shall forgo asking the prior question as to whether any such thing as a human right exists and ask simply whether any such thing as an (...)
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  16.  40
    Are There Inalienable Rights?John O. Nelson - 1989 - Philosophy 64 (250):519 - 524.
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  17.  21
    Brute Animals and Legal Rights: John O. Nelson.John O. Nelson - 1987 - Philosophy 62 (240):171-177.
    Various proponents of animal rights—for example, H. J. McCloskey— maintain that while brute animals cannot have; moral rights they can have legal rights. Indeed, McCloskey himself goes so far as to maintain that even inanimate objects are able to have legal rights. 1 And why should not inanimate objects be able to? After f all, for there to be a legal right is anything more required than that whatever agency is empowered to issue legal rights simply legislate or proclaim that (...)
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  18.  13
    Types and Ontology.Fred Sommers, John O. Nelson & Ronald Bon de Sousa - 1967 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 32 (3):406-408.
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  19.  27
    Modal Logic and the Ontological Proof for God's Existence.John O. Nelson - 1963 - Review of Metaphysics 17 (2):235 - 242.
    Now it cannot be denied, I think, that this argument has the appearance of being sound, that is, both true in its premises and valid in its conclusion. But one surely ought to harbor suspicions concerning an argument which establishes the most momentous of all conclusions upon nothing more than a few propositions. In this paper I shall attempt to show that these suspicions are well-founded by pointing out that the above "proof" derives whatever force it has from an equivocation.
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  20.  16
    On Sommers' Reinstatement of Russell's Ontological Program.John O. Nelson - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (4):517-521.
  21.  21
    Against Human Rights.John O. Nelson - 1990 - Philosophy 65 (253):341 - 348.
  22.  12
    Brute Animals and Legal Rights.John O. Nelson - 1987 - Philosophy 62 (240):171 - 177.
  23. Hume's 'New Scene of Thought' and the Several Faces of David Hume in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.Jeff Broome & John O. Nelson - 2009 - Upa.
    This book is a defense of Hume's philosophical principles in the Treatise of Human Nature. Nelson shows that Hume's new philosophy was a uniquely original and profound masterpiece in philosophical literature, worthy of serious study and acceptance. It is argued that Dialoguesis a reflective philosophical autobiography of Hume himself.
     
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  24.  11
    A Study in Memory.John O. Nelson - 1953 - Philosophy 28 (107):363-365.
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  25.  9
    Does Physics Lead to Berkeley?John O. Nelson - 1982 - Philosophy 57 (219):91 - 103.
  26.  3
    "Everyman's Ontological Argument": A Dissident Version.John O. Nelson - 1979 - Philosophical Investigations 2 (1):1-8.
  27.  6
    How Inductive Conclusions Can Be Certain.John O. Nelson - 1980 - Philosophical Investigations 3 (3):20-32.
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  28.  10
    Induction: A Non-Sceptical Humean Solution.John O. Nelson - 1992 - Philosophy 67 (261):307 - 327.
  29.  40
    In Defence of a Radical Millianism.John O. Nelson - 1996 - Philosophy 71 (278):521 - 530.
    In order to by-pass immaterial historical bickering I shall stipulatively mean by ‘Radical Millianism’ just this much more than what Katz in his recent article in The Philosophical Review , ‘Names without Bearers’ , means by the unqualified term, ‘Millianism’; namely, whereas Katz means by ‘Millianism’ that theory of proper names which holds that proper names ‘have no linguistic meaning,’.
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  30.  39
    Stroud's Dream Argument Critique.John O. Nelson - 1993 - Philosophy 68 (266):473 - 482.
  31.  64
    Some Experiential Incoherencies of Riemannian Space.John O. Nelson - 1975 - Philosophia Mathematica (1):66-75.
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  32.  11
    That a Worker's Labour Cannot Be a Commodity.John O. Nelson - 1995 - Philosophy 70 (272):157 - 165.
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  33. A Dialogue Partly on Political Liberty.Tibor R. Machan & John O. Nelson - 1990 - Upa.
    This work is a classic dialogue between two philosophers, with the unusual twist that it was actually conducted, not fabricated, by two different philosophers. It presents in a conversational tone the various crucial and not so crucial aspects of the topic of political liberty and what if any value it has for us.
     
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  34.  23
    A Berkeleian Reading of Hume’s Treatise, Book I.John O. Nelson - 1987 - Philosophy Research Archives 13:245-269.
    In this essay I try, first, to show that Lockean passages in Book I can be given a Berkeleian interpretation. I take two passages that have, in particular, been cited as allowing only a Lockean interpretation and show how they can be more coherently construed as Berkeleian in their intended meaning. In the process of this demonstration I show that only a Berkeleian interpretation is tenable for Book I. Second, I defend the Berkeleian interpretation against several charges; for instance, a (...)
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  35.  2
    A Berkeleian Reading of Hume’s Treatise, Book I.John O. Nelson - 1987 - Philosophy Research Archives 13:245-269.
    In this essay I try, first, to show that Lockean passages in Book I can be given a Berkeleian interpretation. I take two passages that have, in particular, been cited as allowing only a Lockean interpretation and show how they can be more coherently construed as Berkeleian in their intended meaning. In the process of this demonstration I show that only a Berkeleian interpretation is tenable for Book I. Second, I defend the Berkeleian interpretation against several charges; for instance, a (...)
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  36.  8
    A Defense of Masculinism Versus Feminism or, a Reply to Alison Jaggar and Feminists in General.John O. Nelson - 1993 - Public Affairs Quarterly 7 (3):241-256.
  37.  52
    An Examination of D M Armstrong's Theory of Perception.John O. Nelson - 1964 - American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (2):154-160.
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  38. An Examination of Sommers' Truth-Functional Counterfactuals.John O. Nelson - 1965 - Theoria 31 (1):61.
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  39.  16
    A Groat's Worth More on Moore's Assertion.John O. Nelson - 1965 - Analysis 26 (1):32 -.
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  40. Are Inductive Generalisations Quantifiable?John O. Nelson - 1962 - Analysis 22 (3):59.
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  41.  22
    An Inconsistency in “Dreaming”.John O. Nelson - 1964 - Philosophical Studies 15 (3):33 - 35.
  42.  16
    A Question of Entailment.John O. Nelson - 1964 - Review of Metaphysics 18 (2):364 - 377.
    A r anderson and n d belnap, Jr., Maintained in their 1962 article, "the pure calculus of entailment," that necessary propositions can be entailed only by necessary propositions, And not by contingent ones. Against this r w ashby offered an apparently conclusive counterexample in "entailment and modality" (1963). In support of anderson and belnap, The author of the present paper develops a definition of entailment and argues that contingent propositions never entail necessary ones. However, Psychological factors may intervene in our (...)
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  43.  4
    A Study in Memory.John O. Nelson - 1952 - Philosophical Review 61 (3):421.
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  44.  17
    Can Systems of Imperceptible Particles Appear to Perceivers?John O. Nelson - 1973 - Mind 82 (326):253-257.
  45.  23
    Discussion.John O. Nelson - 1965 - Theoria 31 (1):61-63.
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  46.  25
    Does Physics Lead to Berkeley?: John O. Nelson.John O. Nelson - 1982 - Philosophy 57 (219):91-103.
    Russell said that physics drove him to a position not unlike that of Berkeley —by which he meant subjectivism or solipsism. ‘As regards metaphysics’, he tells us in his Autobiography , ‘when, under the influence of Moore, I first threw off the belief in German idealism, I experienced the delight of believing that the sensible world is real. Bit by bit, chiefly under the influence of physics, this delight has faded, and I have been driven to a position not unlike (...)
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  47.  17
    How and Why Seeing is Not Believing.John O. Nelson - 1984 - Philosophy Research Archives 10:117-137.
    In this paper I attempt to show, first, that doxastic theories of seeing must be rejected on at least two counts: paradoxically, they commit us on the one hand to pyrrhonic skepticism and on the other they fail to account for cases of defeasibility that a theory of perceiving ought to account for. So much for the “why”. As for the “how” I attempt to show that a non-doxastic conception of seeing can be formulated, with the aid of theoretic interpretations (...)
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  48.  5
    How and Why Seeing is Not Believing.John O. Nelson - 1984 - Philosophy Research Archives 10:117-137.
    In this paper I attempt to show, first, that doxastic theories of seeing must be rejected on at least two counts: paradoxically, they commit us on the one hand to pyrrhonic skepticism and on the other they fail to account for cases of defeasibility that a theory of perceiving ought to account for. So much for the “why”. As for the “how” I attempt to show that a non-doxastic conception of seeing can be formulated, with the aid of theoretic interpretations (...)
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  49.  25
    How is Non-Metaphysics Possible?John O. Nelson - 1969 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 30 (2):219-237.
  50.  20
    Has the Authorship of an Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature Really Been Decided?John O. Nelson - 1976 - Philosophical Quarterly 26 (102):82-91.
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