The view of Aristotle and Brentano that ‘true’ applies straightforwardly to statements (judgments, beliefs, propositions) and derivatively to other things makes for awkward and unintuitive definitions in the cases of derived truth. This is corrected by construing ‘true’ as applying analogically to statements and other things. Under this view, six senses of ‘true’ are distinguished. Following the logic of analogy, these senses are partly the same and partly different. These six senses also exhibit an analogy of proportionality. This yields three (...) groups, paired as follows: moral truth is to sentenial truth as productive truth is to ontological truth as cultural truth is to lawful truth.But behind every analogical prediction is a derivative predication. This implies that there is a primary referent of ‘true’ behind moral, productive and cultural truth on the one hand and sentential, ontological and lawful truth on the other. In the case of the former three, it is evidently the human mind. In the case of the latter three, a reasonable hypothesis, shared by Aquinas, is that it is God’s mind. (shrink)

Natural law in Aquinas shares the essential features of law in general: it belongs to mind and stands between end and activity. The mind here is the human mind, the end is happiness which is the natural end of persons as persons and the activity is virtuous activity. The latter is activity that accords with reason. Virtue is called for by the natural law. That is because a) virtue is the habit that inclines persons to rational activity, b) persons are (...) naturally inclined to rational activity and e) to the natural law belong all those things to which persons are naturally inclined. And so the ideas of virtue, rational activity, happiness and natural end are all of them inextricably linked in the Thomistic natural law ethics. (shrink)

Aquinas provides an in-depth analysis of basic philosophical concepts in the thought of Aquinas. These concepts include: being, essence, existence, form, matter, truth, goodness, freedom and necessity, knowledge, willing and choosing, and right action. These ideas are approached from an analytical point of view but the analysis is not exceedingly technical, which allows beginners to follow the discussion. Many other works consider only one aspect of Aquinas's thought such as his treatment of persons, his arguments for God's existence, or his (...) theory of truth but Peterson's Aquinas combines readability with both depth and close analysis to give a comprehensive overview of Aquinas's work without sacrificing either accuracy or depth. - From the publisher. (shrink)

Holism in metaphysics can be defended because it can solve a dilemma about error: that the object of one’s wrong judgment is either inside or outside one’s mind and that neither alternative can be the case. Among holists the American philosopher Josiah Royce provides the best account of both the dilemma and its holist answer. The latter consists in steering between the hard and fast difference of being inside and outside the mind that sparks the dilemma. Royce does this by (...) identifying a unity in the difference, which then ceases to be a stark division and becomes instead a unity-in-difference. I then show how a related dilemma is susceptible to this sort of holist solution. Yet the holist answer to these dilemmas invites all the stock objections to holism. These include the obliteration of finite selves and the distinction between such selves and their experiences. Answering these objections calls for an alternative that uses Royce’s ploy of synthesizing the extremes of being inside and being outside the mind. This sort of realism gets between the horns of the dilemmas via the real and intentional modes of forms. (shrink)

Holism in metaphysics can be defended because it can solve a dilemma about error: that the object of one’s wrong judgment is either inside or outside one’s mind and that neither alternative can be the case. Among holists the American philosopher Josiah Royce provides the best account of both the dilemma and its holist answer. The latter consists in steering between the hard and fast difference of being inside and outside the mind that sparks the dilemma. Royce does this by (...) identifying a unity in the difference, which then ceases to be a stark division and becomes instead a unity-in-difference. I then show how a related dilemma is susceptible to this sort of holist solution. Yet the holist answer to these dilemmas invites all the stock objections to holism. These include the obliteration of finite selves and the distinction between such selves and their experiences. Answering these objections calls for an alternative that uses Royce’s ploy of synthesizing the extremes of being inside and being outside the mind. This sort of realism gets between the horns of the dilemmas via the real and intentional modes of forms. (shrink)

This book introduces readers to Thomistic philosophy through selected topics such as being, God, teleology, truth, persons and knowledge, ethics, and universals. Defending the basis of Aquinas’ natural-law ethics, Introduction to Thomistic Philosophy reveals the role of universalizability and the relation of right and good in his ethics.

Construing all efficient causes as beginning and ceasing with their effects invites the dilemma that a given effect or event either always occurs or neveroccurs. One escapes the dilemma by distinguishing basic and subsidiary efficient causes, according temporal priority of causes to their effects in the case of theformer. In the case of human making and doing, where the two efficient causes belong to the same subject, the two are supplemented by a final cause whichserves to link or to mediate (...) them. This it does by drawing out or actuating the subsidiary cause which exists potentially in the basic cause. Arguing from analogy,can it be argued that, just when basic and subsidiary efficient causes belong to the same non-human subject in nature, they must likewise be supplemented byfinal causes if the potentiality of subsidiary causes in basic causes is to be drawn out and made actual? Surprising though it might seem to some, the answer tothis question is yes. To show this, I first place efficient causes in a dilemma. Next I show how one escapes the dilemma by distinguishing basic and subsidiary efficient causes, making the former temporally precede the latter. These two causes in some cases need to be linked, and this, I argue, requires a cause of another type, a final cause. (shrink)

Distinguishing sense and referent in true belief that is not knowledge and true belief that is knowledge implies scepticism as regards facts. That is because it falsely reduces knowledge to mere true belief To remove the scepticism, it might be held that sense and referent are the same in both. But this over-correction makes the opposite mistake of reducing mere true belief to knowledge. It also implies either assimilating false belief to true belief or saying, counterintuitively, that the sense of (...) a belief varies with the truth-value of the belief The way out is to take the middle path of distinguishing sense and referent in true belief that is not knowledge and identifying sense and referent in true belief that is knowledge. (shrink)

If (1) a person's knowing a proposition P implies that P is true and if (2) facts are unidentical with true propositions then in knowing P a person does not know a fact. Unless the correspondence view of truth is abandoned, this skepticism as regards facts cannot be answered by denying (2). If facts are identical with true propositions then facts are (trivially) true. But if truth consists in a correspondence to fact then every fact, being true, corresponds to a (...) fact and the latter fact to another fact and so ad infinitum leaving the truth of any fact groundless. But the skepticism can be answered by construing the dictum that knowledge implies truth not as (1) above but as (1')» a person's knowing a fact F implies that the statement of that fact is true. On this solution of direct realism facts are substituted for propositions as the objects of knowledge and statements instead of propositions are made the bearers of 'true'. (shrink)

In human beings, choice and action require a cause of a different kind to link them. Otherwise a vicious regress breaks out. This is cause in the sense of end or purpose. It stands between choice and action, making a reciprocative causal triad. Yet apart from our projects, this triad obtains in nature too, and for the same reason. In reproduction, as in choice and action, means are activities that are directed to the replication of pre-existing patterns as ends. Further, (...) when agents are taken not as active but as capable of certain activities, the latter are not means as in reproduction but themselves ends. In this sense, it can be said that persons have a natural end as persons, a thesis for which two arguments are proposed. (shrink)

Something is called true because it conforms to some measure. Since what measures is logically prior to what it measures, the latter is always secondarily speaking true. Further, what is secondarily speaking true pictures its measure. In all there are six types of such picturing. Since “true” is inherently referential and the latter is the mark of mind, truth is properly speaking mind-dependent. Besides, truth has the same status as falsity, and falsity is mind-dependent. That implies that the measures in (...) truth are mind-dependent. That mind is either human or divine. All mind-independent things are improperly speaking true. They are called true only because they bear some relation to what is strictly speaking true. But not all that is secondarily speaking true is improperly speaking true. Judgments are secondarily speaking true since they are measured by facts but are nonetheless properly speaking true. A nominalist alternative to this assay is traced to Aristotle. It is too narrow to catch all types of truth. A conceptualist analysis implicates its defenders in a dilemma in which what they say is either false or contradictory. (shrink)

Hume's law, that is, that moral claims cannot be inferred from exclusively nonmoral claims, is widely accepted by recent and contemporary philosophers, some exceptions being John Searle and A. N. Prior. Chapter 1 distinguishes three versions of the law: the formal version ), the conceptual version ), and the epistemic version ), all of which, according to Salwén, are true. When "valid inference" means "a sentence is a logical consequence of a set of sentences K iff there is no interpretation (...) under which all the sentences of K are true and x false", then the law is, HL: "For all valid arguments, K>X, and all moral expressions Ö, if Ö occurs nonvacuously in X, then Ö appears in K". When "valid inference" means an inference "such that the truth of the premise conceptually guarantees the truth of the conclusion", and when a bridge premise is a conditional sentence whose antecedent is a nonmoral sentence and whose consequence is a categorial norm or moral sentence, then the law reads, HL: "There are no analytic bridge sentences". Thus, HL implies, as against Searle, that the bridge premise, "If Jones has promised to pay Smith five dollars, then Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars," is false. Unlike either HL or HL, HL is about nonmoral reasons for holding moral beliefs. Thus, "HL implies that, say, the acceptance of 'Jones has promised to pay Smith five dollars' is a reason to accept 'Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars' only if it is accepted that promises ought to be kept". (shrink)

Defenders of the evolutionary origin of human beings hold that humankind has in its entirety evolved out of lower life forms. This opposes the idea of creation under which at least one aspect of human beings has not evolved out of pre-existing material things or states of thing but has been produced out of nothing by God. It is here argued that creation is correct. For whatever might be said of other aspects or elements in our natures, our consciousness, taken (...) per se or just as consciousness, is something which could not possibly have evolved out of pre-existing things or states of thing. That is because consciousness is ultimately simple and only what is composite can come to be by evolution out of pre-existing things or states of thing. (shrink)