Ethics in the world of business -- Welfare, rights, and justice -- Equality, liberty, and virtue -- Whistle-blowing -- Trade secrets and conflict of interest -- Privacy -- Discrimination and affirmative action -- Employment rights -- Occupational health and safety -- Marketing, advertising, and product safety -- Ethics in finance -- Corporate social responsibility -- Corporate governance and accountability -- International business ethics.

This second edition of the ground-breaking Ethics in Finance is an up-to-date, valuable addition to the emerging field of finance ethics. Citing examples of the scandals that have shaken public confidence in Wall Street, John R. Boatright explains the importance of ethics in the operation of financial markets and institutions and in the conduct of finance professionals." "Focusing on standards of fairness in market transactions and the duties of fiduciaries and agents in financial relationships, the author introduces a broad range (...) of practical issues related to financial markets, the financial services industry, investment decision making, and corporate financial management. In addition to the topics considered in the first edition, including unethical sales practices, insider trading, the abuse of bankruptcy, and hostile takeovers, the second edition of Ethics in Finance has a broadened scope, incorporating new discussions of issues in mutual funds, conflict of interest, and the financial theory of the firm." "This timely and comprehensive book provides an analysis of ethical issues in finance, suitable for students of finance and business ethics as well as anyone involved in financial activities."--Jacket. (shrink)

The claim that managers have a fiduciary duty to shareholders to run the corporation in their interests is generally supported by two arguments: that shareholders are owners of a corporation and that they have a contract or agency relation with management. The latter argument is used by Kenneth E. Goodpaster, who rejects a multi-fiduciary, stakeholder approach on the grounds that the shareholder-management relation is “ethically different” because of its fiduciary character. Both of these arguments provide an inadequate basis for the (...) fiduciary duties of officers and directors of corporations. The basis is to be found, rather, in considerations of public policy, a point that was established in the Dodd-Berle exchange of the 1930s. This conclusion also shows the inadequacy of Goodpaster’s solution to the so-called stakeholder paradox, and an alternative solution to the paradox is presented. (shrink)

The claim that managers have a fiduciary duty to shareholders to run the corporation in their interests is generally supported by two arguments: that shareholders are owners of a corporation and that they have a contract or agency relation with management. The latter argument is used by Kenneth E. Goodpaster, who rejects a multi-fiduciary, stakeholder approach on the grounds that the shareholder-management relation is “ethically different” because of its fiduciary character. Both of these arguments provide an inadequate basis for the (...) fiduciary duties of officers and directors of corporations. The basis is to be found, rather, in considerations of public policy, a point that was established in the Dodd-Berle exchange of the 1930s. This conclusion also shows the inadequacy of Goodpaster’s solution to the so-called stakeholder paradox, and an alternative solution to the paradox is presented. (shrink)

John R. Boatright, editor of this volume, draws together the contributions of distinguished scholars from a wide range of disciplines--including finance, ...

This presidential address to the Society for Business Ethics argues that business ethics rests upon the mistaken assumption thatteaching and research in the field ought to aim at the incorporation of ethics into managerial decision making. An alternative to this Moral Manager Model is a Moral Market Model, in which the aim is to develop markets that produce ethical outcomes. The differencesbetween the two models are discussed with reference to the themes of responsibility, participation, and relationships.

In addressing the theme of this special issue of Business Ethics Quarterly on business ethics in the new millennium, I want to focusnot on business ethics as an academic field of study but rather on ethics in business. By ethics in business I mean the standards for ethical conduct that are generally recognized in business and the ways in which these standards are established. Ethics in business in this sense is, at least in part, what the field of business ethics (...) studies. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Financial markets Financial services Financial management.

Employee governance, which includes employee ownership and employee participation in decision making, is regarded by manyas morally preferable to control of corporations by shareholders. However, employee governance is rare in advanced market economies due to its relative inefficiency compared with shareholder governance. Given this inefficiency, should employee governance be given up as an impractical ideal? This article contends that the debate over this question is hampered by an inadequate conception of employee governance that fails to take into account the difference (...) between employees and shareholders. It offers a different, more adequate conception of employee governance that recognizes a sense in which employees currently have some ownership rights. The argument for this conception of employee governance is built on an expanded understanding of the ownership of a firm. The article also suggests new strategies for strengthening the role of employees in corporate governance. (shrink)

Intermediaries, such as accountants, lawyers, and bankers, are gatekeepers, which are parties whose cooperation is necessary for corporations to function and who, by withholding cooperation, are able to prevent significant corporate misconduct. The recent scandals at Enron and other corporations were due, in part, to failures by gatekeeper institutions. However, intermediaries exist primarily to provide for-fee services and not specifically to detect and deter misconduct. Insofar asthese institutions are gatekeepers or guardians, they serve reluctantly. Hence the question: What is the (...) responsibility of intermediaries to act as gatekeepers? This article argues that the appropriate moral, as well as legal, principle for justifying responsibility in a gatekeeper role is cost effectiveness. This conclusion is reached by means of a hypothetical exercise called the investors’ bargain in which investors—who bear the costs and receive the benefits of intermediaries’ gatekeeper role—are asked to choose the best means of protecting their interests. (shrink)

Rent seeking by lobbying for government favors is generally thought to be wasteful. In view of this wastefulness, it is puzzling that rent seeking by corporations has not been criticized as a failure to be socially responsible or even as an unethical business practice. This article examines the compatibility of rent seeking with corporate social responsibility by utilizing Thomas Dunfee's idea of a marketplace with morality. This idea is useful for solving this puzzle because in considering whether rent seeking is (...) compatible with corporate social responsibility, it is necessary, first, to define rent seeking, which this article argues is a normative concept, and, second, to find some principled way of identifying rent-seeking behavior. It also solves the puzzle about rent seeking by revealing that the concept of rent seeking itself is of little use in determining whether certain conduct is or is not socially responsible since rent seeking activity cannot be identified without first evaluating which activity is rent seeking. (shrink)

In the 1990s, the role of the chief executive officer (CEO) of major United States corporations underwent a profound transformation in which CEOs went from being bureaucrats or technocrats to shareholder partisans who acted more like proprietors or entrepreneurs. This transformation occurred in response to changes in the competitive environment of U.S. corporations and also to the agency theory argument that high levels of compensation by means of stock options helped to overcome the agency problem inherent in the separation of (...) ownership and control. Some critics charge that this new CEO role is objectionable for a variety of reasons, which may also be applicable to the current financial crisis in which CEO misconduct may have played a part. These objections are based largelyon a team production model of corporate governance, which is held by these critics to be superior to the standard agent-principal model. This article examines the objections offered by critics of the changed role of the CEO and argues that their negative assessment of this development and their use of the team production model to support their conclusions are not warranted. CEOs have changed from hired hands to co-owners, and this change may have contributed in some measure to the current financial crisis. However, in determining the morally preferable role of the CEO, care must be taken not to discard what is sound in the changed role. (shrink)

Intermediaries, such as accountants, lawyers, and bankers, are gatekeepers, which are parties whose cooperation is necessary for corporations to function and who, by withholding cooperation, are able to prevent significant corporate misconduct. The recent scandals at Enron and other corporations were due, in part, to failures by gatekeeper institutions. However, intermediaries exist primarily to provide for-fee services and not specifically to detect and deter misconduct. Insofar asthese institutions are gatekeepers or guardians, they serve reluctantly. Hence the question: What is the (...) responsibility of intermediaries to act as gatekeepers? This article argues that the appropriate moral, as well as legal, principle for justifying responsibility in a gatekeeper role is cost effectiveness. This conclusion is reached by means of a hypothetical exercise called the investors’ bargain in which investors—who bear the costs and receive the benefits of intermediaries’ gatekeeper role—are asked to choose the best means of protecting their interests. (shrink)

In their article, “Shrewd Bargaining on the Moral Frontier,” J. Gregory Dees and Peter C. Crampton challenge us with a puzzle about deception in bargaining. How can the practice of misleading others about our settlement preferences—the terms on which we are willing to come to an agreement —possibly be justified? On any standard ethical theory, they claim, Brer Rabbit's trick of professing fear of the briar patch in order to avoid being eaten by the fox would seem to be wrong, (...) and yet we read this tale to our children for their moral edification. The discussion by Dees and Crampton of this apparent inconsistency is penetrating, instructive, and well-informed. It is also a delight to read. (shrink)

In their article, “Shrewd Bargaining on the Moral Frontier,” J. Gregory Dees and Peter C. Crampton challenge us with a puzzle about deception in bargaining. How can the practice of misleading others about our settlement preferences—the terms on which we are willing to come to an agreement —possibly be justified? On any standard ethical theory, they claim, Brer Rabbit's trick of professing fear of the briar patch in order to avoid being eaten by the fox would seem to be wrong, (...) and yet we read this tale to our children for their moral edification. The discussion by Dees and Crampton of this apparent inconsistency is penetrating, instructive, and well-informed. It is also a delight to read. (shrink)

In order to understand the way in which the results of a study of business ethics could enter into the actual conduct of business, I formulate and examine five models of the role of the manager which can be found in the literature of management theory. These I call the engineering model, the economic model, the management of values model, the formal organization model, and the political model. While none of these models is wholly adequate, each provides important theoretical insights (...) into the relevance of ethics to management decision making which can be of use in the examination of specific cases. (shrink)

The Delaware court's decision in eBay v. Newmark has been viewed by many commentators as a decisive affirmation of shareholder wealth maximization as the only legally permissible objective of a for-profit corporation. The implications of this court case are of particular concern for the emerging field of social enterprise, in which some organizations, such as, in this case, Craigslist, choose to pursue a social benefit mission in the for-profit corporate form. The eBay v. Newmark decision may also threaten companies that (...) seek to be socially responsible by serving constituencies other than shareholders at the expense of some profit. This examination of the court decision concludes that a legal requirement to maximize shareholder value may not preclude a commitment to social responsibility and may even permit the pursuit of a social benefit objective, such as the preservation of the culture developed by Craigslist. In particular, the court's decision in eBay v. Newmark reflects unique features of the case that could have been avoided by Craigslist and by other similar companies. (shrink)

Intermediaries, such as accountants, lawyers, and bankers, are gatekeepers, which are parties whose cooperation is necessary for corporations to function and who, by withholding cooperation, are able to prevent significant corporate misconduct. The recent scandals at Enron and other corporations were due, in part, to failures by gatekeeper institutions. However, intermediaries exist primarily to provide for-fee services and not specifically to detect and deter misconduct. Insofar asthese institutions are gatekeepers or guardians, they serve reluctantly. Hence the question: What is the (...) responsibility of intermediaries to act as gatekeepers? This article argues that the appropriate moral, as well as legal, principle for justifying responsibility in a gatekeeper role is cost effectiveness. This conclusion is reached by means of a hypothetical exercise called the investors’ bargain in which investors—who bear the costs and receive the benefits of intermediaries’ gatekeeper role—are asked to choose the best means of protecting their interests. (shrink)

Having taught management ethics for several years, I have been repeatedly frustrated by the practical mismatch between management problems and moral philosophy…. Unless we can connect ethical theory more closely with management practice, we may be dressing our business curriculum windows with philosophical finery but failing to meet the urgent need for clarity of thought in management ethics.

In this paper an argument by l j jost against the use of j o urmson's concept of central illocutionary force to support a speech act analysis of meaning is rejected on the grounds that jost misinterprets urmson's concept, but it is further argued that the concept correctly interpreted is still of little use because it provides no way of picking out the word whose meaning it explicates.

Hume holds that the moral sentiments are distinguished from other passions of the mind by two features among others: (1) that they are caused by the character of an agent, and (2) that they arise only when this character is viewed disinterestedly. this paper is an attempt to discover hume's reasons for believing that these features are true of the moral sentiments, and what i argue is, first, that hume believes that these features are required to account for certain features (...) of our actual moral views but, second, that his arguments are successful only if these features of our moral views are taken as logical and not merely contingent features. (shrink)