John R. Searle is one of the world's leading philosophers. During his long and outstanding career, he has made groundbreaking and lasting contributions to the philosophy of language, to the philosophy of mind, as well as to the nature, structure, and functioning of social reality. This volume documents the 13th Münster Lectures on Philosophy with John R. Searle. It includes not only 11 critical papers on Searle's philosophy and Searle's replies to the papers, but also an original article (...) by John R. Searle on his overall philosophical enterprise entitled "The Basic Reality and the Human Reality". -/- "I think Münster is probably unique among contemporary universities in its ability to produce such a high level of philosophical production from their philosophy students." - John R. Searle. (shrink)
En el presente ensayo, el autor, partiendo del libro de John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, estudia la ontología social del último Searle poniendo en evidencia las novedades respecto a la teoría de los hechos institucionales formulada por el propio Searle en los años sesenta. Es así novedosa la cuestión que se plantea sobre la fundación de la realidad institucional: ¿Cómo pueden existir objetos institucionales en un mundo que se compone totalmente de partículas físicas en campos de (...) fuerza? Es novedosa también la delimitación trazada por Searle entre dos de los rasgos de las entidades institucionales: la socialidad y la simbolicidad. Es novedosa la definición que da Searle de las "reglas constitutivas", no como reglas que constituyen el objeto del cual son regla, sino como reglas que adscriben funciones. Y es finalmente novedosa la postura de Searle sobre el nexo entre los performativos y los estados de cosas institucionales, y en concreto la consideración de los estados de cosas producidos por performativos como estados de cosas institucionales. El ensayo termina con una crítica a la tesis de Searle sobre la exhaustividad del paradigma bruto vs. institucional. (shrink)
The life history of certain philosophical and theological terms and concepts constitutes in itself an interesting matter for consideration and reflection. None is more interesting than that of natural law. Many studies have traced the development of natural law philosophy from its early precursors among the Pre-Socratics through Plato and Aristotle, the Stoics, St Thomas, and the early British empiricists; have noted its demise in the nineteenth century, largely as a result of the criticism of Hume; and have observed its (...) renaissance in the twentieth century. Despite this undeniable revival of interest in the theory in the present century, a moral philosopher uses the term only at great risk, for no philosophical theory has been so vigorously attacked and so thoroughly ‘refuted’ as natural law. (shrink)
Este artículo se opone a la tesis recientemente sostenida por John Searle según la cual no existen los derechos humanos positivos. Argumentamos que la existencia de dichos derechos no es contradictoria, como pretende Searle, con las nociones de "derecho" y"derechos humanos" definidas en su ontología social. Por consiguiente, es posible aceptar la ontología social de Searle y afirmar al mismo tiempo que los derechos humanos positivos existen. En segundo lugar, ofrecemos razones para cuestionar la supuesta prioridad lógica de una (...) ontología social al modo en que Searle la entiende (esto es, como una empresa puramente analítica) sobre los desarrollos más específicos de la filosofía moral, social y política. Al contrario, sugerimos que, por lo que se refiere a la realidad social, los compromisos ontológicos dependen de los presupuestos sustantivos que se adopten en relación con la naturaleza y los fines de la sociedad misma, o bien no pasarán de ser un formalismo vacío sin relevancia heurística alguna. [This paper challenges the point recently made by John Searle that there are no positive human rights. We contend that the existence of positive human rights is not inconsistent, as Searle argues, with the notions of "right" and "human rights" as defined in his social ontology. Therefore, one could adhere to Searle's social ontology and assert the existence of positive human rights at the same time. Subsequently, the paper gives reason to question the alleged logical priority of social ontology in Searle's sense (i.e., as a purely analytic endeavour) over the particular developments of moral, social, and political philosophy. We suggest, on the contrary, that concerning social reality ontological commitments are dependent on substantive assumptions about the nature and aims of society itself, or else they amount to an empty formalism with no heuristic relevance.]. (shrink)
In his most recent work on John Dewey, John Shook explores Dewey’s political thought in order to illuminate Dewey’s conception of democracy and demonstrate the interlocking quality of his democratic and educational theories. As the book’s subtitle indicates, Shook sees democracy and education as inseparable enterprises for Dewey, with democracy being fundamentally defined by the continuous education of individuals, and with specifically educational spaces serving to directly promote this definitive purpose of democracy. The particular educational goal that Shook (...) identifies in Dewey’s thought is the cultivation of “social intelligence,” a quality that allows individuals to effectively engage.. (shrink)
Este artículo analiza la concepción de la intencionalidad colectiva de John Searle. Primero, enmarca dicho concepto en el conjunto de la ontología social del autor, y expone algunos puntos clave de su teoría de la intencionalidad. Segundo, presenta el modo en que Searle concibe la intencionalidad colectiva y el modo en que compatibiliza dicha idea con el individualismo metodológico y con el internalismo mental. Por último, explica las principales insuficiencias de la propuesta de Searle y la incoherencia existente entre (...) los propósitos generales del autor y su tratamiento de la intencionalidad colectiva. (shrink)
The theory presented in John Searle's "The Construction of Social Reality" has a lot in common with the conventionalist view of institutions. Conventionalism, however, can explain how there can be institutional facts without pre-existing rules, and why people comply with institutional rules.
The title of The Rediscovery of the Mind suggests the question "When was the mind lost?" Since most people may not be aware that it ever was lost, we must also then ask "Who lost it?" It was lost, of course, only by philosophers, by certain philosophers. This passed unnoticed by society at large. The "rediscovery" is also likely to pass unnoticed. But has the mind been rediscovered by the same philosophers who "lost" it? Probably not. John Searle is (...) an analytic philosopher, with some of the same notions as the positivists and behaviorists who rejected consciousness and "lost" the mind in the first place, but he also does not sound like the kind of reductionist who would have joined that crowd. His views, indeed, are sensible enough, and some of his insights so important, that it is a shame to find his thought profoundly limited by some of the same mistakes and prejudices that ruined philosophy, and not just philosophy of mind, under the influence of those positivists and behaviorists. There is enough of genuine value in his treatment, that it can easily be taken up and, with relatively slight modification, added to what is of permanent value in the history of philosophy. (shrink)
I discuss John Henry Newman's correspondence with William Froude, F.R.S., (1810–79) and his family. Froude remained an unbeliever, and I argue that Newman's disputes with him about the ethics of belief and the relationship between religion and science not only reveal important aspects of his thought, but also anticipate modern discussions on foundationalism, the ethics of beliefs and scientism.
The general aim of this very welcome volume is to explore the relation between pragmatism and neuroscience. The thirteen chapters are evenly divided into four parts, roughly organized around the themes of brain and pragmatism, emotion and cognition, creativity and education, and ethics.The beginning chapter written by the editors attempts to show that advances in behavioral and brain sciences intersect core theses of pragmatism with regards to cognition and the mind-world relation. The basic assumption is that neuroscience and pragmatism share (...) a naturalist program: pragmatism refers all philosophical explanation to experimental science and neuroscience explains all.. (shrink)