Because Dasein, as conceived by Heidegger, is inherently temporal, the "who" of Dasein can never be defined simply in terms of a present identity but must have the character of what Derrida calls "différance." Dasein 's authenticity, then, must be an embracing of this, its character as différance. This means that the "self" is "neither a substance nor a subject " but a resolution. The anticipatory resoluteness of authenticity, however, is a unique kind of resolve: it is the resolve to (...) be open to transformation. For that reason, Dasein 's proper self-appropriation—authenticity—is found precisely in its inherent inappropriability. Because Dasein is always being-in-the-world, the openness of its own "who" is equally an openness of being's "what." Dasein 's authenticity is nothing other than the enactment of the question of the meaning of being. (shrink)
In his discussions of “sensibility” and “feeling,” Hegel has a compelling interpretation of the emotional foundations of experience. I begin by situating “mood” within the context of “sensibility,” and then focus on the inherently “outwardizing” or self-externalizing character of mood. I then consider the different modes of moody self-externalization, for the sake of determining why we express ourselves in language. I conclude by demonstrating why the notions of emotion and spirit are necessarily linked.
Hegel's dialectic "Consciousness," Part A from the Phenomenology of Spirit, is interpreted in light of the concept of "reading." The logic of reading is especially helpful for interpreting the often misunderstood dialectic of understanding, as that is described in chapter 3 of the Phenomenology, "Force and Understanding: Appearance and the Supersensible World." Hegel's concept of "the Inverted World" in particular is clarified, and from it Hegel's notion of originary difference is developed. Derrida's notion of "differance" is used to illuminate Hegel's (...) use of difference and to interpret the Hegelian metaphysics that is developed in "Force and Understanding" and in the opening moves of Hegel's Science of Logic. It is argued that the philosophical projects of Hegel and Derrida are ultimately indistinguishable. (shrink)
I want to take up some of the most familiar texts in Aristotle, and I want to approach them in what I think is an Aristotelian fashion, but the conclusions I will reach are not, I think, the familiar ones. I will begin, in Section 1, with Aristotle’s conception of phusis—of nature—and lead from here into a discussion of the nature of life, which will lead us to the themes of soul and body. I will find the principle of desire (...) to be the core of phusis, and I will produce from this analysis a doctrine of self-moving wholes which actively organize relations of opposite bodies according to a desire for self-maintenance. I will then move, in Section 2, to Aristotle’s discussion of epagoge—induction—in the last chapter of the Posterior Analytics and argue for the empirical and conceptual accuracy of his account of the development of cognitive capacities. I will conclude by showing how the logical relations which characterize a situation of knowing as described in the Posterior Analytics are precisely the relations which we will already have seen to characterize a situation of life in Section 1. This will allow us to draw the conclusion, in Section 3, that knowing is a kind of bringing to life of a situation and I will discuss the situation which best exemplifies this, and also how we should try to understand the significance of this. In general, I think that recent moves in philosophy have allowed us to appreciate for the first time the significance of Aristotle’s philosophy, and this account of Aristotle’s animative epistemology should tie in nicely with modern discussions about emergence, interpretation, and other themes. I begin, then, with the basic story of what there is in the world. (shrink)
Against the dualistic conception of mind and matter that is characteristic of much modern philosophy, ancient philosophers show us that our powers are always embedded in nature, and the existence of those powers is dependent upon the existence of the bodies they are “of” Aristotle’s discussion of the habituation in particular offers us the chance to see the materialityand the labor that are presupposed in the acquisition of new powers. Thucydides, finally, shows us the care needed to maintain the existence (...) of these powers, and equally the attitude of neglect that the possession of these powers naturally induces. (shrink)
The Introduction outlines how the topic of imagination developed in Kant and German Idealism. Bates focuses on Fichte’s establishing of imagination as the primary dynamic structure of consciousness itself, and on Schelling’s transformation of this epistemological conception into a metaphysical one, interpreting imagination as the very self-sundering of the Absolute. Chapter 1, “The Sundering Imagination of the Absolute,” then looks at Hegel’s early, Schellingian interpretation of imagination. In Hegel’s Differenzschrift and in Faith and Knowledge, philosophy is construed as a self-conscious (...) reconstruction of the acts of imaginative synthesis by which the factual world of experience was generated. (shrink)
The thesis of Haar's book is that Heidegger puts progressively more weight on the exclusive agency of being as his writings develop, whereas Haar holds that man should be recognized as having greater initiative. The book is a reading of the Heideggerian corpus, beginning with a significantly voluntaristic interpretation of Being and Time and ending with a study of later texts in which Haar claims human individuality risks total effacement.
In “Sense-Certainty” Hegel establishes “the now that is many nows” as the form of experience. This has implications for the interpretation of later figures within the Phenomenology of Spirit: specifically, the thing (from chapter 2), the living body (from chapter 4), and the ethical community (from chapter 6) are each significantly different forms of such a “now” in which the way that past and future are held within the present differs. Comparing these changing “temporalities” allows us to defend Hegel’s distinction (...) between nature and spirit, and his claim that only spirit has a history. This comparison also allows us to see how it is that phenomenological philosophy, and the “end of history” that it announces, is a stance of openness to the future. (shrink)
In “Sense-Certainty” Hegel establishes “the now that is many nows” as the form of experience. This has implications for the interpretation of later figures within the Phenomenology of Spirit: specifically, the thing, the living body, and the ethical community are each significantly different forms of such a “now” in which the way that past and future are held within the present differs. Comparing these changing “temporalities” allows us to defend Hegel’s distinction between nature and spirit, and his claim that only (...) spirit has a history. This comparison also allows us to see how it is that phenomenological philosophy, and the “end of history” that it announces, is a stance of openness to the future. (shrink)