One of the most dominant approaches to semantics for relevant (and many paraconsistent) logics is the Routley-Meyer semantics involving a ternary relation on points. To some (many?), this ternary relation has seemed like a technical trick devoid of an intuitively appealing philosophical story that connects it up with conditionality in general. In this paper, we respond to this worry by providing three different philosophical accounts of the ternary relation that correspond to three conceptions of conditionality. We close by briefly discussing (...) a general conception of conditionality that may unify the three given conceptions. (shrink)
I note that the logics of the relevant group most closely tied to the research programme in paraconsistency are those without the contraction postulate(A.AB).AB and its close relatives. As a move towards gaining control of the contraction-free systems I show that they are prime (that wheneverA B is a theorem so is eitherA orB). The proof is an extension of the metavaluational techniques standardly used for analogous results about intuitionist logic or the relevant positive logics.
We show that there are infinitely many pairwise non-equivalent formulae in one propositional variable p in the pure implication fragment of the logic T of “ticket entailment” proposed by Anderson and Belnap. This answers a question posed by R. K. Meyer.
This paper presents F, substructural logic designed to treat vagueness. Weaker than Lukasiewicz’s infinitely valued logic, it is presented first in a natural deduction system, then given a Kripke semantics in the manner of Routley and Meyer's ternary relational semantics for R and related systems, but in this case, the points are motivated as degrees to which the truth could be stretched. Soundness and completeness are proved, not only for the propositional system, but also for its extension with first-order quantifiers. (...) The first-order models allow not only objects with vague properties, but also objects whose very existence is a matter of degree. (shrink)
It is shown that there are exactly six normal DeMorgan monoids generated by the identity element alone. The free DeMorgan monoid with no generators but the identity is characterised and shown to have exactly three thousand and eighty-eight elements. This result solves the "Ackerman constant problem" of describing the structure of sentential constants in the logic R.
An Ackermann constant is a formula of sentential logic built up from the sentential constant t by closing under connectives. It is known that there are only finitely many non-equivalent Ackermann constants in the relevant logic R. In this paper it is shown that the most natural systems close to R but weaker than it-in particular the non-distributive system LR and the modalised system NR-allow infinitely many Ackermann constants to be distinguished. The argument in each case proceeds by construction of (...) an algebraic model, infinite in the case of LR and of arbitrary finite size in the case of NR. The search for these models was aided by the computer program MaGIC (Matrix Generator for Implication Connectives) developed by the author at the Australian National University. (shrink)
It is shown that the pure implication fragment of the modal logic , pp. 385--387) has finitely many non-equivalent formulae in one variable. The exact number of such formulae is not known. We show that this finiteness result is the best possible, since the analogous fragment of S4, and therefore of , in two variables has infinitely many non-equivalent formulae.
In this paper we consider the implications for belief revision of weakening the logic under which belief sets are taken to be closed. A widely held view is that the usual belief revision functions are highly classical, especially in being driven by consistency. We show that, on the contrary, the standard representation theorems still hold for paraconsistent belief revision. Then we give conditions under which consistency is preserved by revisions, and we show that this modelling allows for the gradual revision (...) of inconsistency. (shrink)
In classical and intuitionistic arithmetics, any formula implies a true equation, and a false equation implies anything. In weaker logics fewer implications hold. In this paper we rehearse known results about the relevant arithmetic R, and we show that in linear arithmetic LL by contrast false equations never imply true ones. As a result, linear arithmetic is desecsed. A formula A which entails 0 = 0 is a secondary equation; one entailed by 0 6= 0 is a secondary unequation. A (...) system of formal arithmetic is secsed if every extensional formula is either a secondary equation or a secondary unequation. We are indebted to the program MaGIC for the simple countermodel SZ7, on which 0 = 1 is not a secondary formula. This is a small but signi cant success for automated reasoning. (shrink)
$LTL is a version of linear temporal logic in which eventualities are not expressible, but in which there is a sentential constant $ intended to be true just at the end of some behaviour of interest—that is, to mark the end of the accepted words of some language. There is an effectively recognisable class of $LTL formulae which express behaviours, but in a sense different from the standard one of temporal logics like LTL or CTL. This representation is useful for (...) solving a class of decision processes with temporally extended goals, which in turn are useful for representing an important class of AI planning problems. (shrink)
It is well known that the relevant arithmetic R# admits finite models whose domains are the integers modulo n rather than the expected natural numbers. Less well appreciated is the fact that the logic of these models is much more subtle than that of the three-valued structure in which they are usually presented. In this paper we consider the DeMorgan monoids in which R# can be modelled, deriving a fairly complete account of those modelling the stronger arithmetic RM# modulo n (...) and a partial account for the case of R# modulo a prime number. The more general case in which the modulus is arbitrary is shown to lead to infinite propositional structures even with the additional constraint that '0=1' implies everything. (shrink)