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John Tienson [41]John L. Tienson [23]John Leander Tienson [1]
  1. The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oup Usa. pp. 520--533.
  2.  64
    Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 1996 - MIT Press.
    In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Horgan and Tienson articulate and defend a new view of cognition.
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  3. Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat.Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham - 2004 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.
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  4.  11
    Reference and Essence.John Tienson - 1981 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 49 (4):1417-1419.
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  5. Internal-World Skepticism and the Self-Presentational Nature of Phenomenal Consciousness.Terence Horgan, John Tienson & Graham George - 2006 - In Kriegel Uriah & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-representational Approaches to Consciousness. Bradford.
  6.  36
    Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind.Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.) - 1991 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    "A third of the papers in this volume originated at the 1987 Spindel Conference ... at Memphis State University"--Pref.
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  7.  94
    The Phenomenology of First-Person Agency.Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham - 2003 - In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. pp. 323.
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  8.  87
    Consciousness and Intentionality.George Graham, Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 468--484.
  9.  63
    Representations Without Rules.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):147-174.
  10.  96
    Deconstructing New Wave Materialism.Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 2001 - In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. pp. 307--318.
    In the first post World War II identity theories (e.g., Place 1956, Smart 1962), mind brain identities were held to be contingent. However, in work beginning in the late 1960's, Saul Kripke (1971, 1980) convinced the philosophical community that true identity statements involving names and natural kind terms are necessarily true and furthermore, that many such necessary identities can only be known a posteriori. Kripke also offered an explanation of the a posteriori nature of ordinary theoretical identities such as that (...)
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  11.  55
    Representation Without Rules.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):147-74.
  12. A Nonclassical Framework for Cognitive Science.Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 1994 - Synthese 101 (3):305-45.
    David Marr provided a useful framework for theorizing about cognition within classical, AI-style cognitive science, in terms of three levels of description: the levels of (i) cognitive function, (ii) algorithm and (iii) physical implementation. We generalize this framework: (i) cognitive state transitions, (ii) mathematical/functional design and (iii) physical implementation or realization. Specifying the middle, design level to be the theory of dynamical systems yields a nonclassical, alternative framework that suits (but is not committed to) connectionism. We consider how a brain's (...)
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  13.  37
    Soft Laws.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 1990 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):256-279.
  14. The Phenomenology of Intentionality and the Intentionality of Phenomenology.Terry Horgan & John Tienson - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press. pp. 520--533.
     
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  15.  95
    Cognitive Systems as Dynamic Systems.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 1992 - Topoi 11 (1):27-43.
  16. Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of the Mind.George Graham, Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 512--537.
     
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  17.  10
    Representations Without Rules in Philosophy of Mind.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):147-174.
  18. The Phenomenology of Embodied Agency.Terry Horgan & John Tienson - unknown
    For the last 20 years or so, philosophers of mind have been using the term ‘qualia’, which is frequently glossed as standing for the “what-it-is-like” of experience. The examples of what-it-is-like that are typically given are feelings of pain or itches, and color and sound sensations. This suggests an identification of the experiential what-it-islike with such states. More recently, philosophers have begun speaking of the “phenomenology“ of experience, which they have also glossed as “what-it-is-like”. Many say, for example, that any (...)
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  19.  39
    An Introduction to Connectionism.John L. Tienson - 1988 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (S1):1-16.
  20.  31
    Settling Into a New Paradigm.Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 1987 - Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 26 (S1):97-113.
  21.  55
    Connectionism and the Commitments of Folk Psychology.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:127-52.
  22.  48
    On Analysing Knowledge.John Tienson - 1974 - Philosophical Studies 25 (4):289 - 293.
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  23. Internal-World Skepticism and Mental Self-Presentation.Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 41-61.
  24.  50
    Hume on Universals and General Terms.John Tienson - 1984 - Noûs 18 (2):311-330.
  25. Questions for Blobjectivism.John Tienson - 2002 - Facta Philosophica 2:301-10.
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  26.  47
    Kasimir Twardowski on the Content of Presentations.John Tienson - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):485-499.
    In On the Content and Object of Presentations, Kasimir Twardowski presents an interesting line of thought concerning the content of a presentation and its relation to the object of that presentation. This way of thinking about content is valuable for understanding phenomenal intentionality, and it should also be important for the project of “naturalizing” the mental (or at least for discovering the neural correlates of the phenomenal). According to this view, content is that by virtue of which a presentation of (...)
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  27.  25
    Representations Don't Need Rules: Reply to James Garson.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (1):1-24.
  28.  19
    Innate Ideas.John Tienson - 1978 - Noûs 12 (3):337-343.
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  29.  18
    A Conception of Metaphysics.John L. Tienson - 1989 - American Philosophical Quarterly 26 (1):63 - 71.
  30.  7
    Settling Into a New Paradigm.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 1991 - In Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.), Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 241--260.
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  31.  73
    Can Things of Different Natural Kinds Be Exactly Alike?John Tienson - 1977 - Analysis 37 (4):190 - 197.
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  32.  64
    Brains Are Not Conscious.John L. Tienson - 1987 - Philosophical Papers 16 (November):187-93.
  33.  71
    Resemblance and General Terms.John L. Tienson - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 54 (1):87 - 108.
    Any successful account of general terms must explain our ability to apply terms correctly to new instances. Many philosophers have thought resemblance offers an ontologically sparse basis for such an account. However, Any natural and plausible account of general terms on the basis of resemblance requires quite a rich ontology, Including at least second order properties and relations. Given a sufficiently rich structure of resemblances, We can surely account for the application of many general terms. I argue, However, That our (...)
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  34.  52
    Higher-Order Causation.John Tienson - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):89-101.
    We have a familiar idea of levels of description or levels of theory in science: microphysics, atomic physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, and the various social sciences. It is clear that philosophers - such as Terry Horgan - who want to be nonreductive materialists with regard to the mental must hold that this is not mere description; there must be genuine higher-level causes, and hence, genuine higher-level properties, in particular mental properties and causes. But there appears to be a deep problem (...)
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  35.  14
    Levels of Description in Nonclassical Cognitive Science.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 1993 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 34:159-188.
    David Marr provided an influential account of levels of description in classical cognitive science. In this paper we contrast Marr'ent with some alternatives that are suggested by the recent emergence of connectionism. Marr's account is interesting and important both because of the levels of description it distinguishes, and because of the way his presentation reflects some of the most basic, foundational, assumptions of classical AI-style cognitive science. Thus, by focusing on levels of description, one can sharpen foundational differences between classicism (...)
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  36.  24
    Pr Cis of Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 1997 - Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):337 – 356.
    Connectionism was explicitly put forward as an alternative to classical cognitive science. The questions arise: how exactly does connectionism differ from classical cognitive science, and how is it potentially better? The classical “rules and representations” conception of cognition is that cognitive transitions are determined by exceptionless rules that apply to the syntactic structure of symbols. Many philosophers have seen connectionism as a basis for denying structured symbols. We, on the other hand, argue that cognition is too rich and flexible to (...)
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  37.  13
    Is This Any Way to Be a Realist?John L. Tienson - 1990 - Philosophical Psychology 3 (1):155-164.
    Abstract Andy Clark argues that the reality and causal efficacy of the folk psychological attitudes do not require in?the?head correlates of the that?clauses by which they are attributed. The facts for which Fodor invokes a language of thought as empirical explanation?systemati?city, for example?are, Clark argues, an a priori conceptual demand upon propositional attitude ascription, and hence not in need of empirical explanation. However, no such strategy can work. A priori demands imposed by our practices do not eliminate the need for (...)
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  38.  11
    About Competence.John L. Tienson - 1990 - Philosophical Papers 19 (1):19-36.
  39. Authors' Replies.Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 1999 - Acta Analytica 144:275-287.
  40.  87
    Cognition Needs Syntax but Not Rules.Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 2006 - In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Malden MA: Blackwell. pp. 147--158.
    Human cognition is rich, varied, and complex. In this Chapter we argue that because of the richness of human cognition (and human mental life generally), there must be a syntax of cognitive states, but because of this very richness, cognitive processes cannot be describable by exceptionless rules. The argument for syntax, in Section 1, has to do with being able to get around in any number of possible environments in a complex world. Since nature did not know where in the (...)
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  41.  44
    Editors' Introduction.Terry Horgan, John Tienson & Matjaž Potrč - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (S1):7-8.
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  42.  39
    Levels of Description in Nonclassical Cognitive Science.Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 1992 - Philosophy 34:159-188.
    David Marr provided an influential account of levels of description in classical cognitive science. In this paper we contrast Marr'ent with some alternatives that are suggested by the recent emergence of connectionism. Marr's account is interesting and important both because of the levels of description it distinguishes, and because of the way his presentation reflects some of the most basic, foundational, assumptions of classical AI-style cognitive science . Thus, by focusing on levels of description, one can sharpen foundational differences between (...)
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  43.  50
    Resisting the Tyranny of Terminology: The General Dynamical Hypothesis in Cognitive Science.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):643-643.
    What van Gelder calls the dynamical hypothesis is only a special case of what we here dub the general dynamical hypothesis. His terminology makes it easy to overlook important alternative dynamical approaches in cognitive science. Connectionist models typically conform to the general dynamical hypothesis, but not to van Gelder's.
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  44. Spindel Conference 1987 Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 1988 - Dept. Of Philosophy, Memphis State University.
  45. Spindel Conference 2001 Origins: The Common Sources of the Analytic and Phenomenological Traditions.E. M. Horgan, John Tienson & Matjaz Potrc - 2002 - University of Memphis.
     
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  46. Settling Into a New Paradigm.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 1988 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (S1):97-113.
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  47. Structured Representations in Connectionist Systems?Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 1991 - In S. Davis (ed.), Connectionism: Theorye and Practice. Oxford University Press.
  48. Oblique Contexts.John Tienson - 1986 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (3):821-822.
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  49.  22
    An Argument Concerning Quantification and Propositional Attitudes.John L. Tienson - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 51 (2):145 - 168.
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  50.  50
    An Observation on Common Names and Proper Names.John Tienson - 1986 - Analysis 46 (2):73 - 76.
    Common names, for Mill, have both connotation and denotation. Thus ‘horse’ connotes certain properties, and the name ‘horse’ denotes the things that have those properties. By contrast, proper names have no connotations; they do not denote in virtue of the possession of certain properties by their denotations, but so to speak, directly. Thus Socrates received his name by being dubbed ‘Socrates’; and he might just as well have been given any other name. This contrast is misleading. After all, we might (...)
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