Introduction Philosophy and education 'Philosophy of education' is a name for nothing clear; but despite this there seem already to be two bodies of opinion ...

In his preface Mr Wilson writes 'I feel that a great many adults … would do better to spend less time in simply accepting the concepts of others uncritically, and more time in learning how to analyse concepts in general'. Mr Wilson starts by describing the techniques of conceptual analysis. He then gives examples of them in action by composing answers to specific questions and by criticism of quoted passages of argument. Chapter 3 sums up the importance of this kind (...) of mental activity. Chapter 4 presents selections for the reader to analyse, followed by questions of university entrance/scholarship type. This is a book to be worked through, in a sense a text-book. (shrink)

Everyone loves something or somebody, and most people are concerned with loving another person like themselves, all equal. This book is based on the belief that getting clear about the concept and meaning of love between equals is essential for success in our practical lives. For how can we love properly unless we have a fairly clear idea of what love is? The book is written in ordinary language and for the ordinary person, without jargon or philosophical technicalities. It aims (...) to show that love between equals involves a single basic disposition, though that disposition expresses itself in various ways. Thus, after an introduction explaining the need for analysis and clarification, the author then deals in order with love as desire or need; with intrinsic friendship and sharing the self; with basic difficulties concerning power, dependence, altruism and paranoia; with sex and erotic love; and finally with the value in human life of love between equals. The work as a whole gives clear, coherent and practical guidance for all who wish to grasp what such love is really like. (shrink)

A study in the philosophy of mind, centred on the problem of 'intentionality' the sense in which emotions can be said to have objects, their relation to these objects, and the implications of this relation for our understanding of human action and behaviour. Dr Wilson sets his enquiry against a broad historical background on what distinguishes man from inanimate objects by describing both Cartesian view of man is matter plus mind and the neo-Wittgensteinian view that there is a dynamic behavioural (...) difference – causal notions being often inapplicable to human action. Dr Wilson goes on to show the controversies and arguments that arise from the notion of intentionality cannot be analysed in causal terms. Dr Wilson believes that this notion can be shown causally and sets out to prove it. Finally, he brings this argument to a larger context mentioning that it has far-reaching effects in natural and social sciences. (shrink)

Abstract Moral education has to be taken as ?education in morality?: that is, in a particular form of thought and life which has its own procedures of reason. We have to establish what these are, what equipment the morally educated person logically requires and, from that, how to assess such equipment and how to generate practical methods that enhance it. The main features of this are not difficult to understand: what stands in our way is certain kinds of psychological resistance (...) to the enterprise as a whole. (shrink)

Abstract The concept of authority is primary and inescapable, and anterior to the opposition of particular values (such as law and order? versus freedom'). No human interaction is possible without authority. Problems about the legitimacy and scope of authority are discussed: particularly the legitimacy of compelling school attendance. Attention is drawn to the particular importance of authority in moral and political education.

The concepts marked by "shame" and "guilt" are analysed briefly, and their merits and demerits as types of moral motivation reviewed. Both concepts appear as inexpellable from human life, although different cultures may weigh them differently and give them different contents. Each has certain advantages and disadvantages, but both may be paralysing rather than morally constructive. Various alternative motivations are considered, including fear and desire; and the conclusion is reached that the moral educator's prime task is to introduce children to (...) forms of life in which they may be pleasureably invested, and where their desire is disciplined by the demands of the form of life itself rather than by guilt or shame. (shrink)

The purpose of this inquiry is to explore the experience of Borderline Personality Disorder with the aim of developing a more liberating approach to its diagnosis and treatment. Eight participants diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder were recruited from a psychiatric hospital operated by the Surrey and Borders NHS Trust and an outpatient daycentre based in London, United Kingdom. A narrative approach to methodology was employed to collect and analyse the participants’ life-stories. Themes to emerge from the participant’s narratives were found (...) to coincide with R.D. Laing’s concept of ontological insecurity. Ontological insecurity describes a number of aspects of the participant’s distress. To conclude, some general implications of this research for psychotherapy are briefly explored. (shrink)

Abstract Arguments about whether stress should be laid on content or on method in moral education are shown to be misguided: both are inextricably interlocked since morality is a complete form of life, partly concerned with action and partly with feeling. Proper motivation for moral education must display this form in the daily lives of the pupils, who will come to be morally educated only in so far as they share the form with those who love them and whom they (...) love. Schools have to be structured into genuine communities in order to make this possible. In these respects morality is parallel to other forms of life and thought in the school curriculum. (shrink)

Originally written and published in 1961, Reason and Morals suggests that although analytical philosophers of the time declined to offer moral guidance, Mr Wilson is concerned that the interested layman should not turn away from them disappointed and argues that much practical knowledge can be derived from a study of their work and an extension of their techniques. Philosophy can help us think and act more reasonably in moral contexts, and the author shows that much of the confusion which besets (...) moral argument arises from a misunderstanding of the nature of morality itself. This book shares with Mr Wilson's Language and the Pursuit of Truth a belief that the revolution in philosophy is sufficiently important to merit explanation and acceptance far outside its academic confines. (shrink)

Abstract Progress in moral education depends chiefly on the rejection of fantasy. The philosophical basis must be understood: it involves (a) a non?partisan approach, and (b) grasp of moral methodology??we are to show pupils how to get the right answers. Research and development require a linear structure, beginning with (and controlled by) conceptual enquiry, then involving psychology and social science, and finally issuing in practical development. Moral education periods are needed in the school timetable. Education in morality must be distinguished (...) from the avoidance of social disorder. The fragmentation of those concerned with moral education into different partisan groups is disastrous: it is not a political issue, but one to be forwarded by scholarship and common sense. (shrink)

Abstract Two basic worries about moral education are considered. The first ?? whether there are or are not fundamental principles of reason and procedure which govern moral decision?making ?? is argued to be unnecessary, since there plainly are some such procedures. The second ?? how and in what direction pupils should be motivated to attend to such principles ?? is a more complex and difficult matter, which has to be tackled whatever one's particular philosophical views on morality. It is argued (...) that the proper object of motivation is primarily allegiance to certain principles of rationality and justice, natural sympathy or personal benevolence being regarded as desirable but too fragile. (shrink)