Order:
  1. Causal Selection and Egalitarianism.Jon Bebb & Helen Beebee - 2024 - In Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 5. Oxford University Press.
    The chapter explores whether, or to what extent, recent work in experimental philosophy puts pressure on the idea that the concept of causation is ‘egalitarian’. Causal selection – where experimental subjects tend to rate the causal strength of (for example) a norm-violator more strongly than a non-norm-violator – is a well established phenomenon, and is in prima facie tension with an egalitarian conception of causation; it also, indirectly, puts prima facie pressure on the idea that causation is a worldly phenomenon (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2.  72
    Demarcating Contextualism and Contrastivism.Jon Bebb - 2022 - Philosophy 97 (1):23-49.
    In this paper I argue that there is a significant but often overlooked metaphysical distinction to be made between contextualism and contrastivism. The orthodox view is that contrastivism is merely a form of contextualism. This is a mistake. The contextualist view is incompatible with certain naturalist claims about the metaphysical nature of concepts within whichever domain is being investigated, while the contrastivist view is compatible with these claims. So, choosing one view over the other will involve choosing to affirm or (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3.  47
    Why we should not assume that ‘normal’ is ambiguous.Jon Bebb - 2023 - Analysis 83 (4):653-661.
    There is a widespread and largely unchallenged assumption within philosophy that the word ‘normal’ is ambiguous: i.e., that it can mean different things in different contexts. This assumption appears in work within topics as varied as the philosophy of biology, medicine, justification, causation, and more. In this paper I argue that we currently lack any independent reason for adopting such an assumption. The reason that would most likely be offered in its favour requires us to ignore an alternative and equally (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark