Order:
Disambiguations
Jon Tresan [8]Jonathan Andrew Tresan [1]Jonathan Tresan [1]
See also
Jon Tresan
University of Rochester
  1. De Dicto Internalist Cognitivism.Jon Tresan - 2006 - Noûs 40 (1):143–165.
  2.  86
    The Challenge of Communal Internalism.Jon Tresan - 2009 - Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (2):179-199.
  3. Wisdom Beyond Rationality: A Reply to Ryan.Iskra Fileva & Jon Tresan - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (2):229-235.
    We discuss Sharon Ryan’s Deep Rationality Theory of wisdom, defended recently in her “Wisdom, Knowledge and Rationality.” We argue that (a) Ryan’s use of the term “rationality” needs further elaboration; (b) there is a problem with requiring that the wise person possess justified beliefs but not necessarily knowledge; (c) the conditions of DRT are not all necessary; (d) the conditions are not sufficient. At the end of our discussion, we suggest that there may be a problem with the very assumption (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  4. Metaethical Internalism: Another Neglected Distinction.Jon Tresan - 2009 - Journal of Ethics 13 (1):51-72.
    ‘Internalism’ is used in metaethics for a cluster of claims which bear a family resemblance. They tend to link, in some distinctive way—typically modal, mereological, or causal—different parts of the normative realm, or the normative and the psychological. The thesis of this paper is that much metaethical mischief has resulted from philosophers’ neglect of the distinction between two different features of such claims. The first is the modality of the entire claim. The second is the relation between the items specified (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  5.  42
    Metaethics and Mental Time Travel: A Reply to Gerrans and Kennett.Iskra Fileva & Jonathan Tresan - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (5):1457-1474.
    In “Neurosentimentalism and Moral Agency”, Philip Gerrans and Jeanette Kennett argue that prominent versions of metaethical sentimentalism and moral realism ignore the importance, for moral agency and moral judgment, of the capacity to experientially project oneself into the past and possible futures – to engage in ‘mental time travel’. They contend that such views are committed to taking subjects with impaired capacities for MTT to be moral judgers, and thus confront a dilemma: either allow that these subjects are moral agents, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Will Retributivism Die and Will Neuroscience Kill It?Iskra Fileva & Jon Tresan - 2015 - Cognitive Systems Research 34:54-70.
    In a widely read essay, “For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything,” Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen argue that the advance of neuroscience will result in the widespread rejection of free will, and with it – of retributivism. They go on to propose that consequentialist reforms are in order, and they predict such reforms will take place. We agree that retributivism should be rejected, and we too are optimistic that rejected it will be. But we don’t think that such (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Question Authority: In Defense of Moral Naturalism Without Clout.Jon Tresan - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):221 - 238.
    Metaethicists of all stripes should read and learn from Richard Joyce's book The Evolution of Morality. This includes moral realists, despite Joyce's own nihilism. Joyce thinks that moral obligations, prohibitions, and the like are myths. But that is just a bit of a rich, broad account of moral attitudes and practices, the bulk of which can comfortably be accepted by realists. In fact, other than nihilism itself, there's only one claim of Joyce's which realists must reject. I argue that that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  8.  31
    Role-Based Interpretations of Moral Judgments: An Objectivist Account.Jon Tresan - 2009 - Social Theory and Practice 35 (3):369-391.
  9.  53
    Review of Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral Psychology, Volume 1: The Evolution of Morality: Adaptations and Innateness[REVIEW]Jon Tresan - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (3).
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark