5 found
Jonas Christensen [3]Jonas Fogedgaard Christensen [2]Jonas F. Christensen [1]
  1. Why incompatibilism about mental causation is incompatible with non-reductive physicalism.Jonas Christensen & Umut Baysan - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (5):546-568.
    ABSTRACT The exclusion problem is meant to show that non-reductive physicalism leads to epiphenomenalism: if mental properties are not identical with physical properties, then they are not causally efficacious. Defenders of a difference-making account of causation suggest that the exclusion problem can be solved because mental properties can be difference-making causes of physical effects. Here, we focus on what we dub an incompatibilist implementation of this general strategy and argue against it from a non-reductive physicalist perspective. Specifically, we argue that (...)
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  2. Counterfactuals and downward causation: a reply to Zhong.Jonas Christensen & Jesper Kallestrup - 2012 - Analysis 72 (3):513-517.
    Lei Zhong (2012. Counterfactuals, regularity and the autonomy approach. Analysis 72: 75–85) argues that non-reductive physicalists cannot establish the autonomy of mental causation by adopting a counterfactual theory of causation since such a theory supports a so-called downward causation argument which rules out mental-to-mental causation. We respond that non-reductive physicalists can consistently resist Zhong's downward causation argument as it equivocates between two familiar notions of a physical realizer.
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    Causality in the Sciences of the Mind and Brain.Lise Marie Andersen, Jonas Fogedgaard Christensen, Samuel Schindler & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (2):237-241.
  4.  97
    Determinable Properties and Overdetermination of Causal Powers.Jonas Christensen - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (3):695-711.
    Do determinable properties such as colour, mass, and height exist in addition to their corresponding determinates, being red, having a mass of 1 kilogram, and having a height of 2 metres? Optimists say yes, pessimists say no. Among the latter are Carl Gillett and Bradley Rives who argue that optimism leads to systematic overdetermination of causal powers and hence should be rejected on the grounds that the position is ontologically unparsimonious. In this paper I defend optimism against this charge by (...)
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    Subset Realization and the Entailment Problem.Jonas F. Christensen - 2022 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):165-169.
    According to the principle of conditional power aggregation (CPA), conditional powers conjoin when the properties that bestow them conjoin. Sophie Gibb has argued that CPA is false given Shoemaker’s account of conditional powers and that this leads to a problem for his account of subset realization. In short: If CPA is rejected, subset realization fails to be an entailment relation, in which case it cannot provide a basis for non-reductive physicalism. I defend the subset account against this argument by denying (...)
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