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Profile: Jonas Olson (Stockholm University)
  1.  55
    Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence.Jonas Olson - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Jonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and so all moral claims are false. Part I explores the historical context of the debate; Part II assesses J. L. Mackie's famous arguments; Part III defends error theory against challenges and considers its implications for our moral thinking.
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  2.  87
    Brentano and the Buck-Passers.Sven Danielsson & Jonas Olson - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):511 - 522.
    According to T. M. Scanlon's 'buck-passing' analysis of value, x is good means that x has properties that provide reasons to take up positive attitudes vis-à-vis x. Some authors have claimed that this idea can be traced back to Franz Brentano, who said in 1889 that the judgement that x is good is the judgement that a positive attitude to x is correct ('richtig'). The most discussed problem in the recent literature on buckpassing is known as the 'wrong kind of (...)
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  3. Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons.Jonas Olson - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):295–300.
    According to T.M. Scanlon's buck-passing account of value, to be valuable is not to possess intrinsic value as a simple and unanalysable property, but rather to have other properties that provide reasons to take up an attitude in favour of their owner or against it. The 'wrong kind of reasons' objection to this view is that we may have reasons to respond for or against something without this having any bearing on its value. The challenge is to explain why such (...)
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  4. The Wrong Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem.Jonas Olson - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (2):225-232.
    The so-called Wrong Kind of Reason (WKR) problem for Scanlon's account of value has been much discussed recently. In a recent issue of Utilitas Gerald Lang provides a highly useful critique of extant proposed solutions to the WKR problem and suggests a novel solution of his own. In this note I offer a critique of Lang's solution and respond to some criticisms Lang directs at a Brentano-style approach suggested by Sven Danielsson and me.
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  5. Brentano's Metaethics.Jonas Olson - forthcoming - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Brentano and the Brentano School. Routledge.
  6.  4
    In Defense of Moral Error Theory.Jonas Olson - 2011 - In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    My aim in this essay is largely defensive. I aim to discuss some problems for moral error theory and to offer plausible solutions. A full positive defense of moral error theory would require substantial investigations of rival metaethical views, but that is beyond the scope of this essay. I will, however, try to motivate moral error theory and to clarify its commitments. Moral error theorists typically accept two claims – one conceptual and one ontological – about moral facts. The conceptual (...)
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  7.  51
    Regimenting Reasons.Jonas Olson & Frans Svensson - 2005 - Theoria 61 (3):203-214.
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  8.  12
    Non-Cognitivism and Fundamental Moral Certitude: Reply to Eriksson and Francén Olinder.Krister Bykvist & Jonas Olson - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-6.
    Accommodating degrees of moral certitude is a serious problem for non-cognitivism about ethics. In particular, non-cognitivism has trouble accommodating fundamental moral certitude. John Eriksson and Ragnar Francén Olinder [2016] have recently proposed a solution. In fact, Eriksson and Francén Olinder offer two different proposals—one ‘classification’ account and one ‘projectivist’ account. We argue that the classification account faces the same problem as previous accounts do, while the projectivist account has unacceptable implications. Non-cognitivists will have to look elsewhere for a plausible solution (...)
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  9. Error Theory and Reasons for Belief.Jonas Olson - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
     
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  10.  77
    Fitting Attitude Analyses of Value and the Partiality Challenge.Jonas Olson - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):365-378.
    According to ‘Fitting Attitude’ (FA) analyses of value, for an object to be valuable is for that object to have properties—other than its being valuable—that make it a fitting object of certain responses. In short, if an object is positively valuable it is fitting to favour it; if an object is negatively valuable it is fitting to disfavour it. There are several variants of FA analyses. Some hold that for an object to be valuable is for it to be such (...)
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  11.  74
    Are Desires de Dicto Fetishistic?Jonas Olson - 2002 - Inquiry 45 (1):89 – 96.
    In The Moral Problem Michael Smith presents what he claims is a decisive argument against moral externalism. Smith's claims that (i) moral externalists are committed to explain the connection between moral beliefs and moral motivation in terms of de dicto desires, and (ii) de dicto desires to perform moral acts amounts to moral fetishism. The argument is spelled out and the difference between desires de dicto and desires de re explained. The tenability of the fetishist argument (as it has been (...)
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  12. Reasons and the New Non-Naturalism.Jonas Olson - 2009 - In Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason. Oxford University Press.
     
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  13.  41
    Intrinsicalism and Conditionalism About Final Value.Jonas Olson - 2004 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (1):31-52.
    The paper distinguishes between two rival views about the nature of final value (i.e. the value something has for its own sake) — intrinsicalism and conditionalism. The former view (which is the one adopted by G.E. Moore and several later writers) holds that the final value of any F supervenes solely on features intrinsic to F, while the latter view allows that the final value of F may supervene on features non-intrinsic to F. Conditionalism thus allows the final value of (...)
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  14.  27
    Précis of Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence.Jonas Olson - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4):397-402.
    _ Source: _Volume 13, Issue 4, pp 397 - 402 Moral error theorists and moral realists agree about several disputed metaethical issues. They typically agree that ordinary moral judgments are beliefs and that ordinary moral utterances purport to refer to moral facts. But they disagree on the crucial ontological question of whether there are any moral facts. Moral error theorists hold that there are not and that, as a consequence, ordinary moral beliefs are systematically mistaken and ordinary moral judgments uniformly (...)
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  15. Expressivism and Moral Certitude.Krister Bykvist & Jonas Olson - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):202-215.
    Michael Smith has recently argued that non-cognitivists are unable to accommodate crucial structural features of moral belief, and in particular that non-cognitivists have trouble accounting for subjects' certitude with respect to their moral beliefs. James Lenman and Michael Ridge have independently constructed 'ecumenical' versions of non-cognitivism, intended to block this objection. We argue that these responses do not work. If ecumenical non-cognitivism, a hybrid view which incorporates both non-cognitivist and cognitivist elements, fails to meet Smith's challenge, it is unlikely that (...)
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  16.  60
    Getting Real About Moral Fictionalism1.Jonas Olson - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 6 6:181.
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  17.  75
    G. E. Moore on Goodness and Reasons.Jonas Olson - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):525 – 534.
    Several proponents of the 'buck-passing' account of value have recently attributed to G. E. Moore the implausible view that goodness is reason-providing. I argue that this attribution is unjustified. In addition to its historical significance, the discussion has an important implication for the contemporary value-theoretical debate: the plausible observation that goodness is not reason-providing does not give decisive support to the buck-passing account over its Moorean rivals. The final section of the paper is a survey of what can be said (...)
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  18.  91
    The Freshman Objection to Expressivism and What to Make of It.Jonas Olson - 2010 - Ratio 23 (1):87-101.
    Cognitivism is the view that the primary function of moral judgements is to express beliefs that purport to say how things are; expressivism is the contrasting view that their primary function is to express some desire-like state of mind. I shall consider what I call the freshman objection to expressivism. It is pretty uncontroversial that this objection rests on simple misunderstandings. There are nevertheless interesting metaethical lessons to learn from the fact that the freshman objection is prevalent among undergraduates and (...)
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  19.  18
    Thomas Hurka, British Ethical Theorists From Sidgwick to Ewing , Pp. Xiv + 310.Jonas Olson - 2016 - Utilitas 28 (2):234-237.
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  20. A.C. Ewing's First and Second Thoughts About Metaethics.Jonas Olson & Mark Timmons - 2011 - In Thomas Hurka (ed.), Underivative Duty: British Moral Philosophers From Sidgwick to Ewing. Oxford University Press.
     
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  21.  73
    A Particular Consequentialism: Why Moral Particularism and Consequentialism Need Not Conflict.Jonas Olson & Frans Svensson - 2003 - Utilitas 15 (2):194-205.
    Moral particularism is commonly presented as an alternative to approaches to ethics, such as consequentialism or Kantianism. This paper argues that particularists' aversions to consequentialism stem not from a structural feature of consequentialism per se, but from substantial and structural axiological views traditionally associated with consequentialism. Given a particular approach to (intrinsic) value, there need be no conflict between moral particularism and consequentialism. We consider and reject a number of challenges holding that there is after all such a conflict. We (...)
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  22.  2
    Essays in Moral Skepticism_, _written by Richard Joyce.Jonas Olson - forthcoming - Brill.
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  23.  46
    Projectivism and Error in Hume's Ethics.Jonas Olson - 2011 - Hume Studies 37 (1):19-42.
    Commentators have attributed to Hume a wide variety of metaethical views. The main questions to be considered in this essay are whether Hume is a moral projectivist and whether he is a moral error theorist. Not surprisingly, these questions cannot be answered with an unqualified ‘yes’ or ‘no.’ We first need to get clear about what is meant by ‘moral projectivism’ and ‘moral error theory.’ I shall argue that Hume is a moral projectivist, and I shall identify two senses in (...)
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  24.  23
    Rationalism Vs. Sentimentalism: Reviewing Price's Review.Jonas Olson - 2014 - Philosophical Papers 43 (3):429-445.
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  25.  2
    A Particular Consequentialism: Why Moral Particularism and Consequentialism Need Not Conflict: Jonas Olson and Frans Svensson.Jonas Olson - 2003 - Utilitas 15 (2):194-205.
    Moral particularism is commonly presented as an alternative to ‘principle- or rule-based’ approaches to ethics, such as consequentialism or Kantianism. This paper argues that particularists' aversions to consequentialism stem not from a structural feature of consequentialism per se, but from substantial and structural axiological views traditionally associated with consequentialism. Given a particular approach to value, there need be no conflict between moral particularism and consequentialism. We consider and reject a number of challenges holding that there is after all such a (...)
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  26.  21
    The Personal and the Fitting.Jonas Olson - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (3):341-352.
    This paper is a critical notice of a recent significant contribution to the debate about fitting attitudes and value, namely Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen’s Personal Value . In this book, Rønnow-Rasmussen seeks to analyse the notion of personal value—an instance of the notion of good for a person—in terms of fitting attitudes. The paper has three main themes: Rønnow-Rasmussen’s discussion of general problems for fitting attitude analyses; his formulation of the fitting attitude analysis of personal value and the notion of ‘for someone’s (...)
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  27.  23
    Against the Being For Account of Normative Certitude.Krister Bykvist & Jonas Olson - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (2):1-8.
    Just as we can be more or less certain about empirical matters, we can be more or less certain about normative matters. Recently, it has been argued that this is a challenge for noncognitivism about normativity. Michael Smith presented the challenge in a 2002 paper and James Lenman and Michael Ridge responded independently. Andrew Sepielli has now joined the rescue operation. His basic idea is that noncognitivists should employ the notion of being for to account for normative certitude. We shall (...)
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  28.  19
    Buck‐Passing Accounts.Jonas Olson - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  29.  52
    The Ethics of Care and Empathy • by M. Slote.Jonas Olson - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):190-192.
    Most moral philosophers who have recently expressed sympathy with feminist or ‘care-based’ perspectives on ethical theory have thought that such perspectives can make valuable contributions to more comprehensive ethical theories. Few have thought that an ethics of care can offer a complete normative theory. However, Michael Slote is one of the ambitious few. In his recent book, The Ethics of Care and Empathy, he seeks to show that a care-based perspective can do a lot of service in first-order moral and (...)
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  30.  10
    Non-Naturalism.Jonas Olson - 2009 - In Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason: New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity. Oxford University Press. pp. 164.
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  31.  22
    Skorupski's Middle Way in Metaethics. [REVIEW]Jonas Olson - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):192-200.
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  32.  12
    Review of Simon Kirchin (Ed.), Thick Concepts (Oxford University Press, 2013). [REVIEW]Jonas Olson - forthcoming - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  33.  24
    Revisiting the Tropic of Value: Reply to Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen.Jonas Olson - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):412–422.
    In this paper, I defend the view that the values of concrete objects and persons are reducible to the final values of tropes. This reductive account has recently been discussed and rejected by Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2003). I begin by explaining why the reduction is appealing in the first place. In my rejoinder to Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen I defend trope-value reductionism against three challenges. I focus mainly on their central objection, that holds that the reduction is untenable since different evaluative (...)
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  34.  16
    Welfare and Rational Care, by Stephen Darwall. Princeton University Press, 2002, Xi + 135 Pages. [REVIEW]Jonas Olson - 2006 - Economics and Philosophy 22 (1):171-177.
  35.  7
    Review of Ingmar Persson, The Retreat of Reason. [REVIEW]Jonas Olson - forthcoming - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  36.  7
    Hume on Is and Ought, by Pigden Charles R. (Ed.).Jonas Olson - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):821-824.
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  37.  6
    Review of Hume on Is and Ought, Edited by CR Pigden. [REVIEW]Jonas Olson - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91:821-824.
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  38.  3
    Review of Stephen Darwall, Welfare and Rational Care. [REVIEW]Jonas Olson - 2006 - Economics and Philosophy 22:171-177.
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  39.  4
    Ewing, AC.Jonas Olson & Mark Timmons - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
  40.  7
    Review of Ingmar Persson, The Retreat of Reason: A Dilemma in the Philosophy of Life[REVIEW]Jonas Olson - 2006 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (8).
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  41.  2
    Review of Robert Audi, The Good in the Right: A Theory of Inuition and Intrinsic Value. [REVIEW]Jonas Olson - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):540-542.
  42. Om moraliska övertygelsers styrka och emotivismens svaghet.Krister Bykvist & Jonas Olson - 2010 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 4.
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  43. The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory.Hirose Iwao & Olson Jonas (eds.) - 2015 - Oxford University Press USA.
    Value theory, or axiology, looks at what things are good or bad, how good or bad they are, and, most fundamentally, what it is for a thing to be good or bad. Questions about value and about what is valuable are important to moral philosophers, since most moral theories hold that we ought to promote the good. This Handbook focuses on value theory as it pertains to ethics, broadly construed, and provides a comprehensive overview of contemporary debates pertaining not only (...)
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  44. Book Review. [REVIEW]Jonas Olson - 2006 - Economics and Philosophy 22 (1):171-177.
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  45. Moral Error: History, Critique, Defence.Jonas Olson - 2017 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Jonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and so all moral claims are false. Part I explores the historical context of the debate; Part II assesses J. L. Mackie's famous arguments; Part III defends error theory against challenges and considers its implications for our moral thinking.
     
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  46. Om värdebärare och värdereduktion.Jonas Olson - 2002 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 1.
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  47. Projectivism and Error in Hume’s Ethics.Jonas Olson - 2011 - Hume Studies 37 (1):19-42.
    This essay argues that while Hume believes both that morality is grounded in our ordinary moral practices, sentiments, and beliefs, and that moral properties are real, he also holds that ordinary moral thinking involves systematically erroneous beliefs about moral properties. These claims, on their face, seem difficult to square with one another but this paper argues that on Hume’s view, they are reconcilable. The reconciliation is effected by making a distinction between Hume’s descriptive metaethics, that is, his account of vulgar (...)
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  48. Partikularistisk konsekventialism.Jonas Olson & Frans Svensson - 2004 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 3.
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  49. Essays in Moral Skepticism_, _written by Richard Joyce.Jonas Olson - forthcoming - New Content is Available for International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
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