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Jonathan Simon
Université de Montréal
  1. Vagueness and zombies: why ‘phenomenally conscious’ has no borderline cases.Jonathan A. Simon - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):2105-2123.
    I argue that there can be no such thing as a borderline case of the predicate ‘phenomenally conscious’: for any given creature at any given time, it cannot be vague whether that creature is phenomenally conscious at that time. I first defend the Positive Characterization Thesis, which says that for any borderline case of any predicate there is a positive characterization of that case that can show any sufficiently competent speaker what makes it a borderline case. I then appeal to (...)
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  2. The hard problem of the many.Jonathan A. Simon - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):449-468.
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    Experiencing left and right in a non‐orientable world.Jonathan A. Simon - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (3):201-222.
    Analytic Philosophy, Volume 62, Issue 3, Page 201-222, September 2021.
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    Transparency About Painkillers: A Remedy for the Evaluativist's Headache.Jonathan A. Simon - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (4):935-951.
    The paradox of pain is that pain is in some ways like a bodily state and in other ways like a mental state. You can have a pain in your shin, but there is no denying that you are in pain if it feels like you are. How can a state be both in your shin and in your mind? Evaluativism is a promising answer. According to evaluativism, an experience of pain in your shin represents that there is a disturbance (...)
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    Indeterminate Comprehension.Jonathan A. Simon - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):39-48.
    Can we solve the Problem of the Many, and give a general account of the indeterminacy in definite descriptions that give rise to it, by appealing to metaphysically indeterminate entities? I argue that we cannot. I identify a feature common to the relevant class of definite descriptions, and derive a contradiction from the claim that each such description is satisfied by a metaphysically indeterminate entity.
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