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Jonathan E. Adler [95]Jonathan Adler [36]Jonathan H. Adler [4]Jonathan Eric Adler [2]
  1. Women and Moral Theory.Eva Feder Kittay, Carol Gilligan, Annette C. Baier, Michael Stocker, Christina H. Sommers, Kathryn Pyne Addelson, Virginia Held, Thomas E. Hill Jr, Seyla Benhabib, George Sher, Marilyn Friedman, Jonathan Adler, Sara Ruddick, Mary Fainsod, David D. Laitin, Lizbeth Hasse & Sandra Harding - 1989 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    To find more information about Rowman and Littlefield titles, please visit www.rowmanlittlefield.com.
     
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  2. Belief's Own Ethics.Jonathan Adler - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):269-272.
     
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  3. Lying, Deceiving, or Falsely Implicating.Jonathan E. Adler - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (9):435-452.
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  4. Testimony, Trust, Knowing.Jonathan E. Adler - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (5):264-275.
  5.  21
    More on Race and Crime: Levin's Reply.Jonathan E. Adler - 1994 - Journal of Social Philosophy 25 (2):105-114.
  6. Epistemological Problems of Testimony.Jonathan Adler - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  7.  22
    Testimony, Trust, Knowing.Jonathan E. Adler - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (5):264-275.
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  8. Akratic Believing?Jonathan E. Adler - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (1):1 - 27.
    Davidson's account of weakness of will depends upon a parallel that he draws between practical and theoretical reasoning. I argue that the parallel generates a misleading picture of theoretical reasoning. Once the misleading picture is corrected, I conclude that the attempt to model akratic belief on Davidson's account of akratic action cannot work. The arguments that deny the possibility of akratic belief also undermine, more generally, various attempts to assimilate theoretical to practical reasoning.
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  9.  90
    Withdrawal and Contextualism.Jonathan E. Adler - 2006 - Analysis 66 (4):280–285.
  10. Transmitting Knowledge.Jonathan E. Adler - 1996 - Noûs 30 (1):99-111.
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  11. The Ethics of Belief: Off the Wrong Track.Jonathan E. Adler - 1999 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):267–285.
  12. Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations.Jonathan E. Adler & Lance J. Rips (eds.) - 2008 - Cambridge University Press.
    This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible, cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth (...)
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  13.  30
    Are Conductive Arguments Possible?Jonathan Adler - 2013 - Argumentation 27 (3):245-257.
    Conductive Arguments are held to be defeasible, non-conclusive, and neither inductive nor deductive (Blair and Johnson in Conductive argument: An overlooked type of defeasible reasoning. College, London, 2011). Of the different kinds of Conductive Arguments, I am concerned only with those for which it is claimed that countervailing considerations detract from the support for the conclusion, complimentary to the positive reasons increasing that support. Here’s an example from Wellman (Challenge and response: justification in ethics. Southern Illinois University Press, Chicago, 1971): (...)
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  14. Another Argument for the Knowledge Norm.Jonathan E. Adler - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):407-411.
    The knowledge norm of assertion is mainly in competition with a high probability or rational credibility norm. The argument for the knowledge norm that I offer turns on cases in which a hearer responds to a speaker's assertion by asserting another sentence that would lower the probability of the speaker's assertion, were its probability less than one. In cases like this, though with qualifications, is the hearer's contribution a challenge to the speaker's assertion or complementary to it? My answer is (...)
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  15.  92
    Reliabilist Justification (or Knowledge) as a Good Truth-Ratio.Jonathan E. Adler - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):445–458.
    Fair lotteries offer familiar ways to pose a number of epistemological problems, prominently those of closure and of scepticism. Although these problems apply to many epistemological positions, in this paper I develop a variant of a lottery case to raise a difficulty with the reliabilist's fundamental claim that justification or knowledge is to be analyzed as a high truth-ratio (of the relevant belief-forming processes). In developing the difficulty broader issues are joined including fallibility and the relation of reliability to understanding.
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  16. Resisting the Force of Argument.Jonathan E. Adler - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (6):339-364.
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  17.  94
    Contextualism and Fallibility: Pragmatic Encroachment, Possibility, and Strength of Epistemic Position.Jonathan E. Adler - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):247-272.
    A critique of conversational epistemic contextualism focusing initially on why pragmatic encroachment for knowledge is to be avoided. The data for pragmatic encroachment by way of greater costs of error and the complementary means to raise standards of introducing counter-possibilities are argued to be accountable for by prudence, fallibility and pragmatics. This theme is sharpened by a contrast in recommendations: holding a number of factors constant, when allegedly higher standards for knowing hold, invariantists still recommend assertion (action), while contextualists do (...)
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  18. Moore's Paradox and the Transparency of Belief.Jonathan E. Adler & Bradley Armour-Garb - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
  19. Taking Property Rights Seriously: The Case of Climate Change.Jonathan H. Adler - 2009 - Social Philosophy and Policy 26 (2):296-316.
    The dominant approach to environmental policy endorsed by conservative and libertarian policy thinkers, so-called (FME), is grounded in the recognition and protection of property rights in environmental resources. Despite this normative commitment to property rights, most self-described FME advocates adopt a utilitarian, welfare-maximization approach to climate change policy, arguing that the costs of mitigation measures could outweigh the costs of climate change itself. Yet even if anthropogenic climate change is decidedly less than catastrophic, human-induced climate change is likely to contribute (...)
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  20.  15
    Abstraction is Uncooperative.Jonathan E. Adler - 1984 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 14 (2):165–181.
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  21.  77
    Relevant Alternatives, Presuppositions, and Skepticism.Jonathan E. Adler - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (11):653-654.
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  22. Pragmatic Encroachment, Methods and Contextualism.Jonathan E. Adler - 2012 - Analysis 72 (3):526-534.
    Defence of conditions to withdraw an assertion that require evidence or epistemic reasons that the assertion is not true or warranted. (Adler, J. 2006. Withdrawal and contextualism. Analysis 66: 280–85) The defence replies to the claim that better methods justify withdrawal without meeting that requirement and without pragmatic encroachment.
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  23.  18
    The Revisability Paradox.Jonathan Adler - 2003 - Philosophical Forum 34 (3-4):383–390.
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  24. Luckless Desert is Different Desert.Jonathan E. Adler - 1987 - Mind 96 (382):247-249.
  25. William James and What Cannot Be Believed.Jonathan E. Adler - 2005 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 13 (1):65-79.
  26.  71
    Conservatism and Tacit Confirmation.Jonathan E. Adler - 1990 - Mind 99 (396):559-570.
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  27.  20
    Shedding Dialectical Tiers: A Social-Epistemic View. [REVIEW]Jonathan E. Adler - 2004 - Argumentation 18 (3):279-293.
    Is there a duty to respond to objections in order to present a good argument? Ralph Johnson argues that there is such a duty, which he refers to as the ‘dialectical tier’ of an argument. I deny the (alleged) duty primarily on grounds that it would exert too great a demand on arguers, harming argumentation practices. The valuable aim of responding to objections, which Johnson’s dialectical tier is meant to satisfy, can be achieved in better ways, as argumentation is a (...)
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  28.  20
    Surprise.Jonathan E. Adler - 2008 - Educational Theory 58 (2):149-173.
    Surprise is of great value for learning, especially in cases where deep‐seated preconceptions and assumptions are upset by vivid demonstrations. In this essay, Jonathan Adler explores the ways in which surprise positively affects us and serves as a valuable tool for motivating learning. Adler considers how students’ attention is aroused and focused self‐critically when their subject matter–related expectations are not borne out. These “surprises” point students toward discoveries about gaps or weaknesses or false assumptions within their subject matter understanding; as (...)
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  29.  21
    Is the Common Law a Free-Market Solution to Pollution?Jonathan H. Adler - 2012 - Critical Review 24 (1):61-85.
    Whereas conventional analyses characterize environmental problems as examples of market failure, proponents of free-market environmentalism (FME) consider the problem to be a lack of markets and, in particular, a lack of enforceable and exchangeable property rights. Enforcing property rights alleviates disputes about, as well as the overuse of, most natural resources. FME diagnoses of pollution are much weaker, however. Most FME proponents suggest that common-law tort suits can adequately protect private property and ecological resources from pollution. Yet such claims have (...)
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  30.  15
    Charity, Interpretation, Fallacy.Jonathan E. Adler - 1996 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 29 (4):329 - 343.
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  31.  3
    Is The Common Law A Free-Market Solution To Pollution?Jonathan Adler - 2012 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 24 (1):61-85.
    Whereas conventional analyses characterize environmental problems as examples of market failure, proponents of free-market environmentalism consider the problem to be a lack of markets and, in particular, a lack of enforceable and exchangeable property rights. Enforcing property rights alleviates disputes about, as well as the overuse of, most natural resources. FME diagnoses of pollution are much weaker, however. Most FME proponents suggest that common-law tort suits can adequately protect private property and ecological resources from pollution. Yet such claims have not (...)
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  32.  66
    Sticks and Stones: A Reply to Warren.Jonathan E. Adler - 2008 - Journal of Social Philosophy 39 (4):639-655.
  33.  84
    Epistemics and the Total Evidence Requirement.Jonathan E. Adler - 1989 - Philosophia 19 (2-3):227-243.
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  34.  66
    Skepticism and Universalizability.Jonathan E. Adler - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (3):143-156.
  35.  21
    Belief and Negation.Jonathan E. Adler & J. Anthony Blair - 2000 - Informal Logic 20 (3).
    This paper argues for the importance of the distinction between internal and external negation over expressions for belief. The common fallacy is to confuse statement like (1) and (2): (1) John believes that the school is not closed on Tuesday; (2) John does not believe that the school is closed on Tuesday. The fallacy has ramifications in teaching, reasoning, and argumentation. Analysis of the fallacy and suggestions for teaching are offered.
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  36.  86
    Three Fallacies.Jonathan E. Adler - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):665-666.
    Three fallacies in the rationality debate obscure the possibility for reconciling the opposed camps. I focus on how these fallacies arise in the view that subjects interpret their task differently from the experimenters (owing to the influence of conversational expectations). The themes are: first, critical assessment must start from subjects' understanding; second, a modal fallacy; and third, fallacies of distribution.
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  37.  69
    Stove on Hume's Inductive Scepticism.Jonathan E. Adler - 1975 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):167 – 170.
  38.  6
    Taking Property Rights Seriously: The Case of Climate Change: Jonathan H. Adler.Jonathan H. Adler - 2009 - Social Philosophy and Policy 26 (2):296-316.
    The dominant approach to environmental policy endorsed by conservative and libertarian policy thinkers, so-called “free market environmentalism”, is grounded in the recognition and protection of property rights in environmental resources. Despite this normative commitment to property rights, most self-described FME advocates adopt a utilitarian, welfare-maximization approach to climate change policy, arguing that the costs of mitigation measures could outweigh the costs of climate change itself. Yet even if anthropogenic climate change is decidedly less than catastrophic, human-induced climate change is likely (...)
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  39.  44
    Jennifer Trusted, "The Logic of Scientific Inference". [REVIEW]Jonathan E. Adler - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (28):291.
  40. Argumentation and Distortion.Jonathan Adler - 2007 - Episteme 4 (3):382-401.
    Why is there so much misrepresentation of arguments in public forums? Standard explanations, such as self-interested biases, are insufficient. An additional part of the explanation is our commitment to, or belief in, norms that disallow responses that amount to no firm judgment, as contrasted with definite agreement or disagreement. In disallowing no-firm-judgment responses, these norms deny not only degrees of support or dissent and a variety of ways of suspending judgment, but also indifference. Since these norms leave us with only (...)
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  41.  45
    Confidence in Argument.Jonathan Eric Adler - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):225-257.
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  42.  39
    Conundrums of Belief Self-Control.Jonathan E. Adler - 2002 - The Monist 85 (3):456-467.
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  43.  37
    Reasonableness, Bias, and the Untapped Power of Procedure.Jonathan E. Adler - 1993 - Synthese 94 (1):105 - 125.
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  44.  31
    Crime Rates by Race and Causal Relevance: A Reply to Levin.Jonathan E. Adler - 1993 - Journal of Social Philosophy 24 (1):176-184.
  45.  45
    Critical Notice.David Miller, Catherine Z. Elgin, Jonathan E. Adler & Douglas N. Walton - 1980 - Synthese 43 (3):125 – 140.
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  46. Exercises in Naturalistic Epistemology.Jonathan E. Adler - 1987 - Behaviorism 15 (2):161-164.
     
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  47.  17
    Report of a Year Working on Inlproving Teaching and Learning.Jonathan Adler - 1997 - Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 16 (3):35-41.
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  48.  29
    Human Rationality: Essential Conflicts, Multiple Ideals.Jonathan E. Adler - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):245.
  49.  14
    Fallacies and Alternative Interpretations.Jonathan E. Adler - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (3):271 – 282.
  50.  22
    Knowing, Betting and Cohering.Jonathan E. Adler - 1986 - Philosophical Topics 14 (1):243-257.
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