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Jonathan E. Adler [91]Jonathan Adler [28]Jonathan Eric Adler [5]Jonathan H. Adler [4]
  1. Belief's Own Ethics.Jonathan Eric Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.
    In this book Jonathan Adler offers a strengthened version of evidentialism, arguing that the ethics of belief should be rooted in the concept of belief--that...
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  2.  42
    Women and Moral Theory.Eva Feder Kittay, Carol Gilligan, Annette C. Baier, Michael Stocker, Christina H. Sommers, Kathryn Pyne Addelson, Virginia Held, Thomas E. Hill Jr, Seyla Benhabib, George Sher, Marilyn Friedman, Jonathan Adler, Sara Ruddick, Mary Fainsod, David D. Laitin, Lizbeth Hasse & Sandra Harding - 1987 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    To find more information about Rowman and Littlefield titles, please visit www.rowmanlittlefield.com.
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  3. Epistemological problems of testimony.Jonathan E. Adler - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  4. Lying, deceiving, or falsely implicating.Jonathan E. Adler - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (9):435-452.
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  5.  91
    Testimony, Trust, Knowing.Jonathan Adler - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (5):264-275.
  6. Akratic believing?Jonathan E. Adler - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (1):1 - 27.
    Davidson's account of weakness of will dependsupon a parallel that he draws between practicaland theoretical reasoning. I argue that theparallel generates a misleading picture oftheoretical reasoning. Once the misleadingpicture is corrected, I conclude that theattempt to model akratic belief on Davidson'saccount of akratic action cannot work. Thearguments that deny the possibility of akraticbelief also undermine, more generally, variousattempts to assimilate theoretical to practicalreasoning.
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  7.  59
    Are Conductive Arguments Possible?Jonathan Adler - 2013 - Argumentation 27 (3):245-257.
    Conductive Arguments are held to be defeasible, non-conclusive, and neither inductive nor deductive (Blair and Johnson in Conductive argument: An overlooked type of defeasible reasoning. College, London, 2011). Of the different kinds of Conductive Arguments, I am concerned only with those for which it is claimed that countervailing considerations detract from the support for the conclusion, complimentary to the positive reasons increasing that support. Here’s an example from Wellman (Challenge and response: justification in ethics. Southern Illinois University Press, Chicago, 1971): (...)
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  8.  39
    More on race and crime: Levin's reply.Jonathan E. Adler - 1994 - Journal of Social Philosophy 25 (2):105-114.
  9.  71
    Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations.Jonathan Eric Adler & Lance J. Rips (eds.) - 2008 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible, cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth (...)
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  10. Transmitting knowledge.Jonathan E. Adler - 1996 - Noûs 30 (1):99-111.
  11.  37
    Abstraction is uncooperative.Jonathan E. Adler - 1984 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 14 (2):165–181.
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  12.  43
    Fallacies and alternative interpretations.Jonathan E. Adler - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (3):271 – 282.
  13.  24
    The Rationality of Science.Jonathan E. Adler - 1983 - Philosophical Quarterly 33 (130):90-92.
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  14. Another argument for the knowledge Norm.Jonathan E. Adler - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):407-411.
    The knowledge norm of assertion is mainly in competition with a high probability or rational credibility norm. The argument for the knowledge norm that I offer turns on cases in which a hearer responds to a speaker's assertion by asserting another sentence that would lower the probability of the speaker's assertion, were its probability less than one. In cases like this, though with qualifications, is the hearer's contribution a challenge to the speaker's assertion or complementary to it? My answer is (...)
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  15. The ethics of belief: Off the wrong track.Jonathan E. Adler - 1999 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):267–285.
  16. Moore's paradox and the transparency of belief.Jonathan E. Adler & Bradley Armour-Garb - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. New York: Oxford University Press.
  17. Reconciling open-mindedness and belief.Jonathan Adler - 2004 - Theory and Research in Education 2 (2):127–42.
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  18. Contextualism and fallibility: pragmatic encroachment, possibility, and strength of epistemic position.Jonathan E. Adler - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):247-272.
    A critique of conversational epistemic contextualism focusing initially on why pragmatic encroachment for knowledge is to be avoided. The data for pragmatic encroachment by way of greater costs of error and the complementary means to raise standards of introducing counter-possibilities are argued to be accountable for by prudence, fallibility and pragmatics. This theme is sharpened by a contrast in recommendations: holding a number of factors constant, when allegedly higher standards for knowing hold, invariantists still recommend assertion (action), while contextualists do (...)
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  19. Withdrawal and contextualism.Jonathan E. Adler - 2006 - Analysis 66 (4):280–285.
  20. Conservatism and tacit confirmation.Jonathan E. Adler - 1990 - Mind 99 (396):559-570.
  21. Reliabilist justification (or knowledge) as a good truth-ratio.Jonathan E. Adler - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):445–458.
    Fair lotteries offer familiar ways to pose a number of epistemological problems, prominently those of closure and of scepticism. Although these problems apply to many epistemological positions, in this paper I develop a variant of a lottery case to raise a difficulty with the reliabilist's fundamental claim that justification or knowledge is to be analyzed as a high truth-ratio (of the relevant belief-forming processes). In developing the difficulty broader issues are joined including fallibility and the relation of reliability to understanding.
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  22. Skepticism and universalizability.Jonathan E. Adler - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (3):143-156.
  23.  31
    Knowledge, Truth, and Learning.Jonathan E. Adler - 2003 - In Randall Curren (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Education. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 285–304.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Epistemological Background Educational Applications On Not Addressing Epistemological Controversies.
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  24.  34
    Charity, Interpretation, Fallacy.Jonathan E. Adler - 1996 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 29 (4):329 - 343.
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  25. Taking property rights seriously: The case of climate change: Jonathan H. Adler.Jonathan H. Adler - 2009 - Social Philosophy and Policy 26 (2):296-316.
    The dominant approach to environmental policy endorsed by conservative and libertarian policy thinkers, so-called “free market environmentalism”, is grounded in the recognition and protection of property rights in environmental resources. Despite this normative commitment to property rights, most self-described FME advocates adopt a utilitarian, welfare-maximization approach to climate change policy, arguing that the costs of mitigation measures could outweigh the costs of climate change itself. Yet even if anthropogenic climate change is decidedly less than catastrophic, human-induced climate change is likely (...)
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  26. Impartiality and Particularity.Owne Flanagan & Jonathan Adler - 1983 - Social Research: An International Quarterly 50.
     
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  27. Luckless desert is different desert.Jonathan E. Adler - 1987 - Mind 96 (382):247-249.
  28. Presupposition, attention, and why questions.Jonathan E. Adler - 2008 - In Jonathan Eric Adler & Lance J. Rips (eds.), Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 748--764.
  29.  26
    Fallacies Not Fallacious: Not!Jonathan E. Adler - 1997 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 30 (4):333 - 350.
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  30.  82
    Confidence in argument.Jonathan Eric Adler - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):225-257.
    When someone presents an argument on a charged topic and it is alleged that the arguer has a strong personal interest and investment in the conclusion, the allegation, directed to the reception or evaluation of the argument, typically gives rise to two seemingly conflicting reactions:I. The allegation is an unwarranted diversion. The prejudices or biases of the arguer are irrelevant to the cogency of the argument. In particular, it is a distraction from the crucial judgment of whether the argument is (...)
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  31.  28
    Impartiality and particularity.Owen J. Flanagan Jr & Jonathan E. Adler - forthcoming - Social Research: An International Quarterly.
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  32.  35
    Review of Mark Johnson: Moral imagination: implications of cognitive science for ethics[REVIEW]Jonathan E. Adler - 1995 - Ethics 105 (2):401-404.
  33.  53
    (1 other version)Knowing, Betting and Cohering.Jonathan E. Adler - 1986 - Philosophical Topics 14 (1):243-257.
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  34.  33
    The revisability paradox.Jonathan Adler - 2003 - Philosophical Forum 34 (3-4):383–390.
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  35.  53
    Particullary, Gilligan, and the two-levels view: A reply.Jonathan E. Adler - 1989 - Ethics 100 (1):149-156.
  36.  73
    Why Be Charitable?Jonathan E. Adler - 1981 - Informal Logic 4 (2).
  37. (1 other version)William James and What Cannot be Believed.Jonathan E. Adler - 2005 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 13 (1):65-79.
    My critical comments focus mainly on premises,, and. However, in treating these I will address other of James’s assumptions—particularly, the presupposition of his argument that it is possible to will to believe. Later I will try to accommodate existential aspects of James’s argument that retain value, even if my objections to his argument stand.
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  38.  73
    Belief and Negation.Jonathan E. Adler & J. Anthony Blair - 2000 - Informal Logic 20 (3).
    This paper argues for the importance of the distinction between internal and external negation over expressions for belief. The common fallacy is to confuse statement like (1) and (2): (1) John believes that the school is not closed on Tuesday; (2) John does not believe that the school is closed on Tuesday. The fallacy has ramifications in teaching, reasoning, and argumentation. Analysis of the fallacy and suggestions for teaching are offered.
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  39.  90
    Stove on Hume's inductive scepticism.Jonathan E. Adler - 1975 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):167 – 170.
  40. Epistemics and the total evidence requirement.Jonathan E. Adler - 1989 - Philosophia 19 (2-3):227-243.
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  41.  42
    Crime rates by race and causal relevance: A reply to Levin.Jonathan E. Adler - 1993 - Journal of Social Philosophy 24 (1):176-184.
  42.  75
    Critical notice.David Miller, Catherine Z. Elgin, Jonathan E. Adler & Douglas N. Walton - 1980 - Synthese 43 (3):125 – 140.
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  43.  47
    Arguing from Ignorance.Jonathan Adler - unknown
    Arguments from ignorance should be schematized: It has not been proven false that p. So it is possible that p. So, it is reasonable to believe p. Also, in opposition to standard views they should be distinguished from burden of proof and absence of evidence arguments. Much of the persuasiveness of such arguments can be located in the slippery uses of "possible." Besides equivocations on "possible" the argument is a fallacy for two reasons. First, the possibility implied by the first (...)
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  44.  90
    (1 other version)Constrained belief and the reactive attitudes.Jonathan E. Adler - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):891-905.
    Evidentialism implies that, for epistemic purposes, belief should be responsive only to evidence. Focusing on our reactive attitude such as resentment or indignation, I construct an argument that the beliefs or judgments accompanying those attitudes are constrained in advance by circumstances to be full, rather than being open to the whole range of partial beliefs. These judgments or beliefs imply strong claims to justification. But the circumstances in which those attitudes are formed allow only very limited evidence. Nevertheless, we cannot (...)
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  45.  36
    Critique of an epistemic account of fallacies.Jonathan E. Adler - 1993 - Argumentation 7 (3):263-272.
    An epistemic account of fallacies is one which takes it as a necessary condition for a fallacy that it has a tendency to produce false or unwarranted beliefs. The most sophisticated form of this account occurs in an article by Robert J. Fogelin and Timothy J. Duggan (“Fallacies,”Argumentation 1, 1987, pp. 255–262). I criticize the Fogelin and Duggan proposal, in particular, and epistemic accounts, more generally. Though an epistemic approach is attractive, it enlarges the class of fallacies, beyond what would (...)
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  46.  75
    (1 other version)In defense of radical empiricism: Essays and lectures.Jonathan E. Adler - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):453-456.
  47. Moral development and the personal point of view.Jonathan Adler - 1987 - In Diana T. Meyers (ed.), Women and Moral Theory. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 205--34.
     
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  48.  66
    Reasonableness, bias, and the untapped power of procedure.Jonathan E. Adler - 1993 - Synthese 94 (1):105 - 125.
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  49.  19
    Reply by Repetition and Reminder.Jonathan E. Adler - 1997 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 30 (4):367 - 375.
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  50.  65
    Where are the limits to reconstruction?Jonathan E. Adler - 1985 - Informal Logic 7 (1).
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