Jonathan Berg argues for the Theory of Direct Belief, which treats having a belief about an individual as an unmediated relation between the believer and the individual the belief is about. After a critical review of alternative positions, Berg uses Grice's theory of conversational implicature to provide a detailed pragmatic account of substitution failure in belief ascriptions and goes on to defend this view against objections, including those based on an unwarranted "Inner Speech" Picture of Thought. The work serves as (...) a case study in pragmatic explanation, dealing also with methodological issues about context-sensitivity in language and the relation between semantics and pragmatics. (shrink)

Replies to comments by Wayne Davis, Anthony Everett, Dale Jacquette, Nikolaj Nottelmann, and Tiddy Smith, on my book Direct Belief: An Essay on the Semantics, Pragmatics, and Metaphysics of Belief.

In the third chapter of LOT 2—"LOT Meets Frege's Problem "—Jerry Fodor argues that LOT provides a solution to "Frege's Problem," as well as to Kripke's Paderewski puzzle . I argue that most of what Fodor says in his discussion of Frege's problem is mistaken.

SummaryThe apparent conflict between first person authority and externalism arises only from needlessly thinking of first person authority in terms of “knowing what.”.

Jerry Fodor and Ernie LePore argue against inferential role semantics on the grounds that either it relies on an analytic/synthetic distinction vulnerable to Quinean objections, or else it leads to a variety of meaning holism frought with absurd consequences. However, the slide from semantic atomism to meaning holism might be prevented by distinctions not affected by Quine's arguments against analyticity; and the absurd consequences Fodor and LePore attribute to meaning holism obtain only on an implausible construal of inferential roles.

In Direct Belief I argue for the Theory of Direct Belief, which treats having a belief about an individual as an unmediated relation between the believer and the individual the belief is about. After a critical review of alternative positions, I use Grice’s theory of conversational implicature to provide a detailed pragmatic account of substitution failure in belief ascriptions and go on to defend this view against objections, including those based on an unwarranted “Inner Speech” Picture of Thought. The work (...) serves as a case study in pragmatic explanation, dealing also with methodological issues about context-sensitivity in language and the relation between semantics and pragmatics. (shrink)

It is shown how the discussion of the semantics of sentences attributing belief, central to the philosophy of language since Frege, may benefit from consideration of pragmatic features of the context of utterance. ;The dissertation begins with a historical introduction to the problem of substitutivity in belief contexts. Traditional solutions advanced by Frege, Russell, and Carnap are reviewed, along with traditional objections to such solutions. It is then suggested that the traditional Quinian approach of declaring belief ascriptions semantically ambiguous might (...) be avoided by appeal to pragmatic considerations. ;Radically divergent appeals to pragmatics are discussed. It is suggested, on one hand, how theories of reference associated with philosophers such as Kripke and Kaplan can benefit from pragmatic analysis, as it is demonstrated that substitution failure in belief ascriptions may be due to pragmatic rather than semantical factors. This is argued for in three ways: it is shown how the result of unacceptable substitution may be pragmatically ambiguous, insufficiently informative, or simply misleading. ;It is also suggested, on the other hand, how some followers of Frege may similarly argue that substitution success may be due to pragmatic rather than semantical factors. That is, it is shown how those who maintain that substitution in belief contexts is not truth-preserving and, roughly, that a sentence attributing a belief to someone is true only if the person would assent to it, can argue that our occasional inclination to accept a belief report to which the believer would not assent may be due to features of the sentence's utterance, rather than its truth conditions. ;After brief speculation on the ramifications of these pragmatic analyses for the semantics of belief, there is a discussion of the principle methodological issues raised by pragmatic analyses, with special attention to the distinction between pragmatic import and semantical meaning. Further discussion of pragmatics comes in the appendix, containing a critical review of various conceptions of pragmatics and of Grice's theory of conversation. (shrink)

Identity, Consciousness, and Value, by Peter Unger.

It is wrong to think that questions of interpretation are significant in informal logic only to the extent that they contribute to the assessment of an argument's conclusion. For one thing, logic is essentially about validity, about that in virtue of which conclusions do or do not follow from given premises, and not about the truth or falsity of conclusions by themselves. Secondly, the evaluation of a given argument requires first determining what the given argument is. Moreover, since arguments are (...) given in rational discourse in order to persuade-in order to arrive, by reason, at agreement-it is necessary to address the very arguments that arguers actually intend. (shrink)

Jerry Fodor and Ernie LePore argue against inferential role semantics on the grounds that either it relies on an analytic/synthetic distinction vulnerable to Quinean objections, or else it leads to a variety of meaning holism frought with absurd consequences. However, the slide from semantic atomism to meaning holism might be prevented by distinctions not affected by Quine's arguments against analyticity; and the absurd consequences Fodor and LePore attribute to meaning holism obtain only on an implausible construal of inferential roles.

Jerry Fodor and Ernie LePore argue against inferential role semantics on the grounds that either it relies on an analytic/synthetic distinction vulnerable to Quinean objections, or else it leads to a variety of meaning holism frought with absurd consequences. However, the slide from semantic atomism to meaning holism might be prevented by distinctions not affected by Quine's arguments against analyticity; and the absurd consequences Fodor and LePore attribute to meaning holism obtain only on an implausible construal of inferential roles.

SummaryThe apparent conflict between first person authority and externalism arises only from needlessly thinking of first person authority in terms of “knowing what.”.

Contents: Preface. Johannes BRANDL: Semantic Holism Is Here To Stay. Michael DEVITT: A Critique of the Case for Semantic Holism. Georges REY: The Unavailability of What We Mean: A Reply to Quine, Fodor and LePore. Joseph LEVINE: Intentional Chemistry. Louise ANTHONY: Conceptual Connection and the Observation/Theory Distinction. Gilbert HARMAN: Meaning Holism Defended. Kirk A. LUDWIG: Is Content Holism Incoherent? Anne BEZUIDENHOUT: The Impossibility of Punctate Mental Representations. Takashi YAGISAWA: The Cost of Meaning Solipsism. Alberto PERUZZI: Holism: The Polarized Spectrum. Jonathan (...) BERG: Inferential Roles, Quine, and Mad Holism. Jerry FODOR & Ernest LEPORE: Replies. (shrink)