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Jonathan Ellis [15]Jonathan R. Ellis [1]Jonathan Eric Ellis [1]
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Jonathan Ellis
University of California, Santa Cruz
  1. On the Concept of a Game.Jonathan Ellis - 2011 - Philosophical Investigations 34 (4):381-392.
    Thomas Hurka writes, “an anti-theoretical position is properly open only to those who have made a serious effort to theorize a given domain and found that it cannot succeed. Anti-theorists who do not make this effort are simply being lazy, like Wittgenstein himself. His central example of a concept that cannot be given a unifying analysis was that of a game, but in one of the great underappreciated books of the twentieth century Bernard Suits gives perfectly persuasive necessary and sufficient (...)
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  2. Rationalization in Philosophical and Moral Thought.Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Ellis - 2017 - In Jean-Francois Bonnefon & Bastien Trémolière (eds.), Moral Inferences.
    Rationalization, in our intended sense of the term, occurs when a person favors a particular conclusion as a result of some factor (such as self-interest) that is of little justificatory epistemic relevance, if that factor then biases the person’s subsequent search for, and assessment of, potential justifications for the conclusion. Empirical evidence suggests that rationalization is common in people’s moral and philosophical thought. We argue that it is likely that the moral and philosophical thought of philosophers and moral psychologists is (...)
     
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  3. Context, Indexicals and the Sorites.Jonathan Ellis - 2004 - Analysis 64 (4):362–364.
    The reason, according to the contextualist, that precise boundaries for expressions like ‘heap’ or ‘tall for a basketball player’ are so difficult to detect is that when two entities are sufficiently similar (or saliently similar), we tend to shift the interpretation of the vague expression so that if one counts as falling in the extension of the property expressed by that expression, so does the other. As a conse- quence, when we look for the boundary of the extension of a (...)
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  4. Content Externalism and Phenomenal Character: A New Worry About Privileged Access.Jonathan Ellis - 2007 - Synthese 159 (1):47 - 60.
    A central question in contemporary epistemology concerns whether content externalism threatens a common doctrine about privileged access. If the contents of a subject.
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  5. Phenomenal Character, Phenomenal Concepts, and Externalism.Jonathan Ellis - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):273 - 299.
    A celebrated problem for representationalist theories of phenomenal character is that, given externalism about content, these theories lead to externalism about phenomenal character. While externalism about content is widely accepted, externalism about phenomenal character strikes many philosophers as wildly implausible. Even if internally identical individuals could have different thoughts, it is said, if one of them has a headache, or a tingly sensation, so must the other. In this paper, I argue that recent work on phenomenal concepts reveals that, contrary (...)
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  6.  88
    The Contents of Hume’s Appendix and the Source of His Despair.Jonathan Ellis - 2006 - Hume Studies 32 (2):195-231.
    This paper has two goals: first, to show that the footnote and structure of App. 20, to which too little careful attention has been given, ultimately undermine a great many interpretations of Hume’s dissatisfaction with his theory of personal identity; and second, to offer an interpretation that both heeds these textual features and (unlike other interpretations consistent with these features) renders Hume worried about something that would have truly bothered him. Hume’s problem, I contend, concerns the relation, in his genetic (...)
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  7.  2
    Rationalization in the Pejorative Sense: Cushman's Account Overlooks the Scope and Costs of Rationalization.Jonathan Ellis & Eric Schwitzgebel - 2020 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43.
    According to Cushman, rationalization occurs when a person has performed an action and then concocts beliefs and desires that would have made it rational. We argue that this isn't the paradigmatic form of rationalization. Consequently, Cushman's explanation of the function and usefulness of rationalization is less broad-reaching than he intends. Cushman's account also obscures some of rationalization's pernicious consequences.
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  8. Sensation, Introspection, and the Phenomenal.Jonathan Ellis - 2012 - In J. Ellis & D. Guevara (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
  9. Colour Irrealism and the Formation of Colour Concepts.Jonathan Ellis - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):53-73.
    According to colour irrealism, material objects do not have colour; they only appear to have colour. The appeal of this view, prominent among philosophers and scientists alike, stems in large part from the conviction that scientific explanations of colour facts do not ascribe colour to material objects. To explain why objects appear to have colour, for instance, we need only appeal to surface reflectance properties, properties of light, the neurophysiology of observers, etc. Typically attending colour irrealism is the error theory (...)
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  10. Stroud's Proposal for Removing the Threat of Skepticism.Jonathan Ellis - 2011 - In W. Wong, N. Kolodny & J. Bridges (eds.), The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Reflection on the Thought of Barry Stroud. Oxford University Press.
    Barry Stroud is well known as a critic of philosophers who purport to answer, or otherwise deflate, the threat of skepticism of the external world. He is most famous in this regard for his seminal paper on transcendental arguments, in which he argues that the prospects of defeating the skeptic with such arguments typically depend upon an implausible form of verification principle. There he mostly focuses upon Strawson and Shoemaker. But since then, Stroud has addressed strategies taken against skepticism as (...)
     
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  11.  57
    Thinking About Thinking About Thinking About Thinking (About Poker).Jonathan Ellis - 2006 - In E. Bronson (ed.), Poker and Philosophy. Open Court Press.
    Remember that childhood game “Odds or Evens” you used to play in order to settle important disputes such as who gets the last slice of pizza? There was only one element of skill to that game: trying to figure out what the other person would throw. But that wasn’t easy. If your opponent was savvy, that meant trying to figure out what he thought you were going to throw. And that sometimes meant figuring out what he thought you thought he (...)
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  12. The Relevance of Radical Interpretation.Jonathan Ellis - forthcoming - In J. Malpas (ed.), The Hermeneutic Davidson. MIT Press.
    In Davidson’s philosophy, one finds a wide variety of rich, provocative, and influential arguments concerning the nature of the mind—that mental states emerge only in the context of interpretation, that belief is “in its nature” veridical, that mental events are physical events, and so on. Most, if not all, of Davidson’s conclusions about the mind have their source in discussions about the project of “radical interpretation.” They rely upon arguments concerning the conditions on the successful interpretation of a speaker by (...)
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  13.  79
    Color, Error, and Explanatory Power.Jonathan Ellis - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (2):171-179.
    Error theorists about color argue that our ordinary judgments ascribing color to material objects are all false. The error theorist proposes that everything that is so, including the fact that material objects appear to us to have color, can best be explained without ever attributing color to objects (for instance, by appealing to surface reflectance properties, the nature of light, the neurophysiology of perceivers, etc.). The appeal of this view stems in significant part from the prevalent thought that such explanations (...)
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  14.  10
    The Philosophical and Satirical Context of the "Suenos" of Quevedo.Jonathan R. Ellis - unknown
    Quevedo brings together a number of philosophical traditions in the Suenos. One chapter of the thesis examines Quevedo's use of Epicurean dream theory as well as the larger ramifications of the dream setting for the satires. Another chapter analyzes the exact nature of Quevedo's sceptical views and their classical sources with emphasis on the content of El mundo por de dentro. Included is a discussion of the moral philosophy presented in the Suenos, deriving primarily from Stoic sources. In each case, (...)
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  15.  9
    Color, Error, and Explanatory Power.Jonathan Ellis - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (2):171-179.
    Error theorists about color argue that our ordinary judgments ascribing color to material objects are all false. The error theorist proposes that everything that is so, including the fact that material objects appear to us to have color, can best be explained without ever attributing color to objects. The appeal of this view stems in significant part from the prevalent thought that such explanations are strongly suggested by our present scientific conception of the world. Recently, however, Barry Stroud has argued (...)
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  16.  17
    Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind.Jonathan Ellis & Daniel Guevara (eds.) - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    Based on a conference held in June 2007 at the University of California Santa Cruz.
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