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Jonathan St B. T. Evans [51]Jonathan Evans [27]Jonathan StB. T. Evans [12]Jonathan St Bt Evans [4]
Jonathan D. Evans [2]Jonathan J. Evans [2]Jonathan S. B. T. Evans [1]Jonathan Roger Evans [1]

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Jonathan Evans
University of Indianapolis
  1. Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition Advancing the Debate.Jonathan Evans & Keith E. Stanovich - 2013 - Perspectives on Psychological Science 8 (3):223-241.
    Dual-process and dual-system theories in both cognitive and social psychology have been subjected to a number of recently published criticisms. However, they have been attacked as a category, incorrectly assuming there is a generic version that applies to all. We identify and respond to 5 main lines of argument made by such critics. We agree that some of these arguments have force against some of the theories in the literature but believe them to be overstated. We argue that the dual-processing (...)
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  2. Bias in Human Reasoning Causes and Consequences.Jonathan St B. T. Evans (ed.) - 1989
    This book represents the first major attempt by any author to provide an integrated account of the evidence for bias in human reasoning across a wide range of disparate psychological literatures. The topics discussed involve both deductive and inductive reasoning as well as statistical judgement and inference. In addition, the author proposes a general theoretical approach to the explanations of bias and considers the practical implications for real world decision making. The theoretical stance of the book is based on a (...)
     
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  3. Rationality in Reasoning: The Problem of Deductive Competence.Jonathan Evans & David E. Over - unknown - Current Psychology of Cognition 16 (1-2):3-38.
     
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  4. Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition.Jonathan Evans - 2008 - Annu.Rev.Psychol 59:255-278.
     
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  5. In Two Minds: Dual-Process Accounts of Reasoning.Jonathan StB. T. Evans - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (10):454-459.
  6. In Two Minds: Dual-Process Accounts of Reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (10):454-459.
  7. Subtracting “Ought” From “Is”: Descriptivism Versus Normativism in the Study of Human Thinking.Shira Elqayam & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):251-252.
    We propose a critique of normativism, defined as the idea that human thinking reflects a normative system against which it should be measured and judged. We analyze the methodological problems associated with normativism, proposing that it invites the controversial “is-ought” inference, much contested in the philosophical literature. This problem is triggered when there are competing normative accounts (the arbitration problem), as empirical evidence can help arbitrate between descriptive theories, but not between normative systems. Drawing on linguistics as a model, we (...)
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  8.  1
    Thinking Twice: Two Minds in One Brain.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    This book explores the idea that much of our behaviour is controlled by automatic and intuitive mental processes, which shape and compete with our conscious thinking and decision making. Accessibly written, and assuming no prior knowledge of the field, the book will be fascinating reading for all those interested in human behaviour.
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  9.  10
    Rationality and Reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans, David E. Over & Peter Carruthers - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):189-194.
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  10.  88
    Questions and Challenges for the New Psychology of Reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2012 - Thinking and Reasoning 18 (1):5 - 31.
    In common with a number of other authors I believe that there has been a paradigm shift in the psychology of reasoning, specifically the area traditionally labelled as the study of deduction. The deduction paradigm was founded in a philosophical tradition that assumed logicality as the basis for rational thought, and provided binary propositional logic as the agreed normative framework. By contrast, many contemporary authors assume that people have degrees of uncertainty in both premises and conclusions, and reject binary logic (...)
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  11.  38
    Reflections on Reflection: The Nature and Function of Type 2 Processes in Dual-Process Theories of Reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2019 - Thinking and Reasoning 25 (4):383-415.
    I present a critical discussion of dual-process theories of reasoning and decision making with particular attention to the nature and role of Type 2 processes. The original theory proposed...
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  12.  46
    Logic and Human Reasoning: An Assessment of the Deduction Paradigm.Jonathan Evans - 2002 - Psychological Bulletin 128 (6):978-996.
    The study of deductive reasoning has been a major paradigm in psychology for approximately the past 40 years. Research has shown that people make many logical errors on such tasks and are strongly influenced by problem content and context. It is argued that this paradigm was developed in a context of logicist thinking that is now outmoded. Few reasoning researchers still believe that logic is an appropriate normative system for most human reasoning, let alone a model for describing the process (...)
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  13.  14
    Subtracting “Ought” From “Is”: Descriptivism Versus Normativism in the Study of Human Thinking.Shira Elqayam & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):233-248.
    We propose a critique ofnormativism, defined as the idea that human thinking reflects a normative system against which it should be measured and judged. We analyze the methodological problems associated with normativism, proposing that it invites the controversial “is-ought” inference, much contested in the philosophical literature. This problem is triggered when there are competing normative accounts, as empirical evidence can help arbitrate between descriptive theories, but not between normative systems. Drawing on linguistics as a model, we propose that a clear (...)
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  14.  22
    Do Smart People Have Better Intuitions?Valerie A. Thompson, Gordon Pennycook, Dries Trippas & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2018 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 147 (7):945-961.
  15. On the Resolution of Conflict in Dual Process Theories of Reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2007 - Thinking and Reasoning 13 (4):321 – 339.
    In this paper, I show that the question of how dual process theories of reasoning and judgement account for conflict between System 1 (heuristic) and System 2 (analytic) processes needs to be explicated and addressed in future research work. I demonstrate that a simple additive probability model that describes such conflict can be mapped on to three different cognitive models. The pre-emptive conflict resolution model assumes that a decision is made at the outset as to whether a heuristic or analytic (...)
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  16.  32
    Uncertain Deduction and Conditional Reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans, Valerie A. Thompson & David E. Over - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
  17.  33
    If: Supposition, Pragmatics, and Dual Processes.Jonathan Evans & David Over - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    'If' is one of the most important words in the English language, being used to express hypothetical thought. The use of conditional terms such as 'if' distinguishes human intelligence from that of all other animals. In this volume, Jonathan Evans and David Over present a new theoretical approach to understanding conditionals. The book draws on studies from the psychology of judgement and decision making, as well as philosophical logic.
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  18. The Probability of Conditionals: The Psychological Evidence.David E. Over & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (4):340–358.
    The two main psychological theories of the ordinary conditional were designed to account for inferences made from assumptions, but few premises in everyday life can be simply assumed true. Useful premises usually have a probability that is less than certainty. But what is the probability of the ordinary conditional and how is it determined? We argue that people use a two stage Ramsey test that we specify to make probability judgements about indicative conditionals in natural language, and we describe experiments (...)
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  19.  16
    The Source of Belief Bias Effects in Syllogistic Reasoning.Stephen E. Newstead, Paul Pollard, Jonathan StB. T. Evans & Julie L. Allen - 1992 - Cognition 45 (3):257-284.
  20.  16
    The Source of Belief Bias Effects in Syllogistic Reasoning.Stephen E. Newstead, Paul Pollard, Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Julie L. Allen - 1992 - Cognition 45 (3):257-284.
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  21.  28
    Heuristic and Analytic Processes in Reasoning.Jonathan Evans - 1984 - British Journal of Psychology 75 (4):451-468.
    A general two-stage theory of human inference is proposed. A distinction is drawn between heuristic processes which select items of task information as ‘relevant’, and analytic processes which operate on the selected items to generate inferences or judgements. These two stages are illustrated in a selective review of work on both deductive and statistical reasoning. Factors identified as contributing to heuristic selection include perceptual salience, linguistic suppositions and semantic associations. Analytic processes are considered to be context dependent: people reason from (...)
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  22.  91
    Matching Bias in Conditional Reasoning: Do We Understand It After 25 Years?Jonathan StB. T. Evans - 1998 - Thinking and Reasoning 4 (1):45-110.
    The phenomenon known as matching bias consists of a tendency to see cases as relevant in logical reasoning tasks when the lexical content of a case matches that of a propositional rule, normally a conditional, which applies to that case. Matching is demonstrated by use of the negations paradigm that is by using conditionals in which the presence and absence of negative components is systematically varied. The phenomenon was first published in 1972 and the present paper reviews the history of (...)
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  23. How Many Dual Process Theories Do We Need: One, Two or Many?Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2009 - In Jonathan Evans & Keith Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press.
  24. Rapid Responding Increases Belief Bias: Evidence for the Dual-Process Theory of Reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Jodie Curtis-Holmes - 2005 - Thinking and Reasoning 11 (4):382 – 389.
    In this study, we examine the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning under both standard presentation and in a condition where participants are required to respond within 10 seconds. As predicted, the requirement for rapid responding increased the amount of belief bias observed on the task and reduced the number of logically correct decisions, both effects being substantial and statistically significant. These findings were predicted by the dual-process account of reasoning, which posits that fast heuristic processes, responsible for belief bias, (...)
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  25.  21
    The Mythical Dual-Process Typology.Gordon Pennycook, Wim De Neys, Jonathan St B. T. Evans, Keith E. Stanovich & Valerie A. Thompson - 2018 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 22 (8):667-668.
  26.  50
    Reasoning to and From Belief: Deduction and Induction Are Still Distinct.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):267-283.
  27.  35
    Rationality in the New Paradigm: Strict Versus Soft Bayesian Approaches.Shira Elqayam & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):453-470.
  28.  33
    The New Paradigm and Mental Models.Jean Baratgin, Igor Douven, Jonathan StB. T. Evans, Mike Oaksford, David Over & Guy Politzer - 2015 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 19 (10):547-548.
  29.  88
    The Duality of Mind: An Historical Perspective.Keith Frankish & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - unknown
    [About the book] This book explores the idea that we have two minds - automatic, unconscious, and fast, the other controlled, conscious, and slow. In recent years there has been great interest in so-called dual-process theories of reasoning and rationality. According to such theories, there are two distinct systems underlying human reasoning - an evolutionarily old system that is associative, automatic, unconscious, parallel, and fast, and a more recent, distinctively human system that is rule-based, controlled, conscious, serial, and slow. Within (...)
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  30.  10
    Suppositions, Extensionality, and Conditionals: A Critique of the Mental Model Theory of Johnson-Laird and Byrne.Jonathan St B. T. Evans, David E. Over & Simon J. Handley - 2005 - Psychological Review 112 (4):1040-1052.
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  31.  41
    Towards a Descriptivist Psychology of Reasoning and Decision Making.Jonathan St Bt Evans & Shira Elqayam - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):275-290.
    Our target article identified normativism as the view that rationality should be evaluated against unconditional normative standards. We believe this to be entrenched in the psychological study of reasoning and decision making and argued that it is damaging to this empirical area of study, calling instead for a descriptivist psychology of reasoning and decision making. The views of 29 commentators (from philosophy and cognitive science as well as psychology) were mixed, including some staunch defences of normativism, but also a number (...)
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  32.  11
    Rationality in the Selection Task: Epistemic Utility Versus Uncertainty Reduction.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over - 1996 - Psychological Review 103 (2):356-363.
    M. Oaksford and N. Chater presented a Bayesian analysis of the Wason selection task in which they proposed that people choose cards in order to maximize expected information gain as measured by reduction in uncertainty in the Shannon-Weaver information theory sense. It is argued that the EIG measure is both psychologically implausible and normatively inadequate as a measure of epistemic utility. The article is also concerned with the descriptive account of findings in the selection task literature offered by Oaksford and (...)
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  33.  37
    Matching Bias on the Selection Task: It's Fast and Feels Good.Valerie A. Thompson, Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Jamie I. D. Campbell - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):431-452.
    We tested the hypothesis that choices determined by Type 1 processes are compelling because they are fluent, and for this reason they are less subject to analytic thinking than other answers. A total of 104 participants completed a modified version of Wason's selection task wherein they made decisions about one card at a time using a two-response paradigm. In this paradigm participants gave a fast, intuitive response, rated their feeling of rightness for that response, and were then allowed free time (...)
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  34.  43
    Two Minds Rationality.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2014 - Thinking and Reasoning 20 (2):129-146.
    I argue that views of human rationality are strongly affected by the adoption of a two minds theory in which humans have an old mind which evolved early and shares many features of animal cognition, as well as new mind which evolved later and is distinctively developed in humans. Both minds have a form of instrumental rationality—striving for the attainment of goals—but by very different mechanisms. The old mind relies on a combination of evolution and experiential learning, and is therefore (...)
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  35.  67
    Spot the Difference: Distinguishing Between Two Kinds of Processing.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2012 - Mind and Society 11 (1):121-131.
    Dual-process theories of higher cognition, distinguishing between intuitive (Type 1) and reflective (Type 2) thinking, have become increasingly popular, although also subject to recent criticism. A key question, to which a number of contributions in this special issue relate, is how to define the difference between the two kinds of processing. One issue discussed is whether they differ at Marr’s computational level of analysis. I believe they do but that ultimately the debate will decided at the implementational level where distinct (...)
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  36.  9
    When Can We Say ‘If’?Jonathan StB. T. Evans, Helen Neilens, Simon J. Handley & David E. Over - 2008 - Cognition 108 (1):100-116.
  37.  8
    The Mental Model Theory of Conditional Reasoning: Critical Appraisal and Revision.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 1993 - Cognition 48 (1):1-20.
    Johnson-Laird and Byrne present a theory of conditional inference based upon the manipulation of mental models. In the present paper, the theory is critically examined with regard to its ability to account for psychological data, principally with respect to the rate at which people draw the four basic inferences of modus ponens, denial of the antecedent, affirmation of the consequent and modus tollens. It is argued first that the theory is unclear in its definition and in particular with regard to (...)
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  38.  7
    Frequency Versus Probability Formats in Statistical Word Problems.Jonathan StB. T. Evans, Simon J. Handley, Nick Perham, David E. Over & Valerie A. Thompson - 2000 - Cognition 77 (3):197-213.
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  39.  14
    Human Versus Machine Thinking: The Story of Chess. [REVIEW]Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2018 - Thinking and Reasoning 24 (4):498-504.
  40.  9
    The Role of Implicit and Explicit Negation in Conditional Reasoning Bias.Jonathan Evans, John Clibbens & Benjamin Rood - 1996 - Journal of Memory and Language 35 (3):392-409.
    Matching bias in conditional reasoning consists of a tendency to select as relevant cases whose lexical content matches that referred to in the conditional statement, regardless of the presence of negatives. Evans demonstrated that use of explicit rather than implicit negative cases markedly reduced the matching bias effect on the conditional truth table task. In apparent contrast, recent studies of explicit negation on the Wason selection task have failed to find evidence of logical facilitation. Experiment 1 of the present study (...)
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  41.  8
    The Mental Model Theory of Conditional Reasoning: Critical Appraisal and Revision.Jonathan StB. T. Evans - 1993 - Cognition 48 (1):1-20.
  42.  44
    Belief Bias in Informal Reasoning.Valerie Thompson & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2012 - Thinking and Reasoning 18 (3):278 - 310.
    In two experiments we tested the hypothesis that the mechanisms that produce belief bias generalise across reasoning tasks. In formal reasoning (i.e., syllogisms) judgements of validity are influenced by actual validity, believability of the conclusions, and an interaction between the two. Although apparently analogous effects of belief and argument strength have been observed in informal reasoning, the design of those studies does not permit an analysis of the interaction effect. In the present studies we redesigned two informal reasoning tasks: the (...)
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  43.  36
    The Social and Communicative Function of Conditional Statements.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2005 - Mind and Society 4 (1):97-113.
    In this paper, I discuss conditionals as illocutionary speech acts whose interpretation depends upon the whole of the social context in which they are uttered and whose purpose is to affect the opinions and actions of others. I argue for a suppositional approach to conditional statements based in what philosophers call the Ramsey test and developing the psychological theory that conditionals elicit a process of hypothetical thinking in their listeners. By reference to the experimental psychological literature on conditionals, I show (...)
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  44.  17
    Reasoning is for Thinking, Not Just for Arguing.Jonathan St Bt Evans - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2):77-78.
    There is indeed extensive evidence that people perform fairly poorly in reasoning tasks and that they often construct arguments for intuitively cued responses. Mercier & Sperber (M&S) may also be right to claim that reasoning evolved primarily as argumentation. However, if it did, the facility became exapted to the function of supporting uniquely human abilities for reflective thinking and consequential decision making.
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  45.  31
    Conditional Truth: Comment on Byrne and Johnson-Laird.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over - 2010 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):5.
  46.  34
    Frequency Versus Probability Formats in Statistical Word Problems.Jonathan St B. T. Evans, Simon J. Handley, Nick Perham, David E. Over & Valerie A. Thompson - 2000 - Cognition 77 (3):197-213.
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  47.  56
    Explicit Representations in Hypothetical Thinking.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):763-764.
    Dienes' & Perner's proposals are discussed in relation to the distinction between explicit and implicit systems of thinking. Evans and Over (1996) propose that explicit processing resources are required for hypothetical thinking, in which mental models of possible world states are constructed. Such thinking requires representations in which the individuals' propositional attitudes including relevant beliefs and goals are made fully explicit.
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  48.  9
    The Influence of Linguistic Form on Reasoning: The Case of Matching Bias.Jonathan Evans - 1999 - Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A 52 (1):185-216.
    A well-established phenomenon in reasoning research is matching bias : a tendency to select information that matches the lexical content of propositional statements, regardless of the logically critical presence of negations. Previous research suggested, however, that the effect might be restricted to reasoning with conditional statements. This paper reports two experiments in which participants were required to construct or identify true and false cases of propositional rules of several kinds, including universal statements, disjunctions, and negated conjunctions. Matching bias was observed (...)
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  49. Introspection, Confabulation, and Dual-Process Theory.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):142-143.
    This excellent target article helps to resolve a problem for dual-process theories of higher cognition. Theorists posit two systems, one of which appears to be conscious and volitional. It seems to control some behaviours but to confabulate explanations for others. I argue that this system is only conscious in an illusory sense and that all self-explanations are confabulatory, as Carruthers suggests.
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  50.  87
    Does Rational Analysis Stand Up to Rational Analysis?Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):88-89.
    I agree with Oaksford & Chater (O&C) that human beings resemble Bayesian reasoners much more closely than ones engaging standard logic. However, I have many problems with their framework, which appears to be rooted in normative rather than ecological rationality. The authors also overstate everyday rationality and neglect to account for much relevant psychological work on reasoning.
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