12 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Jonathan A. Fugelsang [10]Jonathan Fugelsang [5]
  1. A Cognitive Neuroscience Framework for Understanding Causal Reasoning and the Law.Jonathan A. Fugelsang & Kevin N. Dunbar - 2006 - In Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough (eds.), Law and the Brain. Oxford University Press. pp. 157--166.
  2.  31
    Analytic Cognitive Style Predicts Religious and Paranormal Belief.Gordon Pennycook, James Allan Cheyne, Paul Seli, Derek J. Koehler & Jonathan A. Fugelsang - 2012 - Cognition 123 (3):335-346.
    An analytic cognitive style denotes a propensity to set aside highly salient intuitions when engaging in problem solving. We assess the hypothesis that an analytic cognitive style is associated with a history of questioning, altering, and rejecting supernatural claims, both religious and paranormal. In two studies, we examined associations of God beliefs, religious engagement, conventional religious beliefs and paranormal beliefs with performance measures of cognitive ability and analytic cognitive style. An analytic cognitive style negatively predicted both religious and paranormal beliefs (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   21 citations  
  3.  9
    Mathematics Anxiety Affects Counting but Not Subitizing During Visual Enumeration.Erin A. Maloney, Evan F. Risko, Daniel Ansari & Jonathan Fugelsang - 2010 - Cognition 114 (2):293-297.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  4.  21
    The Role of Analytic Thinking in Moral Judgements and Values.Gordon Pennycook, James Allan Cheyne, Nathaniel Barr, Derek J. Koehler & Jonathan A. Fugelsang - 2014 - Thinking and Reasoning 20 (2):188-214.
    While individual differences in the willingness and ability to engage analytic processing have long informed research in reasoning and decision making, the implications of such differences have not yet had a strong influence in other domains of psychological research. We claim that analytic thinking is not limited to problems that have a normative basis and, as an extension of this, predict that individual differences in analytic thinking will be influential in determining beliefs and values. Along with assessments of cognitive ability (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  5.  28
    Atheists and Agnostics Are More Reflective Than Religious Believers: Four Empirical Studies and a Meta-Analysis.Gordon Pennycook, Robert M. Ross, Derek J. Koehler & Jonathan A. Fugelsang - 2016 - PLoS ONE 11 (4):e0153039.
    Individual differences in the mere willingness to think analytically has been shown to predict religious disbelief. Recently, however, it has been argued that analytic thinkers are not actually less religious; rather, the putative association may be a result of religiosity typically being measured after analytic thinking (an order effect). In light of this possibility, we report four studies in which a negative correlation between religious belief and performance on analytic thinking measures is found when religious belief is measured in a (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  6.  23
    Are We Good at Detecting Conflict During Reasoning?Gordon Pennycook, Jonathan A. Fugelsang & Derek J. Koehler - 2012 - Cognition 124 (1):101-106.
    Recent evidence suggests that people are highly efficient at detecting conflicting outputs produced by competing intuitive and analytic reasoning processes. Specifically, De Neys and Glumicic demonstrated that participants reason longer about problems that are characterized by conflict between stereotypical personality descriptions and base-rate probabilities of group membership. However, this finding comes from problems involving probabilities much more extreme than those used in traditional studies of base-rate neglect. To test the degree to which these findings depend on such extreme probabilities, we (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  7.  38
    Reasoned Connections: A Dual-Process Perspective on Creative Thought.Nathaniel Barr, Gordon Pennycook, Jennifer A. Stolz & Jonathan A. Fugelsang - 2015 - Thinking and Reasoning 21 (1):61-75.
    A divide exists in the creativity literature as to whether relatively more or less executive processing is beneficial to creative thinking. To explore this issue, we employ an individual differences perspective informed by dual-process theories in which it is assumed that people vary in the extent to which they rely on autonomous or controlled processing . We find that those more willing and/or able to engage Type 2 processing are more likely to successfully make creative connections in tasks requiring the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  8.  7
    Strategy Choice for Arithmetic Verification: Effects of Numerical Surface Form.Jamie I. D. Campbell & Jonathan Fugelsang - 2001 - Cognition 80 (3):B21-B30.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  9.  41
    Inhibiting Beliefs Demands Attention.Kevin Barton, Jonathan Fugelsang & Daniel Smilek - 2009 - Thinking and Reasoning 15 (3):250 – 267.
    Research across a variety of domains has found that people fail to evaluate statistical information in an atheoretical manner. Rather, people tend to evaluate statistical information in light of their pre-existing beliefs and experiences. The locus of these biases continues to be hotly debated. In two experiments we evaluate the degree to which reasoning when relevant beliefs are readily accessible (i.e., when reasoning with Belief-Laden content) versus when relevant beliefs are not available (i.e., when reasoning with Non-Belief-Laden content) differentially demands (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  10.  33
    Inhibiting Beliefs Demands Attention.Kevin Barton, Jonathan Fugelsang & Daniel Smilek - 2009 - Thinking and Reasoning 15 (3):250-267.
    Research across a variety of domains has found that people fail to evaluate statistical information in an atheoretical manner. Rather, people tend to evaluate statistical information in light of their pre-existing beliefs and experiences. The locus of these biases continues to be hotly debated. In two experiments we evaluate the degree to which reasoning when relevant beliefs are readily accessible (i.e., when reasoning with Belief-Laden content) versus when relevant beliefs are not available (i.e., when reasoning with Non-Belief-Laden content) differentially demands (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  11.  33
    Examining the Representation of Causal Knowledge.Jonathan A. Fugelsang, Valerie A. Thompson & Kevin N. Dunbar - 2006 - Thinking and Reasoning 12 (1):1 – 30.
    Three experiments investigated reasoners' beliefs about causal powers; that is, their beliefs about the capacity of a putative cause to produce a given effect. Covariation-based theories (e.g., Cheng, 1997; Kelley, 1973; Novick & Cheng, 2004) posit that beliefs in causal power are represented in terms of the degree of covariation between the cause and its effect; covariation is defined in terms of the degree to which the effect occurs in the presence of the cause, and fails tooccur in the absence (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  3
    The Micro-Category Account of Analogy.Adam E. Green, Jonathan A. Fugelsang, David J. M. Kraemer & Kevin N. Dunbar - 2008 - Cognition 106 (2):1004-1016.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography