Unravels and assesses Hume's arguments against ethical ratinalism, and the different strands in his positive views, in the light of subsequent advances made in moral epistemology.

Gallant hero of romantic film, who has just killed his equally gallant antagonist in a duel: ‘Was I wrong, father?’ Father : ‘You were both wrong; and you were both right, too.’ David Hume, speaking of moral sceptics, once said ‘And as reasoning is not the source, whence either disputant derives his tenets; it is in vain to expect, that any logic, which speaks not to the affections, will ever engage him to embrace sounder opinions‘. I am guilty of an (...) inconsistency of some kind in quoting the above passage from Hume with approval for, though everything Hume wrote ought to be quoted with approval, it is inconsistent to approve of advice, and then immediately to disregard it. I am also guilty of an inconsistency of another kind. Once upon a time I myself defended a version of moral scepticism, but I can say in mitigation of this deplorable act that my tongue was partly in my cheek at the time, which is where one's tongue should be on the occasion of addressing the Joint Session of the Mind Association and the Aristotelian Society. (shrink)

Professor Körner's Experience and Conduct , like many other notable entities, is divided into three parts. Part I contains accounts of what Körner calls factual and constructive logic, some remarks on the logic of maxims and their consistency and adequacy, a chapter on probabilistic thinking, and another on preference theory. Part II contains chapters on the logic of action, on attitudes, upon the distinction between regulative and evaluative standards of conduct, on morality, justice, welfare, prudence, legality, and what Körner calls (...) ‘idealizations’. Part III, on the epistemology and metaphysics of practical thinking, contains chapters on rationality, evidence, moral pluralism and a final chapter on moral guidance. The amount of guidance one gets from this last chapter is, as one might expect, small. (shrink)

Jonathan Harrison; XII—A Philosopher's Nightmare or the Ghost Not Laid, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 67, Issue 1, 1 June 1967, Pages 179–188.

Published in 1999, this text offers a comprehensive treatment of the Philosophy of Religion. Its overall conclusions are that, though there is no reason to suppose there is a God, doing something that is not quite believing in god, who, as some mystics think - neither exists nor does not exist, may be valuable for some people.

The author discusses the third of the 3 books which make up Hume's 'A Treatise of Human Nature' - ' Of Morals'. 'Of Morals' is also divided into three parts, the second part of which is the subject of this book. In it Hume attempts to give an empiricist theory of justice.

As a result of thinking (pace Tarski, wrongly) that it is propositions, not sentences, that are true or false, it has been supposed (also wrongly) that propositions such as that ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white are necessarily true. But changing the rules for the use of the words in a sentence has no effect on the truth of the proposition, only on what proposition it formulates. Many similar statements, e.g., that ‘plus’ does not (...) mean plus, are only pragmatically contradictory: if this were true, it would be impossible to say so in these words. One should distinguish between sentences that express necessary truths, and sentences that necessarily express truths. It follows that many well known accounts of necessity are wrong, that the truth of an analytic proposition does not follow from the definitions of the words in the sentence that expresses it, that it is not helpful to define meaning in terms of truth, that truth is not relative to language, and that conventionalism is false. This paper is a move in the direction of establishing the eternity of truth. (shrink)

In this paper I shall consider the difficulty for Ethical Egoism, Act Utilitarianism and later what I shall call Cumulative Effect Utilitarianism, that they both commit the fallacy of pragmatic inconsistency. I shall distinguish various forms of the fallacy of pragmatic inconsistency; in particular I shall distinguish between the fallacy of direct and indirect pragmatic inconsistency, and shall argue that though both Ethical Egoism and Act Utilitarianism probably commit both, Cumulative Effect Utilitarianism does not.

The Catholic Church holds it better for the sun and moon to drop from heaven, for the earth to fail, and for all the many millions on it to die in extreme agony, as far as temporal affliction goes, than that one soul, I will not say, shall be lost, but should commit one single venial sin, should will one venial untruth, or should steal one poor farthing without excuse.

These essays cover a number of ethical and moral philosophical areas, including utilitarianism, ethical relativism, roles and rules, the relative interest of virtue vis a vis the weak and the strong, and imperativism.

A detailed consideration of a number of problems concerning the meaning of moral judgements and the justification of morality, and the usefulness and origin of the institution of morality.

The story of the preceding article continues….

Jonathan Harrison teases our minds with two short stories ….

Jonathan Harrison; III*—The Embodiment of Mind or What Use is Having a Body?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 74, Issue 1, 1 June 1974, Pages 35.

Jonathan Harrison; IX*—If I Know, I Cannot Be Wrong, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 79, Issue 1, 1 June 1979, Pages 137–150, https://doi.org/10.

Jonathan Harrison; IX—The Third Dimension, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 61, Issue 1, 1 June 1961, Pages 151–168, https://doi.org/10.1093/aris.

ADDRESS ETHICS WITHOUT PROPOSITIONS. By WINSTON H. F. BARNES 1 SYMPOSIUM : ARE ALL PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS, QUESTIONS OF LANGUAGE I. By STUART HAMPSHIRE 31 II. By AUSTIN DUNAN JONES 49 III. By S. KORNER 63 SYMPOSIUM : THE EMOTIVE THEORY OF ETHICS. f. By RICHARD ROBINSON 79 II. ByH. J. PATON 107 III. ByR.C. CROSS 127 SYMPOSIUM : WHAT CAN LOGIC DO FOR PHILOSOPHY I. By K. K. POPPER 141 II. By WILLIAM KNEALE 155 III. By PROFESSOR A. J. AYER (...) 167 SYMPOSIUM : THINGS AND PERSONS. I. By PROFESSOR D. M. MACKINNON 179 II. By PROFESSOR H. A. HODGES 190 III. BY J. WISDOM 202. (shrink)

There is hardly any view so paradoxical that some philosopher somewhere or other has not propounded it. That everything is air, fire, water; that the world contains nothing but atoms and the void; that nothing exists; that we know nothing; that the world is an idea in the mind of God; that matter does not exist; that the absolute does exist and that everything else is only appearance; that there is no past and no future; that what seems to be (...) reality is an illusion; that propositions about the world that we have neither been able to establish nor refute are neither true nor false; that truth is relative, and that all matter is just a hologram in a one-dimensional space, is just a selection from such paradoxical contentions. (shrink)