23 found
Order:
See also
  1. The Language of Thought and Natural Language Understanding.Jonathan Knowles - 1998 - Analysis 58 (4):264-272.
    Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis have recently argued that certain kinds of regress arguments against the language of thought (LOT) hypothesis as an account of how we understand natural languages have been answered incorrectly or inadequately by supporters of LOT ('Regress arguments against the language of thought', Analysis, 57 (1), 60-6, J 97). They argue further that this does not undermine the LOT hypothesis, since the main sources of support for LOT are (or might be) independent of it providing an (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  18
    Global Expressivism and the Flight From Metaphysics.Jonathan Knowles - forthcoming - Synthese:1-17.
    In recent work Huw Price has defended what he calls a global expressivist approach to understanding language and its relation to the physical world. Global expressivism rejects a representationalist picture of the language-world relation and thereby, by intention at least, also a certain metaphysical conception of what are commonly known as placement problems: how entities of the everyday, common sense world like mental states, meanings, moral values, modalities and so on fit into the natural world. Global expressivism upholds a commitment (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  50
    Knowledge of Grammar as a Propositional Attitude.Jonathan Knowles - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):325 – 353.
    Noam Chomsky claims that we know the grammatical principles of our languages in pretty much the same sense that we know ordinary things about the world (e.g. facts), a view about linguistic knowledge that I term ''cognitivism''. In much recent philosophy of linguistics (including that sympathetic to Chomsky's general approach to language), cognitivism has been rejected in favour of an account of grammatical competence as some or other form of mental mechanism, describable at various levels of abstraction (''non-cognitivism''). I argue (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  4. Pragmatism, Science and Naturalism.Jonathan Knowles & Henrik Rydenfelt (eds.) - 2011 - Peter Lang Publishing.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  5. What's Really Wrong with Laudan's Normative Naturalism.Jonathan Knowles - 2002 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 16 (2):171 – 186.
    The article presents a critical discussion of Larry Laudan's naturalistic metamethodological theory known as normative naturalism (NN). I examine the strongest extant objection to NN, and, with reference to ideas in Freedman ( Philosophy of Science , 66 (Proceedings), pp. S526-S537, 1999), show how NN survives it. I then go on to outline two problems that really do compromise NN. The first revolves around Laudan's conception of the relationship between scientific values and the history of science. Laudan argues we can (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6.  26
    Norms, Naturalism and Epistemology.Jonathan Knowles - 2003 - Palgrave.
    Jonathan Knowles argues against theories that seek to provide specific norms for the formation of belief on the basis of empirical sources: the project of naturalized epistemology. He argues that such norms are either not genuinely normative for belief, or are not required for optimal belief formation. An exhaustive classification of such theories is motivated and each variety is discussed in turn. He distinguishes naturalized epistemology from the less committal idea of naturalism, which provides a sense in which we can (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  7.  90
    Is Folk Psychology Different?Jonathan Knowles - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (2):199-230.
    In this paper, I seek to refute arguments for the idea that folk psychological explanation, i.e., the explanation of actions, beliefs and desires in terms of one another, should be understood as being of a different character than ordinary scientific explanations, a view defended most prominently in analytical philosophy by Donald Davidson and John McDowell. My strategy involves arguing both against the extant arguments for the idea that FP must be construed as giving such explanations, and also against the very (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  80
    Does Intentional Psychology Need Vindicating by Cognitive Science?Jonathan Knowles - 2001 - Minds and Machines 11 (3):347-377.
    I argue that intentional psychology does not stand in need of vindication by a lower-level implementation theory from cognitive science, in particular the representational theory of mind (RTM), as most famously Jerry Fodor has argued. The stance of the paper is novel in that I claim this holds even if one, in line with Fodor, views intentional psychology as an empirical theory, and its theoretical posits as as real as those of other sciences. I consider four metaphysical arguments for the (...)
    Direct download (18 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9.  18
    Scientific Metaphysics.Jonathan Knowles - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):210-211.
  10.  31
    Physicalism, Teleology and the Miraculous Coincidence Problem.Jonathan Knowles - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (195):164-81.
    I focus on Fodor’s model of the relationship between special sciences and basic physics, and on a criticism of this model, that it implies that the causal stability of, e.g., the mental in its production of behaviour is nothing short of a miraculous coincidence. David Papineau and Graham Macdonaldendorse this criticism. But it is far less clear than they assume that Fodor’s picture indeed involves coincidences, which in any case their injection of a teleological supplement cannot explain. Papineau’s and Macdonald’s (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  32
    Book Reviews - Tim Crane, the Mechanical Mind, 2nd Edition, London and New York: Routledge, 2003, XI + 259, $22.95, ISBN 0-415-29030-9 (Hardback), 0-415-29031-7 (Paperback). [REVIEW]Jonathan Knowles - 2005 - Minds and Machines 15 (2):259-264.
  12.  18
    Naturalised Epistemology Without Norms.Jonathan Knowles - 2002 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):283-297.
    I seek to show that we do not need norms in a genuinely naturalistic epistemology. The argumentation is launched against a common conception of such norms as derived through a process of wide reflective equilibrium, where one aims to bring general normative statements into accord with concrete, possibly expert, intuitions about particular cases, taking simultaneously into account relevant scientific findings -- including facts about human psychological abilities -- and philosophical theories. According to this line, it is possible thus to arrive (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  9
    What is Naturalism? Towards a Univocal Theory.Jonathan Knowles - 2008 - SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):28-57.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  8
    Scientific Metaphysics: Ross Don, James Ladyman & Harold Kincaid (Eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, Pp. X+ 243,£ 35 (Hardback). [REVIEW]Jonathan Knowles - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  3
    What is Naturalism? Towards a Univocal Theory.Jonathan Knowles - 2008 - SATS 9 (2).
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  4
    Mario De Caro and David Macarthur, Eds. , Naturalism and Normativity . Reviewed By.Jonathan Knowles - 2011 - Philosophy in Review 31 (1):11-15.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  1
    Non-Reductive Naturalism and the Vocabulary of Agency.Jonathan Knowles - 2013 - Contemporary Pragmatism 10 (2):155-172.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  1
    First Page Preview.Jonathan Knowles - 2006 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (1).
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Kant: Here, Now, and How.Siri Granum Carson, Jonathan Knowles & Bjørn K. Myskja (eds.) - 2011 - Mentis.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Mario De Caro and David Macarthur, Eds., Naturalism and Normativity. [REVIEW]Jonathan Knowles - 2011 - Philosophy in Review 31:11-15.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Physicalism, Teleology and the Miraculous Coincidence Problem.Jonathan Knowles - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (195):164-181.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Theory of Science: A Short Introduction.Jonathan Knowles - 2006 - Tapir Akademisk Forlag.
  23. Kant, Here, Now, and How: Essays in Honour of Truls Wyller.Truls Wyller, Siri Granum Carson, Jonathan Knowles & Bjørn K. Myskja (eds.) - 2011 - Mentis.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography