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Jonathan L. Kvanvig [126]Jonathan Lee Kvanvig [1]
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Jonathan L. Kvanvig
Washington University in St. Louis
  1. The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2003 - Cambridge University Press.
    Epistemology has for a long time focused on the concept of knowledge and tried to answer questions such as whether knowledge is possible and how much of it there is. Often missing from this inquiry, however, is a discussion on the value of knowledge. In The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology properly conceived cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge. He also questions one of the most fundamental assumptions in epistemology, (...)
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  2. Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2009 - In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 140--160.
  3.  1
    1. Divine Conservation and the Persistence of the World.Jonathan L. Kvanvig & Hugh J. McCann - 2019 - In Thomas V. Morris (ed.), Divine and Human Action: Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism. Cornell University Press. pp. 13-49.
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  4.  91
    Affective Theism and People of Faith.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2013 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 37 (1):109-128.
  5.  29
    Rationality and Reflection: How to Think About What to Think.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig presents a new account of rationality, Perspectivalism, which both avoids elevating rationality so that only the most reflective of us are capable of rational beliefs, and avoids reducing it to the level of beasts. He defends optionality about what it is reasonable to think, and provides a framework for rational disagreement.
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  6. Truth is Not the Primary Epistemic Goal.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2005 - In Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Malden, Ma: Blackwell. pp. 285-295.
     
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  7. The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind: On the Place of the Virtues in Contemporary Epistemology.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1992 - Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.
     
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  8.  59
    Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):970-973.
  9.  63
    Can Skeptics Earn Their Keep?Jonathan L. Kvanvig - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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  10.  39
    Destiny and Deliberation: Essays in Philosophical Theology.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2011 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Jonathan Kvanvig presents a compelling new work in philosophical theology on the universe, creation, and the afterlife. Organised thematically by the endpoints of time, the volume begins by addressing eschatological matters and the doctrines of heaven and hell and ends with an account of divine deliberation and creation. Kvanvig develops a coherent theistic outlook which reconciles a traditional, high conception of deity, with full providential control over all aspects of creation, with a conception of human beings who are free and (...)
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  11. Why Should Inquiring Minds Want to Know?: "Meno" Problems and Epistemological Axiology.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1998 - The Monist 81 (3):426-451.
    National Enquirer commercials tell us that some people want to know. I have no idea what such a desire has to do with reading tabloid journalism, but the avowal of wanting to know interests me. Maybe this desire is shared by all; at the very least, curiosity is universal. Curiosity may amount to a desire for knowledge, or perhaps it might be explained in other terms, such as a desire for understanding or for finding the truth. Perhaps none of these, (...)
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  12. Faith and Humility.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
    This book is devoted to articulating the connections between the nature and value of faith and humility. The goal is to understand these two virtues in a way that does not discriminate between religious and secular. Jon Kvanvig claims that each provides a necessary, compensating balance to the potential downside of the other.
     
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  13. Swain on the basing relation.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1985 - Analysis 45 (3):153.
    Suppose we want to know whether a person justifiably believes a certain claim. Further, suppose that our interest in this question is because we take such justification to be necessary for knowledge. To justifiably believe a claim requires more than there being a justification for that claim. Presumably, there is a justification for accepting all sorts of scientific theories of which I have no awareness; because of my lack of awareness, I do not justifiably believe those theories. Further, even if (...)
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  14. Contextualism, Contrastivism, Relevant Alternatives, and Closure.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (2):131-140.
    Contextualists claim two important virtues for their view. First, contextualism is a non-skeptical epistemology, given the plausible idea that not all contexts invoke the high standards for knowledge needed to generate the skeptical conclusion that we know little or nothing. Second, contextualism is able to preserve closure concerning knowledge – the idea that knowledge is extendable on the basis of competent deduction from known premises. As long as one keeps the context fixed, it is plausible to think that some closure (...)
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  15. Closure Principles.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (3):256–267.
    A dispute in epistemology has arisen over whether some class of things epistemic (things known or justified, for example) is closed under some operation involving the notion of what follows deductively from members of this class. Very few philosophers these days believe that if you know that p, and p entails q, then you know that q. But many philosophers think that something weaker holds, for instance that if you know that p, and p entails q, then you are in (...)
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  16. Virtue Epistemology.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2010 - In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 199--207.
     
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  17. ``Curiosity and a Response-Dependent Account of the Value of Understanding&Quot.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2012 - In Timothy Henning & David Schweikard (eds.), Epistemic Virtues.
     
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  18. ``Norms of Assertion&Quot.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2010 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappellan (eds.), Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  19. Lewis on Finkish Dispositions.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1999 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):703-710.
    Finkish dispositions, those dispositions that are lost when their conditions of realization occur, pose deep problems for counterfactual accounts of dispositions. David Lewis has argued that the counterfactual approach can be rescued, offering such an account that purports to handle finkish as well as other dispositions. The paper argues that Lewis's account fails to account for several kinds of dispositions, one of which involves failure to distinguish parallel processes from unitary processes.
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  20. Tennant on Knowability.Michael Hand & Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4):422 – 428.
    The knowability paradox threatens metaphysical or semantical antirealism, the view that truth is epistemic, by revealing an awful consequence of the claim [i] that all truths are knowable. Various attempts have been made to find a way out of the paradox.
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  21. The Basic Notion of Justification.Jonathan L. Kvanvig & Christopher Menzel - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 59 (3):235-261.
    Epistemologists often offer theories of justification without paying much attention to the variety and diversity of locutions in which the notion of justification appears. For example, consider the following claims which contain some notion of justification: B is a justified belief, S's belief that p is justified, p is justified for S, S is justified in believing that p, S justifiably believes that p, S's believing p is justified, there is justification for S to believe that p, there is justification (...)
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  22.  60
    Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge.Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.) - 1996 - Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.
    Alvin Plantinga responds to the essays in a concluding chapter.
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  23.  21
    The Possibility of an All-Knowing God.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1986 - London: Macmillan Press.
  24.  75
    Nozickian Epistemology and the Value of Knowledge.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):201–218.
  25.  47
    Against Pragmatic Encroachment.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (1):77-85.
    Anti-intellectualist theories of knowledge claim that in some way or other, practical stakes are involved in whether knowledge is present. Interest in pragmatic encroachment arose with the development of contextualist theories concerning knowledge ascriptions. In these cases, there is an initial situation in which hardly anything is at stake, and knowledge is easily ascribed. The subsequent situation is one where the costs of being wrong are fairly significant from a practical point of view, and the claim made by pragmatic encroachers (...)
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  26.  61
    Justification and Proper Basing.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2003 - In Erik Olsson (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Dordrecht: Kluwer Publishing Co.. pp. 43-62.
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  27. Perspectivalism and Reflective Assent.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2013 - In David Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 223-242.
     
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  28.  94
    Can a Coherence Theory Appeal to Appearance States?Jonathan L. Kvanvig & Wayne D. Riggs - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 67 (3):197-217.
    Coherence theorists have universally defined justification as a relation only among (the contents of) belief states, in contradistinction to other theories, such as some versions of founda­tionalism, which define justification as a relation on belief states and appearance states.
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  29. II—Jonathan L. Kvanvig: Millar on the Value of Knowledge.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):83-99.
    Alan Millar's paper (2011) involves two parts, which I address in order, first taking up the issues concerning the goal of inquiry, and then the issues surrounding the appeal to reflective knowledge. I argue that the upshot of the considerations Millar raises count in favour of a more important role in value-driven epistemology for the notion of understanding and for the notion of epistemic justification, rather than for the notions of knowledge and reflective knowledge.
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  30.  28
    Anselmian Adversities.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - forthcoming - Religious Studies:1-15.
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  31.  4
    Ii—Millar On The Value Of Knowledge.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):83-99.
    Alan Millar's paper involves two parts, which I address in order, first taking up the issues concerning the goal of inquiry, and then the issues surrounding the appeal to reflective knowledge. I argue that the upshot of the considerations Millar raises count in favour of a more important role in value-driven epistemology for the notion of understanding and for the notion of epistemic justification, rather than for the notions of knowledge and reflective knowledge.
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  32. Coherentists' Distractions.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1995 - Philosophical Topics 23 (1):257-274.
    The heart of coherentism is found in two aspects, one negative and one positive. On the negative side, coherentism is a contrary of foundationalism, the view that the epistemic status of our beliefs ultimately traces to, or derives from, basic beliefs.
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  33. Contrastivism and Closure.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):247 – 256.
    This paper argues for a solution to a problem that contrastivism faces. The problem is that contrastivism cannot preserve closure, in spite of claims to the contrary by its defenders. The problem is explained and a response developed.
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  34. A Critique of Van Fraassen's Voluntaristic Epistemology.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1994 - Synthese 98 (2):325-348.
    Van Fraassen's epistemology is forged from two commitments, one to a type of Bayesianism and the other to what he terms voluntarism. Van Fraassen holds that if one is going to follow a rule in belief-revision, it must be a Bayesian rule, but that one does not need to follow a rule in order to be rational. It is argued that van Fraassen's arguments for rejecting non-Bayesian rules is unsound, and that his voluntarism is subject to a fatal dilemma arising (...)
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  35. Conservatism and its Virtues.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1989 - Synthese 79 (1):143 - 163.
  36.  58
    The Occasionalist Proselytizer: A Modified Catechism.Hugh J. McCann & Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1991 - Philosophical Perspectives 5:587-615.
  37. Religious Pluralism and the Buridan's Ass Paradox.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2009 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1 (1):1-26.
    The paradox of ’Buridan’s ass’ involves an animal facing two equally adequate and attractive alternatives, such as would happen were a hungry ass to confront two bales of hay that are equal in all respects relevant to the ass’s hunger. Of course, the ass will eat from one rather than the other, because the alternative is to starve. But why does this eating happen? What reason is operative, and what explanation can be given as to why the ass eats from, (...)
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  38.  54
    Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge, by Jessica Brown.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1395-1402.
    Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge, by BrownJessica. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. xii + 197.
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  39. The Problem of Hell.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1993 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 37 (2):118-120.
     
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  40. Subjective Justification.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1984 - Mind 93 (369):71-84.
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  41. ``Closure and Alternative Possibilities&Quot.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 456-484.
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    Intellectual Humility: Lessons From the Preface Paradox.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (3):509-532.
    One response to the preface paradox—the paradox that arises when each claim in a book is justified for the author and yet in the preface the author avers that errors remain—counsels against the preface belief. It is this line of thought that poses a problem for any view that places a high value on intellectual humility. If we become suspicious of preface beliefs, it will be a challenge to explain how expressions of fallibility and intellectual humility are appropriate, whether voiced (...)
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  43.  6
    The Possibility of an All-Knowing God.William Hasker & Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (1):125.
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  44.  26
    Sosa's Virtue Epistemology.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2010 - Critica 42 (125):47-62.
    Ernest Sosa's latest epistemology remains a version of virtue epistemology, and I argue here that it faces two central problems, pressing a point I have made elsewhere, that virtue epistemology does not present a complete answer to the problem of the value of knowledge. I will press this point regarding the nature of knowledge through variations on two standard Gettier examples here. The first is the Fake Barn case and the second is the Tom Grabit case. I will argue that (...)
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  45. ``Divine Conservation and the Persistence of the World&Quot.Jonathan L. Kvanvig & Hugh J. McCann - 1988 - In Thomas V. Morris (ed.), Divine and Human Action: Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp. 13-49.
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    On Behalf of Maverick Molinism.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2002 - Faith and Philosophy 19 (3):348-357.
    In clarifying and defending Molinism, Thomas Flint argues against a position he terms Maverick Molinism. This version of Molinism maintains that, though counterfactuals of freedom have their truth-value logically prior to God’s acts of will, God could have so acted that these counterfactuals would have had a different truth value from that which they actually have. Flint believes this position is flawed, and presents an argument for rejecting it. I argue that Flint’s argument against Maverick Molinism is flawed, and suggest (...)
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  47. ``A Critical Notice of Alston's P Erceiving God &Quot.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1994 - Faith and Philosophy 11:311-321.
  48.  31
    Omniscience and Eternity: A Reply to Craig.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2001 - Faith and Philosophy 18 (3):369-376.
  49. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume.Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.) - 2011 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board, it publishes exemplary papers in any area of philosophy of religion.
     
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  50.  55
    Reply to Simion.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):113-116.
    Mona Simion questions whether there is a distinction between taking back an assertion and taking back only the content of an assertion, as I have claimed. After arguing against the distinction in question, Simion grants that there is a difference between the cases that I use to illustrate the distinction, and thus turns to the task of explaining the difference in a way that keeps it from undermining the knowledge norm. The explanation she offers is in terms of a distinction (...)
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