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Jonathan Matheson [33]Jonathan D. Matheson [4]
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Jonathan Matheson
University of North Florida
Jonathan Matheson
University of Rochester
  1. Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence.Jonathan Matheson - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):269-279.
    Conciliatory views of disagreement maintain that discovering a particular type of disagreement requires that one make doxastic conciliation. In this paper I give a more formal characterization of such a view. After explaining and motivating this view as the correct view regarding the epistemic significance of disagreement, I proceed to defend it from several objections concerning higher-order evidence made by Thomas Kelly.
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  2. Bergmann’s Dilemma: Exit Strategies for Internalists.Jason Rogers & Jonathan Matheson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (1):55-80.
    Michael Bergmann claims that all versions of epistemic internalism face an irresolvable dilemma. We show that there are many plausible versions of internalism that falsify this claim. First, we demonstrate that there are versions of ‘‘weak awareness internalism’’ that, contra Bergmann, do not succumb to the ‘‘Subject’s Perspective Objection’’ horn of the dilemma. Second, we show that there are versions of ‘‘strong awareness internalism’’ that do not fall prey to the dilemma’s ‘‘vicious regress’’ horn. We note along the way that (...)
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  3. Moral Experts, Deference & Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson, Nathan Nobis & Scott McElreath - forthcoming - In Moral Expertise: New Essays from Theoretical and Clinical Perspectives. Springer.
    We sometimes seek expert guidance when we don’t know what to think or do about a problem. In challenging cases concerning medical ethics, we may seek a clinical ethics consultation for guidance. The assumption is that the bioethicist, as an expert on ethical issues, has knowledge and skills that can help us better think about the problem and improve our understanding of what to do regarding the issue. The widespread practice of ethics consultations raises these questions and more: -/- • (...)
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  4.  6
    Deep Disagreements and Rational Resolution.Jonathan Matheson - forthcoming - Topoi:1-13.
    The purpose of this paper is to bring together work on disagreement in both epistemology and argumentation theory in a way that will advance the relevant debates. While these literatures can intersect in many ways, I will explore how some of views pertaining to deep disagreements in argumentation theory can act as an objection to a prominent view of the epistemology of disagreement—the Equal Weight View. To do so, I will explain the Equal Weight View of peer disagreement and show (...)
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  5. Disagreement and Epistemic Peers.Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - Oxford Handbooks Online.
    An introduction to the debate of the epistemic significance of peer disagreement. This article examines the epistemic significance of peer disagreement. It pursues the following questions: (1) How does discovering that an epistemic equal disagrees with you affect your epistemic justification for holding that belief? (e.g., does the evidence of it give you a defeater for you belief?) and (2) Can you rationally maintain your belief in the face of such disagreement? This article explains and motivates each of the central (...)
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  6. How Skeptical is the Equal Weight View?Jonathan Matheson & Brandon Carey - 2013 - In Diego Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism. Routledge. pp. 131-149.
    Much of the literature on the epistemology of disagreement focuses on the rational responses to disagreement, and to disagreement with an epistemic peer in particular. The Equal Weight View claims that in cases of peer disagreement each dissenting peer opinion is to be given equal weight and, in a case of two opposing equally-weighted opinions, each party should adopt the attitude which ‘splits the difference’. The Equal Weight View has been taken by both its critics and its proponents to have (...)
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  7.  14
    Gritty Faith.Jonathan Matheson - 2018 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):499-513.
    In this paper, I will connect some of the philosophical research on non-doxastic accounts of faith to some psychological research on grit. In doing so I hope to advance the debate on both the nature and value of faith by connecting some philosophical insights with some empirical grounding. In particular, I will use Duckworth’s research to show that seeing faith as grit both captures the philosophical motivations for non-doxastic accounts of faith and comes with empirical backing that such faith is (...)
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  8.  10
    REVIEW: The Limitations of the Open Mind. [REVIEW]Jonathan Matheson - 2018 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  9.  66
    Conscientiousness and Other Problems: A Reply to Zagzebski.Jonathan Matheson, Jensen Alex, Valerie Joly Chock & Kyle Mallard - 2018 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7 (1):10-13.
  10. The Case for Rational Uniqueness.Jonathan Matheson - 2011 - Logic and Episteme 2 (3):359-373.
    The Uniqueness Thesis, or rational uniqueness, claims that a body of evidence severely constrains one’s doxastic options. In particular, it claims that for any body of evidence E and proposition P, E justifies at most one doxastic attitude toward P. In this paper I defend this formulation of the uniqueness thesis and examine the case for its truth. I begin by clarifying my formulation of the Uniqueness Thesis and examining its close relationship to evidentialism. I proceed to give some motivation (...)
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  11.  7
    The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - Palgrave Macmillan.
    Discovering someone disagrees with you is a common occurrence. The question of epistemic significance of disagreement concerns how discovering that another disagrees with you affects the rationality of your beliefs on that topic. This book examines the answers that have been proposed to this question, and presents and defends its own answer.
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  12.  50
    Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson & Bryan Frances - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This article examines the central epistemological issues tied to the recognition of disagreement.
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  13.  38
    Moral Caution and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson - 2016 - Journal of Social Philosophy 47 (2):120-141.
    In this article, I propose, defend, and apply a principle for applied ethics. According to this principle, we should exercise moral caution, at least when we can. More formally, the principle claims that if you should believe or suspend judgment that doing an action is a serious moral wrong, while knowing that not doing that action is not morally wrong, then you should not do that action. After motivating this principle, I argue that it has significant application in applied ethics. (...)
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  14. Disagreement and the Ethics of Belief.Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - In James Collier (ed.), The Future of Social Epistemology: A Collective Vision. pp. 139-148.
    In this paper, I explain a challenge to the Equal Weight View coming from the psychology of group inquiry, and evaluate its merits. I argue that while the evidence from the psychology of group inquiry does not give us a reason to reject the Equal Weight View, it does require making some clarifications regarding what the view does and does not entail, as well as a revisiting the ethics of belief.
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  15.  74
    Are Conciliatory Views of Disagreement Self-Defeating?Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - Social Epistemology 29 (2):145-159.
    Conciliatory views of disagreement are an intuitive class of views on the epistemic significance of disagreement. Such views claim that making conciliation is often required upon discovering that another disagrees with you. One of the chief objections to these views of the epistemic significance of disagreement is that they are self-defeating. Since, there are disagreements about the epistemic significance of disagreement, such views can be turned on themselves, and this has been thought to be problematic. In this paper, I examine (...)
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  16.  76
    Is There a Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem?Jonathan D. Matheson - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):459-468.
    The generality problem is perhaps the most notorious problem for process reliabilism. Several recent responses to the generality problem have claimed that the problem has been unfairly leveled against reliabilists. In particular, these responses have claimed that the generality problem is either (i) just as much of a problem for evidentialists, or (ii) if it is not, then a parallel solution is available to reliabilists. Along these lines, Juan Comesaña has recently proposed solution to the generality problem—well-founded reliabilism. According to (...)
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  17.  14
    The Impossibility of Mere Animal Knowledge for Reflective Subjects.Sanford Goldberg & Jonathan Matheson - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-12.
    In this paper we give reasons to think that reflective epistemic subjects cannot possess mere animal knowledge. To do so we bring together literature on defeat and higher-order evidence with literature on the distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. We then defend our argument from a series of possible objections.
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  18. Skeptical Theism and Phenomenal Conservatism.Jonathan Matheson - 2014 - In Trent Dougherty Justin McBrayer (ed.), Skeptical Theism: New Essays. pp. 3-20.
    Recently there has been a good deal of interest in the relationship between common sense epistemology and Skeptical Theism. Much of the debate has focused on Phenomenal Conservatism and any tension that there might be between it and Skeptical Theism. In this paper I further defend the claim that there is no tension between Phenomenal Conservatism and Skeptical Theism. I show the compatibility of these two views by coupling them with an account of defeat – one that is friendly to (...)
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  19. Disagreement: Idealized and Everyday.Jonathan Matheson - 2014 - In Jonathan Matheson Rico Vitz (ed.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. Oxford University Press. pp. 315-330.
    While puzzles concerning the epistemic significance of disagreement are typically motivated by looking at the widespread and persistent disagreements we are aware of, almost all of the literature on the epistemic significance of disagreement has focused on cases idealized peer disagreement. This fact might itself be puzzling since it doesn’t seem that we ever encounter disagreements that meet the relevant idealized conditions. In this paper I hope to somewhat rectify this matter. I begin by closely examining what an idealized case (...)
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  20.  5
    Knowledge and Entailment. [REVIEW]Jonathan Matheson & Valerie Joly Chock - 2018 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7 (10):55-58.
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  21. Epistemic Relativism.Jonathan Matheson - 2012 - In Andrew Cullison (ed.), Continuum Companion to Epistemology. Continuum. pp. 161-179.
    In this paper I examine the case for epistemic relativism focusing on an argument for epistemic relativism formulated (though not endorsed) by Paul Boghossian. Before examining Boghossian’s argument, however, I first examine some preliminary considerations for and against epistemic relativism.
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  22.  69
    The Epistemology of Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - Palgrave.
    Discovering someone disagrees with you is a common occurrence. The question of epistemic significance of disagreement concerns how discovering that another disagrees with you affects the rationality of your beliefs on that topic. This book examines the answers that have been proposed to this question, and presents and defends its own answer.
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  23.  42
    A Review of Linda Zagzebski's Epistemic Authority. [REVIEW]Jonathan Matheson, Valerie Joly Chock, Jensen Alex & Kyle Mallard - 2017 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 6 (10):56-59.
  24. Epistemic Norms and Self Defeat: A Reply to Littlejohn.Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4 (2):26-32.
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  25. A Puzzle About Disagreement and Rationality.Jonathan Matheson - 2014 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3 (4):1-3.
    According to Conciliationism, rationality calls for a removal of dissenting opinions – in the end, the disagreement should lead to skepticism toward the disputed proposition for all the involved parties. However, psychological data regarding group inquiry indicates that groups with dissenting members are more successful in their inquiry with respect to the disputed propositions. So, according to the psychological data, rationality calls for preserving dissent – disagreement should be embraced as a great tool for getting at true beliefs. In this (...)
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  26.  70
    Taking Issue: A Review of Bryan Frances' Disagreement. [REVIEW]Jonathan Matheson & Katelyn Hallman - 2016 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 5 (1):7-9.
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  27. Review: The Norm of Belief. [REVIEW]Jonathan Matheson - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (263).
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  28.  51
    Epistemological Considerations Concerning Skeptical Theism.Jonathan D. Matheson - 2011 - Faith and Philosophy 28 (3):323-331.
    Recently Trent Dougherty has claimed that there is a tension between skeptical theism and common sense epistemology—that the more plausible one of these views is, the less plausible the other is. In this paper I explain Dougherty’s argument and develop an account of defeaters which removes the alleged tension between skeptical theism and common sense epistemology.
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  29. Review: The Nature of Normativity. [REVIEW]Jonathan Matheson - 2012 - Metapsychology 16 (48).
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  30.  24
    Henderson, David and Terence Horgan. The Epistemological Spectrum.Jonathan Matheson - 2012 - Review of Metaphysics 65 (4):875-877.
  31.  6
    Epistemological Considerations Concerning Skeptical Theism: A Response To Dougherty.Jonathan D. Matheson - 2011 - Faith and Philosophy 28 (3):323-331.
    Recently Trent Dougherty has claimed that there is a tension between skeptical theism and common sense epistemology—that the more plausible one of these views is, the less plausible the other is. In this paper I explain Dougherty’s argument and develop an account of defeaters which removes the alleged tension between skeptical theism and common sense epistemology.
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  32.  13
    Understanding Knowledge. [REVIEW]Jonathan Matheson - 2013 - Metascience 22 (2):471-474.
    Book review of Knowledge by Evans and Smith.
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  33. Dealing with Disagreement: Uniqueness and Conciliation.Jonathan D. Matheson - 2010 - Dissertation, Proquest
  34. Review: Hard Luck. [REVIEW]Jonathan Matheson - 2014 - Metapsychology 18 (30).
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  35. Review: Knowledge. [REVIEW]Jonathan Matheson - 2013 - Metascience 22 (2):471-474.
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  36. Review: The Epistemological Spectrum. [REVIEW]Jonathan Matheson - 2012 - Review of Metaphysics 65 (4):875-877.
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  37.  45
    The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social.Rico Vitz & Jonathan Matheson (eds.) - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    How do people form beliefs, and how should they do so? This book presents seventeen new essays on these questions, drawing together perspectives from philosophy and psychology. The first section explores the ethics of belief from an individualistic framework. It begins by examining the question of doxastic voluntarism-i.e., the extent to which people have control over their beliefs. It then shifts to focusing on the kinds of character that epistemic agents should cultivate, what their epistemic ends ought to be, and (...)
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