Results for 'Jonathan Maxwell Vogel'

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  1.  39
    Reliabilism Leveled.Jonathan Vogel - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):602.
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  2. Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry.Jonathan Vogel - 2004 - Mind 113 (451):552-555.
  3.  12
    Judgement and Justification.Jonathan Vogel - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):233-236.
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  4. Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation.Jonathan Vogel - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (11):658-666.
  5.  26
    Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology.Jonathan Vogel & Susan Haack - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (4):621.
    For some time, it seemed that one had to choose between two sharply different theories of epistemic justification, foundationalism and coherentism. Foundationalists typically held that some beliefs were certain, and, hence, basic. Basic beliefs could impart justification to other, non-basic beliefs, but needed no such support themselves. Coherentists denied that there are any basic beliefs; on their view, all justified beliefs require support from other beliefs. The divide between foundationalism and coherentism has narrowed lately, and Susan Haack attempts to synthesize (...)
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  6. Reliabilism Leveled.Jonathan Vogel - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):602-623.
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  7.  98
    Inference to the Best Explanation.Jonathan Vogel - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (3):419.
  8. Are There Counterexamples to the Closure Principle.Jonathan Vogel - 1990 - In Michael David Roth & Glenn Ross (eds.), Doubting: Contemporary Perspetcives on Scepticism. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 13-29.
  9. Epistemic Bootstrapping.Jonathan Vogel - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):518-539.
  10.  43
    Empirical Knowledge.Jonathan Vogel - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):428-430.
    This remarkably clear and comprehensive account of empirical knowledge will be valuable to all students of epistemology and philosophy. The author begins from an explanationist analysis of knowing—a belief counts as knowledge if, and only if, its truth enters into the best explanation for its being held. Defending common sense and scientific realism within the explanationist framework, Alan Goldman provides a new foundational approach to justification. The view that emerges is broadly empiricist, counteracting the recently dominant trend that rejects that (...)
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  11. The New Relevant Alternatives Theory.Jonathan Vogel - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:155-180.
  12. Cartesian Skepticism and the Inference to the Best Explanation.Jonathan Vogel - 1998 - In Alcoff Linda (ed.), Epistemology: The Big Questions. Blackwell. pp. 352--9.
     
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  13. Tracking, Closure, and Inductive Knowledge.Jonathan Vogel - 1987 - In Luper-Foy Steven (ed.), The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 197--215.
     
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  14. The Refutation of Skepticism.Jonathan Vogel - 2005 - In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 72--84.
  15. Subjunctivitis.Jonathan Vogel - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):73 - 88.
    Subjunctivitis is the doctrine that what is distinctive about knowledge is essential modal in character, and thus is captured by certain subjunctive conditionals. One principal formulation of subjunctivism invokes a ``sensitivity condition'' (Nozick, De Rose), the other invokes a ``safety condition'' (Sosa). It is shown in detail how defects in the sensitivity condition generate unwanted results, and that the virtues of that condition are merely apparent. The safety condition is untenable also, because it is too easily satisfied. A powerful motivation (...)
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  16. Skeptical Arguments.Jonathan Vogel - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):426–455.
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  17.  21
    The New Relevant Alternatives TheorY.Jonathan Vogel - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):155-180.
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  18. Internalist Responses to Skepticism.Jonathan Vogel - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
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  19. Luminosity and Indiscriminability.Jonathan Vogel - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):547-572.
  20. Dismissing Skeptical Possibilities.Jonathan Vogel - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 70 (3):235 - 250.
  21.  41
    Space, Structuralism, and Skepticism.Jonathan Vogel - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.
    The chapter takes structuralism to be the thesis that if F and G are alike causally, then F and G are the same property. It follows that our beliefs about the world can be true in various brain-in-a-vat scenarios, giving us refuge from skeptical arguments. The trouble is that structuralism doesn’t do justice to certain metaphysical aspects of property identity having to do with fundamentality, intrinsicality, and the unity of the world. A closely related point is that the relation…lies-at-some-spatial-distance-from…obeys necessary (...)
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  22.  50
    Sklar on Methodological Conservatism.Jonathan Vogel - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):125-131.
  23. The Problem of Self-Knowledge in Kant’s “Refutation of Idealism”: Two Recent Views.Jonathan Vogel - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):875-887.
  24. Accident, Evidence, and Knowledge.Jonathan Vogel - 2017 - In Peter Klein, Rodrigo Borges & Claudio Almeida (eds.), explaining knowledge: new essays on the Gettier problem. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 117-133.
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  25. Externalism Resisted.Jonathan Vogel - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):729-742.
  26.  61
    Skepticism and Foundationalism: A Reply to Michael Williams.Jonathan Vogel - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Research 22:11-28.
    Michael WiIliams maintains that skepticism about the extemal worId is vitiated by a commitment to foundationalism and epistemological realism. (The latter is, approximately, the view that there is such a thing as knowledge of the extemal world in general, which the skeptic can take as a target). I argue that skepticism is not encumbered in the ways Williams supposes. What matters, first of all, is that we can’t perceive the difference between being in an ordinary environment and being in the (...)
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  27.  26
    Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction In Epistemology.Jonathan Vogel - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (4):621-623.
    For some time, it seemed that one had to choose between two sharply different theories of epistemic justification, foundationalism and coherentism. Foundationalists typically held that some beliefs were certain, and, hence, basic. Basic beliefs could impart justification to other, non-basic beliefs, but needed no such support themselves. Coherentists denied that there are any basic beliefs; on their view, all justified beliefs require support from other beliefs. The divide between foundationalism and coherentism has narrowed lately, and Susan Haack attempts to synthesize (...)
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  28.  24
    Skepticism and Foundationalism: A Reply to Michael Williams.Jonathan Vogel - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Research 22:11-28.
    Michael WiIliams maintains that skepticism about the extemal worId is vitiated by a commitment to foundationalism and epistemological realism.. I argue that skepticism is not encumbered in the ways Williams supposes. What matters, first of all, is that we can’t perceive the difference between being in an ordinary environment and being in the sort of situation the skeptic describes. This point can be upheld without embracing any substantial foundationalist tenet, such as the existence of basic beliefs, the availabiIity of something (...)
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  29. BonJour on Explanation and Skepticism.Jonathan Vogel - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4):413-421.
    Laurence BonJour, among others, has argued that inference to the best explanation allows us to reject skeptical hypotheses in favor of our common-sense view of the world. BonJour considers several skeptical hypotheses, specifically: our experiences arise by mere chance, uncaused; the simple hypothesis which states merely that our experiences are caused unveridically; and an elaborated hypothesis which explains in detail how our unveridical experiences are brought about. A central issue is whether the coherence of one’s experience makes that experience more (...)
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  30.  99
    Speaking of Knowledge.Jonathan Vogel - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):501–509.
  31. Causation and Subjectivity.Jonathan Vogel - 1999 - In Robert Stern (ed.), Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  32.  25
    Judgement and Justification.Jonathan Vogel - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):233-236.
  33.  20
    Review: Externalism Resisted. [REVIEW]Jonathan Vogel - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):729 - 742.
  34. Barbara H. Basden, David R. Basden, and Matthew J. Wright. Part-List Reexposure and Release Of.J. P. Maxwell, R. S. W. Masters, F. F. Eves, R. P. Behrendt, Jonathan M. Smallwood, Simona F. Baracaia, Michelle Lowe & Marc Obonsawin - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12:320.
  35.  10
    The Problem of Self-Knowledge in Kant’s “Refutation of Idealism”: Two Recent Views.Jonathan Vogel - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):875-887.
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  36.  35
    Taking a Conscious Look at the Body Schema.Jonathan P. Maxwell, Richard S. W. Masters & John van der Kamp - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (2):216-217.
    Dijkerman & de Haan (D&dH) propose a somatosensory perceptual pathway that informs a consciously accessible body image, and an action pathway that provides information to a body schema, which is not consciously accessible. We argue that the body schema may become accessible to consciousness in some circumstances, possibly resulting from cross talk, but that this may be detrimental to skilled movement production.
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  37.  64
    The Exorcist's Nightmare: A Reply to Crispin Wright.Thomas Tymoczko & Jonathan Vogel - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):543-552.
    Crispin Wright tried to refute classical 'Cartesian' skepticism contending that its core argument is extendible to a reductio ad absurdum (_Mind, 100, 87-116, 1991). We show both that Wright is mistaken and that his mistakes are philosophically illuminating. Wright's 'best version' of skepticism turns on a concept of warranted belief. By his definition, many of our well-founded beliefs about the external world and mathematics would not be warranted. Wright's position worsens if we take 'warranted belief' to be implicitly defined by (...)
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  38. They Saw It Coming: Rising Trends in Depression, Anxiety, and Suicidality in Creative Students and Potential Impact of the COVID-19 Crisis.Barbara A. Kerr, Maxwell Birdnow, Jonathan Daniel Wright & Sara Fiene - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 12.
    Previous research has established that creative adolescents are generally low in neuroticism and as well-adjusted as their peers. From 2006 to 2013, data from cohorts of creative adolescents attending a counseling laboratory supported these results. Clinical findings of increased anxiety, depression, and suicidality among creative students in 2014 led the researchers to create 3 studies to explore these clinical findings. Once artifactual causes of these changes were ruled out, a quantitative study was conducted. Study 1, an analysis of mean differences (...)
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  39.  37
    Cognitive Demands of Error Processing Associated with Preparation and Execution of a Motor Skill.Wing Kai Lam, Richard S. W. Masters & Jonathan P. Maxwell - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):1058-1061.
    Maxwell et al. [Maxwell, J. P., Masters, R. S. W., Kerr, E., & Weedon, E. . The implicit benefit of learning without errors. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 54A, 1049–1068. The implicit benefit of learning without errors. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 54A, 1049–1068] suggested that, following unsuccessful movements, the learner forms hypotheses about the probable causes of the error and the required movement adjustments necessary for its elimination. Hypothesis testing is an explicit process that places (...)
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  40.  23
    Attention and Time Constraints in Perceptual-Motor Learning and Performance: Instruction, Analogy, and Skill Level.Johan M. Koedijker, Jamie M. Poolton, Jonathan P. Maxwell, Raôul R. D. Oudejans, Peter J. Beek & Rich S. W. Masters - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2):245-256.
    We sought to gain more insight into the effects of attention focus and time constraints on skill learning and performance in novices and experts by means of two complementary experiments using a table tennis paradigm. Experiment 1 showed that skill-focus conditions and slowed ball frequency disrupted the accuracy of experts, but dual-task conditions and speeded ball frequency did not. For novices, only speeded ball frequency disrupted accuracy. In Experiment 2, we extended these findings by instructing novices either explicitly or by (...)
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  41. On Maxwell Suffis’s “From the Ground Up: Explaining Category Differences in Ontological Pluralism”.Klaus Ladstaetter - 2014 - Southwest Philosophy Review 30 (2):17-24.
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  42. Tell Me You Love Me: Bootstrapping, Externalism, and No-Lose Epistemology.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (1):119-134.
    Recent discussion of Vogel-style “bootstrapping” scenarios suggests that they provide counterexamples to a wide variety of epistemological theories. Yet it remains unclear why it’s bad for a theory to permit bootstrapping, or even exactly what counts as a bootstrapping case. Going back to Vogel's original bootstrapping example, I note that an agent who could gain justification through the method Vogel describes would have available a “no-lose investigation”: an investigation that can justify a proposition but has no possibility (...)
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  43. Skepticism and Spatial Objects.Ali Hasan - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (2):73-95.
    I defend external world realism. I assume that the principle of inference to the best explanation is justified: roughly, a hypothesis that provides a better explanation of the total evidence is more probable than one that does not. I argue that the existence of a world of spatial objects provides a systematic explanation of the spatial contents of visual experience, and that it provides a better explanation than traditional skeptical hypotheses. This paper thus pursues the explanationist strategy of Laurence BonJour (...)
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  44.  66
    Skepticism and Elegance.Kevin McCain - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (1):30-43.
    _ Source: _Page Count 14 Jonathan Vogel has argued in support of an explanationist response to skepticism in several works. Central to this explanationist response is the fact that our non-skeptical view of the world is a better explanation of our experiences than its skeptical rivals. Despite the plausibility of this response to skepticism, it is not without its critics. Recently, Matthew Gifford has argued that Vogel’s response has problems on two fronts. First, Gifford argues that (...)’s strategy for showing that the rwh is a better explanation than its skeptical rivals fails. Second, he argues that if Vogel’s strategy does succeed, then it accomplishes too much—it removes skeptical doubts when it should not. I argue that Gifford is mistaken on both accounts. (shrink)
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  45.  43
    Skepticism and Elegance.Kevin McCain - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (1):30-43.
    _ Source: _Page Count 14 Jonathan Vogel has argued in support of an explanationist response to skepticism in several works. Central to this explanationist response is the fact that our non-skeptical view of the world is a better explanation of our experiences than its skeptical rivals. Despite the plausibility of this response to skepticism, it is not without its critics. Recently, Matthew Gifford has argued that Vogel’s response has problems on two fronts. First, Gifford argues that (...)’s strategy for showing that the rwh is a better explanation than its skeptical rivals fails. Second, he argues that if Vogel’s strategy does succeed, then it accomplishes too much—it removes skeptical doubts when it should not. I argue that Gifford is mistaken on both accounts. (shrink)
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  46. Skepticism and Elegance: Problems for the Abductivist Reply to Cartesian Skepticism.Matthew B. Gifford - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):685-704.
    Some philosophers argue that we are justified in rejecting skepticism because it is explanatorily inferior to more commonsense hypotheses about the world. Focusing on the work of Jonathan Vogel, I show that this “abductivist” or “inference to the best explanation” response rests on an impoverished explanatory framework which ignores the explanatory gap between an object's having certain properties and its appearing to have those properties. Once this gap is appreciated, I argue, the abductivist strategy is defeated.
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  47.  71
    Is Counterfactual Reliabilism Compatible with Higher-Level Knowledge?Kelly Becker - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (1):79–84.
    Jonathan Vogel has recently argued that counterfactual reliabilism cannot account for higher‐level knowledge that one's belief is true, or not false. His particular argument for this claim is straightforward and valid. Interestingly, there is a parallel argument, based on an alternative but plausible reinterpretation of the main premise in Vogel's argument, which squares CR with higher‐level knowledge both that one's belief is true and that one's belief is not false. I argue that, while Vogel's argument reveals (...)
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  48. A Reliabilist Solution to the Problem of Promiscuous Bootstrapping.Hilary Kornblith - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):263-267.
    Jonathan Vogel has presented a disturbing problem for reliabilism. 1 Reliabilists claim that knowledge is reliably produced true belief. Reliabilism is, of course, a version of externalism, and on such a view, a knower need have no knowledge, no justified belief, indeed, no conception that his or her belief is reliably produced. It is the fact that the knower's true belief is reliably produced which makes it a case of knowledge, not any appreciation of this fact. But (...) now argues that reliabilists will, by a process he calls ‘bootstrapping’, far too easily gain knowledge of the reliability of the processes by which their knowledge is produced. For the reliabilist, knowledge which should be difficult to come by is quite easily and trivially attainable, Vogel argues. And this, of course, seems to show a fundamental flaw in the reliabilist conception of knowledge.One solution to this puzzle is offered by van Cleve . Bootstrapping may seem unattractive, van Cleve claims, but only when we fail to consider the alternative. Any epistemological view which does not legitimate bootstrapping, he argues, will inevitably lead to scepticism. And if the choice is between bootstrapping and scepticism, van Cleve will happily accept bootstrapping.It would be nice, certainly, if we could avoid this unpalatable dilemma.Vogel's argument is disturbingly straightforward. Suppose that Roxanne gains knowledge that the gas tank in her car is full by looking at her gas gauge, and let us further suppose that Roxanne has no reason at all to believe that her gas gauge is reliable. As Vogel points out, reliabilists cannot object to these assumptions. Precisely because reliabilism is a version of externalism, reliabilists must allow that there are cases meeting these very conditions. That is, reliabilists must allow that one can gain knowledge by way of a …. (shrink)
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  49. Skepticism and Elegance.Kevin McCain - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (1):30-43.
    _ Source: _Volume 6, Issue 1, pp 30 - 43 Jonathan Vogel has argued in support of an explanationist response to skepticism in several works. Central to this explanationist response is the fact that our non-skeptical view of the world is a better explanation of our experiences than its skeptical rivals. Despite the plausibility of this response to skepticism, it is not without its critics. Recently, Matthew Gifford has argued that Vogel’s response has problems on two fronts. (...)
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  50.  16
    Is Counterfactual Reliabilism Compatible with Higher‐Level Knowledge?Kelly Becker - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (1):79-84.
    Jonathan Vogel has recently argued that counterfactual reliabilism cannot account for higher‐level knowledge that one's belief is true, or not false. His particular argument for this claim is straightforward and valid. Interestingly, there is a parallel argument, based on an alternative but plausible reinterpretation of the main premise in Vogel's argument, which squares CR with higher‐level knowledge both that one's belief is true and that one's belief is not false. I argue that, while Vogel's argument reveals (...)
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