51 found
Order:
  1. Bias in Human Reasoning Causes and Consequences.Jonathan St B. T. Evans (ed.) - 1989
    This book represents the first major attempt by any author to provide an integrated account of the evidence for bias in human reasoning across a wide range of disparate psychological literatures. The topics discussed involve both deductive and inductive reasoning as well as statistical judgement and inference. In addition, the author proposes a general theoretical approach to the explanations of bias and considers the practical implications for real world decision making. The theoretical stance of the book is based on a (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   184 citations  
  2. In Two Minds: Dual-Process Accounts of Reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (10):454-459.
  3. Subtracting “Ought” From “Is”: Descriptivism Versus Normativism in the Study of Human Thinking.Shira Elqayam & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):251-252.
    We propose a critique of normativism, defined as the idea that human thinking reflects a normative system against which it should be measured and judged. We analyze the methodological problems associated with normativism, proposing that it invites the controversial “is-ought” inference, much contested in the philosophical literature. This problem is triggered when there are competing normative accounts (the arbitration problem), as empirical evidence can help arbitrate between descriptive theories, but not between normative systems. Drawing on linguistics as a model, we (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   50 citations  
  4.  85
    Questions and Challenges for the New Psychology of Reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2012 - Thinking and Reasoning 18 (1):5 - 31.
    In common with a number of other authors I believe that there has been a paradigm shift in the psychology of reasoning, specifically the area traditionally labelled as the study of deduction. The deduction paradigm was founded in a philosophical tradition that assumed logicality as the basis for rational thought, and provided binary propositional logic as the agreed normative framework. By contrast, many contemporary authors assume that people have degrees of uncertainty in both premises and conclusions, and reject binary logic (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  5.  8
    Rationality and Reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans, David E. Over & Peter Carruthers - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):189-194.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   108 citations  
  6.  12
    Subtracting “Ought” From “Is”: Descriptivism Versus Normativism in the Study of Human Thinking.Shira Elqayam & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):233-248.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  7. Thinking Twice: Two Minds in One Brain.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    This book explores the idea that much of our behaviour is controlled by automatic and intuitive mental processes, which shape and compete with our conscious thinking and decision making. Accessibly written, and assuming no prior knowledge of the field, the book will be fascinating reading for all those interested in human behaviour.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  8. The Psychology of Deductive Reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 1982
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   106 citations  
  9. On the Resolution of Conflict in Dual Process Theories of Reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2007 - Thinking and Reasoning 13 (4):321 – 339.
    In this paper, I show that the question of how dual process theories of reasoning and judgement account for conflict between System 1 (heuristic) and System 2 (analytic) processes needs to be explicated and addressed in future research work. I demonstrate that a simple additive probability model that describes such conflict can be mapped on to three different cognitive models. The pre-emptive conflict resolution model assumes that a decision is made at the outset as to whether a heuristic or analytic (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  10.  18
    Uncertain Deduction and Conditional Reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans, Valerie A. Thompson & David E. Over - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  11.  20
    Do Smart People Have Better Intuitions?Valerie A. Thompson, Gordon Pennycook, Dries Trippas & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2018 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 147 (7):945-961.
  12. The Probability of Conditionals: The Psychological Evidence.David E. Over & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (4):340–358.
    The two main psychological theories of the ordinary conditional were designed to account for inferences made from assumptions, but few premises in everyday life can be simply assumed true. Useful premises usually have a probability that is less than certainty. But what is the probability of the ordinary conditional and how is it determined? We argue that people use a two stage Ramsey test that we specify to make probability judgements about indicative conditionals in natural language, and we describe experiments (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  13.  16
    The Mythical Dual-Process Typology.Gordon Pennycook, Wim De Neys, Jonathan St B. T. Evans, Keith E. Stanovich & Valerie A. Thompson - 2018 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 22 (8):667-668.
  14.  25
    Reflections on Reflection: The Nature and Function of Type 2 Processes in Dual-Process Theories of Reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2019 - Thinking and Reasoning 25 (4):383-415.
    I present a critical discussion of dual-process theories of reasoning and decision making with particular attention to the nature and role of Type 2 processes. The original theory proposed...
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  15.  47
    Reasoning to and From Belief: Deduction and Induction Are Still Distinct.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):267-283.
  16.  15
    The Source of Belief Bias Effects in Syllogistic Reasoning.Stephen E. Newstead, Paul Pollard, Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Julie L. Allen - 1992 - Cognition 45 (3):257-284.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   53 citations  
  17. How Many Dual Process Theories Do We Need: One, Two or Many?Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2009 - In Jonathan Evans & Keith Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press.
  18. Rapid Responding Increases Belief Bias: Evidence for the Dual-Process Theory of Reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Jodie Curtis-Holmes - 2005 - Thinking and Reasoning 11 (4):382 – 389.
    In this study, we examine the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning under both standard presentation and in a condition where participants are required to respond within 10 seconds. As predicted, the requirement for rapid responding increased the amount of belief bias observed on the task and reduced the number of logically correct decisions, both effects being substantial and statistically significant. These findings were predicted by the dual-process account of reasoning, which posits that fast heuristic processes, responsible for belief bias, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  19.  9
    Suppositions, Extensionality, and Conditionals: A Critique of the Mental Model Theory of Johnson-Laird and Byrne.Jonathan St B. T. Evans, David E. Over & Simon J. Handley - 2005 - Psychological Review 112 (4):1040-1052.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  20.  33
    Rationality in the New Paradigm: Strict Versus Soft Bayesian Approaches.Shira Elqayam & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):453-470.
  21.  86
    The Duality of Mind: An Historical Perspective.Keith Frankish & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - unknown
    [About the book] This book explores the idea that we have two minds - automatic, unconscious, and fast, the other controlled, conscious, and slow. In recent years there has been great interest in so-called dual-process theories of reasoning and rationality. According to such theories, there are two distinct systems underlying human reasoning - an evolutionarily old system that is associative, automatic, unconscious, parallel, and fast, and a more recent, distinctively human system that is rule-based, controlled, conscious, serial, and slow. Within (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  22.  36
    Matching Bias on the Selection Task: It's Fast and Feels Good.Valerie A. Thompson, Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Jamie I. D. Campbell - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):431-452.
    We tested the hypothesis that choices determined by Type 1 processes are compelling because they are fluent, and for this reason they are less subject to analytic thinking than other answers. A total of 104 participants completed a modified version of Wason's selection task wherein they made decisions about one card at a time using a two-response paradigm. In this paradigm participants gave a fast, intuitive response, rated their feeling of rightness for that response, and were then allowed free time (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  23.  11
    Human Versus Machine Thinking: The Story of Chess. [REVIEW]Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2018 - Thinking and Reasoning 24 (4):498-504.
  24.  42
    Two Minds Rationality.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2014 - Thinking and Reasoning 20 (2):129-146.
    I argue that views of human rationality are strongly affected by the adoption of a two minds theory in which humans have an old mind which evolved early and shares many features of animal cognition, as well as new mind which evolved later and is distinctively developed in humans. Both minds have a form of instrumental rationality—striving for the attainment of goals—but by very different mechanisms. The old mind relies on a combination of evolution and experiential learning, and is therefore (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  25.  63
    Spot the Difference: Distinguishing Between Two Kinds of Processing.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2012 - Mind and Society 11 (1):121-131.
    Dual-process theories of higher cognition, distinguishing between intuitive (Type 1) and reflective (Type 2) thinking, have become increasingly popular, although also subject to recent criticism. A key question, to which a number of contributions in this special issue relate, is how to define the difference between the two kinds of processing. One issue discussed is whether they differ at Marr’s computational level of analysis. I believe they do but that ultimately the debate will decided at the implementational level where distinct (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  26.  7
    The Mental Model Theory of Conditional Reasoning: Critical Appraisal and Revision.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 1993 - Cognition 48 (1):1-20.
    Johnson-Laird and Byrne present a theory of conditional inference based upon the manipulation of mental models. In the present paper, the theory is critically examined with regard to its ability to account for psychological data, principally with respect to the rate at which people draw the four basic inferences of modus ponens, denial of the antecedent, affirmation of the consequent and modus tollens. It is argued first that the theory is unclear in its definition and in particular with regard to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  27.  43
    Belief Bias in Informal Reasoning.Valerie Thompson & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2012 - Thinking and Reasoning 18 (3):278 - 310.
    In two experiments we tested the hypothesis that the mechanisms that produce belief bias generalise across reasoning tasks. In formal reasoning (i.e., syllogisms) judgements of validity are influenced by actual validity, believability of the conclusions, and an interaction between the two. Although apparently analogous effects of belief and argument strength have been observed in informal reasoning, the design of those studies does not permit an analysis of the interaction effect. In the present studies we redesigned two informal reasoning tasks: the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  28. Thinking and Reasoning: A Very Short Introduction.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    Thinking is the essence of what it means to be human and defines us more than anything else as a species. Jonathan Evans explores cognitive psychological approaches to understanding the nature of thinking and reasoning, problem solving, and decision making.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  29.  36
    The Social and Communicative Function of Conditional Statements.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2005 - Mind and Society 4 (1):97-113.
    In this paper, I discuss conditionals as illocutionary speech acts whose interpretation depends upon the whole of the social context in which they are uttered and whose purpose is to affect the opinions and actions of others. I argue for a suppositional approach to conditional statements based in what philosophers call the Ramsey test and developing the psychological theory that conditionals elicit a process of hypothetical thinking in their listeners. By reference to the experimental psychological literature on conditionals, I show (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  30.  30
    Conditional Truth: Comment on Byrne and Johnson-Laird.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over - 2010 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):5.
  31.  32
    Frequency Versus Probability Formats in Statistical Word Problems.Jonathan St B. T. Evans, Simon J. Handley, Nick Perham, David E. Over & Valerie A. Thompson - 2000 - Cognition 77 (3):197-213.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  32. Introspection, Confabulation, and Dual-Process Theory.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):142-143.
    This excellent target article helps to resolve a problem for dual-process theories of higher cognition. Theorists posit two systems, one of which appears to be conscious and volitional. It seems to control some behaviours but to confabulate explanations for others. I argue that this system is only conscious in an illusory sense and that all self-explanations are confabulatory, as Carruthers suggests.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  33.  43
    Explicit Representations in Hypothetical Thinking.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):763-764.
    Dienes' & Perner's proposals are discussed in relation to the distinction between explicit and implicit systems of thinking. Evans and Over (1996) propose that explicit processing resources are required for hypothetical thinking, in which mental models of possible world states are constructed. Such thinking requires representations in which the individuals' propositional attitudes including relevant beliefs and goals are made fully explicit.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  34.  87
    Does Rational Analysis Stand Up to Rational Analysis?Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):88-89.
    I agree with Oaksford & Chater (O&C) that human beings resemble Bayesian reasoners much more closely than ones engaging standard logic. However, I have many problems with their framework, which appears to be rooted in normative rather than ecological rationality. The authors also overstate everyday rationality and neglect to account for much relevant psychological work on reasoning.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  35.  23
    How and Why We Reason From is to Ought.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Shira Elqayam - 2020 - Synthese 197 (4):1429-1446.
    Originally identified by Hume, the validity of is–ought inference is much debated in the meta-ethics literature. Our work shows that inference from is to ought typically proceeds from contextualised, value-laden causal utility conditional, bridging into a deontic conclusion. Such conditional statements tell us what actions are needed to achieve or avoid consequences that are good or bad. Psychological research has established that people generally reason fluently and easily with utility conditionals. Our own research also has shown that people’s reasoning from (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36.  8
    On Rules, Models and Understanding.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):345-346.
  37.  24
    Matching Bias and Set Sizes: A Discussion of Yama (2001).Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2002 - Thinking and Reasoning 8 (2):153 – 163.
    Yama (2001) has presented an ingenious series of experiments in which he attempts to separate two accounts in the literature of the cause of "matching bias" in conditional reasoning. One account is that the bias arises from the way in which people process negations and the other is that it is due to the larger set sizes associated with negative propositions, rather than negation per se . Yama's experiments show influences of both negation and set size, from which he concludes (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  38. Whole Mind Theory: Massive Modularity Meets Dual Processes.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over - 2008 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):200 – 208.
  39.  71
    Predicting the Difficulty of Complex Logical Reasoning Problems.Stephen E. Newstead, Peter Bradon, Simon J. Handley, Ian Dennis & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2006 - Thinking and Reasoning 12 (1):62 – 90.
    The aim of the present research was to develop a difficulty model for logical reasoning problems involving complex ordered arrays used in the Graduate Record Examination. The approach used involved breaking down the problems into their basic cognitive elements such as the complexity of the rules used, the number of mental models required to represent the problem, and question type. Weightings for these different elements were derived from two experimental studies and from the reasoning literature. Based on these weights, difficulty (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40.  16
    Adaptive Cognition: The Question is How.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):493-494.
  41.  64
    Dual-Processing Explains Base-Rate Neglect, but Which Dual-Process Theory and How?Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Shira Elqayam - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (3):261-262.
    We agree that current evolutionary accounts of base-rate neglect are unparsimonious, but we dispute the authors' account of the effect in terms of parallel associative and rule-based processes. We also question their assumption that cueing of nested set relations facilitates performance due to recruitment of explicit reasoning processes. In our account, such reasoning is always involved, but usually unsuccessful.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42.  62
    The Role of Language in the Dual Process Theory of Thinking.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):684-685.
    Carruthers’proposals would seem to implicate language in what is known as System 2 thinking (explicit) rather than System 1 thinking (implicit) in contemporary dual process theories of thinking and reasoning. We provide outline description of these theories and show that while Carruthers’characterization of non-verbal processes as domain-specific identifies one critical feature of System 1 thinking, he appears to overlook the fact that much cognition of this type results from domain-general learning processes. We also review cognitive psychological evidence that shows that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43.  21
    Investigating Reasoning with Multiple Integrated Neuroscientific Methods.Matthew E. Roser, Jonathan St B. T. Evans, Nicolas A. McNair, Giorgio Fuggetta, Simon J. Handley, Lauren S. Carroll & Dries Trippas - 2015 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.
  44.  39
    A Farewell Editorial.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2011 - Thinking and Reasoning 17 (4):351 - 352.
    Thinking & Reasoning, Volume 17, Issue 4, Page 351-352, November 2011.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45.  1
    Reasoning with Knights and Knaves: A Discussion of Rips.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 1990 - Cognition 36 (1):85-90.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  46. The Contribution of Amos Tversky.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & De Over - 1997 - Thinking and Reasoning 3:1-8.
  47.  28
    Publication Policy: Reminder and Update.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2009 - Thinking and Reasoning 15 (4):317-318.
  48.  18
    The Presumption of Consciousness.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2014 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (1):26-27.
    Throughout this article the authors presume – without justification – that decision making must be a conscious process unless proved otherwise, and they place an unreasonably strict burden of proof on anyone wishing to claim a role for unconscious processing. In addition, I show that their arguments do not, as implied here, impact upon contemporary dual-process theories of reasoning and decision making.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49.  16
    Normative and Descriptive Consequentialism.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):15-16.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50.  11
    Mental Models as an Explanation of Belief Bias Effects in Syllogistic Reasoning.Stephen E. Newstead & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 1993 - Cognition 46 (1):93-97.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 51