Results for 'Jonathan St-Onge'

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Jonathan St-Onge
Université du Québec à Montréal
  1.  11
    If God does not explain parsimony, what does ?Jonathan St-Onge - 2018 - Ithaque 23:75-96.
    Although many scholars take parsimony for granted today, Elliott Sober shows in his latest book, Ockham’s Razors, that they might not be rationally justified to do so. In particular, he claims that the famous Ockham’s Razor, the heuristic that says one should not postulate more entities than necessary, rests on some implicit assumptions that go back to Newton and his rules of reasoning. The problem is that Newton justified those basic rules on theological grounds, that is, the world is parsimonious (...)
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  2.  47
    Eight journals over eight decades: a computational topic-modeling approach to contemporary philosophy of science.Christophe Malaterre, Francis Lareau, Davide Pulizzotto & Jonathan St-Onge - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2883-2923.
    As a discipline of its own, the philosophy of science can be traced back to the founding of its academic journals, some of which go back to the first half of the twentieth century. While the discipline has been the object of many historical studies, notably focusing on specific schools or major figures of the field, little work has focused on the journals themselves. Here, we investigate contemporary philosophy of science by means of computational text-mining approaches: we apply topic-modeling algorithms (...)
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  3.  58
    Bias in Human Reasoning: Causes and Consequences.Jonathan St B. T. Evans (ed.) - 1990 - Psychology Press.
    This book represents the first major attempt by any author to provide an integrated account of the evidence for bias in human reasoning across a wide range of disparate psychological literatures. The topics discussed involve both deductive and inductive reasoning as well as statistical judgement and inference. In addition, the author proposes a general theoretical approach to the explanations of bias and considers the practical implications for real world decision making. The theoretical stance of the book is based on a (...)
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  4.  24
    Review of Edward Stein: Without Good Reason: The Rationality Debate in Philosophy and Cognitive Science_; Jonathan St. B. T. Evans and David E. Over: _Rationality and Reasoning[REVIEW]Jonathan St B. T. Evans, David E. Over & Peter Carruthers - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):189-193.
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  5.  16
    Thinking Twice: Two Minds in One Brain.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    This book explores the idea that much of our behaviour is controlled by automatic and intuitive mental processes, which shape and compete with our conscious thinking and decision making. Accessibly written, and assuming no prior knowledge of the field, the book will be fascinating reading for all those interested in human behaviour.
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  6.  22
    In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Keith Frankish (eds.) - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    This book explores the idea that we have two minds - one automatic, unconscious, and fast, the other controlled, conscious, and slow. It brings together leading researchers on dual-process theory to summarize the state of the art highlight key issues, present different perspectives, and provide a stimulus to further work.
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  7.  12
    Reasoning, Rationality and Dual Processes: Selected Works of Jonathan St B T Evans.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2013 - Psychology Press.
    In the World Library of Psychologists series, international experts themselves present career-long collections of what they judge to be their finest pieces - extracts from books, key articles, salient research findings, and their major theoretical and practical contributions. Jonathan St B T Evans is amongst the foremost cognitive psychologists of his generation, having been influential in spearheading developments in the psychological study of reasoning from its very beginnings in the 1970s up to the present day. This volume of self-selected (...)
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  8.  2
    What Makes Musical Prodigies?Chanel Marion-St-Onge, Michael W. Weiss, Megha Sharda & Isabelle Peretz - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    Musical prodigies reach exceptionally high levels of achievement before adolescence. Despite longstanding interest and fascination in musical prodigies, little is known about their psychological profile. Here we assess to what extent practice, intelligence, and personality make musical prodigies a distinct category of musician. Nineteen former or current musical prodigies were compared to 35 musicians with either an early or late start but similar amount of musical training, and 16 non-musicians. All completed a Wechsler IQ test, the Big Five Inventory, the (...)
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  9. In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond.Jonathan St Evans & Keith Frankish - 2010 - Critica 42 (125):104-114.
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  10. Plagiarism: For the accusers and the accused.K. R. St Onge - 1994 - Journal of Information Ethics 3 (2):8-24.
     
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  11. How many dual process theories do we need: one, two or many?Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2009 - In Jonathan Evans & Keith Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press.
  12. In two minds: dual-process accounts of reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (10):454-459.
  13.  60
    Reflections on reflection: the nature and function of type 2 processes in dual-process theories of reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2019 - Thinking and Reasoning 25 (4):383-415.
    I present a critical discussion of dual-process theories of reasoning and decision making with particular attention to the nature and role of Type 2 processes. The original theory proposed...
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  14. Questions and challenges for the new psychology of reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2012 - Thinking and Reasoning 18 (1):5 - 31.
    In common with a number of other authors I believe that there has been a paradigm shift in the psychology of reasoning, specifically the area traditionally labelled as the study of deduction. The deduction paradigm was founded in a philosophical tradition that assumed logicality as the basis for rational thought, and provided binary propositional logic as the agreed normative framework. By contrast, many contemporary authors assume that people have degrees of uncertainty in both premises and conclusions, and reject binary logic (...)
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  15.  40
    Uncertain deduction and conditional reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans, Valerie A. Thompson & David E. Over - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
  16. On the resolution of conflict in dual process theories of reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2007 - Thinking and Reasoning 13 (4):321 – 339.
    In this paper, I show that the question of how dual process theories of reasoning and judgement account for conflict between System 1 (heuristic) and System 2 (analytic) processes needs to be explicated and addressed in future research work. I demonstrate that a simple additive probability model that describes such conflict can be mapped on to three different cognitive models. The pre-emptive conflict resolution model assumes that a decision is made at the outset as to whether a heuristic or analytic (...)
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  17.  13
    Thinking and Reasoning: A Very Short Introduction.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    Thinking is the essence of what it means to be human and defines us more than anything else as a species. Jonathan Evans explores cognitive psychological approaches to understanding the nature of thinking and reasoning, problem solving, and decision making.
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  18. Rapid responding increases belief bias: Evidence for the dual-process theory of reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Jodie Curtis-Holmes - 2005 - Thinking and Reasoning 11 (4):382 – 389.
    In this study, we examine the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning under both standard presentation and in a condition where participants are required to respond within 10 seconds. As predicted, the requirement for rapid responding increased the amount of belief bias observed on the task and reduced the number of logically correct decisions, both effects being substantial and statistically significant. These findings were predicted by the dual-process account of reasoning, which posits that fast heuristic processes, responsible for belief bias, (...)
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  19.  16
    Rationality in the selection task: Epistemic utility versus uncertainty reduction.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over - 1996 - Psychological Review 103 (2):356-363.
    M. Oaksford and N. Chater presented a Bayesian analysis of the Wason selection task in which they proposed that people choose cards in order to maximize expected information gain as measured by reduction in uncertainty in the Shannon-Weaver information theory sense. It is argued that the EIG measure is both psychologically implausible and normatively inadequate as a measure of epistemic utility. The article is also concerned with the descriptive account of findings in the selection task literature offered by Oaksford and (...)
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  20.  56
    Reasoning to and from belief: Deduction and induction are still distinct.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):267-283.
  21.  15
    Suppositions, extensionality, and conditionals: A critique of the mental model theory of Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002).Jonathan St B. T. Evans, David E. Over & Simon J. Handley - 2005 - Psychological Review 112 (4):1040-1052.
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  22.  10
    The mental model theory of conditional reasoning: critical appraisal and revision.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 1993 - Cognition 48 (1):1-20.
    Johnson-Laird and Byrne present a theory of conditional inference based upon the manipulation of mental models. In the present paper, the theory is critically examined with regard to its ability to account for psychological data, principally with respect to the rate at which people draw the four basic inferences of modus ponens, denial of the antecedent, affirmation of the consequent and modus tollens. It is argued first that the theory is unclear in its definition and in particular with regard to (...)
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  23.  8
    10 The influence of prior belief on scientific thinking.Jonathan St Bt Evans - 2002 - In Peter Carruthers, Stephen P. Stich & Michael Siegal (eds.), The Cognitive Basis of Science. Cambridge University Press.
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  24.  48
    Towards a descriptivist psychology of reasoning and decision making.Jonathan St Bt Evans & Shira Elqayam - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):275-290.
    Our target article identified normativism as the view that rationality should be evaluated against unconditional normative standards. We believe this to be entrenched in the psychological study of reasoning and decision making and argued that it is damaging to this empirical area of study, calling instead for a descriptivist psychology of reasoning and decision making. The views of 29 commentators (from philosophy and cognitive science as well as psychology) were mixed, including some staunch defences of normativism, but also a number (...)
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  25. The Contribution of Amos Tversky.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & De Over - 1997 - Thinking and Reasoning 3:1-8.
  26.  48
    Two minds rationality.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2014 - Thinking and Reasoning 20 (2):129-146.
    I argue that views of human rationality are strongly affected by the adoption of a two minds theory in which humans have an old mind which evolved early and shares many features of animal cognition, as well as new mind which evolved later and is distinctively developed in humans. Both minds have a form of instrumental rationality—striving for the attainment of goals—but by very different mechanisms. The old mind relies on a combination of evolution and experiential learning, and is therefore (...)
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  27.  71
    Spot the difference: distinguishing between two kinds of processing.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2012 - Mind and Society 11 (1):121-131.
    Dual-process theories of higher cognition, distinguishing between intuitive (Type 1) and reflective (Type 2) thinking, have become increasingly popular, although also subject to recent criticism. A key question, to which a number of contributions in this special issue relate, is how to define the difference between the two kinds of processing. One issue discussed is whether they differ at Marr’s computational level of analysis. I believe they do but that ultimately the debate will decided at the implementational level where distinct (...)
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  28.  42
    Frequency versus probability formats in statistical word problems.Jonathan St B. T. Evans, Simon J. Handley, Nick Perham, David E. Over & Valerie A. Thompson - 2000 - Cognition 77 (3):197-213.
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  29.  41
    How and why we reason from is to ought.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Shira Elqayam - 2020 - Synthese 197 (4):1429-1446.
    Originally identified by Hume, the validity of is–ought inference is much debated in the meta-ethics literature. Our work shows that inference from is to ought typically proceeds from contextualised, value-laden causal utility conditional, bridging into a deontic conclusion. Such conditional statements tell us what actions are needed to achieve or avoid consequences that are good or bad. Psychological research has established that people generally reason fluently and easily with utility conditionals. Our own research also has shown that people’s reasoning from (...)
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  30. CEO target compensation and performance standards in privately-and publicly-held firms through a disclosure regulation change.Patrice Gelinas, Michel Magnan & Sylvie St-Onge - 2009 - International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics 4 (3):222-249.
     
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  31.  22
    Reasoning is for thinking, not just for arguing.Jonathan St Bt Evans - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2):77-78.
    There is indeed extensive evidence that people perform fairly poorly in reasoning tasks and that they often construct arguments for intuitively cued responses. Mercier & Sperber (M&S) may also be right to claim that reasoning evolved primarily as argumentation. However, if it did, the facility became exapted to the function of supporting uniquely human abilities for reflective thinking and consequential decision making.
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  32.  57
    Explicit representations in hypothetical thinking.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):763-764.
    Dienes' & Perner's proposals are discussed in relation to the distinction between explicit and implicit systems of thinking. Evans and Over (1996) propose that explicit processing resources are required for hypothetical thinking, in which mental models of possible world states are constructed. Such thinking requires representations in which the individuals' propositional attitudes including relevant beliefs and goals are made fully explicit.
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  33.  13
    On rules, models and understanding.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):345-346.
  34.  38
    The social and communicative function of conditional statements.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2005 - Mind and Society 4 (1):97-113.
    In this paper, I discuss conditionals as illocutionary speech acts whose interpretation depends upon the whole of the social context in which they are uttered and whose purpose is to affect the opinions and actions of others. I argue for a suppositional approach to conditional statements based in what philosophers call the Ramsey test and developing the psychological theory that conditionals elicit a process of hypothetical thinking in their listeners. By reference to the experimental psychological literature on conditionals, I show (...)
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  35. Musgrove. Conditional tea. son—ing with inducements and advice.Jonathan St B. T. Evans&Joanna Twyman - 1998 - Cognition 69:B1.
     
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  36.  91
    Does rational analysis stand up to rational analysis?Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):88-89.
    I agree with Oaksford & Chater (O&C) that human beings resemble Bayesian reasoners much more closely than ones engaging standard logic. However, I have many problems with their framework, which appears to be rooted in normative rather than ecological rationality. The authors also overstate everyday rationality and neglect to account for much relevant psychological work on reasoning.
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  37. Introspection, confabulation, and dual-process theory.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):142-143.
    This excellent target article helps to resolve a problem for dual-process theories of higher cognition. Theorists posit two systems, one of which appears to be conscious and volitional. It seems to control some behaviours but to confabulate explanations for others. I argue that this system is only conscious in an illusory sense and that all self-explanations are confabulatory, as Carruthers suggests.
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  38.  93
    The duality of mind: an historical perspective.Keith Frankish & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - unknown
    [About the book] This book explores the idea that we have two minds - automatic, unconscious, and fast, the other controlled, conscious, and slow. In recent years there has been great interest in so-called dual-process theories of reasoning and rationality. According to such theories, there are two distinct systems underlying human reasoning - an evolutionarily old system that is associative, automatic, unconscious, parallel, and fast, and a more recent, distinctively human system that is rule-based, controlled, conscious, serial, and slow. Within (...)
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  39.  68
    Dual-processing explains base-rate neglect, but which dual-process theory and how?Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Shira Elqayam - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (3):261-262.
    We agree that current evolutionary accounts of base-rate neglect are unparsimonious, but we dispute the authors' account of the effect in terms of parallel associative and rule-based processes. We also question their assumption that cueing of nested set relations facilitates performance due to recruitment of explicit reasoning processes. In our account, such reasoning is always involved, but usually unsuccessful.
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  40.  25
    Matching bias and set sizes: A discussion of yama (2001).Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2002 - Thinking and Reasoning 8 (2):153 – 163.
    Yama (2001) has presented an ingenious series of experiments in which he attempts to separate two accounts in the literature of the cause of "matching bias" in conditional reasoning. One account is that the bias arises from the way in which people process negations and the other is that it is due to the larger set sizes associated with negative propositions, rather than negation per se . Yama's experiments show influences of both negation and set size, from which he concludes (...)
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  41.  3
    Reasoning with knights and knaves: A discussion of rips.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 1990 - Cognition 36 (1):85-90.
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  42.  23
    Absence of a gender difference in a haptic version of the water-level task.François Berthiaume, Michèle Robert, Richard St-Onge & Julie Pelletier - 1993 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 31 (1):57-60.
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  43.  18
    Adaptive cognition: The question is how.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):493-494.
  44.  39
    A farewell editorial.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2011 - Thinking and Reasoning 17 (4):351 - 352.
    Thinking & Reasoning, Volume 17, Issue 4, Page 351-352, November 2011.
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  45.  19
    Normative and descriptive consequentialism.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):15-16.
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  46.  30
    Publication policy: Reminder and update.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2009 - Thinking and Reasoning 15 (4):317-318.
  47.  22
    The presumption of consciousness.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2014 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (1):26-27.
    Throughout this article the authors presume – without justification – that decision making must be a conscious process unless proved otherwise, and they place an unreasonably strict burden of proof on anyone wishing to claim a role for unconscious processing. In addition, I show that their arguments do not, as implied here, impact upon contemporary dual-process theories of reasoning and decision making.
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  48.  68
    The role of language in the dual process theory of thinking.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):684-685.
    Carruthers’proposals would seem to implicate language in what is known as System 2 thinking (explicit) rather than System 1 thinking (implicit) in contemporary dual process theories of thinking and reasoning. We provide outline description of these theories and show that while Carruthers’characterization of non-verbal processes as domain-specific identifies one critical feature of System 1 thinking, he appears to overlook the fact that much cognition of this type results from domain-general learning processes. We also review cognitive psychological evidence that shows that (...)
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  49. Whole mind theory: Massive modularity meets dual processes.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over - 2008 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):200 – 208.
  50. Subtracting “ought” from “is”: Descriptivism versus normativism in the study of human thinking.Shira Elqayam & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):251-252.
    We propose a critique of normativism, defined as the idea that human thinking reflects a normative system against which it should be measured and judged. We analyze the methodological problems associated with normativism, proposing that it invites the controversial “is-ought” inference, much contested in the philosophical literature. This problem is triggered when there are competing normative accounts (the arbitration problem), as empirical evidence can help arbitrate between descriptive theories, but not between normative systems. Drawing on linguistics as a model, we (...)
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