Las consecuencias para la generación de leyes sociológicas del hecho de la contingencia social y/o de la libertad individual, podrían visualizarse a base de la resolución determinación vs. indeterminación de las mismas. Los enfoques paradigmáticos para abordar el tema de la determinación son: (..

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2008v12n1p1 My purpose is to postulate a principle, which I call “socioantropic”, that can connect in a proper way two historically antithetical notions: free will and determinism in the social word. The main consequence of this is the establishment of a new kind of explanatory structure more in keeping with the special nature of the social sciences. To this end, I shall reconstruct the conventional structure of deductive-nomological explanations, exposing its shortcomings in relation to the social sciences, and hence I (...) shall formulate a proposal for the theoretical resolution of the problem of explanation in the social world. (shrink)

My purpose is to postulate a principle, which I call “socioantropic”, that can connect in a proper way two historically antithetical notions: free will and determinism in the social word. The main consequence of this is the establishment of a new kind of explanatory structure more in keeping with the special nature of the social sciences. To this end, I shall reconstruct the conventional structure of deductive-nomological explanations, exposing its shortcomings in relation to the social sciences, and hence I shall (...) formulate a proposal for the theoretical resolution of the problem of explanation in the social world. (shrink)

In this work, it is argued that one of the foundations of NiklasLuhmann’s theory of social systems, namely that it has no ontology, would prevent the elaboration of explanations in sociology. Because the theory has a formal-logical foundation, which does not presuppose ontology, there are insurmountable obstacles to achieving this objective. For this reason, it is valid to wonder about the merit of a theory that, after 20 years, insists on not aligning itself with ontological premises in a robust way (...) and suggests, therefore, a refusal to integrate sociology within the set of factual sciences. However, we think that the richness of Luhmann’s work allows a dialogue with the mainstream of contemporary theoretical practice. Three rules about what “should not be done” are revalidated from this analysis to philosophically base a theory in sociology and a key suggestion to overcome the problem of explanation in Luhmann’s sociology: social science seeks and directs its activity towards discovery and the use of substantive, real distinctions that also enrich the factual content of statements about social reality. (shrink)

In this work, it is argued that one of the foundations of NiklasLuhmann’s theory of social systems, namely that it has no ontology, would prevent the elaboration of explanations in sociology. Because the theory has a formal-logical foundation, which does not presuppose ontology, there are insurmountable obstacles to achieving this objective. For this reason, it is valid to wonder about the merit of a theory that, after 20 years, insists on not aligning itself with ontological premises in a robust way (...) and suggests, therefore, a refusal to integrate sociology within the set of factual sciences. However, we think that the richness of Luhmann’s work allows a dialogue with the mainstream of contemporary theoretical practice. Three rules about what “should not be done” are revalidated from this analysis to philosophically base a theory in sociology and a key suggestion to overcome the problem of explanation in Luhmann’s sociology: social science seeks and directs its activity towards discovery and the use of substantive, real distinctions that also enrich the factual content of statements about social reality. (shrink)

This essay discusses three axioms of sociopoietic theory from the point of view of philosophy of social science. The first axiom, its de-ontologised character, it is associated to theory formalism and it allows to question the validity of a factual theory that do not presuppose the reality. Th..

This essay tries to synthesize some relevant issues on a classic topic, central for social sciences: social interaction. How is it possible for two or more human beings to build a system of a superior order, composed by elements with emergent properties which are only partially imputable to the indi..

El propósito de este ensayo consiste en aproximarse a una re–evaluación del enfoque negativo de la filosofía hegeliana en el marco de la discusión epistemológica de la ciencia contemporánea. La afirmación de Karel Kosik que sostiene que "En virtud de que la esencia –a diferencia de los fenómenos..

From the traditional point of view, power and truth are not related. Since 20th century there has been a social and historical breach in conventional assumptions about the relationship between power and truth. On one hand, it is generally accepted that scientific facts are considered artificial, in the sense of being constructed. This assumption neither implied any kind of fraud nor did it mean that they could be created ex-nihilo. But the interpretation of Kuhn as well as the subsequent developments (...) of the Strong Programme, successfully postulates that truth is merely a social issue. Since then, it has been increasingly suspected that any objective or neutral description of society is too difficult, rendering it completely illusory. That is why it is necessary to ask again for the relation between the structures of truth and the social structures of power and what kind of impact they have on contemporary sociological theory. In this paper, it is given two examples of that kind of enterprise related to two major leading sociologists: Bourdieu and Giddens. Desde el punto de vista tradicional, no hay asociación entre poder y verdad. Pero desde el Siglo XX existió un quiebre social e histórico en las presuposiciones convencionales acerca de la relación entre poder y verdad. De un lado, en general se acepta que los hechos científicos son artificiales en el sentido que son construidos y se asume que esto no implica algún tipo de fraude ni significa que ellos son creados ex-nihilo. Pero la interpretación de Kuhn, así como también los desarrollos posteriores del Programa Fuerte, permite postular que la verdad es un asunto puramente social. Desde entonces, se ha sospechado cada vez más que cualquier descripción neutral u objetiva de la sociedad es tan difícil que llega a ser completamente ilusoria. Por eso, es necesario preguntarse nuevamente por la relación entre las estructuras de la verdad y las estructuras sociales del poder y qué tipo de impacto ellas tienen en la teoría sociológica contemporánea. En este trabajo, se discuten dos ejemplos de ese tipo de empeño, relacionado con las obras de los sociólogos Bourdieu y Giddens. (shrink)

Is it OK to lie to Siri? Is it bad to mistreat a robot for our own pleasure? Under what condition should we grant a moral status to an artificial intelligence (AI) system? This paper looks at different arguments for granting moral status to an AI system: the idea of indirect duties, the relational argument, the argument from intelligence, the arguments from life and information, and the argument from sentience. In each but the last case, we find unresolved issues with (...) the particular argument, which leads us to move to a different one. We leave the idea of indirect duties aside since these duties do not imply considering an AI system for its own sake. The paper rejects the relational argument and the argument from intelligence. The argument from life may lead us to grant a moral status to an AI system, but only in a weak sense. Sentience, by contrast, is a strong argument for the moral status of an AI system—based, among other things, on the Aristotelian principle of equality: that same cases should be treated in the same way. The paper points out, however, that no AI system is sentient given the current level of technological development. (shrink)

Why are we proposing this anthology of articles drawn from Recherches de Science Religieuse in an English translation? On the eve of its centennial celebrations, the Journal, which has numerous subscribers and readers in English-speaking countries, decided to take stock of its rich heritage in the field of theology, as in that of religious science, embodied in its many past issues and their articles. Over these years and decades, the journal has built up a corpus of documents covering information and (...) thought specific to the French-language sphere of theology and religious sciences. We are also highly aware that the thought reflected in the Journal has taken paths, if inevitably diverse, that are nonetheless rich in encounters and confrontations with what was being taught and thought elsewhere. Such a rich exchange went on over the years that the question arose a decade ago of providing a bilingual, even a trilingual edition in order to facilitate access to the Journal's content. However, opinions from the English-speaking world and beyond converged at that time to encourage us to continue with renewed purpose as witnesses and actors of this French-language realm and to remain faithful to editing the journal in French. Today, it seems to us both useful and desirable to make this theological heritage accessible to a broader public. This first anthology has thus been composed around a fundamental theme, that of faith. (shrink)

La morale n'est pas seulement affaire de raison. Elle engage aussi l'imagination. Tout ce qui compte moralement dans une situation ne se donne pas d'emblee, au premier coup d'oeil. Pour percevoir ce qui importe, il faut changer de perspective, recadrer la situation ou la comparer avec des alternatives contrefactuelles. L'imagination nous permet ainsi de voir les choses autrement et d'elargir notre perception morale. Elle enrichit notre connaissance, comme le montre encore le recours aux experiences de pensee. Quels sont les mecanismes (...) psychologiques a l'oeuvre? Comment en tenir compte dans nos deliberations? Martin Gibert propose de repenser le role de l'imagination en morale a la lumiere des recherches les plus recentes en ethique et en psychologie. (shrink)

In this chapter, we discuss a selection of current views of the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). We focus on the different predictions they make, in particular with respect to the role of prefrontal cortex (PFC) during visual experiences, which is an area of critical interest and some source of contention. Our discussion of these views focuses on the level of functional anatomy, rather than at the neuronal circuitry level. We take this approach because we currently understand more about experimental (...) evidence at this coarse level and because these results are appropriate for arbitrating between current theoretical frameworks. We discuss the Two-Visual-Systems Hypothesis (Milner & Goodale 1995; 2006), Local Recurrency (Lamme 2010; Lamme 2006), Higher Order (Lau 2008; Lau & Rosenthal 2011) and Global Workspace theories (Baars 1997; Baars 2005; Dehaene & Naccache 2001; Dehaene 2014). Despite the apparent stark differences between conscious and unconscious perceptual processing, available evidence suggests that their neural substrates must be largely shared. This indicates that the difference in neural activity between conscious and unconscious perceptual processing is likely to be subtle and highly specialized. We argue that current experimental evidence about the involvement of specific activity in prefrontal cortex supports the higher order neural theory of consciousness. In consequence, imaging techniques that focus only on marked differences between conscious and unconscious level of activity are likely to be insensitive to the relevant neural activity patterns that underlie conscious experiences. Finally, it follows from the evidence we discuss that the functional advantages of conscious over unconscious perceptual processing may be more limited than commonly thought. (shrink)

The year 2010 marks the one-hundredth anniversary of the Recherches de Science Religieuse and provides an opportunity for the journal to explore its past, present, and prospects for the twenty-first century. In order to celebrate the event, this special commemorative issue calls upon authors from many different fields. "Commemoration" involves not only examining the past, however rich it may be, but also taking up the challenge of analyzing the present and reflecting upon the future. In the first section, diverse approaches (...) -- theological, sociological or historical -- are applied to an in-depth diagnosis of the present. The second part is dedicated to memory: the founding years during the modernist crisis and the major stages in the development of the journal under various directors until today, among them, Henri de Lubac and Joseph Moingt. Finally, this special issue is rounded off by a series of broad perspectives tracing out paths for the future of the disciplines at the heart of theology and religious science today, thus remaining faithful to the journal's original mission of "research in movement". (shrink)

When a circular coin is rotated in depth, is there any sense in which it comes to resemble an ellipse? While this question is at the center of a rich and divided philosophical tradition (with some scholars answering affirmatively and some negatively), Morales et al. (2020, 2021) took an empirical approach, reporting 10 experiments whose results favor such perspectival similarity. Recently, Burge and Burge (2022) offered a vigorous critique of this work, objecting to its approach and conclusions on both philosophical (...) and empirical grounds. Here, we answer these objections on both fronts. We show that Burge and Burge’s critique rests on misunderstandings of Morales et al.’s claims; of the relation between the data and conclusions; and of the philosophical context in which the work appears. Specifically, Burge and Burge attribute to us a much stronger (and stranger) view than we hold, involving the introduction of “a new entity” located “in some intermediate position(s) between the distal shape and the retinal image.” We do not hold this view. Indeed, once properly understood, most of Burge and Burge’s objections favor Morales et al.’s claims rather than oppose them. Finally, we discuss several questions that remain unanswered, and reflect on a productive path forward on these issues of foundational scientific and philosophical interest. (shrink)

Arguably the most foundational principle in perception research is that our experience of the world goes beyond the retinal image; we perceive the distal environment itself, not the proximal stimulation it causes. Shape may be the paradigm case of such “unconscious inference”: When a coin is rotated in depth, we infer the circular object it truly is, discarding the perspectival ellipse projected on our eyes. But is this really the fate of such perspectival shapes? Or does a tilted coin retain (...) an elliptical appearance even when we know it’s circular? This question has generated heated debate from Locke and Hume to the present; but whereas extant arguments rely primarily on introspection, this problem is also open to empirical test. If tilted coins bear a representational similarity to elliptical objects, then a circular coin should, when rotated, impair search for a distal ellipse. Here, nine experiments demonstrate that this is so, suggesting that perspectival shapes persist in the mind far longer than traditionally assumed. Subjects saw search arrays of three-dimensional “coins,” and simply had to locate a distally elliptical coin. Surprisingly, rotated circular coins slowed search for elliptical targets, even when subjects clearly knew the rotated coins were circular. This pattern arose with static and dynamic cues, couldn’t be explained by strategic responding or unfamiliarity, generalized across shape classes, and occurred even with sustained viewing. Finally, these effects extended beyond artificial displays to real-world objects viewed in naturalistic, full-cue conditions. We conclude that objects have a remarkably persistent dual character: their objective shape “out there,” and their perspectival shape “from here.”. (shrink)

Consciousness and confidence seem intimately related. Accordingly, some researchers use confidence ratings as a measure of, or proxy for, consciousness. Rosenthal discusses the potential connections between the two, and rejects confidence as a valid measure of consciousness. He argues that there are better alternatives to get at conscious experiences such as direct subjective reports of awareness (i.e. subjects’ reports of perceiving something or of the degree of visibility of a stimulus). In this chapter, we offer a different perspective. Confidence ratings (...) in general, and metacognitive measures in particular, may offer important advantages over subjective ratings. The arguments we offer here are supported by empirical, practical and socio-strategic considerations. However, we do not suggest consciousness and confidence are interchangeable. We recognize the limitations of confidence ratings in some experimental designs and for some research questions. Nevertheless, we also address a potential conceptual link between consciousness and confidence that stems from Rosenthal’s very own work on mental quality space theory. (shrink)

Hundreds of millions of rare biospecimens are stored in laboratories and biobanks around the world. Often, the researchers who possess these specimens do not plan to use them, while other researchers limit the scope of their work because they cannot acquire biospecimens that meet their needs. This situation raises an important and underexplored question: how should scientists allocate biospecimens that they do not intend to use? We argue that allocators should aim to maximise the social value of the research enterprise (...) when allocating scarce biospecimens. We provide an ethical framework for assessing the social value of proposed research projects and describe how the framework could be implemented. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Identity Identity of Latin American Philosophy Four Approaches History of the Controversy Conclusion References Further Reading.

Dynamic Theodicy (DT) is a broad concept we bring up to designate some modern Philosophical Theology attempts to reconcile the necessary and perfect existence of God with the contingent characteristics of human life. In this paper we analyze such approaches and discuss how they have become incomprehensible because the metaphysical assumptions implicit in these explanations have lost their intrinsic relation to the natural human desire for salvation. In the first part we show Charles Hartshorne's DT-model, arising from the modal logic (...) of perfection, and the modern rational problems of this position in making infinite-necessary Being (God) and finite-contingent being (human) compatible. We note that at the heart of the contradictions in this DT account is a dialectical mode of thinking that makes it difficult to find a correct solution to this dichotomy, and to assume a human desire that could be considered related to lifelong goals. In the second part, supported by the proposal of Hans Urs von Balthasar's DT, we develop the concepts of bodily vulnerability, corporeal intentionality, and natural desire for salvation, which come from an Aristotelian-Thomistic thought. This theory is established in order to build an argument, following Alasdair MacIntyre’s ethical framework, on how to make possible the recovery of a metaphysical and anthropological desire that transcends natural aging and goes beyond death. We conclude that both human dependence and the virtues that arise naturally when human beings decide to seek the good of their transcendent condition, make it possible to recover the natural desire for salvation through divine and human love. (shrink)

In 1961, at the age of nineteen, Jorge J. E. Gracia escaped from the island of Cuba by passing himself off as a Catholic seminarian. He arrived in the United States with just a few spare belongings and his mother's diamond ring secured in a hole in one of his shoes. With a Diamond in My Shoe tells the story of Gracia's quest for identity--from his early years in Cuba and as a refugee in Miami to his formative role (...) in institutionalizing the field of Latin American philosophy in the US academy. Committed to integrating into Anglo America without forgetting his roots, Gracia reflects on his struggles and successes as an immigrant and academic, bringing a philosopher's eye to bear on his personal and professional development as a leading Latinx scholar. (shrink)

'Sound Effects' collects original articles on English and American prose fiction which analyse vocal phenomena by using the psychoanalytic concept of the object voice - introduced by J. Lacan and theorised by M. Dolar - as their interpretative tool.

Research on Augmented Reality in education has demonstrated that AR applications designed with diverse components boost student motivation in educational settings. However, most of the research conducted to date, does not define exactly what those components are and how these components positively affect student motivation. This study, therefore, attempts to identify some of the components that positively affect student motivation in mobile AR learning experiences to contribute to the design and development of motivational AR learning experiences for the Vocational Education (...) and Training level of education. To identify these components, a research model constructed from the literature was empirically validated with data obtained from two sources: 35 students from four VET institutes interacting with an AR application for learning for a period of 20 days, and a self-report measure obtained from the Instructional Materials Motivation Survey. We found that the following variables: use of scaffolding, real-time feedback, degree of success, time on-task and learning outcomes are positively correlated with the four dimensions of the ARCS model of motivation: Attention, Relevance, Confidence, and Satisfaction. Implications of these results are also described. (shrink)

Die Beitrage des Sammelbandes widmen sich aus theologisch-philosophischer Perspektive der historischen Rezeption und der systematischen Relevanz des Freiheitsstreits zwischen Martin Luther und Erasmus von Rotterdam. Im systematischen Zentrum steht das jeweilige freiheitstheoretische Verstandnis des Menschen, seiner epistemischen und voluntativen Vermogen und seines metaphysischen Ortes innerhalb der Schopfung, besonders sein Verhaltnis zu Gott. Aus historischer Perspektive wird die Rezeption von Luthers Freiheitsbegriff durch Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Schelling und in der analytischen Philosophie untersucht. Mit Beitragen von Christine Axt-Piscalar, Frank Dettinger, Thomas Frisch, (...) Volker Gerhardt, Friedrich Hermanni, Amit Kravitz, Jorg Noller, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Birgit Recki, Georg Sans SJ, Ruben Schneider und Gunther Wenz. (shrink)

Leibniz was probably the last universal scholar in modern times who made original and innovative achievements in all the essential fields of knowledge of his time: as a reform-oriented lawyer, a multilateral thinking diplomat, as a mathematician of infinitesimal calculus, as the inventor of a calculating machine and in the mining of horizontal wind power, as an organizer of science and as one of the first historians who strived for source-critical methodical objectivity. However, this baroque diversity can only be understood (...) from the center of a monadological philosophy, which wants to establish the unity of scientific worldview and metaphysical concept of the world. It is distorted in the classical reception because only Leibniz the Theodicy was known. The topicality of Leibniz today consists in re-exposing the original basic idea of unity in diversity and asking how it can be made fruitful for philosophical and political thought in the 21st century. This book is a translation of the original German 1st edition Leibniz und die Folgen by Jörg Zimmer, published by J.B. Metzler, imprint of Springer-Verlag GmbH, part of Springer Nature in 2018. The translation was done with the help of artificial intelligence. A subsequent human revision was done primarily in terms of content, so that the book will read stylistically differently from a conventional translation. Springer Nature works continuously to further the development of tools for the production of books and on the related technologies to support the authors. (shrink)

Is it OK to lie to Siri? Is it bad to mistreat a robot for our own pleasure? Under what condition should we grant a moral status to an artificial intelligence system? This paper looks at different arguments for granting moral status to an AI system: the idea of indirect duties, the relational argument, the argument from intelligence, the arguments from life and information, and the argument from sentience. In each but the last case, we find unresolved issues with the (...) particular argument, which leads us to move to a different one. We leave the idea of indirect duties aside since these duties do not imply considering an AI system for its own sake. The paper rejects the relational argument and the argument from intelligence. The argument from life may lead us to grant a moral status to an AI system, but only in a weak sense. Sentience, by contrast, is a strong argument for the moral status of an AI system—based, among other things, on the Aristotelian principle of equality: that same cases should be treated in the same way. The paper points out, however, that no AI system is sentient given the current level of technological development. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question whetherbullshitis a reasonable pragmatic category. In the first part of the paper, drawing on the insights of Harry Frankfurt’s seminal essay, bullshit is defined as an act of insincere asserting where the speaker shows a loose concern for the truth, and does not want the addressee to become aware of condition. The author adds to this definition the condition requiring that the bullshitter expresses morecertaintythan is adequate with respect to condition. In the second part of (...) the paper, it is discussed whether the above definition can cope with special types of bullshit considered to be a challenge to Frankfurt’s definition. These areevasive bullshitting,bullshit lies, andbald-faced bullshitting. It is shown that there is hope for establishing a reasonable pragmatic category of bullshitting if it is related to certain levels of pragmatic description, e.g. conversational implicatures, that can explain the putative challenges. (shrink)