This article provides a comment on The Force of Law, which is Schauer's new and illuminating contribution to the place of law in our societies and in our lives. It constitutes a strong defence of the importance of coercion in law. First, I consider cases where the law is not able to motivate human behaviour adequately, in order to show that legal coercion is not always justified. Second, I examine the Rawlsian distinction between the ideal and the nonideal theory and (...) its application to the theory of law. Third, I tentatively argue that coercion has no place in ideal theory, but a core place in nonideal theory. In this way, it may be plausible to reconstruct the motivation to accept the law, at least when the law is normatively justified. (shrink)

This paper deals with the question of the conflict of constitutional rights with regard to basic rights. Two extreme accounts are outlined: the subsumptive approach and the particularistic approach, that embody two main conceptions of practical rationality. Between the two approaches there is room for a range of options, two of which are examined: the proportionalist approach, which conserves the scope of rights restricting their stringency, and the specificationist approach, which preserves the stringency of rights restricting their scope. I will (...) present arguments in defence of the latter. (shrink)

This paper deals with the possibility of faultless disagreement in law. It does this by looking to other spheres in which faultless disagreement appears to be possible, mainly in matters of taste and ethics. Three possible accounts are explored: the realist account, the relativist account, and the expressivist account. The paper tries to show that in the case of legal disagreements, there is a place for an approach that can take into account our intuitions in the sense that legal disagreements (...) are genuine and at times faultless. (shrink)

In this paper, I intend to articulate an answer to the powerful particularist objection against the notion of moral and legal reasoning based on universal principles. I defend a particular way of specifying and contextualising universal principles. I claim that this account preserves legal and moral justification conceived as subsumption to legal and moral principles. I also try to show how virtues can be reconciled with this account, i.e. what is the right place for virtues in legal adjudication. To carry (...) this out, I draw on a virtue epistemology. (shrink)

En este artículo, se analiza la cuestión de si la existencia del derecho depende necesariamente de la moralidad. La cuestión que ha enfrentado a las doctrinas del derecho natural con el positivismo jurídico. Se trata de mostrar que dicho debate esconde, al menos tres cuestiones diferentes, que requieren respuestas diversas: 1) La cuestión semántica de si las normas positivas injustas son derecho, 2) la cuestión metafísica de si la existencia del contenido del derecho está fundada en hechos morales y 3) (...) la cuestión epistémica de si el contenido del derecho debe ser identificado sin recurrir a consideraciones morales. Se concluye que la primera cuestión es una mera disputa verbal. Se dan algunos argumentos para aceptar la tesis metafísica. Y una respuesta afirmativa a la tercera cuestión es puesta en duda analizando la doctrina de la autoridad de Joseph Raz y, también, tratando de mostrar que el hecho de que algo sea concebible no conlleva que sea metafísicamente posible. (shrink)

Some philosophers have recently emphasized the similarities between lawmaking and the production of linguistic utterances in ordinary communication. Based on these similarities, they have defended a theory of legal interpretation that identifies the legal content of a lawmaking act with the communicative content of the authoritative “utterance”. While different versions of the theory differ with respect to which level of utterance content they regard as relevant, they agree that the theory’s scope is fully general in that it applies to all (...) legal systems. In this paper, we argue that this commitment of the theory is problematic. By examining the role of interpretative arguments in legal interpretation, we argue that there is a tension between this commitment and the doctrine of the rule of recognition. In light of this, we argue that Hartian positivism is only compatible with a weakened or “minimal” version of the theory. Insofar as both the communication theory and Hartian positivism provide true insights on how legal content is determined, this result gives us reason to accept only a minimal version of the theory. (shrink)

This article addresses the use of foreign law in constitutional adjudication. We draw on the ideas of wide reflective equilibrium and public reason in order to defend an engagement model of comparative adjudication. According to this model, the judicial use of foreign law is justified if it proceeds by testing and mutually adjusting the principles and rulings of our constitutional doctrines against reasonable alternatives, as represented by the principles and rulings of other reasonable doctrines. By this, a court points to (...) a wide reflective equilibrium, justifying its own interpretations with reasonable arguments, i.e. arguments that are acceptable from the perspectives defined by other constitutional doctrines, as endorsed by other courts. The point of a judicial engagement of this sort is to work out an overlap between different, reasonable, doctrines in the judicial forum, as part of a liberal forum of public reason. Here, the exercise of public reason filters out the premises of comprehensive doctrines so as to leave us in the region of an overlapping consensus: a region of mid-level principles that can be shared, notwithstanding the fact of legal pluralism. (shrink)

Este libro reúne seis trabajos del autor que procuran suministrar un espacio conceptual para la adecuada comprensión de las prácticas jurídicas en nuestras sociedades. Se trata de elaborar un concepto de derecho, y dar cuenta de sus relaciones con la moralidad, que acoja la posibilidad de que la aplicación judicial del derecho constituya un ámbito en donde la moralidad y de dar cuenta de sus relaciones con la moralidad, que acoja la posibilidad de que la aplicación judicial del derecho constituya (...) un ámbito en donde la moralidad y el derecho se entrecrucen. (shrink)

In his influential paper Legal Reasons, Sources and Gaps' reprinted in The Authority of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), Raz says that legal gaps only exist when law speaks with uncertain voice or when it speaks with many voices, but there are no gaps when law is silent. In this later case, rules of closure, which are analytically true, prevent from the occurrence of gaps. According to Raz, if there is a gap in a legal system, then both the (...) claim that there is a conclusive legal reason to perform a certain action, and its negation are neither true nor false. Therefore, one of the Raz's most important contributions to the solution of the problem of legal gaps is to remark that legal discourse is not altogether governed by the principle of bivalence. However, philosophers often claim that the denial of bivalence leads to a logical inconsistency. If this claim were true, then Raz's solution to the problem of gaps would be seriously threatened. In this paper we show ‐ with the aid of a sophisticated analytical tool, i.e. von Wright's Truth Logic ‐ that the rejection of bivalence only commits us to accept the trivial conclusion that propositions can lack truth‐values. For this reason, Raz's paper can still be regarded as a good starting‐point for analyzing the relationships among norms, practical reasoning and legal gaps. However, we also show that in order to admit propositions which are neither true nor false, Raz's theses must be reformulated. Otherwise, the claim that there is no gap when law is silent would not be compatible with the rejection of bivalence. (shrink)

In his article on pre-conventions, Celano presents, what the author calls, the Ontological Commitment Thesis and the Normative Bite Thesis. In this short comment, the author argues that the two theses are together both incompatible with the idea that pre-conventions are facts which have causal powers in human behaviour; also, if the ontological thesis is abandoned, normative determination could not be obtained. In other terms, the author argues that either pre-conventions are part of our causal explanation of human behaviour or (...) pre-conventions are abstract entities able to determine human behaviour normatively. In the first case, pre-conventions lack normative meaning, while in the second pre-conventions cannot integrate our causal explanation of human actions. Tertium non datur. (shrink)

This paper deals with the question of the conflict of constitutional rights which acknowledge basic rights. Alexy’s conception of balancing is the most relevant approach to this question in legal theory. Alexy’s proportionalist account intends to conserve the scope of rights restricting their stringency. This conception is criticized defending, in a specificationist account, the preservation of the stringency of rights restricting their scope.

En "Legal Reasons, Sources and Gaps", Raz señala que las lagunas jurídicas existen sólo cuando el derecho habla con voz incierta o cuando habla con muchas voces, pero que no hay lagunas cuando el derecho guarda silencio. En este último caso habría reglas de clausura, analíticamente verdaderas, que impiden la ocurrencia de esas lagunas. Según Raz, si hay una laguna en un sistema jurídico, entonces no es verdadero ni falso que exista una razón concluyente para ejecutar cierta acción. Así, una (...) de las contribuciones más importantes de Raz a la solución del problema de las lagunas jurídicas es subrayar que el discurso jurídico no está completamente controlado por la bivalencia. Sin embargo, a menudo se sostiene que el rechazo de la bivalencia conduce a contradicciones. Si esta afirmación fuese verdadera, entonces la solución de Raz al problema de las lagunas jurídicas se vería seriamente amenazada. En este artículo mostramos, con ayuda de una herramienta analítica sofisticada, i.e., la lógica de la verdad de G.H. von Wright, que el rechazo de la bivalencia sólo nos compromete a aceptar la conclusión trivial de que puede haber proposiciones que no son verdaderas ni falsas. Por esta razón, el trabajo de Raz todavía puede ser considerado un buen punto de partida para analizar las relaciones entre normas, razonamiento práctico y lagunas jurídicas. Sin embargo, también mostramos que para admitir proposiciones que no son verdaderas ni falsas, las tesis de Raz deben ser reformuladas. De otra manera, la tesis de que no existen lagunas cuando el derecho guarda silencio no sería compatible con el rechazo de la bivalencia. /// In his paper "Legal Reasons, Sources and Gaps", Raz says that legal gaps only exist when law speaks with uncertain voice or when it speaks with many voices, but there are no gaps when law is silent. In this later case, rules of closure, which are analytically true, prevent from the occurrence of gaps. According to Raz, if there is a gap in a legal system, then both the claim that there is a conclusive legal reason to perform a certain action, and its negation are neither true nor false. Therefore, one of the Raz's most important contributions to the solution of the problem of legal gaps is to remark that legal discourse is not altogether governed by the principie of bivalence. However, philosophers often claim that the denial of bivalence leads to a logical inconsistency. If this claim were true, then Raz's solution to the problem of gaps would be seriously threatened. In this paper we show--with the aid of a sophisticated analytical tool, i.e., von Wright's truth-logic--that the rejection of bivalence only commits us to accept the trivial conclusion that propositions can lack truth-values. For this reason, Raz's paper can still be regarded as a good starting-point for analyzing the relationships between norms, practical reasoning and legal gaps. However, we also show that in order to admit propositions which are neither true nor false, Raz's theses must be reformulated. Otherwise, the claim that there is no gap when law is silent would not be compatible with the rejection of bivalence. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza las principales aportaciones de Ronald Dworkin a la filosofía del derecho y a la filosofía política mostrando que provienen de una visión más amplia que integra el derecho y la moral. La exposición se divide en dos partes. La primera aborda los argumentos de Dworkin para rechazar el positivismo jurídico y presenta su idea de derecho. La segunda se centra en la fundamentación ética del liberalismo y en el criterio distributivo que propone Dworkin.

RESUMEN En este trabajo se analizan las principales ideas de John Rawls acerca de la naturaleza del derecho y del razonamiento jurídico. Partiendo de un trabajo de Ronald Dworkin, y básicamente de acuerdo con él, se exponen las críticas dworkinianas a la doctrina rawlsiana de la razón pública, y se presenta un modo en el cual Rawls podría replicarlas. El objetivo del trabajo es mostrar la fecundidad de las ideas rawlsianas para nuestra concepción del derecho en sociedades democráticas, caracterizadas por (...) el hecho del pluralismo. (shrink)

We analyse the relationship between applicability and effectiveness of legal norms from a philosophical perspective. In particular, we distinguish between two concepts of applicability. The external applicability of norms refers to institutional duties; a norm N is externally applicable if and only if a judge is legally obliged to apply N to some case c. Internal applicability refers instead to the sphere of validity of legal norms. A norm N is internally applicable to actions regulated by its sphere of validity. (...) We also explore the consequences of a thesis which maintains that applicability restricts the concept of effectiveness, so that only applicable norms can be considered effective. Our analysis illustrates that a proper reconstruction of the concept of applicability is of great importance not only for understanding the concept of effectiveness but also for providing insight into the nature of law. (shrink)

En este breve texto el autor nos introduce a la polémica entre Ricardo Guastini y Rafael Hernández Marín en torno a la interpretación del derecho. En dicha polémica Guastini defiende el escepticismo, mientras que Hernández Marín defiende el cognoscitivismo. Estas maneras diferentes de entender la interpretación jurídica son puestas a prueba en un interesante intercambio de ideas que nos permite apreciar los alcances y límites de cada posición.

In this book, I present the results of an investigation which began with an extended stay at Oxford's Balliol College during the first half of 1995. My visit to Oxford was made possible by a grant from the Spanish Ministerio de Educaci6n y Ciencia. My sincere thanks go to Joseph Raz who served as my supervisor in Oxford. For several points of the present study, conversations with Timothy Endicott in Oxford were also of great help. The book is part of (...) a larger project of investigation, directed by Albert Calsami glia, which is a joint effort of a group of legal philosophers from the Universitat Pom peu Fabra and the Universitat de Girona, and which also receives financial support from the Spanish Ministerio de Educaci6n y Ciencia. An earlier version of the manuscript was presented in June 1996 to the selection committee for a tenured professorship in Legal Philosophy at the Universitat de Girona. The members of the committee were Francisco Laporta, Albert Calsamiglia, Gregorio Peces-Barba, Camilo J. Cela Conde, and Francesca Puigpelat. I am grateful to all of them for their comments, which have been extremely useful in preparing the final ver sion of this book. (shrink)

Una forma clásica de explicar el significado de una oración es establecer sus condiciones deverdad. Sin embargo, dado que sólo las oraciones declarativas encajan con este tipo de análisis, las oraciones (e.g. imperativas) que carecen de valor de verdad quedan fuera de este análisis. Con el objeto de evitar esta dificultad, algunas veces se ha sugerido que el cumplimiento de un imperativo les el valor semántico de I, y que este valor depende del concepto de verdad. En este artículo, explicamos (...) esta sugerencia mediante un lenguaje artificial: el lenguaje LN. Nuestra propuesta consiste en suministrar una reconstrucción del concepto de eficacia a partir de la relación de cumplimiento, analógamente a la reconstrucción del concepto de verdad a partir de la relación de satisfacción. Nuestras conclusiones principales son las siguientes: 1) el significado de una oración imperativa es establecido por sus condiciones de eficacia y 2) esta teoría del significado de los imperativos suministra una base semántica, adeucada para la lógica deóntica.A classical way of explaining the meaning of certain sentences is to establish their truth-conditions. However, since only declarative sentences fit this kind of analysis, sentences (e.g. imperatives) which lack truth-value remain outside the theory of meaning. In order to avoid this difficulty, it is sometimes suggested both that compliance with an imperative I is the semantic value of I, and that this value is dependent on the concept of truth. In this article, we explain this suggestion with the help of a constructed language: the artificial language NL. Our proposal Is to provide a reconstruction of the concept of effectiveness from the relation of compliance, on the analogy of the reconstruction of the concept of truth from the relation of satisfaction. Our main conclusions are: 1) the meaning of a imperative sentence would be established by its effectiveness-conditions and 2) this theory of meaning of imperatives would provide a semantic basis, suitable to the deontic logic. (shrink)

El objeto de este artículo es doble. Por una parte, examina el uso que Vives hace de la lengua y del lenguaje, y, por otra parte, indica sus aportaciones al campo de la traducción e interpretación. La diversidad temática presente en su obra hace que su persona sea un punto de referencia para diferentes campos científicos, entre ellos la Filología. Para Vives, tanto el acercamiento filológico, como el aprendizaje de la lengua no sólo deben tener en cuenta la lengua desde (...) un punto teórico, sino también sociocultural. Su especial interés por las lenguas le llevó a realizar un considerable esfuerzo filológico haciendo lecturas e introducciones de varios textos clásicos latinos y también griegos, y transmitiendo su opinión acerca de la forma de realizar versiones o interpretaciones. (shrink)