Ingarden distinguishes four strata making up the structure of the literary work of art: the stratum of word sounds and sound-complexes; the stratum of meaning units; the stratum of represented objectivities (characters, actions, settings, and so forth); and the stratum of schematized aspects (perspectives under which the represented objectivities are given to the reader). It is not only works of literature which manifest this four-fold structure but also certain borderline cases such as newspaper articles, scientific works, biographies, and so forth. (...) Ingarden specifies what is characteristic of a work of literature by asserting that all declarative sentences appearing in the stratum of meaning units of such work possess what he calls a quasi-judgmental character. We discuss here Ingarden’s theory of quasi-judgments and draw out its implication that all works of literature are works of fiction through and through. (shrink)
Hildebrand oftentimes said that his disciples—even when they believed they were deeply indebted to him for knowledge, wisdom, and truth—had a duty to criticize and overcome any error they would find in his philosophy, because the sole purpose of his writings was to state the truth. He himself gave some extraordinary examples of self-critique. In the following, I wish to treat such an example: a significant error about the nature of the free volitional response, which Stephen Schwarz was the first (...) to note and which Hildebrand himself later explicitly revoked. Furthermore, I wish to show that Hildebrand’s rejecting this error makes his ethics as a whole much more consistent, and opens the way to bringing his philosophy of love closer to our experience. (shrink)
In an enlightening dialogue with Descartes, Kant, Husserl and Gadamer, Professor Seifert argues that the original inspiration of phenomenology was nothing other than the primordial insight of philosophy itself, the foundation of philosophia perennis . His radical rethinking of the phenomenological method results in a universal, objectivist philosophy in direct continuity with Plato, Aristotle and Augustine. In order to validate the classical claim to know autonomous being, the author defends Husserl's methodological principle "Back to things themselves" from empiricist and idealist (...) critics, including the later Husserl, and replies to the arguments of Kant which attempt to discredit the knowability of things in themselves. Originally published in 1982, this book culminates in a phenomenological and critical unfolding of the Augustinian cogito , as giving access to immutable truth about necessary essences and the real existence of personal being. (shrink)
Libet considers “positive free voluntary acts” as mere illusions, admitting free will only as Veto. This essay shows seven ways by which we can gain evident knowledge about positive and negative free will, through: (1) the immediate evidence of free will in the cogito, (2) the light of the necessary essence of free will, (3) the experience of moral “oughts” in whose experience freedom is co-given, (4) any denial of human free will entails its assertion or recognition, (5) the objects (...) and subjects of certain acts disclose free will, (6) in a world without free agents there would be no explanation of the beginning of efficient causality, and (7) Veto-power of the will logically presupposes positive free will. Libet’s experiments confirm that the free decision to act at a certain time and the preceding and accompanying free acts make new energy to burst forth in the brain. (shrink)
This book makes four bold claims: 1) life is an ultimate datum, open to philosophical analysis and irreducible to physical reality; hence all materialist-reductionist explanations - most current theories - of life are false. 2) All life presupposes "soul" without which a being would at best fake life. 3) The concept of life is analogous and the most direct access to life in its irreducibility is gained through consciousness; 4) All life possesses an objective and intrinsic value that needs to (...) be respected, human life possesses beyond this an inviolable dignity. Life and personal life are "pure perfections," it being absolutely better to possess life than not to possess it.Chapter 1: the metaphysical essence and the many meanings of 'life,' as well as its 'transcendental' character. Chapter 2: the irreducibility of biological life, its amazing empirical and philosophically intelligible essential features, and the ways of knowing them. Chapter 3: the immediate evidence and indubitable givenness of mental, conscious life as well as questions of death and immortality. Chapter 4: the inviolable objective dignity of personal life and its self-transcendence; a new theory of the fourfold source of human dignity and rights. Chapter 5 : methods and results of philosophy versus those of empirical life-sciences. (shrink)
Este estudo tem por objeto a filosofia scotista dos transcendentais, em especial a filosofia dos transcendentais como “perfeições puras”. Isso levará a uma consideração particular da “liberdade” como uma perfeição pura, bem como à concepção de um novo conceito de amor, não presente no eudemonismo aristotélicotomístico. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Duns Scotus. Filosofia dos transcendentais. Perfeições puras. Liberdade. Amor. Crítica ao eudemonismo. ABSTRACT The object of this study is Scotus’s philosophy of the transcendentals, particularly the philosophy of the transcendentals as “pure perfections”. (...) That will bring into a special consideration of “freedom” as a pure perfection, as well as into the formulation of a new concept of love, not to be found in the Aristotelian-Thomistic eudaimonism. KEY WORDS – Duns Scotus. Philosophy of the transcendentals. Pure perfections. Freedom. Love. Critique on eudaimonism. (shrink)
The author studies Scheler’s essay, “Repentance and Rebirth,” gathering together and interpreting all the insights of Scheler on repentance, and often reading them in the light of Dietrich von Hildebrand’s work in the philosophy of religion. The author examines Scheler’s critique of the reductionist accounts of repentance as well as Scheler’s own account. He gives particular attention to one basic problem in Scheler’s account of repentance, namely, a tendency to let forgiveness arise in the repentant person simply by the force (...) of the act of repenting and not to give due weight to the divine initiative without which there is no forgiveness. (shrink)
In answer to jordan's "disputed questions" the reasons why gilsonianism has been chosen as interlocutor are clarified; the analogous character of the "transcendental sense" of essence and the "primary sense" (first analogate) of essence ((1) "essence of and in really existing beings," (2) ideal and immutable eide, (3) essence of the absolute, real and eternal being) are further elucidated. The main arguments in the essay for "ideal essences" are further explained and the main charges answered by the speculative attempt to (...) reconcile clearly given ideal "essences" with a divine being (subject of philosophical proof) which is not limited by "ideas" like plato's demiourg. Existential thomism (gilson) is credited with having referred to an unmistakably given important metaphysical "principle": existence, which is then wrongly "absolutized," while jordan's "absolutized" "esse" is suspected to refer to no single original datum; the limitation implied in "essence" seems to be held on the basis of a "concoction" of existence, being and essence. (shrink)
What is philosophy? This question (in this case, a philosophical question) deals with the problem of philosophy as a science. The philosophy origin is the "admiration at universal". Husserl's Phenomenology wants to resolve this question searching an "a priori" sintetic. This is not the kantian answer, non a subjective answer. It is a new consideration of experience as the author wants to show.
La cuestión de cuántas categorías hay y cuáles son depende de otra más esencial, la de saber cuál es la naturaleza de las categorías. A su vez, la respuesta a esta cuestión exige distinguir con claridad las categorías ontológicas de los transcendentales, de los modos de ser y de las categorías lógicas y las lingüísticas. Solo tras haber trazado estas distinciones, el autor esboza una respuesta a la pregunta de cuál es el número de las categorías.