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  1. Doing Without Representing.Andy Clark & Josefa Toribio - 1994 - Synthese 101 (3):401-31.
    Connectionism and classicism, it generally appears, have at least this much in common: both place some notion of internal representation at the heart of a scientific study of mind. In recent years, however, a much more radical view has gained increasing popularity. This view calls into question the commitment to internal representation itself. More strikingly still, this new wave of anti-representationalism is rooted not in armchair theorizing but in practical attempts to model and understand intelligent, adaptive behavior. In this paper (...)
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  2. State Versus Content: The Unfair Trial of Perceptual Nonconceptualism.Josefa Toribio - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (3):351-361.
    It has recently been pointed out that perceptual nonconceptualism admits of two different and logically independent interpretations. On the first (content) view, perceptual nonconceptualism is a thesis about the kind of content perceptual experiences have. On the second (state) view, perceptual nonconceptualism is a thesis about the relation that holds between a subject undergoing a perceptual experience and its content. For the state nonconceptualist, it thus seems consistent to hold that both perceptual experiences and beliefs share the same (conceptual) content, (...)
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  3. Nonconceptual Content.Josefa Toribio - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (3):445–460.
    Nonconceptualists maintain that there are ways of representing the world that do not reflect the concepts a creature possesses. They claim that the content of these representational states is genuine content because it is subject to correctness conditions, but it is nonconceptual because the creature to which we attribute it need not possess any of the concepts involved in the specification of that content. Appeals to nonconceptual content have seemed especially useful in attempts to capture the representational properties of perceptual (...)
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  4.  42
    Visual Experience: Rich but Impenetrable.Josefa Toribio - forthcoming - Synthese:1-18.
    According to so-called “thin” views about the content of experience, we can only visually experience low-level features such as colour, shape, texture or motion. According to so-called “rich” views, we can also visually experience some high-level properties, such as being a pine tree or being threatening. One of the standard objections against rich views is that high-level properties can only be represented at the level of judgment. In this paper, I first challenge this objection by relying on some recent studies (...)
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  5.  24
    Social Vision: Breaking a Philosophical Impasse?Josefa Toribio - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):611-615.
    I argue that findings in support of Adams and Kveraga’s functional forecast model of emotion expression processing help settle the debate between rich and sparse views of the content of perceptual experience. In particular, I argue that these results in social vision suggest that the distinctive phenomenal character of experiences involving high-level properties such as emotions and social traits is best explained by their being visually experienced as opposed to being brought about by perceptual judgments.
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  6. How Do We Know How?Josefa Toribio - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):39 – 52.
    I raise some doubts about the plausibility of Stanley and Williamson's view that all knowledge-how is just a species of propositional knowledge. By tackling the question of what is involved in entertaining a proposition, I try to show that Stanley and Williamson's position leads to an uncomfortable dilemma. Depending on how we understand the notion of contemplating a proposition, either intuitively central cases of knowing-how cannot be thus classified or we lose our grip on the very idea of propositional knowledge, (...)
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  7.  23
    Nonconceptualism and the Cognitive Impenetrability of Early Vision.Josefa Toribio - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (5):621-642.
    (2014). Nonconceptualism and the cognitive impenetrability of early vision. Philosophical Psychology: Vol. 27, No. 5, pp. 621-642. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2014.893386.
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  8.  55
    Sensorimotor Chauvinism?Andy Clark & Josefa Toribio - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):979-980.
    O'Regan and Noe present a wonderfully detailed and comprehensive defense of a position whose broad outline we absolutely and unreservedly endorse. They are right, it seems to us, to stress the intimacy of conscious content and embodied action, and to counter the idea of a Grand Illusion with the image of an agent genuinely in touch, via active exploration, with the rich and varied visual scene. This is an enormously impressive achievement, and we hope that the comments that follow will (...)
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  9.  73
    What We Do When We Judge.Josefa Toribio - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):345-367.
    In this paper I argue on two fronts. First, I press for the view that judging is a type of mental action, as opposed to those who think that judging is involuntary and hence not an action. Second, I argue that judging is specifically a type of non-voluntary mental action. My account of the non-voluntary nature of the mental act of judging differs, however, from standard non-voluntarist views, according to which ‘non-voluntary’ just means regulated by epistemic reasons. In addition, judging (...)
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  10. Ruritania and Ecology.Josefa Toribio - 1995 - In Philosophical Issues. Atascadero: Ridgeview. pp. 188-195.
  11.  86
    Free Belief.Josefa Toribio - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):327-36.
    The main goal of this paper is to show that Pettit and Smith’s (1996) argument concerning the nature of free belief is importantly incomplete. I accept Pettit and Smith’s emphasis upon normative constraints governing responsible believing and desiring, and their claim that the responsibly believing agent needs to possess an ability to believe (or desire) otherwise when believing (desiring) wrongly. But I argue that their characterization of these constraints does not do justice to one crucial factor, namely, the presence of (...)
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  12. Semantic Responsibility.Josefa Toribio - 2002 - Philosophical Explorations 1 (1):39-58.
    In this paper I attempt to develop a notion of responsibility (semantic responsibility) that is to the notion of belief what epistemic responsibility is to the notion of justification. 'Being semantically responsible' is shown to involve the fulfilment of cognitive duties which allow the agent to engage in the kind of reason-laden discourses which render her beliefs appropriately sensitive to correction. The concept of semantic responsibility suggests that the notion of belief found in contemporary philosophical debates about content implicitly encompasses (...)
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  13.  37
    Compositionality, Iconicity, and Perceptual Nonconceptualism.Josefa Toribio - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):177-193.
    This paper concerns the role of the structural properties of representations in determining the nature of their content. I take as a starting point Fodor's (2007) and Heck's (2007) recent arguments making the iconic structure of perceptual representations essential in establishing their content as content of a different (nonconceptual) kind. I argue that the prima facie state?content error this strategy seems to display is nothing but a case of ?state?content error error,? i.e., the mistake of considering that the properties that (...)
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  14. Meaning, Dispositions, and Normativity.Josefa Toribio - 1999 - Minds and Machines 9 (3):399-413.
    In a recent paper, Paul Coates defends a sophisticated dispositional account which allegedly resolves the sceptical paradox developed by Kripke in his monograph on Wittgenstein's treatment of following a rule (Kripke, 1982). Coates' account appeals to a notion of 'homeostasis', unpacked as a subject's second-order disposition to maintain a consistent pattern of extended first-order dispositions regarding her linguistic behavior. This kind of account, Coates contends, provides a naturalistic model for the normativity of intentional properties and thus resolves Kripke's sceptical paradox. (...)
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  15. Meaning and Other Non-Biological Categories.Josefa Toribio - 1998 - Philosophical Papers 27 (2):129-150.
    In this paper I display a general metaphysical assumption that characterizes basic naturalistic views and that is inherited, in a residual form, by their leading teleological rivals. The assumption is that intentional states require identifiable inner vehicles and that to explain intentional properties we must develop accounts that bind specific contents to specific vehicles. I show that this assumption is deeply rooted in representationalist and reductionist theories of content and I argue that it is deeply inappropriate. I sketch the main (...)
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  16. Mindful Belief: Accountability, Expertise, and Cognitive Kinds.Josefa Toribio - 2002 - Theoria 68 (3):224-49.
    It is sometimes said that humans are unlike other animals in at least one crucial respect. We do not simply form beliefs, desires and other mental states, but are capable of caring about our mental states in a distinctive way. We can care about the justification of our beliefs, and about the desirability of our desires. This kind of observation is usually made in discussions of free will and moral responsibility. But it has profound consequences, or so I shall argue, (...)
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  17.  61
    Ecological Content.Josefa Toribio - 1997 - Pragmatics and Cognition 5 (2):253-281.
    The paper has a negative and a positive side. The negative side argues that neither the classical notions of narrow nor wide content are suitable for the purposes of psychological explanation. The positive side shows how to characterize an alternative notion of content (ecological content) that meets those requirements. This account is supported by (a) a way of conceptualizing computation that is constitutively dependent upon properties external to the system and (b) some empirical research in developmental psychology. My main contention (...)
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  18.  61
    Implicit Conception of Implicit Conceptions.Josefa Toribio - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:115-120.
  19.  14
    Mind and Supermind – Keith Frankish. [REVIEW]Josefa Toribio - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):139–142.
  20.  22
    Michael Dummett (1925-2011).Josefa Toribio - 2012 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):163-169.
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  21.  33
    Does Seeing Red Require Thinking About Red Things?Josefa Toribio - 2009 - Think 8 (22):29-39.
    We continuously form perceptual beliefs about the world based on how things appear to us in our perceptual experiences. I see that the ripe tomato in front of me is red and I form the belief that this tomato is red based on my seeing it, i.e. based on my veridical perceptual experience of this red tomato. Perceptual experiences and beliefs are representational mental states. Both are defined not by what they are, i.e. their physical properties, but by what they (...)
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  22.  84
    Twin Pleas: Probing Content and Compositionality.Josefa Toribio - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):871-89.
    So called dual factor theories are proposed in an attempt to provide an explanation of the meaning of our utterances and the content of our mental states in terms that involve two different theories, each one serving separate concerns. One type of theory deals with the causal explanatory aspect of contentful mental states and/or sentences. The other type deals with those contentful mental states and/or sentences as related to propositions, i.e., as objects that can be assigned referential truth-conditions (Cfr. McGinn, (...)
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  23.  65
    Perceptual Experience and its Contents.Josefa Toribio - 2002 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (4):375-392.
    The contents of perceptual experience, it has been argued, often include a characteristic “non-conceptual” component (Evans, 1982). Rejecting such views, McDowell (1994) claims that such contents are conceptual in every respect. It will be shown that this debate is compromised by the failure of both sides to mark a further, and crucial, distinction in cognitive space. This is the distinction between what is doubted here as mindful and mindless modes of perceiving: a distinction which cross-classifies the conceptual / non-conceptual divide. (...)
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  24. Free Belief.Josefa Toribio - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):327-336.
  25.  34
    “Sensorimotor Chauvinism?” Commentary on O'Reagan, J. Kevin and Noë, Alva, “A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness”.Andy Clark & Josefa Toribio - unknown
    While applauding the bulk of the account on offer, we question one apparent implication viz, that every difference in sensorimotor contingencies corresponds to a difference in conscious visual experience.
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  26.  1
    Ecological Content.Josefa Toribio - 1997 - Pragmatics and Cognitionpragmatics and Cognition 5 (2):253-281.
  27.  16
    Commentary on J.K O'Regan and A Noe: A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness.Andy Clark & Josefa Toribio - unknown
    O'Regan and Noe present a wonderfully detailed and comprehensive defense of a position whose broad outline we absolutely and unreservedly endorse. They are right, it seems to us, to stress the intimacy of conscious content and embodied action, and to counter the idea of a Grand Illusion with the image of an agent genuinely in touch, via active exploration, with the rich and varied visual scene. This is an enormously impressive achievement, and we hope that the comments that follow will (...)
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  28.  9
    The Disordered Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy and Mental Illness, by George Graham. [REVIEW]Josefa Toribio - 2011 - Disputatio 4 (30):23-27.
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  29.  18
    Causal Efficacy, Content and Levels of Explanation.Josefa Toribio - 1991 - Logique Et Analyse 34 (September-December):297-318.
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  30. The Animal Concepts Debate: A Metaphilosophical Take.Josefa Toribio - 2010 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):11-24.
     
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  31.  12
    Naturalism and Causal Explanation.Josefa Toribio - 1999 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 32 (3/4):243-268.
    Semantic properties are not commonly held to be part of the basic ontological furniture of the world. Consequently, we confront a problem: how to 'naturalize' semantics so as to reveal these properties in their true ontological colors? Dominant naturalistic theories address semantic properties as properties of some other (more primitive, less problematic) kind. The reductionistic flavor is unmistakable. The following quote from Fodor's Psychosemantics is probably the contemporary locus classicus of this trend. Fodor is commendably unapologetic: "I suppose that sooner (...)
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  32.  5
    Positing a Space Mirror Mechanism Intentional Understanding Without Action?Josefa Toribio - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (5-6):5-6.
    Recent evidence regarding a novel functionality of the mirror neuron system , a so-called 'space mirror mechanism', seems to reinforce the central role of the MNS in social cognition. According to the space mirror hypothesis, neural mirroring accounts for understanding not just what an observed agent is doing, but also the range of potential actions that a suitably located object affords an observed agent in the absence of any motor behaviour. This paper aims to show that the advocate of this (...)
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  33.  5
    Una crítica al realismo desde la teoría del significado.Josefa Toribio - 1991 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 5:13.
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  34.  10
    Pulp Naturalism.Josefa Toribio - unknown
    There is a compelling idea in the air. Both contemporary philosophers of mind and philosophers of language are engaged in developing theories of (mental or linguistic) content that are naturalistic. The stand has been taken: semantic properties are not part of the primitive ontological furniture of the world. If we want to vindicate those properties as real, we will have to show that it is possible to unpack them into some other –primitive– set of properties. It is taken for granted (...)
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  35.  9
    Extruding Intentionality From the Metaphysical Flux.Josefa Toribio - 1999 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Ai 11:501-518.
    On the Origin of Objects is, at heart, an extended search for a non-circular and nonreductive characterization of two key notions: intentionality (the content or "aboutness" distinctive of mental states) and computation (the familiar but elusive tool of much cognitive scientific explanation). Only a non-circular and non-reductive account of these key notions can, Smith believes, provide a secure platform for a proper understanding of the mind. The project has both a negative and a positive aspect. Negatively, Smith rejects views that (...)
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  36.  7
    Why There Still has to Be a Theory of Consciousness.Josefa Toribio - 1993 - Consciousness and Cognition 2 (1):28-47.
    "Consciousness", it is widely agreed, does not name any single cognitive phenomenon. But nor is the gathering of distinct phenomena under that single label an accident. What seems to unify the range of cognitive goods in this "variety store" is the central yet elusive notion of the availability of some content or feeling in subjective experience. The paper begins by building a rough taxonomy of the various ways different approaches have tried to give an account of this central target. Among (...)
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  37.  8
    Efficacy, Content and Levels of Explanation.Josefa Toribio - 1991 - Logique Et Analyse 135:297-318.
    Let’s consider the following paradox (Fodor [1989], Jackson and Petit [1988] [1992], Drestke [1988], Block [1991], Lepore and Loewer [1987], Lewis [1986], Segal and Sober [1991]): i) The intentional content of a thought (or any other intentional state) is causally relevant to its behavioural (and other) effects. ii) Intentional content is nothing but the meaning of internal representations. But, iii) Internal processors are only sensitive to the syntactic structures of internal representations, not their meanings. Therefore it seems that if we (...)
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  38.  3
    The Future of the Cognitive Revolution David Marter Johnson and Christina D. Erneling, Editors New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, X + 401 Pp., $44.50 Paper. [REVIEW]Josefa Toribio - 2000 - Dialogue 39 (01):183-.
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  39.  5
    The Implicit Conception of Implicit Conceptions. Reply to Christopher Peacocke.Josefa Toribio - unknown
    Peacocke's characterization of what he calls implicit conceptions recognizes the significance of a subset of contentful states in making rational behavior intelligible. What Peacocke has to offer in this paper is an account of (i) why we need implicit conceptions; (ii) how we can discover them; (iii) what they explain; (iv) what they are; and (v) how they can help us to better understand some issues in the theory of meaning and the theory of knowledge. The rationalist tradition in which (...)
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  40.  3
    Modularity, Relativism, and Neural Constructivism.Josefa Toribio - unknown
    Fodor claims that the modularity of mind helps undermine relativism in various forms. I shall show first, that the modular vision of mind provides insufficient support for the rejection of relativism, and second, that an alternative model may, in fact, provide a better empirical response to the relativist challenge.
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  41.  1
    Language and Meaning in Cognitive Science: Cognitive Issues and Semantic Theory.Andy Clark & Josefa Toribio (eds.) - 1998 - Routledge.
    First Published in 1998. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
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  42. Machine Intelligence Perspectives on the Computational Model.Andy Clark & Josefa Toribio (eds.) - 1998 - Routledge.
    First published in 1998. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
     
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  43. Ruritania and Ecology: Reply to Ned Block.Josefa Toribio - 1995 - Philosophical Issues 8:188-195.
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  44.  20
    Consciousness and Emotion in Cognitive Science: Conceptual and Empirical Issues.Josefa Toribio & Andy Clark (eds.) - 1998 - Garland.
    Summarizes and illuminates two decades of research Gathering important papers by both philosophers and scientists, this collection illuminates the central themes that have arisen during the last two decades of work on the conceptual foundations of artificial intelligence and cognitive science. Each volume begins with a comprehensive introduction that places the coverage in a broader perspective and links it with material in the companion volumes. The collection is of interest in many disciplines including computer science, linguistics, biology, information science, psychology, (...)
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  45. The Future of the Cognitive Revolution.Josefa Toribio - 2000 - Dialogue 39 (1):183-185.
     
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  46. The Future of the Cognitive Revolution. [REVIEW]Josefa Toribio - 2000 - Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie 39 (1):183-185.
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  47. Twin Pleas: Probing Content and Compositionality.Josefa Toribio - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):871-889.
    Dual factor theories of meaning are fatally flawed in at least two ways. First. their very duality constitutes a problem: the two dimensions of meaning cannot be treated as totally orthogonal without compromising the intuition that much of our linguistic and non linguistic behavior is based on the cognizer’s interaction with the world. Second, Conceptual Role Semantics is not adequate for explaining a crucial feature of linguistic representation, viz., the special kind of compositionality known as concatenative compositionality. Dual factor theories, (...)
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