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  1. Prescriptions for Responsible Psychiatry.Joseph Agassi - 1996 - In William T. O'Donohue & Richard F. Kitchener (eds.), The Philosophy of Psychology. Sage Publications. pp. 339.
  2. Towards a Rational Philosophical Anthropology.Joseph Agassi - 1977 - M. Nijhoff.
  3. Williams Dodges Agassi's Criticism.Joseph Agassi - 1978 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (3):248-252.
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  4. Towards a Rational Philosophical Anthropology.Joseph Agassi - 1979 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 35 (4):442-443.
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  5. Paranoia: A Study in Diagnosis.Yehuda Fried, Joseph Agassi & Thomas Szasz - 1979 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30 (2):177-182.
     
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  6.  17
    Science in Flux.Joseph Agassi - 1975 - D. Reidel Pub. Co..
  7.  34
    Kuhn's Way.Joseph Agassi - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (3):394-430.
  8.  66
    Variations on the Liar's Paradox.Joseph Agassi - 1964 - Studia Logica 15 (1):237-238.
    Line 1: The statement on line one is false. Line 2: All statements on line two are false. p and not-p Line 3: All statements on line 3 are true, or all of them are false. p and not-p Line 4: The statement on line 4 is false, or (p and not-p). Line 5: The statement on line 5 is true if and only if (p and not p). Line 6: All statements on line 6 are false. p. Line 7: (...)
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  9. Book Review: Paul Feyerabend: Ein Philosoph Aus Wien, Edited by F. Stadler and KR Fischer. [REVIEW]Joseph Agassi - forthcoming - Philosophy of the Social Sciences.
  10.  32
    Towards an Historiography of Science.Joseph Agassi - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):115-117.
    Bacon's inductivist philosophy of science divides thinkers into the scientific and the prejudiced, using as a standard the up-to-date science textbook. Inductivists regard the history of science as progressing smoothly, from facts rather than from problems, to increasingly general theories, undisturbed by contending scientific schools. Conventionalists regard theories as pigeonholes for classifying facts; history of science is the development of increasingly simple theories, neither true nor false. Conventionalism is useless for reconstructing and weighing conflicts between schools, and overemphasizes science's internal (...)
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  11. Book Review: Tacit and Explicit Knowledge. [REVIEW]Joseph Agassi - 2013 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (2):275-279.
  12.  18
    Sensationalism.Joseph Agassi - 1966 - Mind 75 (297):1-24.
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  13.  9
    Towards an Historiography of Science.Joseph Agassi - 1963 - History and Theory 2 (2):1-117.
    Bacon's inductivist philosophy of science divides thinkers into the scientific and the prejudiced, using as a standard the up-to-date science textbook. Inductivists regard the history of science as progressing smoothly, from facts rather than from problems, to increasingly general theories, undisturbed by contending scientific schools. Conventionalists regard theories as pigeonholes for classifying facts; history of science is the development of increasingly simple theories, neither true nor false. Conventionalism is useless for reconstructing and weighing conflicts between schools, and overemphasizes science's internal (...)
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  14.  68
    The Place of Metaphysics in the Historiography of Science.Joseph Agassi - 1996 - Foundations of Physics 26 (4):483-499.
    Legitimating the use of metaphysics in scientific research constituted a farreaching methodological revolution, invalidating the inductivist demands that science be guided by empirical information alone. Thus, science became tentative. The revolution was established when pioneering historians of science, Max Jammer among them, exhibited the working of metaphysics in scientific research. This raises many problems, since most metaphysical ideas are poor as compared with scientific ones. Yet taking science to be the effort to explain facts in a comprehensive manner, makes some (...)
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  15. Technology, Philosophical and Social Aspects.Joseph Agassi - 1987 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 18 (1):322-331.
     
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  16.  41
    Subjectivism: From Infantile Disease to Chronic Illness.Joseph Agassi - 1975 - Synthese 30 (1-2):3 - 14.
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  17.  81
    Induction and Stochastic Independence.Joseph Agassi - 1990 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (1):141-142.
  18.  73
    To Save Verisimilitude.Joseph Agassi - 1981 - Mind 90 (360):576-579.
    JOSEPH AGASSI 1. Sir Karl Popper has offered two different theories of scientific progress, his theory of conjectures and refutations and corroboration, as well as his theory of verisimilitude increase. The former was attacked by some old-fashioned inductivists, yet is triumphant; the latter has been refuted by Tichy and by Miller to Popper’s own satisfaction. Oddly, however, the theory of verisimilitude was developed because of some deficiency in the theory of corroboration, and though in its present precise formulation it was (...)
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  19. Technology, Philosophical and Social Aspects.Joseph Agassi - 1985
     
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  20. Comparability and Incommensurability.Joseph Agassi - 2003 - Social Epistemology 17 (2 & 3):93 – 94.
  21.  43
    Replies.Joseph Agassi - 1975 - Synthese 30 (1-2):33 - 38.
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  22.  10
    Popper and the Establishment.Nimrod Bar‐Am & Joseph Agassi - 2005 - Critical Review 17 (1-2):13-23.
    Abstract The central thesis of Karl Popper's philosophy is that intellectual and political progress are best achieved by not deferring to dogmatic authority. His philosophy of science is a plea for the replacement of classic dogmatic methodology with critical debate. His philosophy of politics, similarly, is a plea for replacing Utopian social and political engineering with a more fallibilist, piecemeal variety. Many confuse his anti?dogmatism with relativism, and his anti?authoritarianism with Cold War conservatism or even with libertarian politics. Not so: (...)
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  23.  31
    Between Science and Technology.Joseph Agassi - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (1):82-99.
    Basic research or fundamental research is distinct from both pure and applied research, in that it is pure research with expected useful results. The existence of basic or fundamental research is problematic, at least for both inductivists and instrumentalists, but also for Popper. Assuming scientific research to be the search for explanatory conjectures and for refutations, and assuming technology to be the search of conjectures and some corroborations, we can easily place basic or fundamental research between science and technology as (...)
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  24.  73
    Liberal Forensic Medicine.Joseph Agassi - 1978 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 3 (3):226-241.
    The liberal approach to ethics quite naturally tends toward the classic individualistic theory of society, to reductionism or psychologism so-called, that is, to a reduction of all social action to individual action. For example, liberalism allows one to experiment with new medications on one's own body. By extension, liberalism allows one to experiment, it seems, on another person's body with new medication if one acts as the other person's agent, that is, if one has the other person's proper consent. We (...)
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  25.  78
    Corroboration Versus Induction.Joseph Agassi - 1958 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 9 (36):311-317.
  26. Rationality: The Critical View.Joseph Agassi & I. C. Jarvie (eds.) - 1987 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.
  27.  23
    The Philosophy of Common Sense.Joseph Agassi & John Wettersten - 1987 - Philosophia 17 (4):421-438.
    Philosophers wanted commonsense to fight skepticism. They hypostasized and destroyed it. Commonsense is skeptical--Bound by a sense of proportion and of limitation. A scarce commodity, At times supported, At times transcended by science, Commonsense has to be taken account of by the critical-Realistic theory of science. James clerk maxwell's view of today's science as tomorrow's commonsense is the point of departure. It is wonderful but overlooks the value of the sense of proportion.
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  28.  73
    The Lakatosian Revolution.Joseph Agassi - 1976 - In R. S. Cohen, P. K. Feyerabend & M. Wartofsky (eds.), Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos. Reidel. pp. 9--21.
  29. "Popper and After: Four Modern Irrationalists" by David Stove.Joseph Agassi - 1985 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 15 (3):368.
     
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  30. Blame Not the Laws of Nature.Joseph Agassi - 1995 - Foundations of Science 1 (1):131-154.
    1. Lies, Error and Confusion 2. Lies 3. The Demarcation of Science: Historical 4. The Demarcation of Science: Recent 5. Observed Regularities and Laws of Nature.
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  31.  30
    Turner on Merton.Joseph Agassi - 2009 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (2):284-293.
    Stephen Turner complains about weaknesses of Robert K. Merton's teachings without noticing that these are common. He puts down Merton's ideas despite his innovations, on the ground that they are not successful and not sufficiently revolutionary. The criteria by which he condemns Merton are too vague and too high. Merton's merit is in his having put the sociology of science on the map and drawn attention to the egalitarianism that was prominent in classical science and that is now diminished. Key (...)
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  32. Heidegger Made Simple (and Offensive).Joseph Agassi - 2004 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (3):423-431.
    presents Heidegger as a devout mystic who viewed the Nazi Party as the sacred vessel of a divine message—even though, the author adds, his religion is secular and so it has no divinity and no immortal soul. Rickey sees him as a utopian. This makes some sense: the unique in the Shoah involves the unique descent of a highly cultured, enlightened nation to the rock bottom of barbarism. Ricky’s text belies his effort to exonerate Heidegger. Key Words: Rickey • Heidegger (...)
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  33.  43
    What Collapse, Exactly?Joseph Agassi - 2007 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37 (1):74-84.
    Hilary Putnam makes two related points in his recent collection of essays: (1) Values can be rational, and their inescapable intrusion into every kind of discourse is welcome. (2) Ignoring or suppressing this fact is common yet irrational. This is of course true; yet the intrusion in question can be trivial, and it can be problematic. Putnam ignores this here. The book is pleasant to read; it is infused with friendly and appreciative personal anecdotes and observations. It is almost entirely (...)
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  34.  44
    Tautology and Testability in Economics.Joseph Agassi - 1971 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 1 (1):49-63.
    Economics is a science - at least positive economics must be. And science is in part applied mathematics, in part empirical observations and tests. Looking at the history of economics, one cannot find much testing done before the twentieth century, and even the collection of data, even in the manner Marx engaged in, was not common in his day. It is true that economic policy is an older field, and in that field much information is deployed for the purpose of (...)
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  35.  26
    How Ignoring Repeatability Leads to Magic.Joseph Agassi & Nathaniel Laor - 2000 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 30 (4):528-586.
  36. Faraday as a Natural Philosopher.Joseph Agassi - 1971
     
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  37.  44
    Presuppositions for Logic.Joseph Agassi - 1982 - The Monist 65 (4):465-480.
    Positivists identify science and certainty and in the name of the utter rationality of science deny that it rests on speculative presuppositions. The Logical Positivists took a step further and tried to show such presuppositions really no presuppositions at all but rather poorly worded sentences. Rules of sentence formation, however, rest on the presuppositions about the nature of language. This makes us unable to determine the status of mathematics, which is these days particularly irksome since this question is now-since Abraham (...)
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  38.  53
    Criteria for Plausible Arguments.Joseph Agassi - 1974 - Mind 83 (331):406-416.
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  39.  40
    Rationality and the Tu Quoque Argument.Joseph Agassi - 1973 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 16 (1-4):395 – 406.
    The tu quoque argument is the argument that since in the end rationalism rests on an irrational choice of and commitment to rationality, rationalism is as irrational as any other commitment. Popper's and Polanyi's philosophies of science both accept the argument, and have on that account many similarities; yet Popper manages to remain a rationalist whereas Polanyi decided for an irrationalist version of rationalism. This is more marked in works of their respective followers, W. W. Bartley III and Thomas S. (...)
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  40.  20
    The Future of Big Science.Joseph Agassi - 1988 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 5 (1):17-26.
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  41.  48
    The Methodology of Research Projects: A Sketch.Joseph Agassi - 1977 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 8 (1):30-38.
    Summary There is a traditional reluctance among methodologists to study the ever increasingly important phenomenon of research-projects, research-project evaluations, etc. The reason for this is that projects are embedded in programs and programs in intellectual frameworks, or conceptual frameworks, or metaphysical systems. It sounds dogmatic to judge the product of research by a reference to a metaphysical system. Yet, first of all, it is not so dogmatic if judgment can go both ways, if we have competing systems at work, and (...)
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  42.  5
    Book Review: How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind: The Strange Case of Cold War Rationality, by Paul Ericson, Judy L. Klein, Lorraine Daston, Rebecca Lemov, Thomas Sturm, and Michael D. GordinEricsonPaulKleinJudy L.DastonLorraineLemovRebeccaSturmThomasGordinMichael D.How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind: The Strange Case of Cold War Rationality, Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 2013. Viii + 249 Pp. ISBN 978-0-226-04663-1. £24.50. $35.00. [REVIEW]Joseph Agassi - 2016 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 46 (2):210-214.
  43.  34
    Global Responsibility.Joseph Agassi - 1990 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 7 (2):217-221.
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  44.  48
    The Last Refuge of the Scoundrel.Joseph Agassi - 1974 - Philosophia 4 (2-3):315-317.
    Patriotism is a form of loyalty. The range of loyalty is from patriotism to friendship. Liberals were often accused of having no sense of loyalty. They usually tend to deny the charge — even while refusing to take a loyalty oath. Even the liberal philosopher Sir Karl Popper has claimed (Open Society, i, ch. 10), that liberals can be better patriots than others. 1 find this line of defense erroneous and morally wrong. I find it much nicer, much more honest, (...)
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  45.  61
    Sociologism in Philosophy of Science.Joseph Agassi - 1972 - Metaphilosophy 3 (2):103–122.
    SummaryIn a nutshell, the present essay claims this: First, the classical problem of knowledge has recently shifted from, How do I know? to, How do we know?–from psychology to sociology. As a phenomenological matter this is a great improvement, as a solution to the problem of rationality it is erroneous and immoral. The problem, should I act, believe, etc., this or that? is answered: You should do so on the authority of your reason. But change the problem of rationality in (...)
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  46.  89
    Anthropomorphism in Science.Joseph Agassi - manuscript
    ANTHROPOMORPHISM is an inveterate tendency to project human qualities into natural phenomena—consciously or not. The standard and most important variant of anthropomorphism is animism which sees a soul in everything in nature. Before entering into the role of anthropomorphism in the history of science, let us consider a few important and usually neglected logical aspects of the idea.
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  47.  88
    Causality and Medicine.Joseph Agassi - 1976 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1 (4):301-317.
    The philosophers of science who viewed causality as a metaphysical headache were right. Yet when they concluded that it is of no scientific import and of less practical import, they were clearly in error. I say clearly because they thereby recommended that we replace cause by mere empirical correlation, which obviously will not do. Here is an obvious example which proves them in error without even touching upon the question of what science is.
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  48.  23
    Rationality, Problems Choice.John R. Wettersten & Joseph Agassi - 1978 - Philosophica 22.
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  49.  70
    The Problem of Universals.Joseph Agassi & Paul T. Sagal - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 28 (4):289 - 294.
    The pair democreteanism-Platonism (nothing/something is outside space-Time) differs from the pair nominalism-Realism (universals are/are not nameable entities). Nominalism need not be democretean, And democreateanism is nominalist only if conceptualism is rejected. Putnam's critique of nominalism is thus invalid. Quine's theory is democretean-When-Possible: quine is also a minimalist platonist. Conceptualists and realists agree that universals exist but not as physical objects. Nominalists accept universals only as "facons de parler".
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  50.  74
    In Wittgenstein's Shadow.Joseph Agassi - 2010 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (2):325-339.
    Marc Lange offers a stale anthology that reflects the sad state of affairs in the camp of analytic philosophy. It is representative in a few respects, even in its maltreatment of Russell, Wittgenstein, and Popper. Despite its neglect of Wittgenstein, it shows again that Wittgenstein is the patron saint of the analytic school despite the fact that it does not abide by his theory of metaphysics as inherently meaningless.
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