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Joseph Bowen
Stockholm University
  1.  95
    Necessity and Liability: On an Honour-Based Justification for Defensive Harming.Joseph Bowen - 2016 - Journal of Practical Ethics 4 (2):79-93.
    This paper considers whether victims can justify what appears to be unnecessary defensive harming by reference to an honour-based justification. I argue that such an account faces serious problems: the honour-based justification cannot permit, first, defensive harming, and second, substantial unnecessary harming. Finally, I suggest that, if the purpose of the honour based justification is expressive, an argument must be given to demonstrate why harming threateners, as opposed to opting for a non-harmful alternative, is the most effective means of affirming (...)
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  2. AI As a Moral Right-Holder.Joseph Bowen & John Basl - 2020 - In Markus Dubber, Frank Pasquale & Sunit Das (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethics of AI. New York: Oxford University Press.
    This chapter evaluates whether AI systems are or will be rights-holders, explaining the conditions under which people should recognize AI systems as rights-holders. It develops a skeptical stance toward the idea that current forms of artificial intelligence are holders of moral rights, beginning with an articulation of one of the most prominent and most plausible theories of moral rights: the Interest Theory of rights. On the Interest Theory, AI systems will be rights-holders only if they have interests or a well-being. (...)
     
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  3.  33
    Beyond Normative Control: Against the Will Theory of Rights.Joseph Bowen - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):427-443.
    The Will Theory of Rights says that having control over another’s duties grounds rights. The Will Theory has commonly been objected to on the grounds that it undergenerates right-ascriptions along three fronts. This paper systematically examines a range of positions open to the Will Theory in response to these counterexamples, while being faithful to the Will Theory’s focus on normative control. It argues that of the seemingly plausible ways the defender of the Will Theory can proceed, one cannot both be (...)
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  4.  7
    Quong, Jonathan. The Morality of Defensive Force. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. 240. $70.00 (Cloth).Joseph Bowen - 2021 - Ethics 131 (3):625-630.
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